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For My Parents 
Plainly, the more rules you can invent, the less 
need there will be to waste time over fruitless 
puzzling about right and wrong. 
- Francis M. Cornford, 
Microcosmographia Academica: Being a guide for the 
young academic politician (1908) . 
ABSTRACT 
Arbitrations involving states and foreign private parties 
are a complex phenomenon, sharing certain animating values with 
other forms of adjudication, particularly international arbitra-
tions of private commercial disputes, but reflecting at the same 
time singular values that must be fostered if the institution is 
to play a beneficial role in the international community. 
A study of institutional forms of arbitration designed 
primarily to resolve commercial disputes between private parties 
reveals that their emphasis upon stability and upon the 
certainty and predictability of rules can make such institutions 
inappropriate for the arbitration of disputes involving states. 
Regimes designed specifically to regulate arbitrations between 
states and foreign private entities may be more successful in 
displaying sensitivity to the needs and aspirations of both 
public and private parties, but the work of the larges t 
specialised institution, the International Centre for Settleme nt 
of Investment Disputes, is hampered by its governing Treaty for 
it does not deal adequately with t he enforcement of awards 
against states. Ad hoe arbitration continues t o be a useful 
means of resolving commercial disputes between states and 
foreign private parties, especially because the parties are free 
to design or to choose a delocalised procedural law which need 
not hinder enforcement. 
The great difficulty with all f orms of arbitration between 
states and private entities is the substantive law to be applied 
by such tribunals. Under the principle of the autonomy of the 
will, the parties are free to choose the governi ng law, and they 
may select international law. If they do so, however , the 
choice does not imply that the foreign private party is 
assimilated to a state or that the international responsibility 
of the state party is engaged directly vis-a-vis the private 
party. The enforcement of arbitral awards i s also a troubli ng 
problem, but recent municipal case law reveals a growing pro-
enfo rcement bias. Nevertheless, the experience of the Iran-
United States Claims Tribunal reveals the significant advantages 
that accrue to the parties if they agree in advance upon an 
independent enforcement mechanism . 
The political tensions inherent in most "mixed" arbitra-
tions demand flexibility in the appl ication of procedural and 
substantive rules, and require an approach to dispute resolution 
that emphasises the val ue of compromise. As such, the awards 
that emerge from mixed arbitrations are likely to be idio-
syncratic or, at the very least, vague. Nevertheless, if one 
stresses the importance of process values rather than the 
elaboration of substantive rules, arbitration between states and 
foreign private parties can play an important role in the 
enhancement of the international rule of law . 
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PREFACE 
Because this thesis is submitted to a Faculty of Law, I 
feel only mildly reticent in beginning with a citation to a 
regulation, specifically to Regulation 7 of the Un iversity of 
Cambridge's Regulations for Degrees in Science, Letters, and 
Philosophy: "A student, in submitting a dissertation, shall 
state, generally in a preface ••. the sources from which his 
information is derived, the extent to which he has availed 
himself of the work of others, and the portions of his disserta-
tion which he claims as his own original work." 
Lawyers can lay no claim to tr ue scientific method, so t he 
dictates of Regulation 7 cannot be fulfilled by an in-depth 
description of my investigative methodology. Indeed, a recital 
of my approa c h sounds quite pedestrian. No computers have been 
involved , no stati s ti cally relevant samples have bee n taken. 
Instead, I have done those things that lawyers are wont to do. 
I have read books, and articles and reports. I have traced 
lines of cases and attempted to evalua te the relationships 
between various treaties and pieces of legislation. I have also 
been more adventuresome in interviewing a number of rnaJor 
participants in the process I seek to evaluate. 
these things on my own, without collaboration. 
I have done 
Of course I have relied upon the work of o t hers, for in 
international law our scholarly forbears have created law as 
much as described it. My debt to others is recorded in the many 
footnotes that dot the text. This thesis incorporates material 
available as of the end of April, 1986 . 
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I can, however, assert originality, for the purposes of 
Regulation 7, on a number of scores. The synthesis of sources 
contained here is almost entirely new. Some of the material, 
particularly that emanating from the Iran-u.s. Cla ims Tribunal, 
has not yet been discussed in an y published work. The identifi-
cation of the potential effects of contemporary trends in 
commercial arbitration upon the structure of international law 
is novel, as is the discussion of arbitral remedies in the 
context of recognition and enforcement. The conclusions and 
prescriptions are my own. 
Before embarking upon my ritual dance of thanksgivi ng , let 
me thank the reader in advance for tolerating such a long list. 
Let me also say that my particular dance of t hanksgiving, though 
a social rite, reflects heartfelt gratitude for the remarkable 
support I have received over the last three years. The 
Librarians and staff at the Squire Law Library i n Cambridge and 
the McGill University Law Area Library in Montr§al were helpful 
and cheerful in the face of budget constrictions and chronic 
staff shortages. The Assistant Secretary-General of the 
Iran-u.s. Claims Tribunal, Mr W.A. Hamel, organised a very 
productive visit for me at a very difficult moment in the 
Tribunal's history. I thank him, the Co-Registrars, and the 
arbitrators who consented to be interviewed . 
The burden of dealing with administrative de tai ls was 
lifted considerably thro ugh the competent and expeditious inter-
ventions of Miss H§l~ne Marion, Assistant to the Dean at t he 
McGill Faculty of Law and of Dr M.D. Cowley, the Tutor for 
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Advanced Students at Trinity College, Cambridge. Mrs Anna Young 
did a yeoman's serv i ce as a fast a nd expert ma nipul ato r of 
intimidating word processing and pr inting technolog ies. 
I am deeply grateful t o t he Canadian and Uni ted Kingdom 
administrators of the Commonwealth Scholarship Programme who 
granted me the incomparable ex perience of two years in 
Cambridge. The Fellows of Trinity College enrich ed that 
experience by awarding me an Hono urary External Research 
Studentship and various travel grants. This thesis was 
completed during my tenure as a Bo ulton Junior Research Fel low 
at the Faculty of Law, McGill University. I t hank the Boulton 
Trustee s f o r financi a l , material and moral support beyond t he 
dreams of a mere graduate student. 
Young, aspiring academics need encouragement as well as 
wise advice. For both I am indeb ted to Dean R. A. Macdonald and 
Professors I.A. Vlasic, Yves-Marie Morisse tt e and P.-G. Jobin of 
the McGill Faculty of Law, and to Dr Kevin Gray and Mr Phillip 
Allott of Trinity College, Cambri dg e. Professor Michael Bridge, 
also of the Fac ulty o f Law a t McGill, has put himself in a very 
dang erous pos itio n. His erudition and linguistic abilities a r e 
so great that he may soon be thrust i nto the r o le of full-time 
editor and adviser to many of his colleagues. Hi s contributio n 
to the eradication of in f elic i ties and incons i stenc i es in t hi s 
work has been enormous. 
One of my obligations extends beyond t he realm of words. 
I could not have hoped f o r a better supervisor than Professor 
o.w. Bowett of Queens' College , Cambr i dge . He served alter-
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natively, and sometimes concurrently, as guide, researcher, 
mentor, editor, and adviser, fulfilling each function with 
vigour. He has been unfailinyly supportive, accessible and 
reliable, and his broad knowledge and critical faculties have 
saved me from many an error or inexactitude. 
Finally, I would like to exalt the value of good friend-
ships during the pursuit of a Ph.D. My sincere thanks go to 
Alison Evans, Mary Welstead, Stuart Young, and Elizabeth Burr 
for helping to guard my sanity by encouraging walks in the Clare 
Fellows' Garden, tea breaks, picnics on the Backs, Evensong at 
Trinity, playgoing in Lo~don, trips abroad and other such 
essential pursuits. 
Montreal 
June 1986. 
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S.J.T. 
INTRODUCTION 
When legal historians of the twenty-first century and 
beyond are asked to identify important trends in late twentieth 
century Western legal thinking, it is safe to predict that they 
will include on any list the burgeoning interest in so-called 
"alternative dispute resolution", the use of non-judicial 
dispute settlement techniques. That growing interest -- which 
has already spawned an acronym, "ADR", and a specialised 
journal 1 is displayed most strongly within municipal lega l 
systems, particularly that of the United States. 2 
If international lawyers do not seem to have been caught 
up in the craze, it is only because alternative dispute resolu-
tion is nothing new to them. Indeed, a wag might be tempted to 
say of the international contex t that there is very little 
dispute resolution that is not "alternative"; the use of nego-
tiation, mediation, conciliation and arbitration has far out-
stripped resort to court adjudication. And so, despite the 
great amount of writing devoted to t opics on alternative dispute 
resolution in the international milieu, most of it lacks the 
1. Negotiation Journal [on the Process of Dispute Settlement), 
published by the Plenum Pres s of New York and London. The 
first issue is dated January, 1985. 
2. Recent publications in the field include the best-seller by 
R. Fisher and w. Ury, Getting to Yes (1983); and s. 
Goldberg, E. Green & F. Sander, Dispute Resolution (1985). 
See also the symposium on alternative dispute r esolu tion in 
(1984) 29 Villanova L. Rev. 1 21 9. 
----~, 
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zeal of new conversion so manifest among municipal law 
disciples. 
Moreover, in their laudable effort t o upgrade the standing 
of the International Court of Justice, international lawyers 
sometimes tend to devalue other means of dispute resolution, 
perhaps because they do not seem as richly symbolic of a Diceyan 
Rule of Law. 3 The reverse side of the same coin is the 
temptation to turn "alternative" forms of dispute settlement 
into mere surrogates for, or even mirrors of, court adjudica-
tion. Underlying that temptation is an assumption that truly 
"legal" forms of dispute reso lution are limited to the judicial 
models found in the legal systems of Western states. The over-
riding goal of this study is to challenge that assumption, and 
through a comprehensive analysis of one "alternative" means of 
dispute resolution, to demonstrate the need for a variety of 
mechanisms to resolve the complicated disputes that arise in the 
international community. 
The "alternative" method t o be explored is arbitration, 
specifically arbitration involving states and foreign private 
parties. Such arbitrations will, as a rule, deal with 
3. This attitude has been r ecogni sed and criticised by a number 
of eminent scholars including Higg ins, "The Desirability of 
Third-Party Adjudication: Conventional Wisdom or Continuing 
Truth" in R. Higgins & J. Fawcett, eds., International 
Organization: Law in Movement (1974) 38, 48 and 51; 
W. Michael Reisman, Null it and Revision: The Review and 
Enforcement of International Judgments and Awards ( 97 
17-9; and Bilder, Some Limitations of Adjudicatio n as an 
International Dispute Settlement Technique (1982) 23 Va J. 
Int'l L. 1. 
- 3 -
commercial disputes arising out of situations ranging from the 
breach of a contract for the sale and purchase of goods to the 
complete expropriation of foreign owned property. Despite the 
great interest in international commercial arbitration foste red 
by groups such as the International Chamber of Commerce and t h e 
United Nations Conference on International Trade Law, as well as 
by some influential jurists, and by Western business interests, 
surprisingly little scholarly effort has been devoted to any 
synthesis of the experience gained in various arbitrations 
between states and foreign private parties. 4 Although one of 
the aims of this study is therefore to synthesise and evaluate 
that experience, no attempt will be made to compile a list of 
substantive legal rules emerging from such arbitrations. 
4. No major monograph exists in English and only a few articles 
have been written which attempt to canvass the entire field. 
See Delaume, State Contracts and Transnational Arbitration 
(1981) 75 Am. J. Int'l L. 784; Domke, Arbitration Between 
Governmental Bodies and Foreign Private Firms (1962) 17 Arb. 
J, 129; Mann, State Contracts and International Arbitration 
(1967) 42 Brit. Y.B. Int'l L. l; and McLaughlin, Arbitration 
and Developing Countries (1979) 13 Int'l Law. 211. · There 
have been many articles produced which relate to particular 
topics within the general rubric of arbitration between 
states and foreign private parties. See,~' Bockstiegel, 
Arbitration of Disputes Between States and Private Enter-
prises in the International Chamber of Commerce (1965) 59 
Am. J, Int'l L. 579; Broches, The Convention on the Settle-
ment of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of 
other States (1972) 136 Ree . des cours 331 ; Jones, The Iran-
United States Claims Tribunal: Private Ri ghts and State 
Responsibility (1984) 24 Va J. Int'l L. 259; Suratgar, 
Considerations Affecting Choice of Law Clauses in Contracts 
Between Governments and Foreign Nationals (1962) 2 Ind i an J , 
Int'l L. 273; and Teson, State Contracts and Oil Expropria-
tions: The Aminoil-Kuwait Arbitration (1984) 24 Va J . Int'l 
L. 323. 
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Indeed, the much vaunted emergence o f a new lex mercatoria wi l l 
be challenged vigorously, at least as it purpo rtedly applies to 
states. In any ca~e, the confident i ality of many arbitral 
proceedings ensures that any attempt to articu late widely-
accepted substantive rules is bound to produce only a small 
portion of the whole picture,5 
The focus will instead be upon the process of arbit r ation 
as it operates in relations between states and private entities, 
for as Mr Wetter has written, "[a) rbitration in its essence is 
procedure, and as any experienced lawyer knows, procedure 
governs and shapes substance." b Not only does procedure s hap e 
substance, it can also reveal the values that underlie a legal 
system. In a third party adjudicat ion, by examining the p r ocess 
through which authoritative decisi o ns are r e ached , one can 
extrapolate fundamental systemic assumptio ns conce rning the r o le 
of the disputants, the relative importance of their interests, 
the proper sources of legal justification, the e p istemology o f 
legal knowledg e , and the role o f t he adjudicato r. 
In arbit r atio ns involving state s a nd f o reign private 
parties, these underlying values are of great practical 
5. See Beguin, Le developpeme nt de la Le x Mercato ria me nace -t-
il l'ordre juridique international? (1985) 30 Rev. dr. 
McG i 11 4 7 8, 512. 
6. J, Wetter, The International Arbitral Process: Publi c and 
Private (1979) Vol. 1, xx iii. See also de Vr i es, Inte r-
national Commercial Arbitration: A Contractual Su bs ti t ute 
for National Co urts (19 82 ) 57 Tul a ne L. Re v . 42 . 
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interest. For example, when one party to an arbi tration is a 
public entity with full international legal personality and the 
other is a body incorporated under a system of municipal law, it 
becomes necessary to articulate first principles in order to 
understand the very nature of the process. A number of basic 
questions arise. Is arbitration between a state and a foreign 
corporation simply a procedure to adjust private (usually 
contractual) rights, or is it an international legal process 
that must recognise the sovereign policy objectives of the state 
party (and perhaps of the national state of the foreign private 
party)? What system of substantive law is applicable to parties 
of diverse international standing? Are the obligations imposed 
by arbitral tribunals in these types of cases enforceable under 
international law and if so, by whom? 
If the fundamental characteristics o f the arbitral process 
are not articulated, there is a serious danger that the answers 
to questions such as those posed above will be confused. Such 
confusion threatens not only the coherence of the arbitral 
process, but can have adverse consequences for our understanding 
of the international legal system as a whole. In the course of 
arbitrations between states and foreign private parties, claims 
have already been made and d e cisions rendered that, if widely 
accepted, would alter radically the structure of public inter-
national law. For that reason alone, the process and the 
product of arbitral tribunals deserve critical attention. The 
increasing involvement of states and their agencies in inter-
national commerce means that the years ahead are likely to see 
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more commercial arbitrations to wh ich states are party. It is 
therefore impo rtant t o investigate the appropr iateness of 
arbitration as a means of dispute resolutio n and to evaluate the 
authoritative status of awards rendered in this context. 
Before noting briefly the ma i n themes e xp lored in this 
thesis, it would be helpful, by way of introduction, to outline 
two contemporary trends affe cting all forms o f internatio nal 
commercial arbitration. First, a point of semantics must be 
clarified. The use of the word "international" can cause d i f fi-
culties in the context of commercial arbitrati o n because it is 
used to describe processes and r e l a tionship s that aff ect o r 
involve parties that are not states. For present purposes, the 
word should usually be accorded a f unctional definition, meaning 
simply "across state boundaries." When a more precise d e fini-
tion is intended, for example, whe n "interna tional law" is 
discussed, the context makes that clear. 
The most important contempora ry trend is t he easiest t o 
identify: the number of interna tional commercial arbitrations 
has increased mark e dly during t he l as t twenty years. 7 Tongue 
firmly in cheek, Lord Justice Kerr of the English Court of 
Appeal has noted that arbitration has become "something of a 
7. See,~, Paulsson, The Ro le of Swedish Courts in Trans-
national Commercial Arbitration (1981) 21 Va J. Int'l L. 
211, 211; Sanders, A Twenty Years' Review of the Convention 
on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral 
Awards (1979) 13 Int.l Law. 26 9 , 287; B6cksti e gel, supra, 
note 4, 585; and Beguin, supra, note 5, 48 3. 
? 
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forensic industry all over the world." 8 The increased use of 
international commercial arbitration reflects not only the 
expanding scope of world trade, but demonstrates a growing 
commitment to arbitration on the part of commentators and 
business people. Arbitration is widely accepted as a helpful 
means of coping with disputes arising out of East-West trade 9 
and although resistance lingers, many developing nations have 
recently expressed a willingness to participate in the 
process. 10 Still, the most vocal proponents may be found 
amongst Western business interests and their legal advisers. 
Not surprisingly, Western states have brought forth new 
8. 
9. 
10. 
Kerr, "International Arbitration v. Litigation" in C. Schmitthoff, ed., International Commercial Arbitration ( 1974-1980) 141. 
See, e.g., Strohbach, "General Introduction" to Part I, National Reports in (1976) 1 Y.B. Comm. Arb. 4; Delaume, 
"Transnational Commercial Arbitration" in C. Schmitthoff, ed., International Commercial Arbitration (1982), vol. III, 33; and Straus, The Growing Consensus on International Commercial Arbitration (1974) 68 Arn. J. Int'l L. 709. 
For example, the Arab nations, which manifested a strong distaste for international commercial arbitration, have 
recently displayed a change in attitude and have partici-pated through the Euro-Arab Chamber of Commerce in the drafting of Rules of Conciliation, Arbitration and Expertise (in force 10 January 1983), reprinted in (1985) 24 I.L.M. 1119. For discussions of the attitudes of other developing states, see Abbott, Latin America and Interna-tional Arbitration Conventions: The Quandfry of Non-Ratification (1976) 17 Harv. Int'l L.J. I31; Park, The Lex Loci Arbitri and International Commercial Arbitration: When and Why it Matters (1983) 32 Int'l & Comp. L.Q. 21, 38; Paulsson, Le tiers monde dans l'arbitrage commercial inter-
national [1983) Rev. de l'arb. l; and Ribicoff, Alterna-tives to Litigation: Their Application to International Business Disputes (1983) 38 Arb. J. 3 (No. 4) 5. 
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legislation 11 and revised judicial theories 12 t o f a cilitate the 
growing use of international commercial arbitration. 
The other observable trend is the increased reliance of 
international commercial interests upon institutional forms of 
arbitration. Many of the leading experts in the field have no 
hesitation in building and promoting institutional arbitration 
systems. 13 The immediate result has been that the supervising 
institutions have promulgated their own sets of procedural rules 
which typically mirror the judicial systems of procedure that 
exist in Western democracies. 14 In a related development, many 
11. See,~' France. Arbitration Decree o f 14 May 1981, Decree No. 81.500, amending Articles 1492-1507 C.p.c., 
reprinted in (1981) 20 I.L.M. 917; and United Kingdom. Arbitration Act 1979, 1979 (U.K.) c. 42, 
12. See,~' General National Maritime Transport Co. v. Societe Gotaverken Arendel A.B. (21 February 1980, Cour d'appel de Paris), reprinted in (1981) 20 I.L.M, 884 (France); and M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 32 L. Ed. 2d 513, 92 s. Ct 1907 (1972), reprinted in ( 19 7 2 ) 11 I. L. M. 5 9 9 and 8 3 2 (U.S. A. ) . 
13. See,~' Sanders, International Commercial Arbitration (1973) 20 Neth. Int'l L. Rev. 37, 39; Sanders, "The Unification and Future of International Commercial Arbitra-tion" in C. Schmitthoff, ed., International Commercial Arbitration (1974-1980) 146 (an updated looseleaf system); Straus, supra, note 9, 712; Schmitthoff, "Introduction" to c. Schmitthoff, ed., International Commercial Arbitration (1974-1980) 1, 18-9 (an updated looseleaf system); Carbonneau, Arbitral Adjudication: A Comparative Assessment of Its Remedial and Substantive Status in Transnational Corrunerce (1984) 19 Texas Int'l L.J. 33, 92; and Cohn, The Rules of Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce (1965) 14 Int'l & Comp. L.Q. 132, 164. 
14. One sees a greater and greater emphasis upon formal rules concerning the timely production of documents, about the 
order of presentation of pleadings, about hearings, and 
(cont'd.) 
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proponents of arbitration have be g un t o arg ue t hat the ple tho ra 
of institutional rules should be homogeniz e d t hrough agreement 
upon a uniform system. 1 ~ ~ltho ug h no unifica t ion of insti tu -
tional rules has yet occurred, ad hoe arbitral rules promu l gated 
by UNCITRAL 16 were conceived as one means to promo te greater 
uniformity. 
Although the trend towards t he gr e ate r us e of arbitratio n 
is to be applauded, for it represents a commitment to the fair 
and flexible settlement of disputes, the trend t owards inst i t u -
tionalisation requires careful scru tiny. Indeed, certain 
observe rs have already expressed concern t ha t t o o muc h a tte ntio n 
is being devoted to purely procedural matters. Because arbitral 
rule systems "are generally drafted with a view t o the maximum 
15. 
16. 
eve n about the calling of expert witne s ses. See,~, 
International Chamber of Comme r ce, Rules of Conciliation 
..,--~~---:::~-=----:---:----~ and Arbitration, reprinted in (1976) 1 Y.B. Comm. Arb. 157, 
arts 3-6 and 14-5. 
See, ~, Domke & Glossner, "The Present St a te o f t he Law 
RegaraTng International Comme r c ial Arbitratio n" in M. B.os, 
ed., The Pres e nt State of International Law and Othe r 
Essays (1 9 7 3 ) (Centena ry publi c atio n o f the I. L.A.) 31 2-4; 
Lebedev, Developing Effective International Commercial 
Arbitration: A Keynote Address to the New Delhi Congress 
(1975) 30 Arb. J. 59 (No. 1); and Straus, supra, note 9, 
711-2. Contra R. David, L'arbitrage dans le commerce 
international (1982) 68 who argues: "Il existe de bonnes 
ra1sons pour qu'une variete d e r~glements so it p r o posee a ux 
intere sses. Il convient e n p remier lieu de c o nsiderer en 
effet la variete meme des types d'arbitrag es qu'il y a l ieu 
d'administrer." Il will become apparent that Pro fessor 
David's approach is entirely consonant with t he spirit o f 
the present study. 
UNCITRAL [United Nations Conference on Inte rnat ional Trade 
Law], Arbitration Rule s , repr i nted in (1 9 77 ) 2 Y. B . Comm . 
Arb. 161. 
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possible protection of procedural rights, the full potential of 
arbitration as an informal, conciliatory form of dispute resolu-
tion has not been achieved." 17 Some eminent jurists have also 
warned against an atavistic reliance upon municipal court 
procedural models in the international context. 18 
These warnings serve to raise what is perhaps the funda-
mental question in any evaluation of an arbitral process, that 
is, why do the parties choose arbitration? If there are, say, 
three identifiable reasons why parties select an arbitral 
process, designers of arbitral systems and arbitrators them-
selves should, if they are rational, seek to enhance the aspects 
of arbitration that accord with those reasons, while at the same 
time maintaining systemic integrity. Throughout this thesis, 
recurrent stress will be placed upon the expectations of states 
and foreign private parties in choosing arbitration. The 
conformity of those expectations to actual experience will be 
evaluated. 
Two important assumptions of this work must now be stated. 
Because of the emphasis placed upon the importance of party 
17. Perlman & Nelson, New Approaches to the Resolution of 
International Commercial Disputes (1983) 17 Int'l Law. 215, 
253. See also Stein, Jurisprudence and Jurists' Prudence: 
The Iranian-Forum Clause Decisions of the Iran-u.s. Claims 
Tribunal (1984) 78 Arn. J. Int'l L. 1, 35. 
18. See,~, Sir H. Lauterpacht, Private Law Sources and 
Analogies of International Law (1927) 266; J. Moore, Inter-
national Adjudications: Modern Series (1929), Vol. 1, xc; 
Brownlie, The JusticiaS-IT1ty of Disputes and Issues in 
.International Relations (1967) 42 Brit. Y.B. Int'l L. 123 , 
14 2. 
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choice in arbitration, one major assumption may already be 
apparent. Although there persist at least four theories 
concerning the legal nature of arbitration, 19 the approach taken 
here is in line with the dominant contemporary theory which 
roots arbitration in the principle of consent as a manifestation 
of the autonomy of the will, 20 and not in a subrogation of 
rights of adjudication from the state. 21 To stress the autonomy 
of the parties' will does not mean, however, that arbitration 
can or should be entirely divorced from municipal systems of 
law, especially at the point of enforcement. Nor does it imply 
that the parties can grant and withdraw an arbitral tribunal 's 
jurisdiction at will. Arbitration, though based upon party 
consent, becomes an exercise in autonomous jurisdiction once 
that consent has been granted, and a subsequent award typically 
is binding upon the parties even if one has withdrawn from t he 
19. 
20. 
21. 
See,~' J. Lew, Applicable Law in International Commer-
cial Arbitration: A Stud in Commercial Arbitration Awards 
(1978) 52- 61; and Carbonneau, supra, no te 13, 35, n. 1. 
See, ~ _g_., Schmi tthoff, "Defective Arbitration Clauses" in 
C. ScfimTtthoff, ed., International Commercial Arbitration 
(1974-1980) 21, 21; Jalet, Judicial Review of Arbitration: 
The Judicial Attitude (1960) 45 Cornell L.Q. 519, 53 1 ; 
Carbonneau, The Elaboration of a French Court Doctrine on 
International Commercial Arbitration: A Study in Libera~ 
Civilian Judicial Creativity (1980) 55 Tulane L. Rev . 1, 
28; and G. Delaume, Transnational Contracts: Applicabl e Law 
and Settlement of Disputes, r e-issue (1985), Vol. II, 
Ch. 13, l. 
The positivist position is articulated forcefully by Mann, 
Private Arbitration and Public ·Policy (1985) 4 C.J.Q. 257, 
259; and Szaszy, Recogn1t1on and Enforcement of Foreign 
Arbitral Awards (1966) 14 Am. J, Comp. L. 658, 667. 
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process. 22 That being said, wise arbitrators will make every 
attempt to retain the confidence and support of the parties 
throughout the proceedings,23 
A second major assumption is that the choice by disputants 
to utilise international commercial arbitration is based upon a 
complex amalgam of considerations which varies depending upon 
the nature and status of the relevant party. For example, the 
motivations of multinational corporations and of states in 
choosing arbitration are not likely to be identical. 
One preliminary comment can be made, however, concerning 
the motivations of any party tha t chooses international 
22. See,~, Delaume, supra, note 20, Vol. II, Ch. 13, l; 
Sanders, Trends in the Field of Internationa l Commercial 
Arbitration (1975) 145 Ree. des cours 205, 233-4; David, 
supra, note 15, 108; and Schmitthoff, "The Jurisdiction of 
the Arbitrator" in c. Schmitthoff, e~., International 
Commercial Arbitration (1980-1983) 13. It should be noted 
that the distinction between what has been called the 
"contractual" and the "jurisdictional" aspects of arbitra-
tion is not the same as the Italian division between 
arbitrato libero and arbitrato rituale. The latter 
distinction is closer to that between contractual adjust-
ment and arbitration per se. Contra Oppetit, Arbitrage 
·uridictionne l et arbitrage contractuel: A pro~os d 1 une 
JUr1spru ence recen e 7) Rev. de l'arb. 31 • 
23. Lady Fox has written that continuing consent is "an 
essential ingredient to the completion of any arbitration". 
Although, formally, the jurisdiction of an arbitral 
tribunal can withstand the withdrawal of consent, as a 
practical matter the co-operation of both parties is a 
distinct advantage. Moreover, any award rendered without 
the full argument of both sides is bound to possess less 
persuasive value than an award emerging from a contested 
proceeding. See Fox, "Arbitration", in David Davies 
Memorial Institute of Internationa l Studies, Report of a 
Study Group on the Peaceful Settlement of International 
Disputes (1966) 91, 92. 
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commercial arbitration. Contrary t o the experience in the 
municipal sphere, parties to transnational dispu tes are unli kely 
to choose arbitration for its speed or low pro cess c ost. 
Indeed, even proponents of international commercial arbitration 
admit that it can be distressingly slow and extremely 
expensive. 2 4 One must search for other motivations for the 
choice of arbitration, including the neutrality of the forum, 
the informality and flexibility of t he proceedings, the 
confidentiality of the proceedings, the ability to choose the 
arbitrator especially if "expertstt are required, and the desire 
to promote a conciliatory atmosphere conducive to continuing 
business relations. At a very basic level, arbitration may be 
selected simply because the parties are unable to agree upon any 
other venue. The parties may have no ideological objection to 
the use of state courts to resolve their dispute, but the 
private party may not wish to submit to the jurisdiction of the 
courts of the state party and the state party may be reluctant 
to submit to adjudication by the c o urts of a third state and a 
24. See,~' Lalive, Contracts Between a State or a State 
Agency and a Foreign Company ( 1964) 13 Int'l & Comp. L.Q. 
987, 991; Park, Judicial Supervision of Transnational 
Commercial Arbitration: The English Arbitration Act of 1979 
(1980) 21 Harv. Int'l L.J. 87, 116; de Vries, supra note 6, 
61; Delaume, supra, note 20, Vol. II, Ch. 14, 25; 
Mcclelland, International Arbitration: A Practical Guide to 
the System for the Litigation of Transnational Commercial 
Disputes (1977) 17 Va J. Int'l L. 729, 744; Mann, supra, 
note 21, 257; and Forrestal, "Examples of and Reasons for 
Increased Use of International Arbitration" in G. Aksen & 
R. van Mehren, eds, International Arbitrati o n between 
Private Parties and Governments (1982) 56 (Handboo k No. 399 
of the U.S. Practising La w Institute). 
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fortiori to the jurisdiction of the courts of the private 
party's national state. It will become appare nt that in 
arbitrations involving states and fcreign private parties, all 
of these factors may condition a decision to resort to arbitra-
tion. 
Having set out these basic assumptions, it remains only to 
outline the structure of the thesis. First, it must be empha-
sised that this thesis is not a comprehensive treatise on 
arbitration nor an in-depth comparative study of various systems 
of arbitral rules. The limitations of space and form precluded 
any such effort. The focus rests solely on one important type 
of arbitration, that is arbitration between states and foreign 
private parties. The topics selected for study highlight the 
unique difficulties that arise in that context. In Chapte r One, 
the role of institutional arbitration in disputes between states 
and foreign private parties is examined and an attempt is made 
to explore the difficulties of adjudicating cases involving 
assertions of both private and publ ic rights and interests . It 
is suggested that privately sponsored institutional forms of 
commercial arbitration, such as that administered by the Inter-
national Chamber of Commerce, may not be approp ria te for t he 
resolution of disputes involving states. The arbi tral system of 
the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, 
the most comprehensive system designed specifically for the 
resolution of disputes involving public and private parties, 
will be evaluated. Chapter Two offers an assessmen t of ad hoe 
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arbitration through the optic of the debate over ''delocalisa-
tion". This approach is useful because it highlights the 
problems posed for the international legal order by arbitrations 
involving parties of a different international status. More-
over, the issue of delocalisation concentrates attention upon 
the central question whether the substantive rights of the 
parties may be transferred out of the domain o f municipa l law. 
The argument is made that the delocalisation of arbitral 
procedure does not imply that arbitrations between states and 
foreign private parties are governed by international law. 
The Recognition and Enforcement of International Arbitral 
Awards is the topic of Chapter Three, with emphasis placed not 
only upon the enforcement procedures of the New York Convention 
but also upon the much neglected topic of the remedies that can 
be ordered by arbitral tribunals. Enforcement is, of course, 
the central concern of most participants in the international 
arbitral process, and particular problems arise when enforcemen t 
is sought against a state. It is suggested that existing l aw 
provides solutions to these enforcement difficulties, but that 
municipal courts in jurisdictions where enforcement is sought 
must display sensitivity to the special qualities of commercial 
arbitra l awards rende r ed against states. Chapter Fo ur explores 
the work of the Ira n-United Sta tes Claims Tribunal , the most 
ambitious arbitral tribunal involving states and foreign private 
parties yet created. The experience of this Tri bu nal under -
scores the trends referred to above and demonstrates for cefully 
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the need for a variety of dispute resolution devices in t he 
international commercial milieu. The potential influence of the 
Tribunal's awards i8 evaluated and important aspects of its 
process are highlighted, especially the independent enforcement 
mechanism that ensures the enforcement of awards rendered 
against Iran. In the Conclusion, an effort is made to judge the 
impact of arbitrations between states and foreign private 
parties upon our understanding of the structure of international 
law. A model for assessing the role of such arbitrations is 
proposed, and consequent suggestions for institutional design 
are advanced. 
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CHAPTER I: THE LIMITED ROLE OF PERMANENT ARBITRAL 
INSTITUTIONS IN COMMERCIAL RELATIONS BETWEEN 
STATES AND FOREIGN PRIVATE PARTIES 
Since the 1960s, the international business community has 
manifested an increasing interest in arbitration as a dispute 
resolution mechanism. 1 Concurrent with this increased attrac-
tion to arbitration has been the emergence and growth of more 
and more arbitral institutions promulgating sets of rules and 
providing facilities and organisational mechanisms for the 
arbitral resolution of commercial disputes. 2 Commercial 
l. 
2. 
See,~, Domke & Glossner, "The Present State of the Law 
Regarding International Commercial Arbitration", in M. 
Bos, ed., The Present State of International Law and Other 
Essays (1973) 307 (a Centenary Publication of the Interna-
tional Law Association); Straus, The Growing Concensus on 
International Commercial Arbitration (1974) 68 Arn. J. 
Int'l L. 709; Sanders, Trends in the Field of Inter-
national Commercial Arbitration (1975) 145 Ree. des cours 
205; Sanders, "The Unification and Future of International 
Commercial Arbitration" in C. Schmitthoff International 
Commercial Arbitration (1974-1980) 146 (an updated loose-
leaf system); Perlman & Nelson, New Approaches to the 
Resolution of International Commercial Disputes (.l983) 17 
Int'l Law. 215; Coulson, A New Look at International 
Commercial Arbitration (1982) 14 Case Western Res. J. 
Int'I L. 359; and Eisemann, Le phenomene de l'arbitrage, 
son utilite, ses avantages et son role (1976) 53 Rev. dr. 
int'l et dr. comp. 106. 
These institutions take many f o rms and promote diverse 
goals. The arbitral institutions established by local 
chambers of commerce seem designed primarily as money-
spinning schemes, the intention being to attract 
profitable economic activity to particular locales. 
Notable examples include the arbitration schemes of the 
Stockholm Chamber of Commerce and of the London Centre for 
Commercial Arbitration. Lord Justice Kerr, Chairman of 
the United Kingdom Law Commission, has noted the economic 
(cont'd.) 
- 18 -
arbitration is not, of course, a phenomenon of the post-sixties 
period, for it existed long before, but with the increasing 
scale of international trade, arbitration has very much come 
into its own. The emerging institutions must be distinguished 
from the venerable trade association schemes of arbitration 
which were intended to promote good business relations within a 
trade, often by resolving disputes purely on the basis of trade 
benefits of attracting commercial arbitration to London. 
See Kerr, "International Arbitration v. Litigation" in c. 
Schmitthoff, International Commercial Arbitration 
(1974-1980) 141 (an updated looseleaf system). 
Other institutions have been set up primarily to 
facilitate the operation of transnational commercial 
relations, although profits are by no means excluded. 
See, for example, the discussion of the International 
Chamber of Commerce, infra, text accompanying notes 15 to 
52. A very recent example of an institution intended to 
facilitate commercial dealing between businessmen from 
radically dissimilar cultures is the Euro-Arab Chamber of 
Commerce which has promulgated Rules of Conciliation, 
Arbitration and Expertise, in force 10 January 1983, 
reprinted in (1985) 24 !.L,M. 1119. 
Finally, an entirely different class of institution 
has been created specifically to encourage the r esolution 
of commercial disputes between states and foreign private 
parties. The Internationa l Centre for the Settlement of 
Investment Disputes was created by international treaty. 
Although other arbitral institutions can be chosen to 
regulate disputes between states and foreign private 
parties, ICSID was thought to fill a real need by 
responding more directly to the special requirements of 
parties to state contracts. Whether or no t it has met 
that need will be discussed infra, text accompanying notes 
197 to 220. 
On the increasing use of institutional arbitration, 
see Mcclelland, International Arbitration: A Practical 
Guide to the System for the Litigation of Transnational 
Corrunercial Disputes (1977) 17 Va J, Int'l L. 729, 729; and 
McLaughlin, Arbitration and Developing Countries (1979) 13 
Int'l Law, 211, 211 especially fn. 1. 
- 19 -
usages and equity . 3 The more recently established or expanded 
arbitral institutions are said to possess a general mandate to 
resolve disputes arising in many different e~onomic contexts. 
Trade association arbitration was concerned almost exclusively 
with disputes involving contracts for the sale and purchase of 
goods, and although contemporary commercial arbitration is still 
employed predominantly to settle such disputes, its advocates 
assert that its potential ambit is much wider . Arbitrations 
involving states may be especially complex, being concerned with 
the breach of joint venture agreeme n ts, with the unilateral 
alteration by the state of inves tment contracts, and with the 
expropriation of foreign owned property. 
Because of the potential application of contemporary 
commercial arbitration in many economic contexts and perhaps 
because of the increasingly large sums of money involved, 
especially in expropriation claims, one can understand the 
superficial attraction of institutional arbitration which 
provides a stable organisational base for an arbitration 4 and, 
3. Examples include the London Corn and Grain Feed Trade 
Association arbitrations and arbitrations conducted under 
the auspices of various maritime associations. 
4. Sacerdoti notes accu rately that: 
"[i)n institutional arbitration, the r equest for 
arbitration, once it h as been accepted by the 
administering institution, constitutes an agreement 
between the parties and such institution, under which 
the latter provides to the parties the services it 
offers under its rules." 
(cont'd.) 
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more importantly, a set of pre-estab lished procedural rules 
which should prevent renegotiation during a heated dispute, 
thereby helping to ensure that the arbitration goes f orward even 
in the face of a recalcitrant party. It is said, therefore, 
that institutional arbitration enhances the values of certainty 
and predictability.~ Delaume asserts that: 
[s]ubmission to the rules of institutional 
arbitration agencies may make it unnecessary for 
the parties to have recourse, at least initially, 
to the courts to seek an order compelling 
arbitration. 6 
It has also been suggested that by incorporating procedural 
rules (typically the rules of an arbitral institution) into a 
contract which provides for the arbitration of disputes, the 
parties will enhance the likelihood of enforcement, 7 presumably 
5. 
6. 
7. 
Sacerdoti, The New Arbitration Rules of ICSID and UNCITRAL 
(1977) 11 J. World Trade L. 24 8 . See also Schmitthoff, 
"Defective Arbitration Clauses" in C. Schmitthoff, Inter-
national Commercial Arbitration (1974-1980) 21, 32 (an 
updated looseleaf system). 
See,~, Mcclelland, supra, note 2, 735-6. 
Delaume, "Transnational Corrunercial Arbitration" in C. 
Schmitthoff, International Commercial Arbitration (1982), 
vol. III, 58. It should be noted that it is the submis-
sion to institutional arbitral rules by the parties 
themselves that makes such rules binding: 
Arbitration rules per se are thus not law and are 
always in a state of flux. Arbitration rules become 
law only when they are part of an enforceable arbitra-
tion agreement. 
Thompson, The UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules (1976) 17 Harv. 
Int'l L.J. 141, 153. 
See Thompson, ibid., 141-2. Although Thomp s o n was writing 
about the UNCITRAL Rules which were designed primarily f o r 
ad hoe arbitration, his assumption must extend a fortiori 
to the rules of an institutional arbitration. 
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because the courts in an enforcing jurisdiction will be 
impressed by the fairness and legality of procedural rules that 
are not ad hoe or purely contingent. Although this assumption 
will be challenged, 8 it certainly holds a superficial attrac-
tion. 
The desire for certainty and predictability is a powerful 
motivating factor in international commercial relations. 
Business people are renowned for their self-professed attachment 
to stability, and no doubt the existence of arbitral institu-
tions is a source of great comfort to foreign investors who 
would wish to resort to such institutions with their pre-
established "rules" in the event of any dispute. In the context 
of arbitrations involving states and foreign private parties, 
however, a number of troubling issues arise. 
First, one may ask if institutional arbitration is suffi-
ciently attuned to the legitimate political and policy goals of 
states. With the exception of the Internat i onal Centre for 
Settlement of Investment Disputes [ICSJD] regime, institutional 
arbitration is geared primarily to the resolution of commercial 
disputes between private parties. Assumptions and approaches 
that may be most appropriate when dealing with contracts of sale 
between two corporations may not be applicable to arbitrations 
concerning the expropriation of foreign-owned property. To take 
only one example, principles governing the awarding of damages 
8. See infra, Chapter III on the Recognition and Enforcement 
of Interna tional Arbitral Awards . 
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for loss of future profits are not the same in t h e private and 
public law contexts. 9 The "expertise" of comme r cial arbitrators 
and institutional managers is simply not geared to the resolu-
tion of many types of disputes involving states. 
A second difficulty with institutional arbitration, at 
least insofar as states may be involved, is that codified 
procedures, and an increasing emphasis upon precedent, lend a 
certain inflexibility to the process of arbitration. The 
tendency of all institutions is towards formality, perhaps even 
towards particular brands of formality, and the predominantly 
Western designers of institutional arbitration show an under-
standable inclination to mirror the formal structures of 
domestic courts in liberal democracies. One manifestation of 
this trend is that the rules of arbitral tribunals tied to 
institutions have become increasingly detailed with regard to 
such matters as filing dates for written pleadings. lU Although 
this development can be seen to accord with Western, and more 
particularly American, notions of "due process", it may not be 
9. See infra, Chapter III, text accompanying notes 220 to 
286. 
10. Thus we see in the Iran-u.s. Claims Tribunal, a highly 
formal institution (whose institutional Rules, oddly 
enough, are based on the UNCITRAL Rules, designed prima rily 
for ad hoe arbitration), a pre-occupation on the part of 
some arbitrators with the rigorous application of fixed 
delays. See infra, Chapter IV text accompanying notes 228 
to 273. It must be noted that the majority of Tribunal 
members have eschewed such an a pproach, preferring to 
extend time requirements in the interest of the full 
exposition of each case. 
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sufficiently sensitive to alternative forms of legal ordering 
represented in the international legal community . Developing 
states may question an emphasis upon the formally rational 
values of procedure if there follows a corresponding devaluation 
of substantive questions of distributive justice. They may view 
the wrangles that arise concerning the application of a proce-
dural rule as a mere displacement of concern from "re al" issues 
such as long-term colonial exploitation or the improper partici-
pation of a foreign corporation in the buttressing of a previous 
regime which slavishly supported Western interests. The 
increasing formalisation of arbitral procedure that seems to 
follow the creation of institutions may in fact hamper the 
resolution of disputes where developing states are involved 
because the emphasis upon rigoro us procedural rules may not 
allow for sufficient sensitivity to political concerns and 
cultural discontinuities. 
Even when looking at international commercial arbitration 
from a purely Western perspective, one may ask if the increased 
formality, which seems to be a ttendant upon the creation of 
arbitral institutions, has allowed for a rich enough variety of 
approaches to dispute resolution. For example, is the adver-
sarial model replicated in most forms of institutional arbitra-
tion clearly superior to the inquisitorial model of adjudication 
as it exists in various European civil law jurisdictions? 1 1 
11. For a recent and powerful defence of the civil law 
inquisitorial system, see Langbein, The German Advantage in 
Civil Procedure (1985) 52 U. Chi. L.-.,R~e~v~.-n-3~2~3,,~- M~e~n~ar.e~s:;--"'-~~ 
(cont'd.) 
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These questions are of more than purely theoretical 
interest for they point to a serious problem for advocates of 
institutional arbitration. States have demonstrated a striking 
disinclination to resort to arbitrations conducted under t h e 
auspices of institutions in major cases involving questions of 
the expropriation of foreign owned property. 1 2 Even when a 
dispute would not seem to have a crucial effect upon state 
policy or sovereignty, ad hoe arbitration retains great 
has suggested that the arbitration system of the Inter-
national Chamber of Commerce bears s ome relation to an 
inquisitorial process. See Mendes, International Corr~er-
cial Arbitration: A Critical Evaluation (1984) Proc. Conf. 
Can. Council Int'l L. 122, 133. Although there is a 
limited inquisitorial aspect, the system nevertheless tends 
to exalt adversarial values. See,~' the ICC Rules of 
Conciliation and Arbitration, reprinted in (1976) 1 Y.B. 
CornP1. Arb. 157, arts 3, 4, 5, 6, 14(1) and 16. The 
arbitrator's power to decide a case based on written 
submissions alone, which Mendes uses as his primary example 
of the inquisitorial nature of ICC proceedings, is in fact 
a strictly limited power dependent upon the parties' 
agreement. See art. 14(3). 
12. It is no accident that all of t he famous "oil arbitrations" 
in the 1970s and 80s were submitted to ad hoe arbitration . 
See,~' B.P. Exploration Co. (Libya) v. Go vernment of 
the Libyan Arab Republic (Merits), decision of 10 October 
1973 and 1 August 1974, reprinted in 53 I.L.R. 297; Libyan 
American Oil Co. v. The Government of the Libyan Arab 
Re~ublic (Merits), decision of 12 April 1977, reprinted in (1 81) 20 I.L.M. l; Texaco Overseas Petroleum Co. and 
California Asiatic Oil Co. v. The Government of the Libya n 
Arab Republic (Merits), decision of 19 January 1977, 
reprinted in 53 I.L.R. 389, 422; and The Government of the 
State of Kuwait v. The American Independent Oil Co. 
(Aminoil), Final Award of 24 March 1982, reprinted in 
(1982) 21 I.L.M. 976. And note the arbitration between 
British Petroleum and the Government of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran which is presently taking place 
(proceedings confidential). 
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currency. 13 The purpose of this Chapter is to explore represen-
tative regimes of institutional arbitration to determine why 
states remain distrustful. Given the plethora of existing 
structures, it has been necessary to focus upon the institutions 
that could potentially play the greatest role in arbitrations 
between states and foreign private parties. The arbitration 
structures developed by the International Chamber of Commerce in 
Paris will be explored first, for t he ICC runs the largest and 
most widely used international commercial arbitration institu-
tion. Where particularly helpful, some comparisons will be made 
0 with roughly analagous institutions, such as the London Centre 
for Commercial Arbitration and the system of the American 
Arbitration Association. 14 The ICSID regime will then be 
13. See,~, Benteler v. Belgian State (18 November 1983), 
reprinted in (1984) 1 J. Int'l Arb. 184; and Hellas Inter-
national Co. for Garments S.A. v. The Greek State (18 
January 1982), reprinted 1n (1985) 10 Y.B. Comm. Arb. 34. 
14. These comparisons have a limited value, for as Paulsson 
points out: 
[A] valid distinction may, in my view , be made when 
comparing ICC .•• arbitrations and the multitude of 
other arbitration institutions that are clearly tied 
to a place. Parties referring to arbitration under 
the rules of one of the many trade associations in 
London know they are getting justice as defined, 
ultimately, by English law; the same is true for 
Swedish law where they have opted for the Stockholm 
Arbitration. 
Paulsson, Delocalisation of International Commercial 
Arbitration: When and Why it Matters (1983) 32 Int'l & 
Comp. L.Q. 53, 56. In other words, the expectations of t he 
parties who choose a clearly "localised" arbitration may be 
entirely dissimilar to those who choose an institutional 
arbitration that professes to be independent of any 
particular locality. On the complicated issue of 
"delocalisation", see infra, Chapter II. 
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examined in greater depth, for it is the only arb itral institu -
tion designed specifically with state-foreign private party 
disputes in mind. 
A. International Chamber of Commerce Arbitration: Private 
Disputes and Public Interest 
Xhe International Chamber of Commerce [ICC) was created 
immediately after the First World War, undoubtedly to encourage 
the re-establishment and the expansion of trading links between 
the recently pacified European states. Since then, its member-
ship has grown to include affiliates in over eighty states 
around the world. In 1924, the ICC created a Court of Arbitra-
tion which "has become the most important and significant 
tribunal for disputes arising out of international commerce." 15 
Because of this pre-eminence , the ICC is the best exemplar of 
institutional commercial arbitration systems in the interna-
tional setting. It is not unique, but serves here as a conve-
nient paradigm. In the following short account of the ICC 
system, the emphasis will be upon the theoretical problems posed 
by the possible participation of states in the ICC arbitral 
process. Although, of course, certain aspects of the ICC Rules 
of Arbitration will be discussed, no systematic evaluation of 
the substantive content of the Rules will be undertaken. 
case, that task has already been accomplished in a most 
In any 
sophisticated manner in a recent book by Professors Craig, Park 
15. J. Lew, Applicable Law in International Commercial 
Arbitration: A Study in Commercial Arbitration Awards (1978) 22. 
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and Paulsson. 1 6 
Describing the ICC arbitral institution as a "court" or a 
"tribunal'' is not entirely accurate, for the Court is really an 
administrative body established to manage arbitrations and to 
design and refine the ICC Rules of Arbitration. As is stated in 
art. 1(1) of those Rules: 
"The function of the Court is to 
provide for the settlement by arbitration of business disputes 
of an international character in accordance with these Rules." 
And in art. 2(1): "The Court of Arbitration does not itself 
settle disputes. Insofar as the parties shall not have provided 
otherwise, it appoints, or confirms the appointments of , 
arbitrators." 17 Although the ICC itself is headquartered in 
Paris, the locus of an ICC arbitration may be anywhere in the 
world. Lew notes, however, that 
[i]n practice •.• the ICC fix [sic] the arbitration 
in a place which is accessible ~both the parties 
and the arbitrators, which is geographically conve-
nient for witnesses and the presentation of 
evidence, which is legally favourable to both 
arbitration proceedings and the enforcement of the 
arbitration awards ..• which is politically accept-
able to both parties, a nd which has the basic 
requirements •.. necessa1¥ for the conduct of 
arbitration proceedings. 
16. w. Craig, W. Park & J. Paulsson, International Chamber of 
Commerce Arbitration (1984). 
17. International Chamber of Commerce, Rules of Conciliation 
and Arbitration, reprinted in (1976) 1 Y.B. Comm. Arb. 157 
[hereinafter ICC, Rules]. 
18. Lew, supra, note 15, 23. 
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When the parties to a dispute have stipulated in their 
contract or in a subsequent agreement that a dispute is to be 
submitted to ICC arbitration, they are thereby deemed to have 
selected the ICC arbitration Rules. 1 9 As was noted by Lord 
Justice Kerr in the English Court of Appeal, "(t]he detailed 
provisions of the [ICC] rules are designed to cover every step 
in an arbitration conducted under their terms, from the incep-
tion of the arbitration to the issue of a final award which is 
designed to be enforceable against the unsuccessful party 11 • 2 0 In 
addition, the Court of Arbitration provides active management 
throughout the arbitral process, 21 appointing a third arbitrato r 
if the parties fail to agree, 22 ruling on challenges to 
arbitrators, 23 replacing arbitrators who fail to act 
expeditiously, 2~ and exercising general powers of super-
19. 
20. 
21. 
ICC, Rules, supra, note 17, art. 8(1). 
Bank Mellat v . Helliniki Techniki SA (1983] 3 All E.R. 428 
(C,A,) per Kerr L.J. 433 (Leave to Appeal Refused). 
See Sacerdoti, supra, note 4, 250. 
22. ICC, Rules, supra, note 17, art. 2(4). 
23. ICC, Rules, ibid., art. 2(7). See also Raffineries de 
petrole d 1 Homs et de Banias c. Chambre de commerce 
internationale, Tribunal de grande instance de Paris, 28 
March 1984, and Cour d'appel de Paris, 15 May 1985, 
reprinted in [1985] Rev. de l'arb. 141 (No. 1), a case in 
which the cha llenge of an arbitrator was upheld by the ICC 
Court of Arbitration, prompting litigation in a municipal 
court. 
24. ICC, Rules, ibid., art. 2(8), 
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vision. 2 ~ The The ICC has also established an International 
Centre for Technical Expertise to assist in the appointment of 
experts when they are needed in any ICC arbitration. 26 
The efficiency of pre-established rules of procedure and 
the support of an institutional structure are the primary 
advantages held out to parties who select ICC arbitration. It 
is clear that such an institutional structure with pre-orda ined 
rules responds primarily to the desire for certainty and 
clarity. Parties who choose ICC arbitration can feel relatively 
confident that their dispute will ultimately be decided and that 
the procedure will, broadly speaking, be fair. The value of 
clarity is underscored by other aspects of the ICC Rules. For 
example, the Rules state that, before a file is given to an 
arbitrator, and sometimes even thereafter, the parties may apply 
to national courts for interim measures of protection . This 
simple rule precludes endless . debate over the residual jurisdic-
25. 
26. 
See, e.g ., ICC, Rules, ibid., arts 18(1)-(3), 21 and 26. 
ArticT"e"Ll is of particular importance as a supervisory 
mechanism, for it requires that "[b)efore signing an award, 
whether partial or definitive, the arbitrator shall submit 
it in draft form to the Court. The Court may lay down 
modifications as to the form of the award and, without 
affecting the arbi trator's liberty of decision , may also 
draw attention to points of substance. No award shall be 
signed until it has been approved by the Court as to i ts 
form ." 
See,~' Delaume, supra, note 6, 71; and Stein & Wotman, 
International Commercial Arbitration in the 1980s: A 
Comparison of the Major Arbitral Systems and Rules (1983) 
38 Bus. Law. 1685, 1686. 
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tion of municipal courts in such matters. 27 The arbitration 
rules of t he American Arbitrati o n Association a nd o f the Lo ndon 
Court of Arbitration expressly empower the a r b itral tribuna l to 
order interim measures of protection, 28 but oddly enough, this 
provision actually leads to less certainty, for arbitral 
tribunals have no independent p o wer to enforce me asures of 
prote ction by attaching property. It become s necessary t o 
resort to municipal courts and their role is unclear in many 
sets of arbitral rules. The ICC Rules are at least explicit in 
allowing the parties to apply to municipal courts for interim 
measure s. 29 
Yet, no set of rules is capable of completely pre-empting 
interpretational disputes. No set of rules will e ver ensure 
full predictability. The ICC Rules of Arbitration are no 
excepti o n. On many crucial issues, the Rul e s mu s t resort t o very 
general statements of principle, even to the bold articulation 
of aspirations. For example, art. 2 ( 4) of the Rules states t hat 
27. ICC, Rules, ibid., art. 8(5). The questi on whe the r t he 
jurisdiction of an arbitral tribunal is exclusive, thereby 
precluding applications for interim measures of protectio n 
before municipal co urts, has prompted a serious division of 
opinion, particularly within the United States judiciary . 
See infra, Chapter I II, text ac c ompanying no tes 295 to 309 . 
28. Se e, ~, Stein & Wotma n, supra, note 26, 17 08; a nd 
Branson & Tupma n, Selecting an Arbitral Forum : A Guide to 
Cost-Effective International Arbitration (1984) 24 Va J. 
Int'l L. 917, 928. 
29. See,~' Delaume, supra, note 6, 84-5. Fo r a broader 
discussion of the issue s involve d in ordering interim 
measures, see infra, Chap ter III, te x t a c c ompa nying no t es 
29 5 to 318. 
- 31 -
when a tribunal of three arbitrators is to be appointed, each 
party-nominated arbitrator is to be "independent o f the party 
appointing him", Such a rule would seem to be very straight-
forward. It could even be viewed as a prima facie requirement 
of all third-party adjudication. That is not the case. For 
example, the Code of Ethics promulgated by the American Bar 
Association and the American Arbitration Association would allow 
party-appointed arbitrators in some circumstances to act as 
advocates for the parties that appoint them. 30 "Independence " 
is a complicated notion and, in practice, even when expressly 
require d, the "con tinental theory that even the party-appoi nted 
arbitrator is not simply an advocate for his party but mus t be 
free of links that may bias his judgment" 31 has not been 
followed uniformly. In one recent ICC arbitrat ion involving 
Syrian a nd Yugoslavian public sector corporations and a Swiss 
private corporation, the ICC Court of Arbitration was forced to 
rule upon a charge of bias brought against the Sy rian arbitra-
tor. No rule requiring "independence " could preven t the need 
for such challenges, nor could it in this case preclude further 
litigation in municipal courts. 32 Rules are very rarely, if 
ever, "transparent" or auto-interpretive. 
30. See, 
~' 
Stein & Wotman, supra, note 26 , 1701. See also Chapter IV, text accompanying notes 328 to 334. 
31. Sacerdot i, sui2ra, note 4, 253. 
32. Raffineries de 12etrole d'Homs et de Banias, sui2ra, note 23 . 
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Similarly, the rule governing the substantive law to be 
applied by an ICC arbitral tribunal is very broadly phrased, 
potentially requiring every tribunal to engage in c omplicated 
exegesis. Mirroring the language of art. VII of the European 
Convention, 33 the relevant ICC Rule states: 
The parties shall be free to determine the law to 
be applied by the arbitrator to the merits of the 
dispute. In the absence of any indication by the 
parties as to the applicable law, the arbitrator 
shall apply the law designated as the proper law by 
the rule of conflict which he deems appropriate. 34 
Perhaps due to difficulties in the bargaining process, parties 
often do not choose a governing law expressly. When no choice 
is made, an ICC tribunal will have to determine, first, what 
conflicts rules to apply and, secondly, what substantive law is 
brought into operation by the applicab le rules of conflict. As 
will be discussed in detail below, 35 such a process is by no 
means clear or predictable. 
The ICC rule concern ing the enforcement of arbitral awards 
is likewise of limited pred ictive value. Indeed, it is little 
more than exhortato ry. Article 24(2) states simply that: 
[b]y submitting the dispute to arbitration by the 
International Chamber of Commerce, the parties 
shall be deemed to have undertaken to carry out the 
33. European Convention on International Commercial Arbitra-
tion, done 16 May 1961, (1961) 484 UNTS 364 . 
34. ICC, Rules, supra, note 17, art. 13(3). 
35. See infra, Chapter II, text accompanying notes 98 to 279. 
- 33 -
resulting award without delay and to have waived 
their right to any form of appeal insofar as such 
waiver can validly be made. 3 6 
Although it has been estimated that ninety per cent of ICC 
awards are complied with voluntarily, 37 that rate of success can 
hardly be due to the transparency of art. 24(2). The waiver of 
appeal is only required "insofar as such waiver can validly be 
made", and the validity of a waiver of recourse to appeal can 
potentially be subject to national court adjudication in every 
enforcing jurisdiction. As Lord Justice Megaw of the English 
Court of Appeal noted in the Dalmia Dairy case, "those who turn 
their minds to the effect of these (ICC] rul e s will no doubt 
realise that any award against a person who is unwilling to obey 
it can be enforced only by the machinery of some system of 
law." 3 b In other words, the apparently clear rule of art. 24(2) 
will often require municipal court action. 
The point is not to offer implicit criticisms of the ICC 
Rules based upon a supposed lack of clarity or of predictive 
value. The drafters of these Rules were persons o f great 
experience, possessed of an eminently practical turn of mind. 
36. ICC, Rules, supra, note 16, art. 24(2). 
37. See,~, Paulsson, Le tie rs-monde dans l'arbitrage 
commercial international (1983] Rev. de l'arb. 1, 20; and 
M1rab1to, The United Nations Convention on the Recognition 
and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards: The First Four 
Years (1975) 5 Ga J, Int'l & Comp. L. 471, 482. 
38. Dalmia Dairy Industries Ltd. v . National Bank of Pakistan 
(1978] 2 Lloyd's L, Rep. 227 (C,A .), ~ Megaw L,J ,, 284 . 
- 34 -
If perfect clarity and certainty have not been achieved, t he 
cause cannot be mere incompetence. The real reason is deeply-
rooted in the very nature of rules. Simply put, no rules 
promulgated by any institution can be designed solely to exalt 
the values of transparency and predictability. At least two 
other classes of values must be comprehended within a given set 
of rules. First, it is necessary to design a system congruent 
with the policy objectives sought to be pursued and, at least at 
a basic level, with the social reality in which the rules must 
operate. Secondly, rules must be created which are rich enough 
to allow for the drawing of analogies, for if rules are overly 
specific, it will not be possible for the persons at whom the 
rules are directed to use them as general guidelines for 
conduct. The ICC Rules, like all sensible sets of rules, were 
designed to achieve a balance be t ween the three classes of 
values although it is obvious that clarity and certainty were 
the pre-eminent values. The Rules and the institutional 
structures of the ICC are employed widely, and t he re can be 
little doubt that they "work". But for present purposes, an 
important question remains to be answered. Is the balance 
struck in the ICC system between the values of clarity and 
certainty, congruence, and analogical utility a balance whi ch is 
appropriate in the context of a rbitrations between states a nd 
foreign private parties? 
Not surprisingly, given the complexity of the question 
posed, the answer is a convenient (but accurate) prevarication 
-- yes and no. That states a r e willing to r esort to ICC 
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arbitration is undisputed. Martin Domke and Karl-Heinz 
Bockstiegel have both reported that the number of ICC cases 
involving "public authorities" increased sharply in the 
1960s. 39 It would appear that the involvement of states in ICC 
arbitration has remained substantial throughout the 1970s and 
early 1980s. 4 u However, if one examines the type of dispute 
usually submitted by states to ICC arbitration, an interesting 
pattern emerges. The vast majority of cases in which a state 
has agreed to become involved with the ICC system concern what 
39. Domke & Glossner, supra, note 1, 318; and Bockstiegel, 
Arbitration of Disputes Between States and Private Enter-
prises in the International Chamber of Commerce (1965) 59 
Am. J. Int'l L. 579, 579-80. Professor Bockstiegel goes on 
to point out, at 582, that in many cases involving states 
"the Conciliation Committee of the ICC was able to bring 
about an amicable settlement between parties in the 
preliminary proceedings. Only a small proportion of the 
claims submitted thus came to a genuine arbitral decision." 
40. See,~, the cases of Framatome et al. v. Atomic Energy 
Organization of Iran, ICC Award, 30 April 1982, (1984) 
Clunet 58, reprinted (1982) 8 Y.B. Comm. Arb. 94 
(translation); and Procureur de la Republique v. S.A. 
Ipitrade International, Tribunal de grande instance de 
Paris, 12 September 1978, reprinted in (1978) 106 J. de dr. 
int'l 857 (a municipal court action arising out of an ICC 
arbitration involving the government of Nigeria and a 
foreign private party). Dispute resolution clauses 
submitting future disputes to ICC arbitration can also be 
found in a few contemporary state contracts. See,~, 
Agreement between Government of Qatar and Qatar Petroleum 
Co. et al. (16 September 1976), reprinted in P. Fisher, 
ed., A Collection of International Concessions and Related 
Instruments (Contemporary Series) (1975), vol. IV, art. 10; 
and Financing Agreement between Three Parties including the 
Islamic Republic of Mauritania for Establishment of a New 
Mining Company (14 May 1975), reprinted in P. Fischer, ed., 
A Collection of International Concessions and Related 
Instruments (Contempo rary Series) (1975), vol. I, art. 22. 
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may be called "purely commercial matters", that is , contractual 
disputes involving private law rights and obligations. 4 1 More-
over, to say simply that "states" are willing to submit to ICC 
arbitration is not precise enough for, typically, it is not the 
government of a state that agrees to a contractual clause found-
ing ICC jurisdiction, but a state trading agency or public 
sector enterprise. 42 One of the clearest examples of this 
distinction is found in the practice of the Arab Republic of 
Egypt. 
In two important agreements concluded in the mid-1970s, 
the Egyptian government, an Egyptian state agency, and two 
foreign contractors negotiated oil exploration concessions. 
Both agreements stipulated expressly that any c on tractual 
disputes between the foreign contractors and the state agency 
would be submitted to ICC arbitration, but that disputes between 
41. See,~' ICC Case Nos. 3099 and 3100, Award o f 30 May 
1979, reprinted in (1979) 7 Y.B. Comm. Arb. 87 (a sales 
contract case); ICC Case No. 3896, Partial Award o f 23 
December 1982 reprinted (1982) 10 Y.B. Comm. Arb. 47 (a 
construction contract case); ICC Case No. 4237, Award of 17 
February 1984, reprinted in (T984) lo Y.B. Comm. Arb. 52 (a 
sales contract case); and Raffineries de petrole d'Homs et 
de Banias, supra, note 23 (a sale and delivery contract 
case). 
42. See all the cases cited ibid.; and Societe des grands 
travaux de Marseille v. East Pakis tan Industrial Develop-
ment Corp., Award of 5 May 1976, reprinted in (1976) 5 Y.B . 
Comm. Arb. 177 (a construction contract case bu t with 
"development" overtones as the ob ject of the contract is a 
natural gas pipeline). And see Von Mehren & Kourides , 
International Arbitration Between States and Foreign 
Private Parties: The Li'2xan Nationalization Cases (1981) 
75 Am. J. Int'l L. 476, 549, fn. 286. 
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the Government and the other parties would "be referred to the 
jurisdiction of the appropriate A.R.E. courts and [would] be 
finally settled by such courts." 43 The depth of the Egyptian 
government's reluctance to submit to ICC arbitration was 
revealed in the case of S.P.P. (Middle East) Ltd. v. Egypt 4 ~ in 
which the government asserted that it was not bound by an 
arbitration agreement between a state agency and a forei gn 
investor. Although this argument was rejected by the ICC 
tribunal, it was accepted by the Cour d'appel de Paris which 
overturned the ~ward. 4 ~ Nevertheless, a Dutch court agreed to 
enforce the award. 46 
The SPP award reveals the serious problems that can result 
when governments (as opposed to state agencies that are engaged 
in essentially private transactions) are parties to ICC arbitra-
43. Petroleum Exploration and Production Sharing Agreement 
Between Arab Republic of Egypt (A.R.E.) and Egyptian 
General Petroleum Corp. and Chevron Oil Co. of Egypt 
(22 February 1976) reprinted in Fischer, supra, note 40, 
vol. II, paras XXIII(a) and XXIII(b); and Petroleum 
Concession Agreement Betwee n Arab Republic of Egypt, 
E tian General Petroleum Cor ., General Develo ment Co. 
an Egyptian Petro eum Deve opment Co. 6 June 975 , 
reprinted in Fischer, supra, note 40, vol. I, paras 
XXXIII(a) and XXIII(b) (the last-named party is a Japanese 
Development Company). 
44. SPP (Middle East) Ltd. v. Egypt, Award of 11 March 1983, 
reprinted in (1983) 22 I.L.M. 752. 
45. Arab Republic of Egypt v. S.P.P., Cour d'appel de Paris, 12 
July 1984, reprinted in (1984) 10 Y.B. Comm. Arb. 113; and 
in (1984) 23 I.L.M. 1048 (France). 
46. SPP (Middle East) Ltd. v. Arab Republic of Egypt, District 
Court of Amsterdam, 12 July 1984, reprinted in (1984) 10 
Y.B. Comm. Arb. 487 (The Netherlands). 
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tion. The ICC system is designed to resolve "business" 
disputes, 47 and it is widely accepted that good bus iness 
relations require, above all, stability and predictability. 
Although, as noted above, no system of rules can promote one 
value to the exclusion of all others, it is in the interest of 
most participants in the ICC system that the values of clarity 
and certainty be emphasised. Private commercial relations 
require that emphasis. Yet states cannot be concerned solely 
(or even primarily) with the commercial value of stability and 
predictable rules. Congruence with their own policy objecti ves 
must be a major preoccupation. 4 b But the congruence valued by 
the creators of the ICC Rules was, of course, congruence between 
the Rules and the ICC's own policy purpose, which is to 
encourage increased commercial contact by promoting stability 
and certainty. For the institution of the ICC, then, pursuing 
the values of congruence with policy objectives and of clarity 
and certainty in the drafting of rules is complementary. For 
governmental participants in the process, the val ues of certain-
ty and congruence with policy may be conflicting. This confl ict 
itself creates a further, systemic, lack of congruity between 
the institution of the ICC and the social reality it seeks to 
serve, at least insofar as states are involved in the process . 
47. ICC, Rules, supra, note 17, art. 1(1). 
48. The third value, that of useful analogy, is more purely an 
internal process value which will not commonly lead t o 
conflicting approaches in the circumstances here 
described. 
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The ICC and its Rules pursue a policy objective which may c ome 
into direct conflict with the needs o f one class of clients 
states. A concrete example will help to point the problem. 
Professor Carbonneau is a leading proponent of ICC 
arbitration, primarily because he believes that arbitration 
within an institution is the best means of generating a 
consistent body of arbitral law that will amount to a new lex 
mercatoria. 49 For this reason, Professor Carbonneau advocates 
the publication of awards, and would insist upon fully 
articulated reasons. Interestingly, Professor Bockstiegel 
believes that one of the primary reasons that state agencies 
have agreed to submit disputes to ICC arbitration is "the 
remarkably confidential nature of the proceedings." 50 No loss 
of prestige or adverse public reaction will flow from a 
confidential award. Even the existing confidentiality has not 
been enough to prompt states to submit highly politicised or 
policy-sensitive disputes to ICC arbitration. An insistance 
upon published, reasoned awards would make the submission of 
such disputes even less likely. 
49. Carbonneau, Rendering Arbitral Awards with Reasons: The 
Elaboration of a Common Law of International Tran s ac tions 
(1985) 23 Col. J. Trans. L. 579 [hereinafter Rendering 
Awards). See also Carbonneau, Arbitral Adjudication: A 
Comparative Assessment of Its Remedial and Substantive 
Status in Transnational Commerce (1984) 19 Texas Int'l L. 
J. 33 [hereinafter Carbonneau, Arbitral Adjudication). 
SO. Bockstiegel, supra, note 39, 584 . 
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The very idea of the "emerging lex mercatoria" undersco res 
the true nature of the ICC system, which is a system designed to 
resolve private law disputes. State agencies can submit t o such 
a process because their disputes are often almost entirely 
commercial in nature. The underlying assumptions of the parties 
and of the arbitral tribunal will be congruent. All those 
engaged in the system would recognise and pursue similar ideals: 
clarity of the process, speed of resolution, certainty of 
result, congruence with the needs of international commerce. 
The needs and ideals of governments do not fit within this neat 
schema, especially when issues of public policy and sovereignty 
are involved as in the case of the expropriation of foreign 
owned property. The goals of promoting international commerce 
and of encouraging the development of a lex mercatoria wil l be 
of little importance to a developing state see king to expro-
priate the assets of a foreign oil company that it believes has 
been gaining excessive profits for many years.~ 1 ICC arbitra-
tion wil l probably not be capable of sufficient sensivity and 
subtlety in such cases. Indeed, it is simply not designed to 
cope with the intense cultural and ideological differences that 
may emerge in the course of that type of dispute. 
Even Professor Carbonneau has admitted that, in his 
conception of the lex mercatoria, the rules developed in the 
51. For a broader critique of the concept of the lex 
mercatoria, see infra, Chapter II, text accompanying notes 
264 to 279. 
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course of ICC arbitrations "would be valid at least for advanced 
Western COITLmercial parties who regularly submit to ICC arbitra-
tion."52 The inappropriateness of ICC arbitration in cases 
involving governments wishing to assert justifications of public 
policy and sovereignty is typical of any institutional arbitra-
tion designed to settle private commercial disputes. Entirely 
similar problems would confront arbitration under the auspices 
of the American Arbitration Association or the London Centre for 
Commercial Arbitration, to take but two examples, In the 1960s 
the difficulty was recognised by administrators within the World 
Bank who therefore commissioned the design of arbitral and 
conciliation systems geared specifically to the needs of govern-
ments and foreign private parties whose disputes would tend to 
become politicised, The conciliation process is beyond the 
scope of the present work, but ICSID arbitration is of central 
importance. 
B, ICSID Arbitration: Preventing the Politicisation of 
Disputes 
The drafters and the subsequent promoters of the ICSID 
Convention assert forcefully that the primary goal of the ICSID 
arbitral regime is to "maintain a careful balance between the 
interests of investors and tho s e of host States".~ 3 In a recent 
52, Carbonneau, Rendering Awards, supra, note 49, 596. 
53. International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 
Report of the Executive Directors on the Convention on the 
Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and 
Nationals of Other States (18 March 1965), reprinted in 
(1965) 4 I.L.M. 524, 526. See also Broches, The Con v en-
(cont'd.) 
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award, an ICSID arbitral tribunal took pains to promote the same 
ideology: 
[t]he Convention is aimed to pro tect, t o the same 
extent and with the same vigour the inves t o r and 
the host-state, not forgetting that to protect 
investments is to protect the general interest of 
development and of developing countries.~ 4 
A great effort has been made t o create a public perception t hat 
the Convention is equally favourab l e to the inte rests o f 
developed and developing states. 
Despite the fact that the World Bank undertook extensive 
consultations and oversaw rigourous negotiations before the 
conclusion of the ICSID Convention, ~~ the assertion of a corn-
plete balancing of interests is, at best, disingenuous. In a 
similar manner, the Executive Directors of the World Bank have 
suggested that the ICSID Convention would "streng then the part-
nership between countries in the cause of economic development". 
Such strengthening would occur because: 
tion on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between 
States and Nationals of Other States (1972) 136 Ree. des 
cours 331, 348; and Delaume, Le CIRDI e t l'immunite des 
!::tats [1983] Rev. de l'arb. 143, 144. Both Messrs 3roches 
and Delaume have served as Sec retar ies-General of ICSID. 
54. Amco Asia Corp. v. Republic of Indonesia, ICSID Award on 
Jurisdiction of 25 September 1983, reprinted i n (1985) 10 
Y.B. Comm. Arb. 61, 66. 
55. See,~' International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development, supra, note 53; and United States. Senate. 
Committee on Foreign Relations, 29 March 1966, reprinted in 
(1966) 5 I.L.M. 649 (in his Statement before the CoITLmittee , 
the Under Secretary o f the Treasury , Joseph w. Barr noted, 
at 651, that over eighty-six states had par ticipated in t he 
drafting of the Convention during four regional meetings 
held in Addis Ababa, Santiago, Geneva and Bangkok in 
1963-4). 
- 43 -
(t)he creation of an institution designed to 
facilitate the settlement of disputes between 
states and foreign investors can be a major step 
toward promoting an atmosphere of mutual confidence 
and thus stimulating a larger flow of pr ivate 
international capital into those countries which 
wish to attract it.~ 6 
Although, at first glance, the analysis is attractive, purport-
ing to reflect an equitable equili brium between the interests of 
capital exporting and importing states, a number of the tacit 
assumptions and assertions made by the promoters o f the 
Convention are open to challenge. First, one legitimately may 
ask whether, given the wide variety of economic systems that 
must co-exist in the contemporary world, a "larger flow of 
private international capital" is universally desired. It is at 
least worth exploring the possibility that developing states are 
more comfortable with investments channeled through state 
foreign aid agenci e s or international organisations. It is 
certainly true that in the post-colonial era many states are 
suspicious of private foreign investors. One commentator has 
noted in addition that "(t]he bargai ning power be twe en the 
parties has also changed. The private investors, confronted by 
newly independent states aware of their economic power, no 
longer dictate the investments in the same manner as in the 
past."~ 7 For that reason, it is fair to say that the "climate 
for private investment is very different from what it was when 
56. International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 
ibid., 525. 
57. Gopal, International Centre for Settlement of Investment 
Disputes (1982) 14 Case w. Res. J. Int'l L. 591, 593. 
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ICSID was conceived."~ 8 In other words, for many states or f o r 
large segments of the population of some states, the desire to 
develop may be tempe red by a wish to avoid the perceived 
negative influences of large infusions of foreign private 
capital. 59 
Even for states that are open to foreign private invest-
ment, the statement of the Executive Directors of the World Bank 
reveals a second and in this case, simplistic, assumption. The 
creation of a specialised dispute resolution mechanism is said 
to encourage the flow of capital "into those countries which 
wish to attract it". In the attempt to establish the equally 
beneficial effect of the Convention, the Directors have asserted 
a degree of free will that is not always present. Despite t he 
enormous increase in the political power of d~veloping states 
adverted to above, it is still the case that many resource- and 
capital- poor states may believe that they have no choice but t o 
encourage foreign private investments, in spite of the possible 
negative consequences. 
58. Ibid. 
59. Those "perceived negative influences" may i nclude a 
lessening of public contro l over the domestic economy, 
poss ibilities for the undue influence of expatri-Ot managers a)..( 
over internal politics, and the likelihood of profits being 
removed from the host state. Elites that remain outside 
the domestic power structure may view f o reign pr ivate 
capital as essentially anti-revolutionary for it can serve 
to prop up tyrannous dictatorships. See also Gopal, ibid. 
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The final challe ng eable asse rti o n o f the Executi ve 
Directors is that the ICSID Conventi on promo t e s an atmosphere o f 
"mutual confidence" 60 between f o r e ign inves t o rs a nd po t en t ia l 
host states, thereby encouraging the international fl ow o f 
capital. The whole idea of "conf i dence" in an e conomic c o nte x t 
is linked inexorably t o Western, marke t-oriented, concep t ions o f 
eco nomic organisation. In no sense does t he I CSID Convent ion 
increase a developing state's "co nfidence" that a foreign 
private investor will behave in a manner consistent with public 
policy or national aspirations. The only real increase in 
"confidence" that ma y be experi e nced by the hos t state is 
derived from the fact that, under the ICSID regime, confiden-
tiality is assured, so that disputes can be settled without 
negative publicity. Otherwise, the foreign investor is the only 
party who se l e vel o f c o n f ide nc e is enhanced s i g nif i cantly. 
Investor confidence in the security of his position is 
undoubtedly an important ingredient in international commerc e. 
Such confidence is no doubt increased by t he po ssibility o f 
third-party adjudica tion in a neutral forum. As Broc he s has 
pointed out, the "fear of political risks operates as a 
deterrent to the flow of private f o reign capital t o developing 
c o untries". 01 The po ssibility of a neutral fo rum f o r the 
60. That phrase was repeated as recently as 1984 by the ICSI D 
bureaucracy. See International Centre f o r Settlement o f 
Investment Disputes, Annual Repo rt (1984) 6. 
61. Broches, su~, note 53, 343. See also Unite d St a t es , 
Senate. Commit tee on Fore i g n Re la t ions, 29 Ma r c h 19 66 , 
r e printed in ( 1 966) 5 I.L.M. 649, 669. 
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resolution of disputes probably decreases that fear . Schmidt 
has suggested that 
(f]rom the standpoint of the investor, any method 
of resolving conflict with the host state must 
display three characteristics to be meaningful: 
easy access to the decisional forum, opportunity to 
air the merits of a claim, and reasonable proba-
bility of enforcement of a decision in the 
investor's favour. 02 
A neutral forum, removed from the influence or control of the 
host state will undoubtedly enhance the possibilities for 
attainment of the first and second of these desiderata. As will 
be discussed below, 63 the ICSID regime is designed to provide 
facilitated accomplishme nt of the third goal -- enforcement --
as well. It is therefore common ground amongst most independent 
observers that ICSID arbitration promotes investor security, and 
investor "confidence". 6 4 But to take the argument a step 
further, as some do, 65 to suggest that ICSID i ncreases the 
62. Schmidt, Arbitration Under the Auspices of the Interna-
tional Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes 
(ICSID): Implications of the Decision on Jurisdiction in 
Alcoa Minerals of Jamaica, Inc. v. Government of Jamaica 
(1976) 17 Harv. Int'l L.J. 90, 104. 
63. See infra, text accompanying notes 166 to 196. 
64. See,~, de Vries, International Commercial Arbitration: 
A Contractual Substitute for National Courts (1982) 57 
Tulane L. Rev. 42, 60; and Lew, supra, note 15 , 20-1. 
65. Apart from the words of the Executive Directors cited 
supra, note 56, see Moore, International Arbitration 
Between States and Foreign Investors - The World Bank 
Convention (1966) 18 Stanford L. Rev. 1359, 1350; and 
United States. Department of State. Statement of Andreas F. 
Lowenfeld, Deputy Legal Adviser (Regarding ICS ID], 28 June 
1966 before the Subcommittee on International Organizations 
and Movements of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of 
Representatives, reprinted in (1966) 5 I.L.M. 821, 821-2 
(hereinafter Lowenfeld Statement]. 
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"confidence" of host states in foreign investment is nothing 
more than a politically motivated justification designed to 
encourage the involvement of developing states in the ICSID 
process, 
To question the assertion of increased "mutual confidence" 
is not to argue that the ICSID regime is merely a Western ploy 
or that developing nations should not be involved. The point is 
simply that to encourage greater state participation in ICSID, 
an issue that will be addressed in more detail at the end of the 
present chapter, proponents should not rely upon disingenuous 
assertions of equality, Develop ing states may indeed find great 
advantages within the ICSID system, but increased confidence is 
not one of them. Moreove r, it is most difficult to make out the 
case that developing states have just as much to gain from ICSID 
as do foreign investors. A Deputy Legal Adviser to the U.S. 
Department of State was refreshingly honest when he testified 
before a House oE Representatives Su b-Committee: 
As the country with the greatest amount of interna-
tional investment, and the grea test stake in the 
development and wide acceptance oE international 
law standards regarding protection of private 
property, the United States stands to gain sub-
stantially from the [ICSID] convention. 66 
Investors will tend to be better protected under ICSID than 
under the legal system of a developing state. 6 7 The state will 
66. Lowenfeld Statement, ibid., 822. 
67. The increased protection is due primarily to the neutrality 
of the forum. As will be discussed infra, text a ccom-
pany ing notes 113 to 165, the foreign private investor will 
not necessarily escape the app licat ion of the municipal law 
of the host state simply through the use oE the ICSID 
regime. 
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tend to lose the ability to give rein to auto-interpretive 
notions of sovereignty. The quid pro quo may be increased 
foreign private sector investment,b 8 although, as pointed out 
above, that result is neither automatic, nor necessarily 
desired. But perhaps such a rigidly instrumentalist argument is 
not, ultimately, the best justification for ICSID. From the 
perspective of the interna tional lawyer (as opposed to the 
business professional) ICSID is a process that can serve to 
depoliticise disputes by emphasising their commercial origins 
and by discouraging the resort to state-to-state methods of 
dispute resolution, i.e. the espousal of claims , except in 
extreme cases. For that reason, it will be argued below that 
ICSID arbitration should be viewed primarily as a method of 
resolving essentially private disputes but from a perspective 
that is sensitive to the public policy goals of state parties. 
The ICSID process should not be viewed as an international 
process wedded to international law ; i t s enormous po tential 
value -- not yet realised -- lies precisely in ICSID's ability 
to prevent private comme rc ial disputes from becoming interna -
tional disputes. To evaluate that potentia l fully, it is first 
necessary to explore in some detail the structure o f the ICSI D 
regime. 
68. It has been argued t hat the mere adherence to the ICSID 
Convention may increase a state's "credit-worthiness'' . G. 
Schwarzenberger, Foreign Investments and International Law 
(1969) 142. See also G. Delaume, Transnational Contracts: 
Applicable Law and Settlement of Disputes, re - issue (1985), 
vol. II, eh. 15, 11. 
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i. The Jurisdiction of ICSID 
ICSID arbitration proceedings are administered by t he 
ICSID Secretar i at (the Centre). The arbitration itself is 
conducted by arbitrators who are appointed within the terms of 
the Convention. The jurisdiction of a particula r tribunal is 
defined by art. 25 of the ICSID Convention. 69 Mr Aron Broches, 
first Secretary-General of ICSID, has offered a complete gloss 
on the article which bears repeating in full, for it precludes 
the necessity for yet another description of ICSID jurisdiction : 
Proceedings under the auspices of the Centre must 
meet four tests set out in Article 25. The first 
and most important one is that bo th parties must 
have consented to have recourse to the Centre. 
However, once this requirement of consent, which 
has been called the cornerstone of the jurisdiction 
of the Centre, has been met, t he consent becomes 
irrevocable and cannot be unilaterally withdrawn. 
The second test concerns the quality of the 
parties. One party must be a Contrac ting State, or 
one of its constituent subdivisions or agencies, 
and the other must be a national of another 
Contracting State .••• In addition t o the require-
ment of consent and the nationality requiremen t for 
establishing jurisdict ion ratione_e_~rS£~?e, two 
further tests must be met under t he heading o f 
jurisdiction rationae materiae: the dispute must 
be a 'legal dispute' and it mus t arise directly out 
o f an 'investment '. Neither term is defined in the Convention. 70 
69. International Bank f or Reconstruction and Develop~ent, 
Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between 
State s and Nationals of Other States (done 18 March 1965; 
e ntered into f o rce 14 October 1966) 575 U.N.T . S, 160 
[hereinafter ICSID Convention]. 
70. Broches, supra, note 53, 340-1. See also Kemby , 
Jurisdiction - Sovereign Immunity (1983) 24 Va J, Int'l L. 
217, 224-5 who lists only three "factors " gove rning 
jurisdiction, by combining the requirements of a "legal 
dispute" and an "inves tment". 
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Each of these requirements has been t he subject of limited 
judicial interpretation and fairly extensive doctrinal comment. 
As Broches pointed out, the over-riding jurisdictional 
requirement for ICSID is party consent. To be more precise, it 
is not party consent alone that is required. In fact, consent-
ing to the jurisdiction of an ICSID tribunal is best seen as a 
two-stage process. The first step is that both the host state 
and the national state of the foreign investor must become party 
to the ICSID Convention. The precise timing of ratification 
does not appear to be a crucial issue, as long as it occurs 
before an arbitral clause is invoked. In the very first 
arbitration held under the auspices of ICSID, the Tribunal held 
that the national state of a foreign investor need only have 
ratified the Convention at the time of the application of the 
arbitral clause, not at the time of its draEting. 71 Although 
adherence to the Convention compels neither the host state 72 nor 
the private foreign investor 73 to use ICSID arbitral facilities, 
ttit was nevertheless felt", at least by the Executive Directors 
of the World Bank, "that adherence to the Convention might be 
71. Lalive, The First 'World Bank' Arbitration (Holiday Inns v . 
Morocco) - Some Legal Problems (1980) 51 Brit. Y.B. Int'l 
L. 123, 146. See also Delaume , supra, no te 68, vol. II, 
eh. 15, 10. 
72. Delaume, ibid., 7; and Vuylsteke, Foreign Investment 
Protectionan"d ICSID Arbitration (T974) 4 Ga J. Int'l & 
Comp. L. 343, 348. 
73. Broches, "Arbitration in Investmen t Disputes " in C. 
Schmitthoff, International Commercial Arbitration 
(1974-1980) 8 (an updated looseleaf system) . 
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interpreted as holding out an expectation that Contracting 
States would give favourable consideration to requests by 
investors for the submission of a dispute to the Centre." 74 
The second stage in the process of consent to the juris-
diction of an ICSID arbitral tribunal is the submission of a 
particular dispute by specific parties. The Executive Directo rs 
of the World Bank have called the second stage oE consent "the 
cornerstone of the jurisdiction of the Centre." 75 Because the 
proximate consent of the parties is required, one ma y presume 
that submission of the dispute is not an unfriendly act 76 and in 
consequence that the freely expressed will of the parties will 
be given effect, 77 For that reason alone, the state party 
should be discouraged from advancing preliminary arguments 
opposing jurisdiction that are based upon a supposed inter-
ference with the sovereignty of the state. As Professor Lalive 
has suggested, the response to such arguments is clear and 
cogent: 
agreeing 
"by ratifying the 1965 Washington Convention and 
to ICSID arbitration ... [the state has) exercised 
74. International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 
suora, note 53, 528. 
75. Ibid., 527. See also Broches, " Arbitration clauses and 
1nst1tutional arbitration: ICSID: a special case" in 
Associazione Italiana Per L'Arbitrato, Commercial 
Arbitrations: Essays in Memoriam Eugenio Minoli (1974) 69, 
79. 
76. See,~, Broches, supra, note 53, 365. 
77. See,~, Broches, supra, note 75, 79. 
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its sovereignty and not 'alienated' it. 78 That response is 
obviously consistent with the spirit of the ICSID Convention 
which establishes that consent, once given, ~ay not be withdrawn 
unilaterally. Thus, in the case of Alcoa Minerals of Jamaica, 
Inc. v. Government of Jamaica, 79 the ICSID tribunal "unanimously 
asserted jurisdiction over an investment disputes by giving 
effect to an agreement to arbitrate despite the host state's 
failure to attend the proceedings and its purported unilateral 
withdrawal of consent to ICSID arbitration." 8 u 
The only formal requirement is that the consent of the 
parties be expressed in writing. 81 Commonly, this written 
consent will be contained in an arbitration clause submitting to 
ICSID's jurisdiction, 82 but it is clear that no particular form 
is required. In the words of the Tribunal in Amco Asia Corp. v. 
Republic of Indonesia: 
[s]uch consent in writing is not to be expressed in 
a solemn, ritual and unique formulation. The 
investment agreement being in writing, it suffices 
78. Lalive, supra, note 71, 158. 
79. Unpublished, but reported in Schmidt, supra, note 62. 
80. Schmidt, ibid., 92-3. Schmidt unfortunately goes on to say 
that an agreement to arbitrate is an irrevocable interna-
tional agreement. Although the ratification by state 
oarties of the ICSID Convention is clearly an "interna-
~ional agreement", the submission of a particular dispute 
to arbitration is an essentially private act made 
"irrevocable" only by the express words of the governing 
treaty (concluded by states, not by private parties). 
81. Article 25(1) of the ICSID Conve ntio~, supra, note 69. 
82. As in the Alcoa Minerals o f Jamaica case r eported in 
Schmidt, supra, note 62, 103. 
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to establish that its interpretation in good faith 
~hows that the parties agreed to ICSI D arbitration, 
1n order for the ICSI D tribunal to have jurisdic-
tion over them. 8 3 
There appears to be no temporal limitation f o r consent beyond 
the obvious necessity that written consent be given before t he 
Tribunal is asked to hear a case. Nor are t he pa r ties unde r any 
obligation to inform t he ICSID Secretariat o f any contracts 
which provide for the settlement of future disputes under ICSID 
auspices. 84 The Centre need only be notified when a dispute is 
submitted for arbitration . 
The second ma jor requirement to found ICSID jurisdiction 
relates to the quality o f t he parties. As already noted, the 
parties must be a contracting state (or state agency) 85 and the 
national of another contracting state. Mr Broches has suggested 
that the necessi ty to be a "na tiona l of a nother contracting 
state" does not preclude mixed economy corporations or 
government-owned commercial entities from benefitting from the 
ICSID regime unless such a corporation or entity "is acting as 
an agent f o r the government or is discharging an essentially 
governmental function." 86 This interpretation is certainly 
83. Supra, note 54. 
84. See, e.a., Internatio nal Centre for Se ttl eme nt of Invest-
ment Disputes, Annual Report (1967). 
85. Article 25(1) of the ICSID Convention, supra, note 69, 
permits a state party to designate to ICSID any public 
entities that the state considers to be eligible to be 
parti es to ICSI D arbitrations. 
86. Broches, supra, note 53, 355. 
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consistent with the generally flexi b le approach that has been 
taken by ICSID tribunals to the question of party standing. ~or 
example, in two ICSID awards r e ndered in 1983, the Tribunals 
decided that they could assert jurisdiction even though, 
formally, the investor corporation was a national of the host 
state, because in each case the corporations were controlled by 
a parent corporation in another state party to the ICSID 
Convention. 87 The Convention itself allows, in art. 25(2)(b ) , 
that when states require a foreign investor to create a local 
corporation as the channel for investment, the parties may 
neve rtheles s agree that the local corporati o n will be treated as 
"foreign" for the purposes of ICSID jurisdiction. But ICSID 
tribunals seem to be willing to go a step farther, to imply such 
agreement from the facts, even in the f ace of s t a te objec-
tions.SS 
The last two jurisdictional requirements imposed by the 
ICSID Convention are that disputes must be "legal disputes" and 
87. In Amco Asia Corp. v. Republic of Indonesia, supra, note 
54, the Tribunal relied heavily on the fact that even in 
the application for incorporation under the laws of 
Indonesia, the investor corporation was described as a 
"foreign business". When Indonesia agreed to an ICSID 
arbitral clause, it knew perfectly well that the business 
was foreign. The case of Kl6ckner Industrie Anlagen GrnbH 
v. United Republic of Cameroon, ICSID Award on of 21 
October 1983, reprinted in (1985) 10 Y.B. Comm. Arb. 71, 
involved a joint venture company controlled (fifty-one~ 
cent) by Klockner. That factual foreign control was held 
to be sufficient to found jurisdiction. See also Moore, 
supra, note 65, 1362. 
88. Branson & Tupman, supra, note 28, 924. 
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they must relate to an "investment". Neither of these terms is 
defined in the Convention, but the lack of definitions has not 
yet po sed any serious problems. As Mr Delaume points out, "the 
concept of 'legal dispute' can be easily circumscribed."ti 9 
Although the differentiation between "law" and "non-law" (or, to 
phrase it somewhat differently, between the legally "relevant" 
and legally "irrelevant") has been the source of great contro-
versy for years, pitting positivists against those of a natural 
law orientation, in the practice of ICSID no great challenge has 
arisen to provoke or require rigid differentiation. The 
explanation of the phrase offered by the Executive Directo rs of 
the World Bank has so far proved entirely adequate: 
The expression "legal dispute" has been used to 
make clear that while conflicts of rights are 
within the jurisdiction of the Centre, mere 
conflicts of interests are not. The dispute must 
concern the existence or scope of a legal right or 
obligation, or the nature or extent of the repara-
tion to be made for breach of a legal obligation. 90 
Because nearly all disputes submitted to ICSID will be founded 
in an investment contract, one would be hard put to imagine a 
case in which a tribunal would d e cline jurisdiction for the lack 
of a "legal" dispute, particularly because submission of the 
dispute in the first case is entirely dependent upon the consent 
of both parties. 
89. Delaume, supra, note 68, vol . II, eh. 15, 34. 
90. International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 
supra, note 53, 528. 
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The question what is an "investment" dispute is somewhat 
more complicated. Not only is no definition found in the 
Convention, but even its "legislative history", to adopt an 
~merican phrase, fails to provide guidance. 9 1 It has been 
argued that the definitional lacuna renders the jurisdiction of 
any ICSID tribunal "uncertain". 92 But the implication of Aron 
Broches's explanation is that the lack of certainty is more 
apparent than real: 
The term "investment disputes" characterises 
disputes by their subject ma tter and the area of 
activity in which ~hey arise. In practice, 
however, this term is used more particularly t o 
refer to disputes between a State and a foreign 
investor arising out of investmen ts by the latter 
in the territories of the focmer.~ 3 
The approach is entirely functionalist. One might almost 
conclude, as did Branson and Tupman, that the simple agreement 
of the pa rties to submit a dispute to ICSID would lead t o a 
strong presumption that an "investment" was involved. 9 ~ But 
that presumption would be incorrect according to the Tribunal 
sitting in the Alcoa Minerals of Jamaica case. 95 In that case, 
91. Delaume, ICSID Arbitration and the Courts (1983) 77 Am. J. 
Int'l L. 784, 795. 
92. Moore, supra, note 65, 1362. 
93. Broches, suora, note 73, 1. 
94. Branson and Tupman, supra, note 28, 924: "If the parties 
designate a particular dispute foe ICSID arbitratlon, t hen 
in practice a tribunal may give we ight to the parties' 
intent and not decline jurisdict ion on the basis of a 
technical definition of 'investment disputes'". 
95. Alcoa Minerals of Jamaica, Inc. v. Government of Jamaica , 
supra, note 62 (as reported by Schmidt). 
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the Tribunal held that the foreign company's operations in 
Jamaica did amount to a n investment, but only because they fit 
the "ordinary meaning" of that term. The Tribunal rejected the 
argument that the simple consent to ICSID jurisdiction implied 
that the dispute related to an investment. ~ 0 Schmidt therefore 
asserts that" [i]t would now seem to be firmly established that 
an analysis of the parties' actual capital relationship is 
necessary in each ICSID case".97 
The apparent rigour of that holding was moderated substan -
tially in a recent ICSID arbitration involving a foreign-owned 
hotel operation in Indones ia. There the Tribunal held that, 
when evaluating the jurisdictional requirement that the dispute 
relate to an investment, it "must only be satisfied that prima 
facie the claim ••• is within the jurisdictional mandate of 
ICSID". 9 8 On balance, there is a strong likel i hood that the 
great majority of cases involving a state and a foreign private 
party for which ICSID arbitration is sought will be found to 
meet the "investmen t" requirement. That result would seem t o 
accord with the expectations of the ICSID Secretariat. In its 
Annual Report for 1984, the Secretariat strongly defended the 
decision not to include a definition of "investment" within the 
ICSID Convention: 
96. Ibid., 100. 
9 7 • S C hm i d t , i b i d . , 1 0 0 • 
98. Amco Asia Corp. v. Republic of Indonesia, supra , note 54. 
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[T]he absence o f a c lear defini t ion o f the no tion 
of investment in t he ICSID Co n vention, deolored by 
certain commentato rs, has, in effect, bee; a wise 
precaution. It permits the Conventi o n t o be 
adapted to changes in the form o f c oope ratio n 
between investors and hos t State s and to res oond t o 
the needs of ICSID users. 9 9 • 
The goal seems to be the encouragement of broad access to ICSID 
by providing for flexibility in jurisdictio nal e valuation. 
Disputes involving emerging f o r ms of capi t al i nvestment will not 
automatically be precluded from ICSID adjudicat i on. Of course, 
under art. 25(4) of the ICSID Convention, s t ates, when ratifyi ng 
the Convention, are free to limit their consent to certain 
classes of disput e s or s pecifi c ally t o exclude other classes. lOU 
At the time of Mr Delaume's survey, o nly four states had opted 
to restrict access, lU l and only one o ther state has since take n 
that approach. 10 2 
ICSID itse lf h a s underta ke n o the r means of broadening 
access to its facilities, specifically by relaxing, in certain 
classes of cases, the requirement that a dispute relate to an 
"investme nt". In 1978, t h e Adm i ni s t r ative Council approved 
99. International Centre for Set t l e ment of Investment 
Disputes, supra, note 60, 9, 
100. See,~, Delaume, supra, note 68, vol. II, eh. 15, 39 ; 
and Moore, supra, note 65, 1376, 
101. Saudi Arabia, Guyana, Jama i c a and Papua-Ne w Guine a. 
Delaume, ibid. As noted above, a state is not entitled t o 
restrict access after consent t o ICSID arbit r ation has 
been given. 
102. Se e Delaurne, International Centre for Settlement of 
Investment Dispute s (1984) Proc . Conf, Can. Council Int'l 
L. 101, 104. That s t ate is I s rael. 
- 59 -
"Additional Facility Rules" establishing guidelines as to when 
ICSID would consent to administer an arbitration that would 
normally fall outside its jurisdiction. With the prior consent 
of the Secretary-General, ICSID can be used to settle disputes 
not arising out of an investment as long as one disputant is a 
party to the Convention and the dispute does no t involve an 
ordinary commercial transaction, Any "fact finding" proceeding 
can also fall within the scope of the Additional Facility. lU3 
An arbitration under the Additional Facility is not a standard 
ICSID arbitration and the Convention does not apply to such 
proceedings. The main result is that, unlike standard ICSID 
proceedings, the arbitration is fully subject to the municipal 
law of the forum. Perhaps this is the reason that the Additional 
Facility has hardly ever been used. 1o 4 
Finally, it should be stressed that art. 41 of the ICSID 
Convention reiterates the important general principle that 
transnational arbitral tribunals are the masters of their own 
competence, judges of their own jurisdiction. lU~ 
103. The most complete discussion of the Addition Facility, 
which is relied upon in the preceding account is to be 
found in Broches , The "Additional Facility" of the Inter -
national Centre for Settlement of Investmen t Disputes 
(ICSID) (1979) 4 Y.B. Comm. Arb. 373, 374-6. 
104. Delaume, supra, note 68, 81. 
105. See,~, International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development, supra, note 53, 529; Delaume, ibid., 58; and 
Broches, supra, note 53, 341. 
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Probably because the jurisdiction of an ICSID tribunal is 
entirely consensual, the drafters of the Convention were able to 
insist that the remedies avai l able through ICSID would be 
exclusive. Article 27 of the Convention excludes concucrent 
diplomatic protection offered by the investor 's national state. 
Article 26 reiterates that, once chosen by the parties, an ICSID 
tribunal has sole authority to hear a case and to order 
remedies. 106 The exclusivity of ICSID remedies was underscored 
by the French Cour d'appel de Rennes in the Atlantic Triton 
case . 10 7 
The only express exception to the rule of exclusivity is 
that, under art. 26, a contracting state may submit to ICSID 
jurisdiction but make its consent to a particular arbitration 
dependent upon the exhaustion of local remedies. lOb It would 
appear, however, that the Convention allows parties to stipulate 
other exceptions to the rule of exclusivity, for example, the 
106. ICSID Convention, su~ra, note 69. See a lso International 
Bank for Reconstr-uct1on and Development, supra, note 53, 
528-9; Delaume, sup ra, note 53, 145; Vuylsteke, supra, 
note 72, 350. 
107. Revolutionary People's Republic of Guinea et al. v. 
Atlantic Triton Co., Cour d'appel de Rennes, 26 October-
1984, reprinted in (1985) 24 I.L.M. 341 (France), 
108. ICSID Convention, supra, note 69. See also Delaume, 
supra, note 68 , vol. II, eh. 15, 46; and Broches, supra, 
note 53, 349. At the page here cited Delaume notes that 
the ability to invoke the exhaustion of local remedies 
rule has been little used in pcactice. None o f the ICSI D 
clauses submitted to the Secretariat required the 
exhaustion of local remedies, although a number of 
bilateral treaties did so . 
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resort to municipal courts for interim measures of protection, 
an issue that will be discussed presently. 1 09 
A party dissatisfied with a tribunal award is not left 
without recourse under the ICSID Convention. Article 50 allows 
parties to apply for an interpretive ruling by the tribunal in 
cases where the meaning of the award is unclear. Revision of 
technical errors is provided for in art. 51. In extreme cases, 
art. 52 permits parties to apply to the Secretary-General within 
120 days of the rendering of a final award for annulment of the 
award on five enumerated grounds. llu The application is 
evaluated by an ad hoe committee with three members, none of 
whom can have sat on the original arbitral tribunal. One recent 
award has been challenged under this procedure. 111 
The free consent to ICSID jurisdiction and the attendant 
exclusivity of its remedies can lead to only one logical 
conclusion. If a party to a pending ICSID arbitration attempts 
to circumvent the proceedings by applying for judgment from a 
municipal court, the court should stay its own proceedings and 
109. Delaurne, ibid. See text accompanying notes 120 to 128. 
110. ICSID Convention, supra, note 69. The grounds are 
(1) that the Tribunal was not properly constituted; 
(2) that the Tribunal manifestly exceeded its powers; 
(3) that there was corruption on the part of a Tribunal 
member; (4) that there was a significant departure from a 
fundamental procedural rule; and (5) that the award failed 
to state the reasons upon which it was based. See also 
Branson and Tupman, supra, note 28, 935. 
111. It is understood that the Arnco Asia award on the merits, 
infra, note 147, is the subject of an application for 
annulment filed on 8 March 1985. 
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direct the parties to pursue ICSID remedies. 112 This conclusion 
has led some commentators to a furt her assertion, that ICSI D 
arbitration is a creature of international law. The implica-
tions of such a claim must now be explored. 
ii. ICSID's "International" Status 
There can be no doubt that the ICSID Convention is an 
.international treaty nor that the ICSID Secretariat, as a 
subdivision of the International Rank for Reconstruction and 
Development, is an international body. The more difficult 
questions are whether or not a specific ICSID arbitra l tribunal 
should be viewed as an international tribunal and whether or not 
the obligations imposed by such a tribunal are international 
legal obligations. Although a full-fledged discussion of the 
problems of "internationalisation" or "deloca lisation" will be 
postponed to the next Chapter, some preliminary points must be 
stressed here. 
First, a discussion of the internatio n a l na tu re o f an 
ICSID tri~unal is not a barren intellec tua l exercise . If such a 
tribunal is held to be "international", the practical ramifica-
tions are enormous. The applicable substantive law, one would 
assume, would be international law. The f ore ig n private party 
would in some manner be transmuted into an international person 
that could ask for a ruling that the state party was in breac h 
of an investment agreement and responsible for any expropria-
112. Delaume, supra, note 91, 790. 
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tion, This second claim would be extra-contractual and would 
sound directly in international law. In theory such a claim 
might even be made if there has been no breac h under the proper 
law of the contract. Moreover, one would expect a reciprocity 
of obligations enforceable, to the extent possible, directly 
thorough the operation of public international legal principles. 
Such striking consequences point to the need for careful 
evaluation of the premise. 
A second important point is that, in assessing the 
international quality of any tribunal, it is best that for the 
sake of analytical clarity a distinction be drawn between the 
procedural law and the substantive law to be applied by the 
tribunal. As will be demonstrated, the simple fact that the 
procedural law of a tribunal is in some fashion insulated from 
municipal legal controls is not sufficient to establish that the 
tribunal operates under international law. 1 1 3 
The ICSID arbitral regime was designed to discourage, as 
far as possible, the intervention of municipal c ou rts in the 
process of arbitration. Article 44 of the Convention states 
that goal explicitly, as noted by Professor Carbonneau: 
113. 
(A]ccording to article 44 of t he Convention, ICSID 
arbitration, unless the parties provide otherwise, 
is completely independe nt of any national legal 
provisions and free from the possibility of 
national court interve nt ion or supervision. ICSID 
The most intense contemporary debate concerning the 
international status of a permanent (or at leas t 
long-term) tribuna l has r evolved around t he Iran-U.S. 
Claims Tribunal. The debate is canvassed infra, Chapter 
IV, text accompanying notes 6 to 70. 
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rules are designed to be comprehensive and de tailed 
enough to function as a self-sufficient body of 
arbitral regulations, leaving problems arising 
during the proceedinq to be resolved by the 
arbitral tribunal.ii~ 
The vast majority of commentators are in accord with this view. 
Mr Delaume has stressed that the ICSID Convention establishes a 
Hself-contained" system which operates "in total independence 
from domestic laws", 11 ~ even the lex loci arbitri. Professor 
David has asserted that the ICSID procedure "est completement 
d§tach§ de tout ordre juridique national". 116 Mr Broches has 
w~itten that the Convention itself "constitutes t he loi de 
l'arbitrage and as such excludes the applicability of any 
national lex fori, except where the Convention itself refers to 
it."117 
Mr Broches' statement, it should be noted, recognises a 
necessary caveat . It would not be accurate t o say that n a ti onal 
procedural law is excluded from every ICSID arbitration, for the 
Convention allows the parties to an arbitration to refer to 
alternative rules of procedure. They are not bound to rely 
exclusively upon the ICSID system of rules. 118 The Executive 
Directors of the World Bank have suggested that the parties' 
114. Carbonneau, Arbitral Adjudication, supra, note 49, 95. 
115. Delaume, Foreign Sovereign Immunity: Impact on 
Arbitration (1983) 38 Arb. J. 34 (No. 2) 35. See also 
Delaume, supra, note 68, vol. II, eh. 15, 41. 
116. R. David, L'arbitrage dans le commerce interna tional 
(1982) 431. 
117. Broches, supra, no te 73, 6. See also Broches, supra, note 
53, 385. 
118. ICSID Convention, supra, note 69, art. 44. 
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ability to modify the procedural law is "[i]n keeping with t he 
consensual character of proceedings under the Convention". l lY 
Needless to say, the freedom granted to the parties would allow 
them, if they saw fit, to choose the procedural rules of a 
national system or of various municipal systems to govern their 
arbitration. The procedure of an ICSID tribunal, although 
typically anational, is not neces s arily so. 
A good example of this potential procedural complexity, 
one with important practical ramifications, is the ICSID 
procedural rules governing the awarding of interim measures of 
protection. At first blush, the "exclusiv i ty" of the ICSID 
proceedings, adverted to immediately above, would seem to 
preclude any resort to national courts for orders of interim 
measures of protection. 12 0 The Co ur d'appel de Rennes adopted 
that view in the Atlantic Triton case, quashing attachment 
orders imposed upon three ships that were the subject of a 
pending ICSID arbitration. 121 The court emphasised that the 
ICSID Convention and Rul e s allowed ICSID tribunals to issue 
protective orders.1 2 2 
119. International Bank for Reconstruc tion and Development, 
supra, note 53, 530. 
120. See, ~, Delaume, ·Note (1985) 24 I.L.M. 340; and Bran s o n 
and Tupman, suora, note 28, 929-30. 
121. Revolu~ionary Peopl~'s Republic of Guinea et al. v. 
Atlantic Triton Co., supra, note 107, 344. 
122. ICSID Convention, supra, note 69, art. 47 ( e l abora ted upon 
in Rule 39) • 
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Tribunals operating under the auspices of ICSID have 
ordered provisional measures in two cases, the Holiday Inns case 
~nd the AGIP case. 123 In the Amco Asia Corp. case, an applica-
tion for interim measures was refused.12 4 Indonesia had 
asserted that an article in the Hong Kong newspaper, The 
Business Standard, had contained information provided by Amco 
Asia officials that prejudiced the pending ICSID arbitration 
between Indonesia and Amee Asia and otherwise harmed the 
Indonesian state. The Government therefore asked the ICSID 
tribunal to order that the claimants, Amco Asia: 
abstain from promoting, stimulating, or instigating 
the publication of propaganda presenting their case 
selectively outside this Tribunal or otherwise 
calculated t9 discourage foreign investment in 
Indonesia. 12 ~ 
The Tribunal held that the article printed in Hong Kong "could 
not have done any actual harm to Indonesia, nor aggravate or 
exacerbate the legal dispute now put before the tribunal". 12 6 
Moreover, even a continuing press campaign would not affect the 
rights asserted in the instant dispute, but only the future 
prospects for foreign investment in Indonesia. 127 
123. The Holiday Inns v. Morocco case is reported in Lalive, 
supra, note 71; AGIP Co. SpA v. Government of the Popular 
Republic of the Congo (1983) 8 Y.B. Comm. Arb. 133. See 
also Delaume, suora, note 68, Vol . II, eh. 15, 58. 
124. Amco Asia Corp. et al v. Indonesia, ICSID Decision of 9 
December 1983, reprinted 1n (1985) 24 I.L.M. 365 (re 
interim measures). 
125. Ibid., 365. 
126. Ibid., 367. 
127, Ibid., 368. 
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Although it is li kely t h at a mu nicipal cou r t would al so 
have refuse d to grant Indonesia t he interim meas u r e s requested 
in the Amco Asia Corp. case, t here a re circums tanc e s where a 
municipal court would be far more inclined to grant orders of 
protection than would an ICSID tribu nal. The ma i n reaso n f o r 
the difference in attitudes relates to the prob l em of the 
enforcement of orde rs. The Atlantic Triton case points t he 
problem nicely. As noted above, a French court in that case 
refused to allow attachment orders against three ships because 
of the exclusivity of ICSID remedies. The party t h reatened by 
the dissipation of the assets wo uld have t o as k the arb it ra l 
tribunal to order interim measures. But an ICSID t r ibunal has 
no means of enforcing any order it issues. The attachment of 
property can only operate through state mechanisms of en f orce-
ment which cannot, o f c ourse , r e spo nd to o r de rs o f arbitral 
tribunals. The tribunal would have to rely on the good fait h 
c ompliance of the party against whom the order wa s issued. Bu t 
orde rs of interim pro tection a r e c ommonly r e quested and mos t 
ne ede d precise ly in ci rcumsta nces whe r e such good faith is in 
doubt. 128 The ICSID tribunal sitting in the Atlantic Trito n 
case simply c ould not e n fo rce any attac hment of t he ships ad 
litem. 
128. The issue of interim measures of protectio n is canvassed 
in greater detail infra, Chapter III, tex t accompanying 
notes 294 to 318. Comparisons are there d r awn be tween the 
ICSID system and var ious other systems of a r bi tral rul es . 
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It would appear, then, that in attempting to "interna-
tionalise" the ICSID system, removing any taint of national 
court involvement, the designers may have precluded sometimes 
necessary protective orders. And yet, as pointed out above, the 
procedural system is not quite so simple. In fact, the exclu-
sivity of ICSID is subject to derogations if such derogations 
are agreed to by the parties explicitly. Mr Delaurne has noted 
that: 
(e]xhaustion of local remedies is the only excep-
tion set forth in the Convention to the exclusive 
character of ICSID proceedings. However, the 
parties are free to provide additional exceptions 
to the rule. This may be the case in r egard to 
conservatory measures of protection. 1 2 9 
The parties would have to provide for the resort to municipal 
courts in the agreement to arbitrate . This view was also 
accepted by the French court in Atlantic Triton which stressed 
that parties to an ICSID arbitration could not apply to 
municipal courts for interim measures "unless otherwise agreed 
by the parties". 130 Of course, the great difficulty is that the 
parties often do not have the foresig h t or the political 
capacity expressly to derogate from the principle of ICSID 
exclusivity by providing for the possibility of court-ordered 
interim measures. In all likelihood, an ICSID arb i tration will 
effectively be insulated from the procedural rules of any state. 
In that sense, ICSID procedure is "international". 
129. Delaume, supra, note 68, vol. II, eh. 15, 46. See also 
Delaume, supr~, note 115, 42. 
130 . Revolutionary People's Republic of Guinea et al v . 
Atlantic Triton Co., supra, note 107, 344. 
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The position with regard to the substantive law to be 
applied by ICSID tribunals is less certain. The governing rule 
is contained in art. 42(1) of the ICSID Convention 13 1 which 
provides, in effect, for a three tier system of substantive law. 
Consistent with the over-riding principle of free consent to 
ICSID jurisdiction, an ICSID tribunal is directed to look first 
to the express choice of the parties. If the parties have 
spoken on the issue of substantive law, the tribunal need look 
no further for guidance. Moreover, the choice of the parties 
would appear to be unrestricted: they may choose a national 
system of law, a national system as it exists at a certain date, 
general principles of law, international law, or any combination 
of these systems. 132 Article 42(3) also allows the parties to 
direct an ICSID tribunal to decide a case ex aequo et bono. 
Such a choice will never be implied. 1 3 3 It has been suggested 
that decisions ex aequo et bono may be very appropriate in the 
case of long-term investment contracts. 134 One ICSID tribunal 
has issued such an award.135 
131. Supra, note 69. 
132. See,~, Delaume, supra, note 68, vol. I, eh. 1, 5; 
Broches, supra, note 53, 389; and Broche s, supra, note 73, 
5. 
133. ICSID Convention, supra, note 69. See also Lew, supra, 
note 15, 343; and Broches, supra, note 53, 341. 
134. Broches, supra, note 73, 11. 
135. Benvenuti et Bonfant srl v. People's Republic of the 
Congo, ICSID Award reprinted in (1983) 8 Y.B. Comm. Ar b . 
114. See also Delaume, supra, note 68, vol. II, eh. 15, 
68. 
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A former Secretary-General of ICSID has inplied that there 
may be some circumstances in which the express choice of the 
parties will not be respected fully, If confronted with a 
situation in which the parties have chosen to apply state law 
and the state has subsequently altered its law, Aron Broches has 
suggested that "the application by the Tribunal of international 
law rules is at least permissible to the extent that these rules 
are 'the law of the land' ," 136 Such an attempt at stabilisation 
is disingenuous to say the least, for effectively it ignores the 
expressed will of the parties while purporting to uphold it. 
Just this technique was employed by the International Chamber of 
Commerce tribunal in the SPP (Middle East) Ltd. case which is 
discussed and criticised in a subsequent Chapter. 137 If the 
parties expressly choose the law of a single state, it must be 
presumed that they choose the law of that state simpliciter , and 
not the law of the state plus international law (as incorporated 
in the municipal law of the state), This presumption is justi-
fied if only because the additional reference to international 
law would lead to great uncertainty in the rules to be applied 
to a contract with a private party, and this degree of 
uncertainty is scarcely consistent with the express cho ice of 
law made by the parties. 
136. Broches, suora, note 53, 389. 
137. SPP (Middle East) Ltd. v. Egypt, supra, note 44. ror a 
cr1t1cal evaluation, see infra, Chapter II, text accom-
panying notes 234 to 239. 
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A use ful study suggests tha t, un f o rtunately , many clauses 
submitting disputes to ICSID jurisdic tion c o ntain no e x press 
choice of substanti ve law. 1 3b The ICSID Convention then 
provides for a second and third tier o f rul e s. In the absence 
of party choice, art. 42(1) states that an ICSI D tribunal is to 
apply "the law of the Contracting State party t o t he dispute 
(including its rule s on the conflict o f laws) and s u ch rul e s o f 
international law as may be applicable". The inte nt of the 
drafters of the ICSID Convention clearly was not t o "interna-
tionalise" the applicable law completely. The Preamble to the 
Convention makes this r e ticence c lear, f o r the drafters s eem t o 
assume that many disputes relating to investments would continue 
to be subject to municipal law processe s. 139 No doubt, the 
Preamble was drafted in part to allay the fears o f certain 
deve loping nations which had argue d thro ugho ut t he negoti a ting 
process that international law should have no application to 
investment contracts unles s the parti e s had agreed e xpressly t o 
its application. 1 4 u 
Given the direc tio ns o f art. 42(1), one wo uld a ssume t hat 
an ICSID tri b unal, Eaced with a situation in which no party 
choice was evident, woul d employ the following techn ique. Th e 
138. Broche s, supra, no t e 53, 390. 
139. ICSID Convention, supra, note 69, Preamble. See also 
Broches, 1b1d., 349-.~~ 
140. See,~' Majood, Law Applicable in Arbitrati o n of 
Investment Disputes Under the Wo rld Bank Conventi o n (1973 ) 
15 J. Indian L. I nst. 31 1 , 313. 
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tribunal wo uld loo k f irs t to t he conf licts r ules co ntained in 
the national legal s y stem o f the sta te p a rty. This second tier 
of rules would gui d e the tribunal to the third tier , the 
applicable substantive law. The difficulty arises because o f 
the inclusion in art. 42(1) of ano ther source o f rules of legal 
justification. The precise relat ions h ip between "s u ch rules of 
international law as may be applicable " and the otherwise 
controlling system of national law is u nclear. 1 4 1 Moore has 
argued that international law is merely "supplementary" 142 to 
the national law, but that phraseology could le a d one undu 1l y t o 
discount the rol e that internatio nal leg a l principles play i n 
ICSID arbitration. Mr Broches has articulated the better 
position with cogency: 
My submission as to the relatio nship be tween the 
law of the host State a nd inte rnationa l law in the 
second sentence of 42(1) i s as f o llows . The 
Tribunal will first look at the law of the host 
State and that law will in the first instance be 
141. See, ~, Branson & Tupman, supra, no te 28, . 930. 
142. Moore, supra, note 65, 1379. In the agreement submit t i ng 
their investment dispute to ICSID, AGIP Co SpA and the 
Congolese government provided that the tribunal was to 
apply "Congolese Law, suppleme n ted if necessary by any 
principles of international law". But it is important t o 
remember that such a clause c onstitutes an exp r e ss choice 
of law, and that art. 42(1) itself contains no wo rds wh ich 
necessarily imply a s e conda r y status f o r the rules o f 
international law. In the e nd , the Tribunal f o und tha t 
the nationalisation undertaken by the Congolese government 
was contrary to Congolese law, so that application of 
international law was unnecessary. AGIP Co. SpA v. 
Government of the Popular Republic of the Cong o, supra, 
note 123, especially at 133-4. 
- 73 -
applied to the merits of the dispute. Then the 
result will be tested against international law. 
That process will not involve the confirmation or 
denial of the validity of the host State's law, but 
may result in not applying it where that law, or 
action taken under that law, violates international 
law. In that sense ..• international law is 
hierarchically superior to national law under 
Article 42(1). 143 
The Executive Directors of the World Bank have indicated clearly 
that they understand the invocation of "internationa l law" in 
art. 42(1) to refer to the sources of law listed in art. 38(1 ) 
of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. 144 It is 
therefore interesting that when the draft of art. 42(1) was 
being discussed, and experts from many developing states argued 
against the application of international law to relations 
between states and foreign private parties, the objection was 
met by the response of the future ICSID Secre tary -General that 
in fac t "international law" as applied in these cases would 
comprise only such basic principles as pacta sunt servanda and 
good faith. 14 ~ It will be argued in a subsequent Chapter that 
the latter view is essent ially correct because international l aw 
simply does not contain a well elaborated system of commercial 
law,146 
An excellent example of the possible interplay betwee n 
municipa l and international law, and the confusion that may 
143. Broches, supra, note 53, 392. 
144. International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 
supra, note 53, 530. 
145. Reported in Majood, supra, note 140 , 315. 
146. See infra, Chapter II, text accompanying notes 201 to 263. 
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result, is found in the Amco Asia case. In 1968, a United 
States investor entered into a long-term investment in an 
Indonesian Hotel, concluding as well a separate management 
contract with an Indonesian corporation that owned the land on 
which the hotel was built. In 1980, the government withdrew its 
investment authorisation, citing the investor's failure to 
perform adequately, and the hotel was seized by the Indonesian 
corporation in an action that the Tribunal held would not have 
been imputed to the government had it not been for the army's 
active part icipation in the seizure. 1 47 The parties had not 
chosen any governing law, so the Tribunal found that it was 
bound "to apply Indonesian law, which is the law of the Con-
tracting State party to the dispute, and such rules of inter-
national law as the Tribunal deems to be applicable", 1 4 8 an 
approach fully consonant with art. 42(1) of the ICSID 
Convention. 
As its governing principle, the Tribunal adopted the 
well-worn maxim pacta sunt servanda, which was held to be a 
basic notion common to Indonesian and international law. 14 9 
When greater specificity was required, however, the Tribunal 
seemed to founder. In l ook ing at the investment contract 
147. Amco Asia Corp. et al. v. Republic of Indonesia (Merits), 
ICSID Award of 21 November 1984, reprinted in ( 1985) 24 
I.L.M. 1022, 1024-6 (hereinafter Amco Asia]. 
148. Ibid., 1023. 
149. Ibid., 1033-5. 
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between the government and the foreign corporat i on , the Tribunal 
refused to draw an analogy with the French doctrine of contrats 
administratifs, 1 ~ 0 because that doctrine was not a "general 
principle of law". 1 ~ 1 But the Tribunal admitted that the 
investment contract was "not identical to a private law con-
tract, due to the fact that the state is entitled [unilaterally] 
to withdraw the approval it granted". 1 ~~ Falling back on the 
safe refuge of imprecision, the Tribunal held that the legal 
relationship was sui generis and only analogous t o contract. 1 ~ 3 
Whether that sui generis relationship fell within the regime of 
Indone sian or of international l aw was, perhaps wisely, not 
discussed. 
International legal principles were employed to assert 
that there exists a fundamental right to nationalise for a 
nation's "public interest and welfare", but that when national-
isation occurs, compensation must be paid. 154 Furthermore, it 
was asserted that: 
150. 
the full compensation o f prejudice, by awarding t o 
the injured party the damnum emergens and the 
lucrum cessans is a principle common to the main 
For a full discussion of this doctrine, see infra, Chapter 
III, text accompanying notes 260 to 276. 
151. Amco Asia, supra, note 147, 1027-8. 
152. 
15 3. 
154. 
Ibid., 1029. 
Ibid., 1030. 
Ibid., 1029-30. 
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systems of municipal law, and therefore, a ge neral 
principle of law which may be considered as a 
source of international law, 1 ~~ 
If the Tribunal were really applying international law, one 
might have expected a more fulsome discussion of t he authorities 
in support of this important proposition. In fact, it will be 
argued in a subsequent chapter that t he position in interna-
tional law regarding the awarding of damages for l oss of future 
profits is much more complicated than this ICSID Tribunal would 
have us believe. Even in systems of municipal law, there is no 
consensus that the loss of future profits will he awarded when a 
state breaches a public contract, 1 56 The Tribunal's unexplained 
invocation of "international law" obfuscates rather than 
clarifies the situation. In a similar vein, the Tribunal 
"doubted" that restitutio in integrum could be ordered against a 
sove reign state. 1 ~7 Although, for practical r easons , that doubt 
is probably justified, the point merits some elaboration given 
that a number of important tribunals have reached a contra-
dictory conclusion , most notably the Permanent Court of Interna-
tional Justice . 1 58 
155. Ibid., 1036-7. 
156. See infra, Chapter III, text accompanying no tes 271 to 
274. Interestingly , when the Tribunal made its award for 
damages, it establ ished only a lump sum , making it 
impossible to know how much was actually awarded for the 
loss of future profits. Ibid., 1039. 
157. Ibid., 1032. 
158. Case Concerning__the Facto r y at Chorzo w (Indemnity Merits) , 
P . C.I.J., Ser.A, No . 13 (1928) 47. See a lso Texaco Over-
seas Petroleum Co. and California Asiatic Oil Co. v. The 
Government of the Libyan Arab Republic (Merits ) , decision 
of 19 January 1977, reprinted in 53 I.L.R. 389 , 422. 
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A lack of precision and some wilful obfuscation may be 
forgiven in arbitral tribunals, the members of which must 
struggle to produce a majority op inion , often in the face o f 
great antipathy between the parties, However, in attempting t o 
apply art, 42(1) and to mesh a municipal with the international 
legal system, the Tribunal in the Amco Asia case fell into at 
least one dangerous trap. In finding that the seizure of the 
previously foreign-owned hotel could be imputed to the govern-
ment because of the involvement of armed forces personnel in the 
seizure, the Tribunal went on to say that the state 's involve-
ment amounted to an internationa lly wrongful act for which 
Indonesia was internationally responsible. 159 There is no d oubt 
that such a seizure would prima facie amount t o an interna-
tionally wrongful act, but the responsibility for such an act is 
engaged, it must be remembered, vis! vis the nationa l state of 
the expropriated party. By using the terminology of state 
responsibility, without caveat, in the context of an arbitration 
between a state and a foreign private party, the Tribunal 
muddled the true relationship of the parties. One is a state, 
the other has been granted by its own st a te the right directly 
to pursue a claim that would normally be the object of state 
espousal. Because ICSID tribunals are given the right to apply 
inte rnationa l law (in the absence of party choice), it is all 
too easy to forget the principle of subrogation that underlies 
that ability. That is not to say that the rights of a state and 
159. Amco Asia, supra, note 147, 1026. 
- 78 -
of its nati o nal are utterly distinct. 16 0 The ri gh ts arise out 
of the same facts and the remedies may overlap. But one dis-
tinction is esse ntial. 
Under basic principles of international law, the remedies 
for a private investor will typically arise s o lely from its 
contractual relationship with the host state. The private pa rty 
canno t invoke the principles of state responsibility directly. 
How far does the ICSID regime alte r those genera l principles? 
Eli Lauterpacht has set the issue clearly: 
The central question here is: to what extent does 
this paragraph authori ze the Tri bunal t o app ly 
public international law to the disputes brought 
before it, not simply as a source of rules to be 
applied by analogy for the interpretation of an 
agreement, but as if the Tribunal were sitting to 
consider the matter as an international claim of 
the investor espoused by his o wn national State 
against the State party t o the agree ment. 1 61 
The r esponse o f some commentators is that the ICSID regime turns 
the world upside down. Vuylsteke has suggested that one oE t he 
most important featur e s o f the ICSID Convention is its complete 
"internationalisatio n" o f the arbitrat i on agreement, the 
arbitral pro cedure and of the obligations of the parties. 1 6 2 
Delaume has callerl ICSID arbitration proceedings and the sub-
160. See, ~' the warning of Lauterpach t, "The World Bank 
Convention on the Settlement of International Investment 
Disputes" in Recueil d'§tudes de droit international e n 
hommage a Paul Guggenheim (1968) 660. 
161. Ibid., 665. 
162. Vuylst e ke , sup r a , no te 73, 3 48 and 349. 
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sequent awards "truly international". 163 The claim has been 
advanced most EorceEully by Broches: 
Under the Convention, mutual consent has the efEect 
of elevating agreement between a private company 
and a State to have recourse to ICSID conciliation 
or arbitration to the level of an international 
legal obligation, and to that extent the Convention 
constitutes the private company a subject of inter-
national law. 164 
The U.S. State Department's position, as expressed in hearings 
before a Congressional Committee considering the U.S. legisla-
tion to implement the ICSID Convention, would appear to accord 
with Mr Broches' view. The Deputy Legal Adviser suggested that 
arbitrations under the Convention would "create a significant 
new body of international law ... without the restriction of the 
traditional principle that only states and not private parties 
are the subject of international law". 16 ~ 
It will be suggested that the theories promoting the full 
international legal status of ICSID arbitrations are mistaken, 
but to evaluate these striking claims fairly, it is Eirst 
necessary to examine a final aspect of the ICSID regime, the 
enforcement of awards, for it is probably the most significant 
163. Delaume, suora, note 91, 784; and Delaume, supra, note 68, 
vol. II, eh. 15, 70. 
164. Broches, supra, note 53, 352. Odd l y enough , in a 
different forum, Broches has argued that "[a]rbitration 
proceedings under the Convention partake of both public 
international and private international arbitration". 
Broches, supra, note 73, 5. It will be argued that this 
description is more accurate than the theory advanced by 
Broches that is quoted in the text. 
165. Lowenfeld Statement, supra, note 65, 822. 
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contribution of the designers of ICSID to the law of arbitration 
between states and foreign private parties. Indeed, the 
enforcement regime of ICSID can be viewed as the linch-pin of 
that entire system. At first glance, it is also the strongest 
argument in favour of the theory of full internationalisation, 
although it will be argued that the initial impression is 
misleading. 
iii. The ICSID Enforcement Regime 
All states party to the ICSID Convention are required, 
under art . 54, to recognise an ICSID a wacd as binding and t o 
enforce the pecuniary obligations established by the award as if 
it were a final judgment of a munic ipal court in the state where 
enforcement is sought ,l bb All that should formally be required 
is the presentation of a copy of the award, certified as 
authentic by the ICSID Secretary-General. · There are no permis-
sible grounds for challenge before domestic courts . In striki ng 
contrast to the New York Convention on the Recognition and 
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 167 even the public 
policy of the forum where enforcement is sought is excluded from 
166, ICSID Convention, supra, note 69, See also Internatio nal 
Bank for Reconstruct i on and Deve lopment, supra, note 54, 
530; Broches, supra, note 54 , 400; and Delaume, Economic 
Development and Sovereign Immunity (1985) 79 Am . J, Int'l 
L. 319, 343. 
167. (Signed 10 June 1958; entered into force 7 June 1959) 330 
UNTS 38, reprinted in (1968) 7 I.L.M. 1046. For a full 
discussion of the enforcement regime of the New York 
Convention , see infra, Chapter III. 
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application. In other words, an award that would offend the 
basic public policy of the f orum must still be recognised and 
the pecuniary obligations enforced. 168 Only domestic cules 
concerning the execution of judgments per se will continue to 
apply. 169 The sole limitation upon enforcement would appear to 
be the requirement that only ''pecuniary" awards be enforced. 
Injunctions issued by an ICSID tribuna l are not c ove red by the 
facilitated enforcement regime. 
Such cursory examination of the ICSID Convention could 
give the impression that execution will be enhanced greatly in 
a ll circumstances. In fact , serious enforcemen t pro blems 
remain. These difficulties result primarily from the essential 
incongruity in the ICSID regime between parties who have 
different and unequal standing in the international community. 
Because the ICSID enforcement regime still relies upon the 
action of municipal courts, the unequal status of the parties 
causes continuing problems. 170 In the end, parties to ICSID 
awards may even find that they are required to rely upon 
168. See,~, Carbonneau, Arbitral Adjudication, supra, note 
49, 95-6; Delaume, supra, note 91, 801; Delaume, suora, 
note 115, 36; Schmidt, supra, note 62, 105; Vuylsteke, 
supra, note 72, 358; and Branson & Tupman, supra, note 28 , 
936. 
169. ICSID Convention, supra, note 69, art. 54(3). See also 
Schmidt, ibid.; and Broches, supra, note 53, 401. 
170. These problems unde rscore the great value of independent 
enforcement mechanisms such as the one designed for the 
use of parties before the Iran-United Claims Tribunal. 
See the discussion, infr~, Chapter IV, t e xt accompanying 
notes 359 to 373. 
- 82 -
traditional methods of espousal and diplomacy in order to 
enforce valid awards. 
The most significant problems with enforcement are likely 
to confront the private investor who has been successful in an 
ICSID arbitration. The cause of the problems is the distinction 
allowed in the ICSID Convention between the stages of "recogni-
tion" and "enforcement". The effect of that distinction is 
that, although consent to ICSID jurisdiction can be seen as an 
irrevocable waiver of a state's traditional immunity from 
suit, 171 no concurrent waiver of immunity from execution is 
i r11pl ied. Indeed, art. 55 of the Convention provides expressly 
that the rules concerning sovereign immunity from execution that 
are found in the national law of the enforcing jurisdiction 
remain applicable. 172 An excellent example of the practical 
effect of the distinction between recognition and enforcement is 
found in the Cour d'appel de Paris judgment in the Benvenuti and 
Bonfant case. 173 The foreign investor had benefitted F.com a 
favourable ICSID awacd rendered in 1980 which it immediately 
sought to enforce in France. The President of the Parisian 
171. 
172. 
173. 
See,~, Delaume, supra, note 115, 38. 
See, e.a., Von Mehren & Croff, "International Arbitration 
BetweenJ?rivate Parties and Governments: Treaty and 
Statutory Developments" in G. Aksen & R. Von Mehren, 
International Arbitration between Private Parties and 
Governments (1982) (Handbook 399 of the U.S. Practising 
Law Institute) 101-2; and Delaume, supra, note 166, 343. 
Benvenuti & Bonfant Co . v. Government of the People's 
Republic of Congo (Cour d ' appel de Paris, 6 June 1931), 
repcinted in (1981) 20 I.L.M. 878 (France). 
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court of first instance granted recognition, but made it subject 
to the following reservation: 
We rule that no measure of execution , or even a 
conservatory measure , can be taken pursuant to said 
award, on any assets located in France without 
prior authorization. 174 
The foreign investor appealed against that reservation and t' e 
Cour d'appel struck it down in what would at first seem to be a 
ringing endorsement of ICSID exclusivity. The Court held that 
under art. 54 of the ICSID Convention, the role of a domestic 
court is simply to determine the authenticity of an award as 
certified by the ICSID Secretary-General. 17 ~ If it is authen-
tic, recognition should be granted. But the Court then made it 
clea r that recognition and enforcement are two distinct stages: 
the order for recognition did "not constitute a measu re of 
execution but [was] only a decision preceding possible measures 
of execution". 176 The reservation of the President of the court 
of first instance was struck down , it would seem, only because 
it was an unnecessary addition to an order that would have no 
impact upon the ultinate execution oE the arbitral award in any 
case. When the foreign private party applies Ear execution 
per se, it nay still be confronted with a sovereign immunity 
defence that is per fectly allowable under the ICSID regime. 
174. Quoted in ibid., 879. 
175. 
176. 
Ibid., 881. 
Ibid. 
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Luzzatto points out that the issue of sovereign immunity 
is a very sensitive one in international law,17 7 and it would 
have been difficult for the drafters of the ICSID Convention to 
exclude its application at the stage of enforcement. The number 
. of ratifications would probably have been reduced greatly. There 
can be no doubt, however, that the failure to restrict the 
sovereign immunity defence to enforcement undermines seriously 
the gains otherwise achieved in the ICSID Convention. 178 Moore 
points out that "from the private investor's viewpoint, the 
Convention does not go far enough in affording execution 
remedies". 179 Reisman would have preferred that the Convention 
or a separate protocol contain "a divesting clause, whereby 
state parties surrender iRmunity claims for enforcement of 
awards"~ 180 but political reality made such a clause unlikely. 
Nevertheless, if the foreign investor is in a strong bargaining 
position, it is possible for the parties to an ICSID arbitration 
to agree in advance that the state will waive its immunity from 
177 Luzzatto, International Commercial Arbitration and the 
Municioal Law of States (1977) 157 Ree. des cours 9, 99. 
178. Even the Executive Directors of the World Bank felt 
comoelled to note that "[t]he doctrine of sovereign 
imm~nity may prevent the forced execution in a State of 
judgments obtained against foreign States". Interna tional 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development, supra, note 53, 
530. 
179. Moore, supra, note 65, 1378. See also Carbonneau, 
Arbitral Adjudication, supra, note 49, 97. 
180. W.Michael Reisman, Nullity and Revision: The Review and 
Enforcement of International Judgments and Awards (1971) 
835. 
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execution. 181 
Mr Delaume has attempted t o colour the picture a rosier 
hue by emphasising the growing acceptance of "restrictive" 
doctrines of immunity. He believes that as restrictive immu n ity 
gains ground "it can only contribute to giving a new practical 
significance to ICSID awards". 182 Unfortunately, this view is 
probably too optimistic. Even with the growing acceptance of 
restrictive theories of immunity, no broad consensus has emerged 
concerning immunity from enforcement. Cases such as Maritime 
International Nominees Establishment show that even when states 
implement legislation f o unded upon "restrictive '' theories of 
immunity, courts cannot always be convinced to grant enforcement 
against a state. 183 The issue of sovereign immunity is can-
------ --- -----
181. See,~' Delaume, supra, note 68, vol. II, eh. 15, 47 
and 75-6. 
182. Delaume, ibid., 75; and Delaume, supl'.'a, note 91, 800. 
Mr Delaume believes that the rest r ictive doctr i ne of 
immunity will bolster ICSID awal'.'d s because it will ease 
the enforcement of awards against state assets that are 
destined for commercial use. 
183. Maritime International Nominees Establishment v. Republic 
of Guinea, 693 E'. 2d 1094 (D.C. Cir. 1982), reprinted i n 
( 1982) 21 I.L.M. 1355 as am. ( 1983) 22 I.L.M. 86 ( cert. 
den. 104 s. Ct 71 (1983)) (U.S.). The parties had 
initially provided for ICSID arbitl'.'ation, but Guinea l ate!'.' 
refused to submit the dispute, preferring instead to 
proceed to arbitration under the auspices of the American 
Arbitration Association. When the award was rendered 
against Guinea, the state sought to pl'.'event enforcement, 
claiming sovereign immunity. The claim was rejected by 
the court of first instance, but was accepted by the 
Circuit Court of Appeal which therefore ruled that it had 
no subject matter jurisdiction to confirm the AAA award. 
The initial agreemen t upon ICSID arbitration was held not 
to constitute a waiver of immunity from enforcement. 
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vassed in detail in a later Chapter 1 8 4 but for present purposes 
only one point need be emphasised: the ICSID Convention does not 
exclude the application of municipal law t heories of sovereign 
immunity that will commonly frustrate the execution of ICSID 
awards rendered against states. The system is not as "selE-
contained" as at Eirst it might appear, nor as "international", 
if that term is used to mean "beyond the reach of municipal 
law". 
Certain authors have suggested that a state party that 
invokes sovereign immunity to prevent execution would be in 
breach of its obligation under art. 53(1) to recognise the 
"binding" quality of ICSID awards and to give them effect. l B~ 
Although this reading of art. 53(1) is cogent, it is important 
to note that the Convention here Eails to provide any institu-
tional re~edies. Indeed, two of the Convention's most vocal 
supporters have admitted that the only remedies would be the 
right of diplomatic protection exercised by the national state 
of the foreign investor (only after the award has b e en rendered 
and enforcement frustrated) 186 and, if the dispute related to 
184. See infra, Chapter III, text accompanying notes 132 to 
170. 
185. Delaume, suora , no te 68, vol. II, eh . 15, 77; Carbonne au, 
Arbitral Adjudication, supra, note 49, 96; and Moore, 
supra, note 65, 1372. 
186. See art. 27 ICSID Convention, supra, note 69, which states 
that once an ICSID proceeding has been consented to by the 
parties, the national state of the foreign investor cannot 
exercise any form o f diplomatic protection. The r i ght o f 
(cont'd.) 
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the interpretation of the Convention, recourse under art. 64 of 
the Convention to the International Court of Justice. 187 
Clearly, when serious issues of public international law are 
involved, parties to ICSID arbitrations may find themselves 
thrown back upon pure "international" remedies. 
Nor is it solely the foreign private party that may find 
itself forced to resort t o recourses outside the Convention. A 
state that is a successful party to an ICSID award may also dis-
cover that the enforcement system is not truly "self-contained". 
Again, the problem is caused by the unequal status of the 
parties in an ICSID arbitration. Vuylsteke has written that 
"the enforcement of the award is an international obligation not 
only for both parties to the proceedings but also t he award is 
valid and enforceable in the jurisdictio n of all Contracting 
States". 188 The first part of the statement is quite funda-
mentally wrong because the nature of the obligations of each 
diplomatic protection springs back to life if the obliga-
tions of the parties to respect the award are breached. 
See generally, Sirefman, The Work Ba~Plan for Investment 
Dispute Arbitration (1965) 20 Arb. J. 168, 175. 
187. Delaume, supra , note 68, Vol. II, Ch. 15, 77-8; Broches, 
supra, note 73, 7; and Broches, supra, note 53, 344. See d" 
also United States. Senate ~ Committee on Foreign 
Relations, 29 March 1966, r~printed in (1966) 5 I.L.M. 649 
(Statement of Joseph W. Barr, Under Secretary of the 
Treasury) 660. 
188. Vuylsteke, supra, note 72, 360. 
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party is not, strictly speaking, equivalent. 189 The state party 
has indeed bound itself "internationally" to enforce an award, 
but the foreign investor is only bound contractually by virtue 
of the agreement submitting the dispute to ICSID arbitration. 
It is the national state of the investor, as a party to the 
ICSID Convention, that is subject to an international obligation 
to enforce the award, but that obligation is the same as that 
imposed upon all states party to the Convention. 
In the end, if the foreign investor fails to comply with 
an award, the host state has no international law recourses 
ayainst the breaching investor. The state must hope that other 
contracting states fulfill their enforcement obligations. 190 If 
they do not do so, the remedies available are only those arising 
from public international law. Again, the ICSID system would 
prove itself to be far from "self-contained". 
It is now possible to evaluate the claims made by certain 
proponents of ICSID that its processes are part of the system of 
international law, In support of that proposition one can 
adduce some solid evidence. First, the ICSID regime is the 
------------ -
189. Vuylsteke is probably guilty of little more than impreci -
sion in phrasing this statement, for elsewhere he seems to 
distinguish private and public remedies clearly: "The 
Convention is designed to replace the classical pattern of 
diplomatic protection; principles of interstate responsi-
bility do not apply to claimants under it." Ibid., 357. 
190. The assumption here, of course, is that the foreign 
investor does not have enough property in the host sta te 
to satisfy the terms of the award. If there is enough 0 
property in situ~, the host state is in a very strong 
position. ' 
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creature of a multilateral treaty. Secondly, the procedure 
governing an ICSID tribunal can be fully delocalised (although 
it is not necessarily so). Thirdly, the Convention provision 
regarding substantive law provides for the possible application 
of international law in an ICSID arbitration. Finally, the 
enforcement regime of ICSID is designed to discourage any 
involvement of municipal courts or law. An award may not even 
be challenged on gr_ounds of public policy. 
But the preceding discussion has shown that most of these 
indicia of internationalisation are subject to important 
caveats. Although the ICSID Convention is an international 
treaty, the parties to a given ICSID arbitration are not of 
equivalent status. The foreign investor is simply subrogated in 
the internationally postulated rights of its national state. 
Aron Broches has argued a contrary position: 
From the legal point of view, the most striking 
feature of the Convention is that it firmly 
establishes the capacity of a private individual or 
a corporation to proceed directly against a State 
in an international forum, thus contributing to the 
growing recognition of the individual as a subject 
of international law. 191 
There are two major problems with this argument. Most important 
is the essentially inverse reasoning. The "capacity of a 
private individual or a corporation to proceed directly against 
a State" remains a limited exception to the first principles of 
international law, It is only because states agreed in a 
191. Broches, supra, note 53, 349. 
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multilateral convention to subrogate certain of t heir rights of 
action that non-state parties can "proceed directly against a 
State". It is hard to see how such an exceptional ab ility is 
part of a "growing recognition of the individual as a subject of 
international law." 
That assertion reveals another serious problem. Mr 
Broches has attempted to link the rights of indi vidua ls and of 
corporations, seeming to equate their moral positions. Few 
people would deny that the second half of the twentieth century 
has seen a burgeoning recognition of human rights within the 
international legal order. This development will be discussed 
in a subsequent Chapter. 19 ~ The growing content oE the 
international law of human rights attests to the heightened 
status of individuals under international law, That increased 
status is based upon fundamental principles of human dignity. 
No equivalent moral position has yet been ascribed to corpora-
tions; "corporate dignity" is not yet exalted, e v en in Western 
capitalist states, as a fundamental truth. Therefore, to link 
the strictly limited ability of a corporation to plead a com-
mercial claim directly against a state in an ICSID arbitration 
(and the vast majority of investors will be corporations) with 
the "growing recognition of the individual as a sub j ect of 
international law" is simply incoherent. Corporations and 
individual investors have been granted an exceptional ability to 
plead before ICSID tribunals, but they are not therefore equated 
192. See infra, Chapter II, text accompanying notes 241 to 254. 
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with states. This fact undercuts assertions that ICSID arbitra-
tion is a creature of international law. 
Any claim of full international status is also contra-
dicted by the limitations that are necessarily placed upon the 
subrogation of the state's international rights in the private 
investor. Although art. 27 of the ICSID Convention precludes 
the national state of the foreign investor from exercising its 
right of diplomatic protection once a dispute has been submitted 
to ICSio, 193 if the state party refuses to abide by the ICSID 
award and if execution becomes impossible, the right of 
diplomatic protection revives. 194 The private foreign investor 
itself has no further international recourses and must rely on 
its national state to espouse its claim. 
Other refinements to the general principle that the ICSID 
system is "self-contained" also challenge the claim of full 
internationalisation. These refinements have all been discussed 
193. ICSID Convention, supra, note 69, art. 27(1). See also 
Sirefman, suora, note 186, 175; Schwarzenberger, "The 
Arbitration Pattern and the Protection of Property Abroad" 
in P. Sanders, ed., International Arbitration Liber 
Amicorum for Martin Domke (1967) 313, 317; and Radley, 
Some Aspects of the World Bank Convention on the Settle-
ment of Investment Disputes (1966) 4 Can. Y.B . Int'l L. 
43, 53. It should be noted that art. 27(2) of the 
Convention excluded from the definition of "diplomati c 
protection" any "informal diplomatic exchanges for the 
sole purpose of facilitating a settlement of the 
dispute". 
194. The right revives as soon as the state party "shall have 
failed to abide by and comply wi t h the award rendered in 
such dispute." ICSID Convention, ibid., art. 27(1). See 
also Broches, supra, note 53, 371; and Delaurne, supra, 
note 68, vol. II, eh. 15, 45. 
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above and need merely be rehearsed b r ieEly here. For example, 
ICSID procedure will not necessarily be insulated from the rules 
of a national lega l syste m bec a use the parti e s can agree to be 
governed by a municipal system of pro ceedural rules. As con-
cerns the substantive law to be appl i ed by the ICSID tribunal, 
the general rule is that, in the absence of party choice, the 
domestic law of the state party will apply in conjunction with 
principles of international law. No international law tribunal 
would be called upon to apply municipal law as a fundamental a nd 
independent source of legal justification. Finally, and most 
importantly, whe n sta te-sa nctione d e n f orcement is required, the 
ICSID Convention allows municipal laws governing t he defence o E 
sovereign immunity to apply, thereby p r ecluding execution of 
awards against state s in many jurisd i ctions. 
A balanced evaluation of the ICSID regime leads to the 
conclusion that an ICSID tribunal is a mixed creature, part 
private and part public. Although, as Julian Lew suggests, the 
ICSID Secretariat is a public in t ernational insti tu t i on s e t u p 
by virtue of an inte rna tio na l tre aty, particular tr ibunals set 
up under the auspices of ICSID are not international, but 
partake o f public law and private law p rinciples a nd struc-
tures. 19 5 
The co nclusion that an ICSID tribunal has a mixed vocation 
is not surprising, given the institutional mandate wh ich is t o 
195. See g e nerally Lew, supra, no te 15, 21. For a s omewhat 
mo re extre me f o rmulat i on of a n I CSID tri b u nal' s "mixed " 
nature, see Schwarze nberger, supra, note 193, 318. 
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resolve investment disputes between states and foreign pcivate 
parties. It is ICSID's vocation to be sensitive both to private 
contractual regimes and to basic principles of international 
law. Indeed, its pre-eminent concern is to provide a forum that 
will tend to "depoliticise" disputes that would otherwise be the 
subject, at first instance, of inter-state claims. 1 ~ 0 To 
fulfill that role effectively, it may be important that ICSID 
arbitration is not viewed as an "international" forum. 
treated as an international process, the full panoply of 
If it is 
sovereignty and self-determination issues may be invoked by 
states to justify non-participation. With this concern in mind, 
it is now opportune to examine an intensely practical issue: 
the extremely sparse use of the ICSID regime. 
iv. The Under-Utilisation of ICSID 
Throughout its relatively short history, ICSID has been 
plagued by the failure of parties to submit disputes. As noted 
above, the process of consent to ICSID jurisdiction has two 
distinct stages, ratification of the Convention by states and 
submission of concrete disputes. Although the first stage has 
attracted many adherents, the second stage seems to have 
presented a barrier for many parties. 
196. See,~' Sullivan, Implicit Waiver of Sovereign Immunity 
by Consent to Arbitration: Terr1tor1al Scope and 
Procedural Limits-rl983)--rs-Texas Int'l L.J. 329, 334. 
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As of 1984, over ninety states had signed t he ICSID 
Convention and fully eighty-eight oE those states had become 
party through ratification. 197 These figures compare most 
favourably with the ratification statistics of other multi-
lateral arbitration treaties. The most revealing comparison may 
be drawn with the New York Convention on the Recognition and 
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 198 the only other multi-
lateral arbitral convention designed to apply globally. By 
1934, the New York Convention had been ratified by sixty-seven 
states. 199 Most of the major Western industrial states are 
party to the ICSID Convention, although Australia has not yet 
ratified the Convention. Apart from Romania, no COMECON states 
are party to the Convention. 2 uu After initially refusing~ 
bloc to become members of ICSID, 201 there has recently been some 
softening in the Latin kmerican po sition, with Paraguay and El 
Salvador ratifying and Costa Rica signing the Convention. 202 
197. Reported in (1986] Rev. de l'arb. 144 (No. 1). 
198. Supra, note 167. For a complete discussion, see infra, 
Chapter III. 
199. Reported in (1986) Rev. de l'arb. 143 (No. 1). 
200. International Centre for Settlement of Investment 
Disputes, supra, note oO, 18-9. Yugoslavia is also a 
party. 
201. See,~' Broches, supra, note 73, 3. 
202. International Centre for Settlement of Investment 
Disputes, supra, note 60, 6. See also Kemby, supra, note 
70, 225-6. 
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Despite the widespread ratification of the ICSID 
Convention, Aron Broches was certainly not overstating the case 
when he wrote that "advance acceptance of the Centre's jurisdic-
tion has not resulted in a large number of cases, 112 03 Indeed, 
from the entry into force of the ICSID Convention in 1966 to t he 
end of the 1983-4 reporting year, only eighteen cases had been 
submitted to ICSID jurisdiction, two of which were submitted for 
conciliation, Only eleven of the disputes had been terminated, 
seven through settlement or discontinuance, meaning that only 
four awards had been issued. 204 No awards ha ve been made public 
since the 1984 ICSID Annual Report was released. 
ICSID proponents have sought to draw favoura ble inferences 
fro~ these statistics. Aron Broches has suggested that: 
both the small number of cases and the high 
incidence of s e ttlement by mutual agreement after 
the institution of proceedings are a n eloquent 
demonstration oE the strong ind ucement toward 
amicable settlemen t provided by binding arbitration 
agreements. 205 
In a similar vein, Georges Delaume has argued that the exc lusive 
nature of ICSID arbitration and the facilit ated enforcement 
mechanisms may promote compromise in the wish to a void proceed-
ings, He opined furthermore that because of: 
the usually protracted duration of investments and 
the fact that disputes rarely occur in the ini t ial 
years of association betwee n the hos t sta t e and 
203. Broches, supra, note 103, 374. 
204. ICSID, supra, note 60, 8-9. See also Delaume, supra, note 
68, vol. II, eh. 15, 69. 
205. Broches, supra, note 103, 374, 
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investors, it was expected tha t, in the early years 
of ICSID, the number of ICSID proceed ings s hould be limited. 206 
Although these explanations no doubt have merit, o ne 
senses elements of desperate justification. For example, 
Broches' suggestion that the "high incidence of settlement by 
mutual consent after the institution of proceedings" demon-
strates ICSID's ability t o promote comprise is somewhat strained 
when one remembers that he is referring to a total sample of 
only sixteen cases. Delaume's argument that "disputes rarely 
occur in the initial years of assoc ia tion" also strains credu-
lity when one remembers that ICSID has now been in operation for 
twenty years. Although it is true that the pace of submission 
of disputes has quickened somewhat in the 1980s, 207 no over-
whelming increase in submissions has occurred. Indeed in 
1983-4, only two r equests for arbitration were lodged. 2 Ub 
Despite the fact that a large proportion of contemporary 
bilateral investment treaties refer to ICSID arbitration, 209 
underscoring the apparent willingness of states to accept ICSID 
jurisdiction in theory, few concre te d isputes are submitted. 
The reasons offered by Delaume and Broches, although plausible, 
206. Delaume, supra, note 68, vol. II , eh. 15, 2. 
207. ICSID, supra, note 60, 8. 
208. Ibid., 7. One request for conciliation was also sub-
mitted, 
209 . Kemby reports that o ut of the roughly 200 bilateral 
investment treati es concluded since 1973, sixty-seven 
include clauses choosing "ICSID as the proper d i spu te 
r esolution mechanism" . Kemby , supra, note 70, 225-6. 
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are not exhaustive. It will be instructive to canvas s briefly 
some of the more negati ve reasons that have been offered to 
explain ICSID's highly limited case load. 
To begin with relatively rninor- concerns, it has been 
suggested that ICSID proceedings are too slow. In the first 
eleven ICSID arbitrations, "the average time for constituting 
the tribunal was eight to nine months" 2 10 even though the rules 
require constitution within a much shorter period. The relative 
lassitude continued through the process with the average period 
for completion of an ICSID arbitration being estimated at 
between two-and-a-half 21 1 and three 212 years. Such delays can 
be serious if capital is paralysed. 2l 3 On the other hand, it is 
difficult to imagine an international method of third party 
dispute resolution that would inevitably provide speedier 
justice, Ad hoe arbitration does not tend to be any more 
expeditious. 
Nor are high costs, a charge sometimes levelled at ICSID, 
a problem limited to institutional arbitration. Indeed, the 
cost of an ICSID arbitration is quite rigorously controlled. 
The fee to register a dispute is only $100 (U.S.). As of 
1 January 1985, arbitrato r-s' Eees were limited to $500 (U.S.) 
-----·--·------
210. Branson & Tupman, supra, note 28, 925. 
211. Delaume, sunra, note 68, vol. II, eh, 15, SO. 
212. 
213. 
Gopal, supra, note 57, 594. 
Ibid. 
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per day and ICSID cha rges o nly its c osts as admi nis t rative 
expenses, typically divided equally a mongst the p arties. The 
f e es and expenses o f arbitrato rs have amc unted to no more than 
five per cent of the value of any ICSID award and have ranged as 
low as one per cent.21 4 
It has also been sugge ste d that one o f the reasons for 
ICSID's lack of activity is that its service s are "poorly 
publicized". 215 The large number of ratifications to the 
Convention wo uld seem to belie that fact. Moreovec , as is 
apparent from the citations contained here, two Secretaries-
General of ICSID, Messrs Broches and Delaume, ha ve made heroic 
efforts to acquaint the legal public (which is presumably a 
major pool for investment contract negotiators) with ICSID's 
services, 
The more substantial reasons offered to explain the 
paucity of ICSID cases are all related, not surprisingly, to 
particular conceptions of state sovereignty and pub l i c policy. 
Profe s s o r Schwarzenberge r h a s comme nt e d upo n "the u nwillingness 
of most capital-importing Sta tes to commit themselves in any 
binding form to any truly international jurisdiction". 216 
Although many capital-importing States may see no c a use to worry 
abo ut ratifying the ICSID Conventio n, and indeed t h e y may s e e a 
214. Delaume, supra, n o te 68, vol. II, eh, 15, 51-2. 
215. Gopal, supra, note 57, 597. 
216. Sc hwar ze nberg e r, supra, no te 193, 320. 
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distinct advantage iE it increases their "credit-worthiness", 
the submission oE concrete disputes proves more troubling. When 
confronted with the imJ11inent possibility of ICSID adjudication: 
Many states, especially those from Latin America, 
object to putting individuals or corporations, 
either foreign-registered or fo~eign-controlled, on 
an equal footing with states. 2 1 1 
This objection to ICSID arbitration must be distinguished 
clearly from antipathies based upon the Calvo Doctrine which 
emphasises first, the impermissibility of any interference in 
the internal affairs of a host state through the exercise of 
diplomatic protection, for which ICSID arbitration may be seen 
as a surrogate, and secondly, the importance of equal treatment 
as between nationals and foreign investors which a specialised 
forum such as ICSID undercuts. 218 The Calvo Doctrine is, in 
essence, a regional preoccupation in Latin A.-nerica and has not 
filtered into more generally applicable international law 
although that certainly does not mean that "Calvo clauses" oer. 
se are without effect. 2 19 
---- ~ ----- ----
217. Rodley, supra, note 193, 49. 
218. See the excellent description of the Calvo Doctrine in 
Szasz, The Investment Disputes Convention and Latin 
America (1971) 11 Va J. fnt'l L. 260~60-2. See also 
Abbott, Latin America and International Arbitration 
Conventions: The Quandry of Non-Ratification (1976) 17 
Harv. Int·r:r L. J. 131. 
219. See,~' I. Brownlie, Principles of Public International 
Law, 3d ed. (1979) 546; and D. O'Connell, International 
Law, 2d ed. (1970) 1060-1. See also, more pa r ticularly, 
Broches, supra, note 53, 373. 
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The concern to maintain the inequality of status between 
foreign private investors and host states is not limited t o 
Latin A.merica. Indeed, in the post c o lonial era it is oE great 
concern to the majority of developing states. Although it is 
not empirically demonstrable, this concern may be the single 
greatest inhibition to the increased use of ICSID. There are 
means of combatting this concern. The first is to emphasise 
more and more the unique capacity of ICSID to respond not solely 
tci commercial imperatives but to the legitimate public policy 
objectives of states, Unlike the ICC and comparable institu-
tions, ICSID was de s igned expressly to cope with both public and 
private interests, ICSID arbitrators may be expected to display 
sensitivity to both sets of concerns. Ironically, the best 
means of reassuring prospective state parties that ICSID 
arbitration c a n comprehend and assimilate their legitimate 
interests 220 is to combat the misguided assertion that ICSID 
arbitration is "international" in the traditional sense of that 
ter-m. In fact, ICSID arbitration is not an inter-national legal 
institution, as the preceding discussion has attenpted to 
demonstrate. But in the pursuit of commercial stability, almost 
------------
220. The proponents of ICSID need not jump through hoops 
attempting to me e t all possible objections of sta t es t o 
third party adjudication. The narrow conceptions of 
"state interest" and "sovereignty" that have held sway in 
some quarters in the post colonial era should not be 
pandered to, but some sensitivity must be displayed to t h e 
reasonable fears of newly emergent states which are 
attempting to buttress the ir often tenuous hold on go vern-
mental authority. Equating states with private corpor a -
tions can spark legitimate wo rry. 
- 101 -
as an absolute goal, and in reliance upon superficia l notions oE 
equality, arguments have been advanced that treat bo th parties 
to rcsrn arbitration as internatio nal persons. Not only do such 
arguments offend developing states -- and it must be stressed 
that the same analysis is never applied vis-~-vis foreign 
investment in developed states -- they also threaten to undercut 
the greatest contribution that a system such as ICSID can 
potentially make. 
ICSID arbitration is ideally suited to prevent, or at 
least to lessen, the politicisation of disputes. The ICSID 
regime provides expressly for the suspension oE efforts at 
diplomatic pr:otection and allows foe the third party adjudica-
tion of disputes within a procef durally flexible system that 
apply legal rules (or non-legal principles) chosen by the 
can 
parties. The probability of enforcement, though not guaranteed, 
is certainly enhanced. The system is designed to ensure that 
disputes that are predominantly commercial in nature do not 
become the subject of state claims. But to argue that the 
private foreign investor is equivalent to a state is to 
re-introduce the very structure of ar:gurnentation that ICSID 
seeks to preclude. The interests oE the host state are seen to 
be attacked by another s ta te through its surrogate , the private 
investor. The private party argues that it has "international" 
rights, that it can assert directly against the host state. An 
"international" right is bound to be conceived- in more politi-
cised terms than a private contractual right. To prevent such 
I 
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politicisation and to encourage broader participation in the 
system, ICSID should be described and publicised for what it is: 
a governing institution created under international law that 
manages arbitrations of a mixed, public and private, nature. 
Needless to say, within the ICSID arbitration itself, the 
parties are treated with equality and the foreign private party 
can expect to be treated with fairness. But the private party 
is asserting private (typically contractual) rights which only 
become international claims if the ICSID process fails to 
produce its desired result, if the ICSID award is refused 
enforcement. It is only when ICSID doesn't work, or rather, 
when states do not abide by their enforcement obligations, that 
the dispute must move to the plane of international law and 
become, quite often, fully politicised. 
Given the seeming reluctance of states to participate in 
ICSID arbitration and given the inappropriateness of institu-
tional arbitration under the auspices of groups such as the ICC 
in the context of disputes between states and foreign private 
parties, it is not surprising that the alternative of ad hoe 
arbitration is still widely employed. The next Chapter will be 
devoted to issues that have arisen primarily in that context. 
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CHAPTER II: AD HOC ARBITRATION AND THE POTENTIAL 
APPLICATION OF DELOCALISED LAW 
A series of major ad hoe arbitral awards rendered in the 
1970s and early 1980s highlighted a dispute that had been 
percolating through the international legal commu n ity. The 
dispute centred around possibilit i es f o r the so-called 
"delocalisation" of the procedural and substantive law of 
arbitrations between states and private entities, 1 Indeed, t h e 
controversy concerning delocalisation has, in recent years, 
dominated academic commentary on the subject. Succinctly put, 
the issue of delocalisation involves two separate questions. 
First, is it possible to insulate an international arbitration 
from the application of the procedu ral rules of t he lex loci 
arbitri? Secondly, is it possible for the pa r ties t o agree or, 
in the absence of agreement, for an arbitrator to apply to the 
substance of a dispute a system of law divorced from any single 
national system? 2 
1. For a recent and most hel~ful survey of the issues, see 
Park, The Lex Loci Arbitr1 and International Commercial 
Arbitration: When and Why it Matters (1983) 32 Int'l & Comp . 
L.Q. 21 where the positions adopted are often radically 
different from those taken here. An approach more sensitive 
to the concerns of developing (ca pital importing) nations 
may be found in Te son, State Contracts and Oil Exp ropri a -
tions: The Aminoil-Kuwa1t Arb itration (1984) 24 Va J. I n t'l 
L. 323. 
2. Some confusion in terminology is apparent in much of the 
academic c ommentary concerning the issue of del ocalisation . 
One often sees the wo rds "delocalisation" and "interna-
tionalisation" us e d i nterchange ably . On the o t her hand, 
some writers tend to use the f o rmer word when r e f e r r ing t o 
( cont'd.) 
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Although the term "delocalisation" has been applied both to the 
procedure governing an arbitration and to the substantive law to 
be applied by the arbitrators, the two concepts are entirely 
distinct 3 and it will be seen that the justifications advanced 
for each are quite different. In practical terms, the issues 
tend to arise in different ways. For example, the potential for 
delocalised substantive law has been emphasised most strongly by 
foreign investors, traders and resource exploration companies 
seeking to "stabilise" contractual undertakings with host states 
questions of arbitral procedure and the latter when discuss-
ing substantive law. On balance, it seems that the word 
"delocalisation" is both more forceful and more broadly 
descriptive. It can be applied to issues of substance and 
procedure. It is an inclusive word which can comprehend all 
of the various possible permutations of applicable law. 
Pace Carbonneau, it does not necessarily signify the 
complete detachment of arbitral law and procedure from "the 
procedural and substantive law of any national system." 
Carbonneau, Book Review, (1984) 24 Va J. Int'l L. 527, 530. 
"Delocalisation" can refer as well to arbitral systems of 
law which blend various national systems or which conflate 
certain national, transnational and international systems. 
The serious difficulty with the word "internationalisation" 
is that it connotes a connection with international law~ 
se, a connection which can rarely exist in arbitrations 
involving a foreign private party and a state. As such, it 
tends to limit thinking concerning the various options 
available to parties and arbitral tribunals vis-a-vis the 
applicable law. More importantly, it obfuscates the true 
status of private parties in transnational arbitrations, an 
issue that will be addressed throughout this Chapter. For 
all these reasons, the word "delocalisation" will be used in 
preference to the word "internationalisation", except when 
the latter word is specifically appropriate. 
3. For the simple reason that the law applicable to procedure 
need not be the same as the law governing the substance of a 
dispute. See, ~, Mann, "Lex Facit Arbitrum" in P. 
Sanders, International Arbitration Liber Amicorum Martin 
Domke ( 19 6 7} 15 7, 16 6 . 
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by expressly removing contracts from the unilateral amending 
power of the state. On the other hand, arbitrators themselves 
have often championed the cause of procedural delocalisation as 
a means of ensuring flexibility and to avoid the application of 
perhaps idiosyncratic procedural rules of the often fortuitously 
chosen locus. 
The issue of delocalisation has arisen most starkly in ad 
hoe arbitrations, especially those arising out of breaches of 
contracts between states and foreign private parties. As far as 
substantive law is concerned, the need for "stabilisation" is 
most clearly apparent in such contracts. As for procedure, 
despite the existence of the UNCITRAL rules designed for ad hoe 
arbitration, ad hoe trib~nals are often left without any express 
guidance from the parties, and tribunals are enabled to canvass 
all possibilities. For these reasons, the problems of delocal-
isation are best explored through a study of ad hoe arbitration, 
providing the primary focus for this Chapter. On occasion, 
however, examples may be drawn from the practice of institu-
tional arbitral tribunals when particularly apt . 
Although the heyday of "delocalisation" may already be 
over, especially in relation to substantive law, the debate has 
raised important theoretical difficulties with regard to contem-
porary conceptions of international arbitration. In the course 
of the debate, claims have been asserted, especially on behalf 
of multinational corporations , which could have a profou nd 
effect upon our understanding of international law. For that 
reason, the debate concerning delocalisation, in both its 
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procedural and substantive aspects, retains great interest. 
Understanding the context of that debate will aid in an under 
standing of the existing and potential role of international 
arbitration. 
It is common ground amongst experts in international 
arbitral law that there is simply no common ground concerning 
the possibilities for delocalisation. 4 For some specialists, 
delocalisation of arbitral procedure or substantive law is a 
dangerous folly.~ For others, delocalisation is seen as 
inevitable in a world where trade and investment cross state 
boundaries and engage diverse legal systems. 6 Some would 
preclude the delocalisation of procedure, but allow delocalisa-
tion of the substantive law, either through the application of 
"general principles" 7 or through international law per se. 8 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
See,~' the comments of Delaume, State Contracts and 
Transnational Arbitration (1981) 75 Am. J, Int'l L. 784, 
791; and Straus, The Growing Consensus on International 
Commercial Arbitration (1974) 68 Am. J, Int'l L. 709. 
See,~' Park, supra, note 1. 
See,~' Paulsson, Delocalization of International 
Commercial Arbitration: When and Why it Matters (1983) 32 
Int'l & Comp. L.Q. 53. 
See,~' Verdross, Quasi-International Agreements and 
International Economic Transactions (1964] Y.B. World Affs 230. 
See,~' Mann, State Contracts and International Arbitra-
tion (1967) 42 Brit. Y.B. Int'l L. l. It should be noted, 
however, that Dr Mann appears to be growing increasingly 
uncomfortable with the idea of~ form of delocalisation. 
He has always asserted that the procedural law governing an 
(cont'd.) 
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The debate, as typically framed, retains a strong academic 
flavour, Professor Bockstiegel has noted that in his experience 
with tra nsnational arbitrations, an experience, it must be 
added, that is rich and wide-ranging, most commercial disputes 
are settled with little reference to an explicit governing law, 
either procedural or substantive. Concerning the substantive 
law, Professor Bockstiegel had this to say: 
[T]he majority of cases is decided exclusively on 
the interpretation of contracts and the relevance 
of trade usages so that very little depends on the 
question of the applicable law and in fact very 
often that question may be and often is not [sic] 
expressly decided by the arbitrators.~ ~-
However, Professor Bockstiegel did modify this e valuation by 
adding the caveat that in arbitrations involving a state, "the 
determination of the applicable law plays a much greater 
role." 10 Even so, and despite the pride of place given to t h e 
issue of delocalisation in recent academic commentary, the 
international arbitration cannot be delocalised . His 
support for deloca lisation of t he substantive law of state 
c o ntracts is also waning, but as will be seen below, his 
late warnings have come to naught, 
9. Bockstiegel, "The Legal Rules Applicable in International 
Commercial Arbitration Involving States or State-controlled 
Enterprises" in International Chamber of Commerce, Court of 
Arbitration, Documents of the 60th Anniversary Conference (1983) 47. 
10. Ibid. But see the Mining concessi o n agreement between the 
State of Haiti and Societe Miniere d'Haiti, a subsidiary of 
Kennecott Copper Corporation (24 March 1976), reprinted in 
P. Fischer, ed., A Collection of International Concessions 
and Related Instruments (Contemporary Series) ( 1975), Vol. 
III. In that concession agreemen t , no governi ng substa n-
tive law was established. 
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survey of international concession agreements compiled by 
Fischer reveals that the practice of states and foreign private 
parties when negotiating such agreements is often to provide for 
the application of delocalised procedural law in any arbitration 
proceedings, but to retain the national law of the state party 
to govern the substance of disputes. That was the approach 
taken in recent concession agreements involving Panama and the 
American corporation Texasgulf,ll between the Republic of 
Liberia and a foreign-owned gold and diamond extraction 
corporation, 12 between the Islamic Republic of Mauritania and 
foreign mining interests, 13 between the Republic of Liberia and 
a consortium of U.S., Japanese and German mining interests, 14 
and between the Republic of Indonesia and a Japanese aluminium 
consortium. 15 
11. Agreements between the Government of Panama and Foreign 
Investors for the development of the Cerro Colorado Copper 
Deposits (25 February 1976), reprinted in Fischer, ibid., 
Vol. II. ~~ 
12. Concession Agreement between the Government of the Republic 
of Liberia and the Liberia Gold and Diamond Corporation (20 
September 1976), reprinted in Fischer, ibid., Vol. III. 
13. Financing Agreement between Three Parties including the 
Islamic Republic of Mauritania for the Establishment of a 
New Mining Company (14 May 1975), reprinted in Fischer, 
~., Vol. I. 
14. Financing Agreement between the Government of the Republic 
of Liberia and LISCO, the Liberia Iron and Steel Corpora-
tion (5 June 1975), reprinted in Fischer, ibid., Vol. I. 
15. Master Agreement between the Government of the Republic of 
Indonesia and the Investors for the Asahan Hydroelectric 
and Aluminium Project (7 July 1975), reprinted in Fischer, 
ibid., Vol. I. 
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In other contemporary concession agreements, there is no 
prima facie delocalisation of either the substantive or the 
procedural law. For example, in a recent concession involving 
the Republic of Ghana and a foreign-owned diamond company, it 
was expressly agreed that the contract would "be governed by and 
construed in accordance with the laws for the time being in 
force in Ghana." Any eventual ad hoe arbitration would operate 
under the rules established by the Ghanian Arbitration Act 
1961. 16 Other concessions have provided for the application of 
national substantive law and for the exclusive jurisdiction of 
municipal courts. 17 In still other concessions where national 
substantive law is specified, although the parties have provided 
for arbitration, there seems to be an assumption that the same 
national procedural law will govern. 18 Moreover, such agree-
16. Concession Agreement between the Government of the Republic 
of Ghana and Amalgamated Diamond Co. (Ghana) Ltd. (1976), 
reprinted in Fischer, ibid., Vol. IV, arts 32 and 36. 
17. See,~, Association Contract for Block B of the Cerrejon 
Coal Projec t - Between Carbones de Colombia, S.A. (CARBOCOL) 
and International Colombia Resources Corporation (INTERCOR, 
a subsidiary of EXXON Corporation) (17 December 1976), 
reprinted in Fischer, ibid., Vol. IV; and Agreement for the 
Joint Exploration and Development of Uranium Reserves 
Between the Colombian Instituto de Asuntos Nucleares (IAN) 
and Total Co. (13 December 1976), reprinted in Fischer, 
ibid., Vol. IV. 
18. See, e.g., Agreement between the Government of Qatar and 
Holcar 011 Co. of the British West Indies (1 January 1976), 
reprinted in Fischer, ibid., Vol. II, where the parties 
seem to assume that the procedure will be regulated by the 
lex loci arbitri. See also the Operating Agreement between 
Lesotho National Development Corporation and O'Okiep Coope r 
Co. (1976 draft), reprinted in Fischer, ibid., Vol. IV. 
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ments may include a clause which allows cases to be stated 
before the courts of the state party to the concession agree-
ment. 1 9 
As a question of mere numbers, it seems that there is a 
trend away from any express delocalisation of substantive law 2 0 
but that the delocalisation of procedure is an increasingly 
common phenomenon. 21 In any event, the evidence is not suffi-
cient to enable one to pronounce delocalisation a dead letter. 
The differing trends concerning delocalised substance and 
delocalised procedure simply highlight the distinct justifica-
tions of each and underscore the merit in dealing with the 
phenomena separately. It must also be pointed out that the 
delocalisation of substantive law is still an option chosen by 
some parties to state contracts. In a major conc ession 
involving the Arab Republic of Egypt and the Chevron Oil Co., an 
Egyptian government commercial entity (but not the government 
per se) bound itself to resort to I.C.C. arbitration in any 
19. See,~, the Petroleum Agreement Between the Independent 
State of Papua New Guinea and ARCO Australia, Ltd. (1976 
draft), reprinted in Fischer, ibid., Vol. IV; and Agreement 
Between the Independent State of Papua New Guinea and 
Dampier Mining Co. Ltd. Re O.K. Tedi Mineral Deposits (22 
March 1976), reprinted in Fischer, ibid., Vol. III. 
20. G. Delaume, Transnational Contracts: Applicable Law and 
Settlement of Disputes, re-issue, (1985), Vol. II, Ch. 14, 
32. 
21. J. Lew, Applicable Law in International Commercial Arbitra-
tion: A Study in Commercial Arbitration Awards (1978) 17. 
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dispute with the foreign private contractor. 22 The substanti ve 
law was also delocalised. The choice-of-law clause was very 
sophisticated and hence worthy of note: 
The signatories base their relations with respect 
to this Agreement on the principles of goodwill and 
good faith. Taking into account their different 
nationalities, this Agreement for such arbitration 
shall be given effect and shall be interpreted and 
applied in conformity with principles of law common 
to the A.R.E, and the U.S,A. and in the absence of 
such common principles, then in conformity with the 
principles of law normally recognized by civilized 
nations in general, including those which have been 
applied by International Tribunals. 23 
Some other recent contracts between states and state-controlled 
entities, and foreign private parties have provided for proce-
durally delocalised arbitration wherein the arbitrators are also 
directed to act as amiables compositeurs, basing t heir decisions 
on ·principles of equity and on trade usages, 24 In a sense, this 
is another form of delocalised substantive law, although it is 
not the choice of a non-national "system". Moreover, even if 
delocalised substantive law is infrequently chosen, arbitrators 
22. Petroleum Exploration and Production Sharing Agreement 
between the Arab Republic of Egypt (A.R.E.) and Egyptian 
General Petroleum Corp. and Chevron Oil Co. of Egypt (22 
February 1976), reprinted in Fischer, supra, note 10, Vol. 
II, art. XXIII. 
23. Ibid,, art, XXXIII(k), 
24. See,~, Contract for the Sale and Purchase of Liquified 
Natural Gas between Societe Nationale de Algerie and El 
Paso Algeria Corp. of Delaware, U.S.A. (28 October 1975), 
reprinted in Fischer, ibid., Vol. II; and Mining Convent ion 
between the Government~Haiti and Societe Franco-
Haitienne des Mines (15 January 1976), reprinted in 
Fischer, ibid., Vol. II. 
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in major cases continue to apply various forms of delocalised 
proper law, even in the absence of party choice. 
The express selection of either form of delocalisation, 
procedural or substantive, will often depend upon the negotiat-
ing strength of the parties to an investment, concession or 
sales contract. 25 A developing state that is desperate for 
economic growth may be willing to give away more, in terms of 
"legal" sovereignty, than a state which finds itself in a 
relatively stronger economic position. The former states may 
bow more easily to demands by a foreign investor for delocalisa-
tion. On the other hand, a state with greater bargaining power 
may be able to force agreement for the application of its own 
procedural and substantive law in the case of subsequent 
arbitration, or at the very least, may be able to preclude any 
express choice of delocalised procedure or substance. 
Because of their understandable desire to promote contrac-
tual stability, foreign investors will undoubtedly continue to 
press for express delocalisation in their contracts with states. 
Once a contract is formed, it is probably fair to say that the 
state party is in the vastly stronger position because of its 
potential ability to manipulate the internal legal and taxation 
systems to its own advantage. But during the period of negotia-
tion, the corporation, especially if it is a large transnational 
25. See, ~' Suratgar, Considerations Affecting Choice of Law 
Clauses 1n Contracts Between Governments and Foreign 
Nationals (1962) 2 Indian J. Int'l L. 273, 276. 
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corporation facing a deve loping natio n, may be i n a relati vel y 
stronger position: it can withhold or delay badly needed i nve s t -
ment. Corporations will be loathe to give up any p r o tection 
that they feel could be gained by the bargained-for delocalisa-
tion of the applicable substantive law or arbitral procedure. 
Proponents of delocalisation c o mmonly ground their support 
for the concept in the principle of "party auto nomy". 
words of Professor Carbonneau: 
In the 
The party autonomy principle that underlies 
arbitration gives the contracting parties t he power 
to fashion a remedial process tailored to their 
specific needs, limited by fundamental public 
policy concerns . 26 
Lew goes so far as to suggest that the principle of party 
autonomy as it applies to international commercial arbitration 
is without limits. 27 This view frankly caters to the needs of 
international busine s s men who want the i r "contractual relation-
ship[s), as far as possible, to be governed by really interna-
tional private law." 2 & Western commen t ators also stress that 
the stability of commercial relationships is an important f a ctor 
in enco uraging forei g n inve stment and in promoting a world-wi de 
growth in trade. 
26. Carbonneau, Arbitral Adjudication: A Comparative Assessment 
of Its Remedial and Substantive Status in Transnationa l 
Commerce (1984) 19 Texas Int'l L.J. 33, 36. See also 
Sanders, Trends in the Field of International Commercial 
Arbitration (1975) 145 Ree. des c ours 205, 262; and Lew, 
supra, note 21, 111. 
27. Lew, ibid. 
28. Sanders, supra, no te 26, 2 6 2 . 
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So important is the theory of party autonomy , for some 
academic observers, that in the absence of an expre ss choice o f 
delocalised substantive or procedural law, these observers wo uld 
imply a "will of the parties" to favour delocalisation 2 9 because 
this approach allows an arbitrator great flexibility in divining 
the true intentions of the parties. Although this t h eory may be 
justifiable in cases involving commercial contracts between 
private parties, it should be applied warily in the context of 
state and foreign private party agreements. One should not 
presume lightly that a state has bargained away an important 
aspect of its sovereignty by agreeing tacitly t o the delocalisa-
tion of substance or procedure. 3 u Even less should the mere 
fact that a contract has international elements be enough to 
require the delocalisation of substan tive or procedural law, 
particularly when one of the parties is a state or a state 
agency. 31 
Indeed, a number of influential commentators have attacked 
the very idea of delocalisation and its theoretical basis in 
29. See,~, ibid. 
30. In his excellent Hague lectures, Professor Luzz a tto pointed 
out that the 1961 European Convention on Arbitration 
"represents the most advanced step toward a denatio nalisa -
tion of internatio nal arbitration." He added, howe ver, 
that the Convention had been ratif i ed by few sta t e s, which 
demonstrates that states are not widely committed to the 
principle of delocalisation. Their tacit acceptance of the 
principle should not be assumed. Luzzatto, International 
Commercial Arbitration and the Municipal Law· of States (1977) 157 Ree. des cours 9, 30. 
31. Pace Professor Sanders, supra, no te 26, 262. 
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party autonomy, Although not rejecting the idea completely, 
Professor Reisman of Yale has questioned the wisdom of support-
ing a process of delocalisation because such a process implies 
"that prescriptive competence for international commercial 
relations ••. should be allocated to international wealth 
elites." 32 In plainer words, multinational corporations might 
be allowed to set their own rules. Dr Mann has undertaken a 
frontal assault by rejecting the independence of arbitration and 
asserting that it must be controlled through state law. 
lecture delivered in England, he stated categorically: 
The message of this lecture is that it is in the 
highest interest of the State, that it is a matter 
of public policy of great import to maintain the 
principle of judicial review of arbitration not 
only to develop the law, but also to ensure the 
administration of justice and thus to avoid the 
risk of arbitrariness. 33 
In a 
Oddly enough, Dr Mann finds himself in agreement with a member 
of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences who rejected a "primary 
role" for the will of the parties in any determination of the 
applicable substantive or procedural law. The relevance of the 
will of the parties could only be determined, he suggested, by 
resort to the rules of an existing state legal system. 34 
32. W. Michael Reisman, Nullity and Revision: The Review and 
Enforcement of International Judgments and Awards (1971) 
830. 
33. Mann, Private Arbitration and Public Policy (1985) 4 C.J.Q, 
257,267, 
34. Szaszy, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral 
Awards (1966) 14 Am. J, Comp. L. 658, 667. 
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It should be apparent that the debate concerni ng the 
possibility of delocalisation is heated. Arguments brought to 
bear upon the issue reflect competing desires for corrunercial 
stability, for- economic efficiency, for principled consistency, 
for the pr-otection of state sovereignty, and for party autonomy . 
It may be that these contrary desires are simply incompatible. 
Professor Weil has suggested that every dispute arising out of a 
state contract involves two antagonists, generally in good 
faith, whose interests are radically divergent. 35 Although 
contracts posit a formal juridical equality between two parties 
based upon free will, state contracts "constitue ~ certains 
egards un corps etranger dans un systeme de droit public dont 
l'!me est la puissance publique, voire la souverainet~." 36 
Arbitration must cope with these radically contradictory 
interests and the proponents of de localisation see in that 
process a means of coping. In seeking some form of "legal 
neutrality", those who advocate delocalisation are willing to 
accept, in Professor de Vries's words, the shattering of "the 
expeditious unity of forum procedure, substantive rules, and 
language found in domestic litigation or domestic arbitra-
tion".37 
35. Weil, Problemes relatifs aux contrats passes entre un etat 
et un particulier (1969) 128 Ree. des cours 95, 104. 
36. Ibid., 101. 
37. de Vries, International Commercial Arbitration: A Contrac-
tual Substitute for National Courts (1982) 57 Tulane L. 
Rev. 4 2, 6 7. 
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What must be assessed is the costs involved in the loss of 
that "expeditious unity", Although delocalisation has not 
carried the day in quite the manner predicted by its early 
adherents, it is, as Professor Fragistas noted as long ago as 
1960, "a social fact". 38 Moreover, in recent times, various 
multinational corporations have advocated a significant exten-
sion of the possibilities for a delocalised substantive law, 
arguing that even when parties to a state contract intended that 
the substantive law of the state party would apply, the substan-
tive law might nevertheless be delocalised through the applica-
tion of international law as incorporated in the national law of 
the state, 39 Furthermore, the international responsibility of 
the state could be engaged directly vis-a-vis the foreign corpo-
ration. This argument is the new fronti er of the delocalisation 
debate and it raises important issues concerning the relation-
ship between public and private law in an international setting. 
But if those issues are to be addressed with any subtlety, it is 
first necessary to canvass the more conventional claims of the 
proponents of delocalisation and to evaluate the claims and the 
38. Fragistas, Arbitrage etranger et arbitrage international en 
droit prive (1960) 49 Rev. crit. 1, 15. 
39. See,~, the arguments made by the foreign investor in 
S.P.P. (Middle East) Ltd, v. Egypt (11 March 1983), 
reprinted in (1983) 22 I.L.M. 752 (I.c.c. Arbitration; 
Paris) [hereinafter S.P.P.). It should be noted that the 
award itself was quashed by the Cour d'appel de Paris, 
reducing greatly its authoritative value. Arab ReEublic of 
Egypt v. S.P.P. (12 July 1984; Cour d'appel de Paris), 
reprinted in (1984) 10 Y.B. Comm. Arb. 113 and (1984) 23 
I.L.M. 1048 (France). 
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arguments made against them. Before undertaking that task, a 
preliminary point of clarification is required. 
It used to be relatively simple to describe the relation-
ship between procedural law, rules of the conflict of laws and 
substantive law. Under traditional approaches to arbitration, 
the procedure was dictated by the lex fori. That procedural 
law, which included rules governing the arbitrator's jurisdic-
tion, typically instructed the arbitrator to look to the 
conflicts rules of the forum for guidance in determining the 
substantive law to apply to the dispute. Contemporary arbitral 
practice, especially after the advent of the delocalisation 
debate, has altered that simple schema beyond recognition. As 
will be discussed below, it can no longer be assumed that the 
lex fori will govern arbitral procedure. The source of any 
applicable rules of conflict of laws is therefore entirely 
contingent. Indeed, one may go so far as to suggest that recent 
practice, for better or for worse, calls into question the 
necessary applicability of any state conflicts rules. The 
source of substantive law is therefore also contingent. Due to 
this now-complicated schema, the remainder of this Chapter will 
be divided as follows. First, an examination of the possibili-
ties of delocalised arbitral procedure will be undertaken. The 
second section will focus upon delocalisation of substantive 
law, but as a preliminary issue, the role of conflict of laws 
rules and possible sources for those rules will be explored. 
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A. Possibilities for the Delocalisation of Arbitral Proced u re 
The argument concerning delocalised arbitral pro cedure is 
primarily a manifestation of the age-old c o nflict between the 
desire for certainty, and recognition of the need for flexi-
bility. For many years, the dominant approach to t h e problem 
had been to assert that the functioning of an international 
arbitral tribunal was governed automat i cally by the lex loci 
arbitri: 
The traditional view is that the binding nature of 
an award must necessarily derive from a legal 
system which is at once (a) exclusively competent 
and (b) national, and that this legal system must 
be that of the place o f arbitratio n. 4 0 
That view was reflected in the 1923 Protocol on Arbitration 
Clauses which stated, in art. 2, that arbitral procedure "shall 
be governed by the will of the parties and by t he law of the 
country in whose territory the arbitration takes p lace . 11 4 1 
Judge Cavin, the arbitrator in the Sapphire case 42 of 1963 
accepted the automatic application of t h e law of the lex fori 
and that approach continues to find fa vour amongst t he English 
40. 
41. 
42. 
Paulsson, Arbitration Unbound: Award Detached fro m the Law 
of its Country of Origin (1981) 30 Int'l & Comp. L. Q. 358, 
360. 
Protocol on Arbitration Clause s (1923) 27 L.N.T.S. 157, 
reprinted in M. Hudson, International Legislation (1931), 
Vol. II, No. 98, at 1062. 
- 120 -
judiciary, 43 many English academic commentators, 44 and a 
scattering of continental observers. 4 ~ The American Supreme 
Court also assumed that there would be an intimate link between 
the choice of an arbitral site and the procedural law that would 
apply: 
43. See, ~, Bank Mellat v, Hell iniki Techniki SA [ 1983] 3 
All E.R. 428 (U.K,), ~ Kerr L.J,, at 431: 
Despite suggestions to the contrary by some learned 
writers under other systems, our jurisprudence does not 
recognise the concept of arbitral procedure s floating i n 
the transnat i onal firmament, unconnected with any 
municipal system of law .•• 
See also the comments of Lord Justice Kerr in his private 
capacity as an expert author on English arbitration law: 
Kerr, "International Arbitration v. Litigation" in C. 
Schmitthoff, ed., International Commercial Arbitration 
(1974-80) 141, 152-3 (an updated looseleaf sys t em), 
44. See,~' Simmo nds, "Extraterritoriality and Arbitration 
Proceedings" in C. Schmittho ff, ed., International Commer-
cial Arbitration (1974-80) 136, 141 (an updated looseleaf 
~ystem); and Schmitthoff, "Defective Arbitration Clauses" 
in C. Schmitthoff, ed., International Commercial Arbitra-
tion (1974-80) 21, 33 (an updated looseleaf s ystem). 
45. See, e.g., Mann, supra, note 8, 6 and 36 ; and Coing, "The 
Substa ntive Law and the Law o f Arb i tration Procedure" in C. 
Sc hmitthoff, ed., International Commercial Arbitration 
(1974-80), 75, 78-9 (an updated looseleaf system), quoting 
the German author Raape: 
Parties wish to give legal significance and effect to a n 
award, but this can only be fulfilled on the basis of 
the positive law of one state •••• Therefore parties 
are obliged to base their arbitration on an individua l 
positive law o r legal syste m. An arbitration court i s 
not enthroned high above the earth. It is not floating 
in the air. It must land somewhere. 
See also the views of Professor Kronstein cited in Jalet, 
Judicial Review of Arbitration: The Judicial Attitude 
(1960 ) 45 Cornell L.Q. 519. 
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An agreement to arbitrate before a specified 
tribunal is, in effect, a specialized k i nd o f forum 
selection clause that posits no t only the s it us of 
the suit but also the ~rocedure to be us ed in 
resolving the dispute. 6 
It was for this reason that the Court was willing to uphold an 
arbitration clause that derogated from the jurisdiction of 
United States courts. It had previo usly allowed such deroga-
tions for valid choice of forum clauses that bequeathed juris-
diction upon foreign courts.47 
The strongest arguments in favour of the traditional view 
are that it provides certainty (and predictability ) and that it 
may encourage simplified recognition and enforcement of any 
subsequent award. Certainty of result is enhanced, it is said, 
because a national system of procedure provides clear rules 
that are supervised by a national c o urt of the forum. 48 The 
identity of the supervising court woul d be known in advance. 
The parties retain their contractual freedom because they may 
choose an arbitral forum the procedural law of which conforms t o 
their desires and expectations. Parties could also choose a 
46. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 519; 41 L.Ed 2d 
270 (1974) (U.S.A.) [hereinafter cited to L.Ed]. See also 
the comments of Cutler, Comparative Conflicts of Law: 
Effectiveness of Contractual Choice of Forum (1985) 20 
Texas Int'l L.J. 97, especially at 98 and 104-5; and 
Carbo nneau, supra, note 26, 35-6. 
47. See The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. l; 32 L.Ed 
2d 513 (1972), reprinted 1n (1972) 11 I.L.M. 599 and 832 
(U.S.A.) [cited to L.Ed]. 
48. See Van den Berg, The New York Convention of 1958 (1981) 
30; and Mann, England Rejects 'De locali s ed' Contracts and 
Arbitration (1984) 33 Int'l & Comp. L.Q. 19 3 , 196-7. 
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neutral forum whose procedural law enhanced the values of 
flexibility and efficiency.4 9 
Recognition and enforcement are aided by the application 
of the lex loci arbitri, it is suggested, due to the special 
requirements of the now widely-ratified 1958 Convention on the 
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards [the New 
York Convention] .~ 0 Problems of recognition and enforcement 
will be examined in detail below~l but for present purposes, the 
argument may be set out as follows: The enforcement-enhancing 
provisions of the New York Convention can apply only to awards 
that are final and "binding" in the country of origin (art. 
V(l)(e)) and the Convention can be invoked in state parties only 
when the award whose enforcement is sought is "foreign", that is 
when the award was "made in the territory of a state other than 
the state where recognition and enforcement •.• are sought" 
(art. I). The issue arises whether an award rendered under 
49. These were the justifications employed by Judge Lagergren 
for his choice of the lex loci arbitri to govern the 
procedure of the arbitral tribunal in B.P. v. Libya 
(Merits), decisions of 10 October 1973~ 1 August 1974, 
reprinted in (1979) 53 I.L.R. 297. It should be noted, 
however, that Judge Lagergren did not hold himself to be 
bound to apply the lex loci arbitri; Danish law was simply 
sophisticated and convenient and for those reasons was 
adopted. See also ICC Case No. 4237, Award of 17 February 
1984, reprinted in (1984) 10 Y.B. Comm. Arb. 52, where 
French procedure governing international arbitration was 
chosen for its convenience and flexibility. 
50. (10 June 1958) 330 UNTS 38. 
51. See infra Chapter III on the recognition and enforcement of 
international arbitral awards. 
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delocalised law can be said to be "binding" under the legal 
system of the arbitral forum; there is an even greater problem 
if, for any reason, the award has bee n set aside under the lex 
loci arbitri. The question whether a delocalised award is 
"foreign" is somewhat less troublesome. To be "made in" the 
territory of another state, there is no need to assume that the 
award must be rendered under the procedural law of that state. 
Moreover, under art. I of the Convention, recognition and 
enforcement can be accorded also "to arbitral awards not 
considered as domestic awards in the state where their recogni-
tion and enforcement is sought." Although originally intended 
to cover the case of awards rendered within the state where 
enforcement is sought and under its procedural law, but under 
such circumstances that the municipal law would not consider the 
award to be domestic (~. where both parties are foreign),~ 2 
this treaty provision can, without violence to the language, be 
read to include awards rendered under a delocalised procedure. 
They would not be "considered as domestic" and could be 
enforced. The re might exist a difficulty, howeve r, if the 
enforcement jurisdiction had bound itself to the Convention only 
on the basis of reciprocity . In such a case, a court in the 
enforcing jurisdiction might well hold that because a delocal-
ised award is not supported by any national state, no reciprocal 
obligation can be posited. Hence a delocalised award would not 
52. Van den Berg, supra, note 48, 37-8. 
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be enforced. In response, a cogent argument could be put 
forward along the following lines: All that the reciprocity 
condition requires is that the award be "made in" the territory 
of another contracting state. No supervision of that state's 
legal system is needed. Parties wishing to avoid even a hint of 
these difficulties might very well desire to anchor their award 
clearly in the procedural system of a state party to the New 
York Convention. But it is suggested that no such anchoring is 
necessary for enforcement under the Convention. 
A final justification for the traditional view of the 
automatic applicability of the procedural law of the lex loci 
arbitri is to be found in the principles of state sovereignty 
and state public policy. It has been suggested that states have 
a legitimate interest in protecting the "integrity of the 
[state] adjudicatory process" and, as a matter of policy, in 
protecting the rights of third parties. 53 This interest, it is 
said, is superior to the party autonomy principle under which 
delocalised arbitration is commonly justified. As long as the 
local judge limits his intervention to that which can be 
justified by sovereign public policy, the compulsory application 
of the lex loci arbitri is to be commended. :i 4 This "state 
interest" approach owes much to contemporary trends in American 
conflicts law which, at least since Currie, has emphasised state 
53. See Park, supra, note 1, 22. 
54. Ibid. 
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interest as the crucial factor in deciding cases of pure 
conflict. !:i ::i 
In recent years, the applicability of the lex loci arbitri 
has been challenged by judges, arbitrators and commentators who 
question the necessary application of any national procedural 
law in an international arbitration. With the increasing 
acceptance of the need for jurisdictional flexibility in dealing 
with international commercial relations, ::i 5 came a new belief 
that parties should be granted a high degree of autonomy in 
choosing or molding a procedural law to govern their arbitra-
tion.57 As a practical matter as well, international arbitral 
tribunals will often sit in more than one place for the sake of 
convenience, thereby destroying any easy reliance upon a single 
lex loci arbitri. !:ib 
French courts took the lead in formulating an approach to 
arbitral procedure which is radically different from the tradi-
55. See, ~' Bauerfeld, Effectiveness of Choice-of-Law 
Clauses in Contract Conflicts of Law: Party Autonomy or 
Objective Determination? ( 1982) 82 Col. L. Rev. 1659, 1674. 
For a critical evaluation of Currie's methodology, see 
Juenger, Conflict of Laws: A Critique of Interest Analysis 
( 19 8 4 ) 3 2 Arn. J. Comp. L. 1. 
56. See the seminal formulation of this value by the U.S. 
Supreme Court in Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., supra, note 
46, per Stewart J. at 281. 
57. See,~, R. David, L'arbitrage dans le commerce 
international (1982) 385; and Luzzatto, supra, note 30, 
53-7. 
58. See Thomas, Arbitration Agreements as a Signpost of the 
Proper Law (1984] Lloyd's Mar. & Comrn. L.Q. 141, 148-9. 
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tional view. In the famous case of General Natio na l Maritime 
Transport Co. v. Societe Gotaverken Arendel A.B., s 9 the Cour 
d'appel de Paris rejected outright the guiding rul e o f the lex 
loci arbitri. In that case, an arbitration conducted under the 
Rules of the International Chamber of Commerce (I. C.C.] was held 
to be divorced from and beyond the supervisory ju r isdiction of 
the Fre nch national system even though the arbitration had been 
conducted in Paris. The Court applied Article II of the I.C.C. 
Rules rigidly; that rule excludes the application of any 
supplementary national procedural law. bU Moreover, the Court 
held, c o rrectly it wo uld appear, that t he choice of Paris a s the 
arbitral forum was largely fortuitous: it was chosen simply as 
the home of the I.C.C. and because of its "neutrality". There 
did not appear to be any desire to cho ose French procedural law. 
As Carbonnea u points out, the Gotaverken decision should no t 
have come as a surprise to anyone who had followed modern French 
case law which generally "has been supportive of t h e eliminatio n 
o f na tional legal r estri c t i ons on the inte rnatio na l arbitral 
p r ocess." 6 1 The disting uishe d panel of ad hoe arbitrators in 
59. (Cour d ' appel de Paris), decision of 21 Fe b rua r y 1980, 
reprinted in (1981) 20 I.L.M. 884 . See also Societe AKSA, 
SA v. Societe NORSOLOR, SA ( Cour d'appel de Pa ris), 
decision of 9 Decembe r 1980, reprinted in (1981) 20 I.L.M. 
887. 
60. Societe Gotaverken, ibid., 884. 
61. Carbonneau, suora, note 2, 532. See also the c omments of 
the Tribunal 1n The Government of the State of Kuwa it v. 
The American Independent Oil Co., Final Awa r d o f 24 March 
1982, reprinted in (1982) 21 I.L.M. 976 (here ina fter 
Aminoil]. 
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the Aminoil case also recognised the traditional support of the 
French legal system for international arbitration: 
It must also be stressed that French law has 3lways 
been very liberal concerning the procedural law of 
arbitral tribunals, and has left this to the free 
choice of the Parties who, often, have not had 
recourse to any one given national system. 62 
Although not uniformly applauded by arbitral experts, 63 the 
principles of the Gotaverken decision were subsequently codified 
in the French Arbitration Decree of 14 May 1981, 64 legislation 
which Professor Carbonneau believes was designed "to give full 
recognition to the special characteristics of international 
commercial arbitration and [to] provide regulations for a 
process that is 'anational' or 'supranational' in character." 6 5 
The Decree included a very broad definition of "interna-
tional" arbitration, describing it as any arbitration that 
"implicates international commercial interests." 6 6 The Decree 
went on to establish that the parties to an arbitration possess 
complete freedom to "define the procedure to be followed in the 
arbitral proceedings. 116 7 
62. Aminoil, ibid., 991. 
63. See,~. the review of French academic reactions in 
Delaume, International Arbitration Under French Law: The 
Degree of May 12, 1981 (1982) 37 Arb. J. 38 (No. 1) 43-5. 
64. Decree No. 81.500 amending arts 1492-1507 Code de procedure 
civil, reprinted in (1981) 20 I.L.M. 917 (translation). 
65. Carbonneau, supra, note 26, 78-9. 
66. Art. 1492 C.p.c. 
67. Art. 1494 C.p.c. 
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The Gotaverken decision and the subsequent amendments t o 
the Code of Civil Procedure were hailed by the propo nents of 
delocalisation as the heralds of a new age. Indeed the spirit 
of the Gotaverken decision has inspired French courts in subse-
quent cases to underscore their reluctance to "interfere" in 
international arbitration. In the case of the Raffineries de 
petrole d'Homs et de Banias c. Chambre de commerce interna-
tionale68 the Cour d'appel de Paris refused to review the ICC's 
procedure even as it affected such an i mportant question as 
arbitrator bias. The liberalised French approach to procedura l 
questions in international arbitration has started to affect 
France's neighbours. In the case of Joseph Muller A.G. v. 
Bergesen, the Swiss Federal Supreme Court recognised that the 
dominating importance of the will of the parties " e nables [them] 
to set up their own rules of procedure or to choose already 
existing private rules of procedure or to choose the rules of 
procedure of a State." Moreover, "even the mandato r y rules o f 
procedure o f a State also can be d e clared inappli c a ble and they 
c an be substituted with the parties' own rules." 69 
Nevertheless, the theoretical justification for the 
acceptance of procedural delocalisation remains obscure. The 
68. (Tribunal de gra nde instance de Paris), decision of 28 
March 1984 and (Cour d'appel de Paris), decision of 15 May 
1985, reprinted in (1985] Rev. de l'arb. 141 (No. 1) 
(France), especially at 149-50. 
69. 26 February 1982, reprinted in (1984) 9 Y.B. Comm. Arb. 
437, 439. 
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noted expert, Jan Paulsson, grounds his faith in delocalisation 
on a strong belief in party autonomy and on his perception that 
international arbitration is essentially a "private" matter: 
The municipal judge necessarily applies the rules 
of conflict of the forum, which represent the 
politico-juridical concepts -- particularly as 
the territorial limits of legislative power --
to 
of 
The the State from which he derives his authority. 
international arbitrator is in a fundamentally 
different position. Whatever one may think of the 
contractual (as opposed to judicial) source of an 
arbitral tribunal's authority as a purely internal 
matter, it is difficult to consider the interna-
tional arbitrator as a manifestation of the power 
of the State. His mission, conferred by the 
parties' consent, is one of a private nature ••• 70 
Professor B~rman adopts a rather diffrent viewpont, stressing 
that international arbitration is not so much private as "supra-
national", and that it should therefore be conducted "under 
supranational norms and authorities." 71 Mr White has argued 
along similar lines, suggesting that only some form of "interna-
tional regime" of procedure "is likely to be sufficiently 
sensitive to the special problems raised by one party's being a 
State." 72 Such an international regime may be found in the 
procedural rules of various arbitral institutions, such as the 
r.c.c., but even though businessmen seeking stability in their 
70. Paulsson, supra, note 40, 362. 
71. B~rmann, "Limits of Arbitral Jurisdiction" in 
C. Schmitthoff, ed., International Commercial Arbitration 
(1974-80) 40, 48 (an updated looseleaf system). 
72. White, Ex ro riation of the Lib an Oil Concessions -- Two 
Conflicting Internat1ona Arb1trat1ons 981 30 Int 1 & 
Comp. L • Q. 1 , 7 • 
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relations 73 may prefer an established body of rules, it will be 
seen below that parties do not always choose institutional 
rules, and they thereby leave open other possible governing 
procedural systems. The viewpoint which emphasises the "supra-
national" aspect of arbitration downplays the element of party 
autonomy and intensifies the jurisdictional aspect of arbitra-
tion. It underscores the jurisdictional imperatives of the 
arbitral tribunal itself, rather than those of any national 
legal system. 
The relevance of a choice between one or the other of 
these theoretical justifications for delocalisation is greatest 
when considering the best approach to procedural law in the 
absence of party choice. If it is not possible to divine any 
"will of the parties", express or implied, is delocalisation 
still possible? Clearly, if one accepts the "supranational" 
justification, delocalisation remains an option. It would then 
be up to the arbitrators to choose, perhaps even to create, 
rules of procedure. One of the earliest and foremost proponents 
of this approach was, perhaps surprisingly, Lord McNair: "[S]ub-
mission of a dispute to a tribunal of arbitration involves the 
acceptance of such system of law as the arbitrators may decide 
to be the relevant one ." 7 4 Although never carrying the argument 
quite as far as Lord McNair, even the English House of Lords 
73. See,~, Luzzatto, supra, note 30, 49. 
74. McNair, The Genera l Principles of Law Recognized by 
Civilized Nations (1957) 33 Brit. Y.B. Int'l L. 1, 6. 
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flirted with the notion of limited arbitrator freedom. 7 ~ The 
power of arbitrators to mold delocalised procedures was recog-
nised expressly by the parties to the Arninoil arbitration, l b 
although, in a sense, this recognition can be seen as an express 
choice of the possibility of delocalisation by the parties, the 
mechanics of which they left to the arbitrators to design. 
Here, the "will of the parties" can remain the underlying 
justification for procedural delocalisation. 
A number of recent arbi tral awards go further, however, in 
positing an independent authority vested in arbitrators to 
establish delocalised rules of procedure in the absence of 
direction from the parties. The three major ad hoe arbitrations 
arising out of the nationalisation of various Libyan oil 
concessions are very much on point. 
Arbitrator Mahmassani stated: 
In the LIAMCO case, Sole 
It is an accepted principle of international law 
that the arbitral rules of procedure shall be 
determined by the agreement of the parties, or in 
75. Bremer Vulkan Schiffbau und Maschinen - fabrik v. South 
India Shipping Corp. [1981] A.C. 909, [1981] 1 All E.R. 289 
(H.L.) [cited to A.C.], where Lord Diplock held, at 985, 
that the arbitrator was "the master of the procedure to be 
followed in the arbitration". 
76. See the Arbitration Agreement of 23 June 1979 which 
established the Arninoil Tribunal: 
Art. IV: Unless otherwise agreed by the Parties, and 
subject to mandatory provisions of the procedural law of 
the place in which the arbitration is held, the Tribunal 
shall prescribe the procedure applicable to the 
arbitration on the basis of natural justice and of such 
principles of transnational arbitration procedure as it 
may find applicable ••• 
Reprinted in Aminoil, supra, note 61, 980. 
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default of such agreement, by decision of the 
Arbitral Tribunal, independently of the local law 
of the seat of arbitration. 77 
Dr Mahmassani did not assert, however, that international law 
contained its own procedural rules which could govern an 
arbitration. It would appear that some kind of "general 
principles" would apply. This debatable proposition will be 
examined presently. 
A parallel approach to arbitral procedure was adopted by 
Professor Dupuy in the TOPCO arbitration where he held that, in 
the absence of express agreement of the parties, "the Arbitral 
Tribunal must determine the law or system of law applicable to 
the arbitration. 1178 He could find "no decisive reason, either 
theoretical or practical" why the Tribunal should be governed by 
the procedural law of the seat of the arbitration. 79 Instead , 
he opted for somewhat ill-defined procedural rules supposedly 
contained in international law. 
Judge Lagergren, in the~ Arbitration, was not as 
sanguine about the practical difficulties that could confro ~t an 
arbitral award rendered under a delocalised procedure. He 
believed that recognition and enforcement of a delocalised award 
could be hampered significantly. For that reason, and not 
because he felt bound by the weight of authority, Judge 
77. Libyan American Oil Co. v. The Government of the Libyan 
Arab Republic (merits), decision of 12 April 1977, 
reprinted in (1981) 20 I.L.M. 42. 
78. Texaco Overseas Petroleum Co. v. Libya (merits), decision 
of 19 January 1977, reprinted in (1979) 53 I.L.R. 422, 431 [hereinafter TOPCOJ. 
79. TOPCO, ibid., 432. 
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Lagergren held that the lex loci arbitri -- Danish l aw -- s ho u ld 
regulate the B.P. Arbitration. 8 0 
In so holding, Judge Lagergren exp ressly rejected the 
decision in the Aramco Arbitration, a decision approved of and 
followed by Professor Dupuy in TOPCO, that international 
arbitrations must be governed by "international" p r ocedural law. 
In Aramco, the Tribunal had he ld that because the contract at 
issue had been signed by a state, it would be an insult to the 
state's dignity if an arbitration in which it was involved was 
to be governed by the procedural law of another state. Because 
no other legal syste m was applicable, international law must 
govern. 81 In the B.P. Arb itration, Judge Lagergren put a higher 
value on efficacy than on state dignity : 
By providing f o r arbitration as an exclusive 
mechanism for resolving c o ntrac tual disputes, the 
parties t o an agreement, even if one of them is a 
State, must ••• be presumed to have intended to 
create an effective remedy. The effectiveness of 
an arbitral award that lacks nationality - which it 
may if the law of the arbitration is international 
law - generally is smaller than that of an award 
founded on the procedural law of a spe cific legal 
system and partaking o f its natio nality. 02 
80. B.P. v. Libya (merits), supra, note 49, 309. For a clear 
and cogent reading of the Tribunal decision, see Greenwood, 
State Contracts in International Law -- The Libyan Oil 
Arbitrations (198 2 ) 53 Brit. Y.B. Int'l L.27, passim, but 
especially at 36. 
81. Saudi Arabia v. Aramco, decision of 23 August 1958, 
reprinted 1n (1963) 27 I.L.R. 117, 154-6. 
82. B.P. v. Libya (mer i ts), supra, no te 49, 309. This a r g ume nt 
~a fixed nationa l procedural law, based upo n the 
importa nce of e asy e nforceme n t, was imp licitly rej ec t ed by 
Sole Arbitrator Dupuy in TOPCO v. Libya (me ri t s), supra, 
(cont'd. ) 
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Although Judge Lagergren's view is eminently practical, he 
seems to have adopted an overly cautious approach due to a mis -
apprehension of the goals and effects of procedural delocalisa-
tion. The first and crucial point is that, as will be argued 
fully in Chapter Three ,b 3 awards rendered under a deloca lised 
procedure are capable of enforcement under the existing rules of 
the New York Convention of 1958. Moreover, as Mr Paulsson 
argues so cogently, the essential goal of delocalisation is not, 
as some detractors fear, to create an "anational" award floating 
in the firmament of "supranational" law. Rather, the goal is to 
shift the control function from the state in which the award is 
rendered to the state in which it is to be enforced. 8 ~ Such a 
shift is practical and sensible. 
In many cases, parties who create an arbitral tribunal do 
not establish the seat. It may be that the parties simply fail 
to reach agreement or that they wish to allow the arbitrators to 
choose a location that is convenient. In any case , it is left 
to the arbitrators to select a locus; in such circumstances it 
note 78, 432 where it was held that enforcement of an award 
was a consideration "not within the jurisdiction of the 
Arbitrator". Formally, this assertion may be true, but it 
would be a myopic Arbitrator indeed who did not care about 
the practical value of his award. Nevertheless, for 
reasons explored in the text, it is fair t o say that proce-
dural delocalisation does not open up as many enforcement 
difficulties as Judge Lagergren imagined. 
83. Infra, Chapter III, text accompanying notes 65 to 104. 
84. Paulsson, supra, note 6, 54; and Paulsson, supra, no te 40, 
375. 
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is clear that the parties have manifested no intention to choose 
the lex loci arbitri as the governing procedural law. From t he 
parties' perspective, the location of the arbitration is 
entirely fortuitous. But is the situation necessarily different 
if the parties choose a seat expressly? Dr Mann would argue 
that if the parties have chosen a seat they must impliedly be 
seen to have desired the application of local procedural law.b~ 
Yet the locus of an international arbitration is often chosen 
merely for reasons of convenience or neutrality. If the parties 
know who their arbitrators will be, a seat may be chosen because 
it has good transportation links with the arbitrators' home 
countries or because the President of the Tribunal expresses a 
strong preference. Or a particular city or country may be 
selected because it is viewed as a "neutral" location. For 
example, an arbitration between a developing state with a 
democratic socialist government and a Belgian corporation may 
take place in Helsinki or Stockholm. If an ad hoe arbitration 
is taking place under the auspices of an international insti t u-
tion, the chosen seat may be the headquarters of that institu-
tion, simply to facilitate communication. Indeed, it is proba-
bly quite rare that the parties' choice of a seat is intended to 
make manifest their inte ntion to choose the procedural rules o f 
the host state. If that is the desired result, it can be stated 
85. Mann, supra, note 3, 163. 
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explicity.b 6 There is no particular reason to foist upon the 
parties to a freely-negotiated contract rules of procedure which 
they have not chosen and which they do not want , Even more is 
this the case if the parties have expressly adopted a set of 
rules such as those promulgated by the various international 
arbitral bodies. 
If the parties choose a set of institutional rules to 
govern, those rules should operate. If the parties are silent, 
the arbitral tribunal should be permitted to establish the rules 
which are to govern its operations. These rules may be national 
rules if they should prove useful , as was the case in the B.P. 
Arbitration, or they may be a compendium of rules from various 
sources, as long as the sources and their inter-relationship are 
stated clearly. This last point deserves emphasis in view of 
contemporary developments in arbitral practice. In two recent 
oil concession arbitrations, counsel for foreign corporations 
have argued that no coherent set of procedural rules need be 
adopted. In Mobil Oil Corp. v. The Government of Libya, b ? and 
in B.P. v. The Government of Iran, 88 it was suggested that the 
86. As, for example, in the contract discussed in Kuwait v. 
Aminoil (Final Award), supra, note 61, which provided for 
the application of French procedural law with certain 
modifications. 
87. The case has been settled and no proceedings have been 
published. The information has been provided by counsel in 
the case. 
88. The proceedings are confidential. The informa t ion has been 
provided by counsel in the c ase. 
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Tribunals possessed complete discretion in molding p rocedures to 
suit any contingencies as the cases developed. 89 Such an 
unprincipled approach to procedure unnecessarily offends legal 
values such as certainty and prior knowledge (publicity) of 
rules. Although it is here advocated that, in the absence of 
party choice, arbitrators should retain a wide discretion to 
choose or to mold flexible and appropriate rules of procedure, 
such a discretion should not be allowed to degenerate into mere 
"ad hocery". 
There is, of course, no particular reason why interna-
tional procedural law must apply to an arbitration i n which a 
state is involved; there is even a legitimate question whether 
an international law of arbitral procedure exists. For example, 
the procedural rules designed to facilitate the operation of the 
International Court of Justice are much too formal to apply in 
the average ad hoe arbitration. Moreover, whole sets of impor-
tant questions are not addressed by those rules -- questions 
such as the appointment and replacemen t of arbitrators. It 
could be argued that a more specifically arbitral, yet interna-
tional, procedure is to be found in the rules established to 
govern ICSID arbitrations. Yet such rules are inst itution-
specific and they can hardly be said to constitute a customary 
law of procedure. Parties must still contract into the ICSID 
89. The sole arbitrator in B.P. v. The Government of Iran 
rejected this contention and adopted the "principes direc-
teurs" of Book One of the Fre nch Code of Civil Procedure as 
the governi ng procedural syst e m. 
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system. The UNCITRAL rules have a more legitimate claim to 
status in international law, but even their use has not been so 
widespread as to constitute custom, especially for arbitrati o ns 
involving states and foreign private parties. Probably the best 
argument that can be put forward is that by compari ng various 
sets of arbitral rules, such as the UNCITRAL, AAA, ICC and 
Inter-American systems, a core of "international" procedural 
rules may emerge. But any such core could more accurately be 
described as an emerging procedural lex mercatoria. The many 
difficulties involved in the application to state s of a lex 
mercatoria will be discussed below. 9 u 
For present purposes, the crucial point is simply that the 
procedural law of an international arbitration is not necessari-
ly governed by the lex loci arbitri, 91 but may be regulated by 
another system of rules chosen or designed by the parties or, in 
the absence of choice, by the arbitrators. That system of rules 
may be another national system, or an institutional system, o r a 
combination of various existing syste ms. Any suc h combination 
is best set out in advance for, in the interests of justice, it 
is best to avoid any hint of post facto rule "selection". 
90. See infra, text accompanying notes 264 to 278. Se e also 
supra, Chapter 1 for a discussion of the d i fficulties in 
applying rules designed for private arbitrations to 
arbitrations involving public entities. 
91. See,~, Delaume, supra, note 63, 41; and Lynch, Conflict 
of Laws in Arbitration Agreements Between Develo ped and 
Developing Countries ( 1981) 11 Ga J. Int'l & Comp. L. 669, 
686. 
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The greatest fear of those who object to the principle of 
delocalised procedure is that there will be no proper control 
over the abuse of power by the arbitrators. The problem and the 
locus of responsibility have been identified by Pro fessor 
Reisman: 
Determining the limits of arbitral power is a many-
sided responsibility. There is an obligation to 
the parties themselves: to determi ne their objec-
tives in good faith and to give them maximum appli-
cation. Concomitantly, there is a responsibility 
to the inclusive community of which the direct 
participants are a part: to avoid an agreement or 
award that is alien in its procedure to inclusive 
standards or detrimental in its effects to commu-
nity order. 92 
Acceptance of the principle of delocalised procedure in no way 
lessens the parties' responsibility to act in good faith, nor 
does it prevent the application of inclusive c ommunity standards 
as a final means of control upon arbitra tor excess. It simply 
shifts the control function from the legal system of the 
arbitration's host state to that of the prospective enforcement 
jurisdiction. It remains an obligation for that system to 
evaluate the essential fairness of the arbitral procedure using 
standards of npublic policyn which are asserted by all national 
legal systems. ~3 
92. Reisman, supra, note 32, 248. 
93. This approach is also advocated by Professor Luzzatto, 
supra, note 30, 55 and, implicitly, by the drafters of a 
bill introduced before the Parliament of the Kingdom of the 
Netherlands. After the creatio n of the Iran-Uni ted States 
Claims Tribunal, it became necessary for the Dutch Govern-
ment to define more clearly the relationship between 
Tribunal awards and the Dutch l ega l system. Although 
(cont'd.) 
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The practicality of this approach can be asserted for 
three reasons. First, t he re is no reason why national courts 
should be entangl8d in disputes where, as is often the case, the 
parties are both foreign, the underlying contract has no connec-
tion to the host state and enforcement is not sought within the 
territory of the arbitral forum. 94 Second, it makes sense t o 
impose judicial control upon an international arbitration only 
when necessary. This principle flows from the very nature of 
the process, a process which is predicated upon party autonomy 
and the free choice of an independent and flexible dispute 
resolution mechanism. It flows also from the importance o f 
neutrality, often the primary reason for the choice of an 
independent arbitral forum, Judicial supervision is not 
necessary until the award is to ha ve practical impor tance at 
the time of enforcement. The award itse lf does not have the 
suggesting that the awards had t o meet "basic requirements 
of the [Dutch] legal order", t he drafters imposed only a 
requirement of registration. Any further control, based 
upon principles of public policy, would apply only if t h e 
award was to be enforced in the Netherlands. See The 
Netherlands. Ministers of Justice and Foreign Affairs. 
Applicability of Dutch Law to the Awards of the Tribunal 
Sitting in The Hague to Hear Claims Between Iran and the 
United States: Explanatory Notes, r epri nted in (1983) 4 
Iran-u.s.C.T.R. 308, 311-12 (The bill see ms to have died 
on the order paper). 
94. See,~, Park & Paulsson, The Binding Force of Inter-
national Arbitral Awards (1983 ) 23 Va J. Int'l L. 253, 
255-6. 
- 141 -
independent value of a court judgment which may fig u re, at least 
in common law jurisdictions, in the crucial process of stare 
decisis. An arbitral award involving a state and a foreign 
private party has real meaning only for the parties involved; it 
is activated at the moment when enforcement is demanded. Th ere-
fore, no court should be permitted to intervene until that 
moment has arrived. The parties have no interest in abstract 
applications of national law. Their interest is in the finalit y 
of the award, an interest that should only be challenged at the 
moment of enforcement. Opponents of procedural delocalisatio n 
profess concern that control may be required at an earlier stage 
in order to avoid the creation of bad precedents. The argument 
would run that even if an award never reaches the stage of 
enforcement, it may be cited as authority. The simple answer is 
that no award should be accorded great persuasive authority if 
it is never enforced. This prescription calls for a less 
abstract appreciation of legal authority. 
Another objection to delaying the assertion of control 
until the stage of enforcement is that the method is likely to 
prove cumbersome, forcing a party to support the validity of its 
award in every enforcing jurisdiction. But would t he shifting 
of the control functi o n really alter significantly the enforce -
ment procedure that already exists? It seems doubtful. Under 
the existing regime of the New York Convention, courts of the 
recognising and enforcing state may still subject a "bind i ng" 
foreign award to a n e v a luation based upon domestic public 
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policy.~~ National courts can already conduct public policy 
tests, so openly shifting the control function would only 
sanction what can presently occur and would remove the extra-
neous step of applying the particular rules of the arbitral 
forum. 
The third practical reason for discouraging mandatory 
application of the lex loci arbitri and the consequent super-
vision of its national courts is that the parties may not wish 
to enforce their award through municipal courts at all. Even 
the debatable proposition that "localised" awards may be easier 
to enforce under the New York Convention then becomes irrele-
vant.9b The parties may wish to rely upon good faith, economic 
pressure or other methods to ensure the efficacy of their 
arbitral award. They may even choose to design independent 
methods of enforcement such as security accounts or performance 
95. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign 
Arbitral Awards, supra, note 50, art. V(2)(b). See also 
the Inter-American Convention on International Commercial 
Arbitration (done 30 January 1975), reprinted i n (1975) 14 
I.L.M. 336, art. 5(2)(b), which contains almost identical 
wording. The only multilateral convention which precludes 
the application of domestic public policy to awards 
rendered under its terms of reference is the World Bank 
Convention the Settlement of Investment Disputes between 
States and Nationals of Other States (done 18 March 1965) 
575 UNTS 160, arts. 53-5 , although that interpretation 
might also be given, in the absence of express provisions, 
to the COMECON Convention on Settlement by Arbitration of 
Civil Law Disputes Resulting from Economic, Scientific and 
Technical Co-operation (done 26 May 1972), reprinted in (1974) 13 I.L.M. 5. 
96. See Greenwood, supra, note 80, 37. 
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bonds. 97 In such circumstances, the application of the perhap s 
idiosyncratic procedural rules of the arbitral forum could 
become disruptive and potentially destabilising. 
The best view, then, is to recognise that the principle of 
party autonomy and the goals of practicality and ef f iciency all 
point towards flexibility as the preferred approach to proce-
dural law. The law of the forum should not of necessity apply, 
the control function being shifted to the national legal system 
of the enforcement jurisdiction and then exercised only when 
enforcement is demanded by one of the parties. Every award for 
which enforcement is sought would be subject to supervision and 
no award of practical significance would be left floating in a 
legal void. 
B. Possibilities for the Delocalisation of the Substantive 
Law in International Arbitration 
i. New Approaches to the Conflict of Laws 
In order to explore the possibilities for the delocalisa-
tion of substantive law, it is first necessary t o examine the 
connection between choice of law rules and the proper law of 
state contracts. As noted at the outset of this Chapter, the 
connection used to be viewed as entirely obvious. The 
97. The best contemporary example is the Security Account 
designed by the negotiators who created the Iran-United 
States Claims Tribunal. That Account ensures Iranian 
compliance with awards rendered against it, at least f o r 
the foreseeable future. See the discussion, infra, Chapter 
IV, text accompanying notes 359 to 390. 
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procedural rules governing an arbitration, tho ugh t t o be 
necessarily those of the lex fori, include d rule s governing t he 
jurisdiction of the arbitrators. These jurisdictional rules 
told the arbitrators to look to the choice of law rules of the 
lex fori in order to determine what s ubstantive law to apply i n 
the arbitra tion. 9 b It might be that t he conflicts rules of the 
forum would direct the arbitrator to look first to the express 
choice of the parties, but such defere nce to the principle of 
party autonomy had to be prescribed by the state law of the 
forum, The leading contemporary e xponent of this traditi o na l 
view is Dr Mann, who asserts that all arbitrations between a 
state and a foreign private party are founded upon conflict 
principles of private in t ernational law. The conflict rules of 
the lex fori he s e es as mandato ry, a nd it is those rules alone 
that determine whether or not the law chosen by the parties can 
operate, A thorough-going state positivist, Dr Mann has 
encap s u lated his positio n as f ollows: 
Every right o r po wer a priva te person enjoys i s 
inexorably confe rre d by o r de rived from a system of 
municipal law which may conveniently and in accor-
dance with tradition be called the lex fori. 99 
98. See the descriptions of this trad itional approach c o ntai ne d 
in Luzzatto , supra, note 30, 52; and Lew, supra, note 21, 
245. 
99. Mann, supra, note 3, 160 (and generally 159-61), See a l so 
Mann, comments in the Colloquium, Contrats entre etats et 
personnes privees etrangeres (1975) 11 Re v . belge dr. i nt' l 
562, 565. 
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Dr Mann's position manifests the virtue of simplicity and 
it has been supported, at least tacitly, in the dicta of several 
domestic 10 0 and internationa1 1 01 tribunals. However, Dr Mann 
now finds himself preaching in the wilderness, his approach 
supported by less and less contemporary arbitral or doctrinal 
authority. The trend, as Dr Mann himself acknowledges and 
c o ndemns, has been for arbitrators increasingly to ignore the 
traditional rules of private international law as they seek to 
determine the proper law of state contracts. Indeed, starting 
in 1963 with the Sapphire arbitration, 1u2 the process for 
selecting the proper law of a state contract has been set on its 
head. 
100. See,~, Amin Rasheed Shipping Corp. v . Kuwait Insurance 
Co. [1984] 1 A.C. 50, 60-5 (H.L.) (U.K.). 
101. See,~, The Case Concerning the Payment of Various 
Serbian Loans Issued in France, P.C.I.J., Ser.A., nos. 
20/21 (Judgment no. 14); and Libyan American Oil Co. v. 
The Government of the Libyan Arab Republic (Merits), 
supra, note 76, 32 and 34. 
102. In Sapphire International Petroleums Ltd. v. National 
Iranian Oil Co., supra, note 42, the Tribunal held, at 
173, that the contract in question, an oil concession, had 
a "quasi-international character which releases it from 
the sovereignty of a particular legal system". No 
national conflicts rules seemed to apply and t he parties 
were deemed to have chosen "rules of law, based upon 
reason, which are common to civilized nations" as the 
proper law of the contract. It should be noted that, 
standing on its own, the Sapphire arbitration would not 
constitute highly persuasive authority because its subse-
quent fate does not lend it great credibility. But 
Sapphire was only the beginning of a process of change 
that will be investigated infra. 
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The first step towards the reversa l of classical conflicts 
theory in the field of international arbitration was the rejec-
tion of any necessary conjunction between the procedural law 
governing an arbitration and the system of conflicts rules that 
should apply: 
A manifestation, whether express or otherwise, as 
to the procedural law to be followed at the 
arbitration, does not show that the parties intend 
the private international law of the same system to 
apply, lu3 
Once liberated from predetermination, the selection of conflicts 
rules came to be seen as a matter of free will. This veritable 
Reformation resulted in the belief that the governing principle 
should be first and foremost that the parties should be free to 
choose the law to govern their relations. 104 The right to this 
free choice, pace Dr Mann, ne e d not derive from any particular 
state system, but is in fact a "general principle of private 
international law." Such was the decision of the influential 
Institut de droit international, taken at its Athens Session in 
1979, 10 ~ and it is supported by even a cursory examination of 
103. Lew, supra, note 21, 251. 
104. See, ~-~.£!.! . ' Yntema, 'Autonomy' in Choice of Law (1952) 1 
Am.J, Comp. L. 341. 
105. Institute of International Law, "Resolutions Adopted by 
the Institute at its Athens Session 1979", in (1980) 58 
Y.B. Inst. Int'l L. 194, 194: 
I •.• Considering that in the case of a contract 
between a State and a foreign private person the 
parties may, under the general principles of private 
international law, designate the proper law of the 
contract and, if such is their intent, withdraw t he 
contract from the exclusive application of any 
domestic law. 
(cont'd.) 
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various municipal systems of conflicts of law. 106 Julien Lew 
points out that party autonomy is now such a formidable 
principle in choice of law that Tribunals sometimes look to 
The Resolutions were adopted by a vote of thirty-eight 
for, four against and with thirteen abstentions. 
In his contribution to the new International Encyclo-
pedia of Comparative Law, Professor Iando also accepted 
that "the parties' freedom to choose the law which governs 
their contract seems to be so widely accepted that it must 
be said to be a 'general principle of law recognized by 
civilized nations'". However, his positivist beliefs 
forced Professor Iando to offer the further suggestion 
that "the exigencies of logic are fully satisfied by the 
argument •• that the party reference acquires its legal 
sanction by the conflict rules of the forum". In fact, 
the very point of the reliance upon "general principles" 
of conflicts law to found party autonomy is that there 
need be no logical link with the conflicts rules of the 
forum. In any cas.e, Professor Iando' s theory would 
collapse if the law of the forum did not, in fact, provide 
for a primary rule of party autonomy, for then the 
relationship between "general principles" and the lex fori 
would be antipathetic and the "exigencies of logic" would 
not be net. Iando, "Contracts" in "Private International 
Law", in International Association of Legal Science, 
International Encyclooedia of Comparative Law (n.d.) vol. 
III, chap. 24, 33. See also Lew, supra, note 21, 82. 
106. Although there has been a long and difficult evolutionary 
process, and although the issue is not fully settled, most 
major modern systems of conflicts of law have now adopted 
the operative principle of party autonomy in the choice of 
substantive law governing contracts. See,~, H. 
Batiffol & P. Lagarde, Droit international prive, 7~me ed. 
(1981), t. II, 257 et seq. (France); American Law 
Institute, Restatement (second) of the Conflict of Laws 
(1971) §§186-7 (U.S.A.); J. Morris, gen. ed., 
Dicey and Morris on the Conflict of Laws, 10th ed. (19 80), 
vol. 2, r. 145 (U.K.); J.-G. Castel, Canadian Conflict of 
Laws (1977), vol. 2, 516 (Canada); Hamlyn v. Talisker 
(1894) 21 L.R. 21 (H.L.) (Scotland); Code civil du Bas 
Canada, art. 8 (Quebec). 
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"implied" choices. 10 7 Such attempts are largely fallacious and 
often serve simply to mask the arbitrators' independent evalua-
tion of the appropriate substantive law. 
This last point raises the crucial issue what is to happen 
if the parties fail to exercise their new-found free will? Here 
again, traditional conflicts assumptions have been jettisoned. 
In the past, the arbitrators would probably have felt bound to 
apply the conflicts rules of the forum, It now appears that 
arbitrators, like parties, are possessed of free will. Judge 
Lagergren was explicit about this point in the B.P. Arbitration. 
He held that the arbitral tribunal "is at liberty to choose the 
conflicts of law rules that it deems applicable, having regard 
107. Lew, supra, note 21, 181 et seq. See also Bockstiegel, 
supra, note 9, 60 who seems to accept the notion of an 
implied choice of substantive l a w. Lord McNair had no 
difficulty with the p roposition: 
[I]t is submitted that an entirely adequate basis for he 
choice by tribunals of an appropriate system can be 
found in the intention of the parties, manifested either 
by express provision in their contract, as sometimes 
happens, or by implication from the terms of the 
contract and the nature of the transaction envisaged by 
it. 
McNair, supra, note 73, 5. 
The "implied" intention is less common in municipal 
systems of law where courts will instead look most 
commonly to the law of the closest and most real 
connection (in England) or to the "policies" and 
"interests" of the forum (in the U.S.A,). See Thomas, 
supra, note 58, 308; and Bauerfeld, supra, note 55, 
1661-5. 
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to the circumstances of the case." 108 He proce e de d , of course , 
to choose the conflicts rules of the forum, Denmark, but simply 
because of their convenience and flexibility. It was pro bably 
important that the Danish rules provided for party freedom of 
choice. One wonders if Judge Lagergren would have adopted the 
same approach if he had been confronted with a less sophis-
ticated lex fori. If one accepts that, failing party agreement 
upon a set of conflicts rules, the arbitrators will have to 
discover some means of selecting an appropriate governing law, 
the central issue is whether or not their choice is in any way 
constrained. 
If the arbitration has been structured, at the parties' 
behest, within an institutional regime, the issue may be partly 
clarified. For example, both t he ICC and the UNCITRAL regimes 
provide for wide discretion vested in a tribunal to apply any 
conflicts rules that it deems to be applicable. 1 0 9 The assump-
tion seems to be that state conflicts rules will be applied. 
Similarly broad powers were ass ume d to exist by the d rafters o f 
the 1961 European Convention, the only major multilateral 
108. B.P. v. Libya, supra, note 49, 3 26. See also Seguin, Le 
developpement d e la Lex Mercatoria menace-t-il l'ordre 
juridique inte rnational? (1985) 30 Rev. dr. McGill 478, 
513. See also Bocksteigel, ibid., 60; Bra nson and Tupman, 
Selecting an Arbitral Forum: A Guide to Cost-Effective 
International Arbitration (1984) 24 Va J. Int'l L. 917, 
930; and Lew, ibid., 584. 
109. UNCITRAL, Arbitration Rules, reprinted in (1977) 2 Y.B. 
CoTIUTI. Arb. 161, art. 33(1); ICC, Rules of Conciliation a nd 
Arbitration, reprinted in (1976) 1 Y.B. Comm. Arb. 157, 
art. 13(3). 
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arbitration convention that deals expressly with the issue of 
conflicts of law. That Convention provides for the governance 
of conflict rules "that the arbitrators deem applicable." 1 1 0 
If forced to accept the principle of choice, traditional 
conflicts theory would have limited any such choice to the rules 
of a given municipal system of conflicts, most commonly the 
system with which the underlying contract (or relationship) has 
the closest connection. ll l Recent developments in arbitral 
practice have called into question that straightforward rule. 
Two new conflicts methodologies have been advocated by experts 
and adopted by tribunals. 
The first, and least audacious, new conflicts method would 
permit arbitrators, in the absence of party choice, to apply 
"conflict of law rules determined by comparative law 
methods". 112 The arbitrators could look to different conflicts 
systems to accumulate various accepted connecting factors. They 
would then apply the substantive law indicated by the prepon-
derant majority of these connecting factors. Alternatively, t h e 
arbitrators could attempt to determine a "general" conflicts 
rule common to many systems and simply apply that r u le to deter-
110. European Convention on International Commercial Arbitra-
tion (1961) 484 UNTS 364 (done 16 May 1961), VII(l). 
111. This traditional approach was retained by the members of 
the Institut de droit international in Article l of their 
1979 Resolutions. Institute of International Law, supra, 
note 105. 
112. Bockstiegel, supra, note 9, 52. 
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mine the proper law. l l 3 
In recent times, an even more striking claim has been made 
by those who would encourage the delocalisation of substantive 
law. It has been held, or at least suggested, in a number of 
major arbitral awards involving a state and a f oreign private 
party that, in the abse nce of party choice, the arb i t rator must 
look to conflicts rules supposedly contained in public inter-
national law in order to determine the applicable law. This 
approach found its most explicit support in Professor Dupuy's 
decision in TOPCO v. Libya, 114 but Dr Mahmassani also seems t o 
have assumed the existence of public international conflicts 
rules in the LIAMCO case, 11 ~ although he did not deem it 
necessary to apply such rules. Distinguished academi c commenta-
tors have also accepted the proposition. llb 
There exists, however, a profound practical difficulty. 
In the forthright words of Dr Akehurst: "(A]ttempts to discover 
choice of law rules laid down by public international law have 
113. See Lew, supra, note 21, 584. 
114. TOPCO v. Libya (Merits), supra, note 78, 445. See also 
the comments of Greenwood, supra, note 80, 40; and Teson, 
supra, note 1, 333, fn. 50. 
115. Libyan American Oil Co. v. The Government of the Libyan 
Arab Republic (Merits), supra, note 77. 
116. Indeed, it may have been the veritable father of 
delocalisation who first advanced the idea. See 
Fragistas, supra, note 38, 14-9. See also Bockstiegel, 
supra, note 9, 52. 
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not been successful." 11 7 Purporting t o choose t h e conflicts 
rules of international law is, in reality, nothing more than a 
veiled attempt to allow the arbitrators to choose any substan-
tive law they wish, for international law can prov ide no real 
guidance. It may be that such an appro ach allo ws f o r appro-
priate flexibility and that it encourages due sensi t ivity to the 
underlying political realities of an arbitration. Indeed, the 
argument is being advanced increasingly that arbitrators need 
not rely on~ conflicts of law rules in order to determine t h e 
applicable law, but that they should choose an appropriate law 
directly. Lew asks whether it is 
necessary for arbitrators to app l y any conflict of 
laws system? Would it not be preferable for t hem 
to make a direct choice of the national law or 
other standard which their commo n sens e and commer-
cial experience suggest t o be most approp r iate for 
the particular c ircumstances? 118 
This approach was assumed and underscored by the French Arbitra -
tion Decree of 14 May 198 1 which amended art. 1496 of the Code 
of Civil Pro cedure, 119 and arbitra t ors show a n inc r easing 
tende ncy to expre ss c omple te indepe nde nce from a ny c o nflicts 
system when choo sing substantive law. 1 2 0 It is preferable that 
t h is approach be adopted openly rather than masked as a choice 
1 1 7. Akehurst, Jurisdiction in International Law (1972-73) 46 
Brit. Y.B. Int'l L. 145, 222. 
118. Lew, supra, note 21, 225. 
119. Decree No. 81.500 amending arts 1 492-1507 C.p. c ., 
reprinted in (1981) 20 I.L. M. 9 1 7 (transl a t ion ). 
120. See~-, Seguin, supra, no t e 108, 516. 
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of non-existent international law conflicts principles, for t he 
role of the arbitrator in shaping the result is mo re explicit, 
hence open to critical comment. 
It should be stressed that the reason why arbitrators seem 
tempted to forge out on their own, independently of any estab-
lished conflicts rules, is the heavy emphasi s p l aced upon 
delocalisation of the substantive law as a technique of contrac-
tual stabilisation. 121 At the insistent urging of foreign 
investors, some arbitrators have become attracted to the idea of 
"general priciples of law" which would, it is a s s erted, prevent 
the unilateral modification of a contractual regime by the state 
party. The potential application of g e neral principles will be 
discussed below. 122 The important point is that, for some 
arbitrato rs, the attraction of gene ral princip les has led th em 
to disclaim any need for conflicts rules. If one knows in 
advance that one wishes to apply general principles of law, it 
may be thought unnecessary to refer to any means of rule selec-
tion. For example, in the LIAMCO v. Libya arbitrati on , Dr 
Mahmassani invo~d "general principles" without any reference to 
choice-of-law rules, 123 expressly in order to provide for 
contractual stabilisation. 
121. See,~, J, Wetter, The International Arbitral Process: 
Public and Private (1979), Vol. 1, 407, who describes the 
principle of contractual stabilisation with g rea t clarity . 
122. See infra, tex t accompanying no t e s 175 to 200. 
123. Supra, no te 77. 
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Given all of the possible appro aches to t h e c o nflict of 
laws in international arbitration, it is not surprising that 
Professor Bockstiegel's empirical studies have revealed "that no 
single pattern can be found in choice-of-law clauses in 
contracts with State parties." 124 Nor do resulting arbitrations 
reveal any clearly dominant attitude towards the c o nflict of 
laws.125 
Of the more flexible approaches to conflicts, the most 
coherent appears to be the one based upon comparative law 
methodology. Very little authority supports Dr Man n 's proposi-
tion that choice of law must be "founded upon and permitted by 
the private international law of the forum." 126 If the parties 
are free to choose their conflicts rules, in the absence of such 
a choice the arbitrators should be pe rm i tted to do the same . 
There is no particular reason why that choice should be limited 
to the conflicts rules of another sing le state, although such a 
choice may often be both appropriate and convenient a s i t was in 
the B.P. v. Libya arbitration. To e liminate idiosyncratic rules 
that might hinder the selection of sensible principles, the 
arbitrators should be free to employ comparative methodology t o 
establish wide ly accepted c o nnecting factors or to d e term i ne t h e 
most sophisticated a nd s e nsitive conflicts rules. This app roach 
124. Bockstiegel, supra, note 9, 57. 
125. Lew, supra, note 21, 581. 
126. Mann, Comme nts in the Colloquium, supra, no te 99 , 565. 
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would provide flexibility while at the same time ensuring that 
the arbitrators are not left without guiding principles, 
To suggest that "international law" can itself provide 
adequate conflicts rules, or to allow arbitrators full authority 
to pick any law directly are not acceptable methods because they 
allow the parties absolutely no certainty in their legal 
relations. In practice , the resort to a supposed body of 
"international" conflicts rules would almost always result in 
the application of highly abstract rules such as "good faith". 
Such an approach is particularly inappropriate when the parties 
have attempted to construct a complex choice-of-law clause 
incorporating different systems of law. Such clauses require 
interpretation simply because they are so complex, but to resort 
to "international" conflicts rules would emasculate the clauses. 
The inevitable over-generality of the substantive rules that 
would be indicated by such an undeveloped conflicts system would 
~ean that the parties' intention would not be fulfilled. If 
they had wanted their rela tions to be governed by abstract 
principles such as good faith, they need not have negotiated a 
complex choice of law clause in the first place. To say that 
they could gain certainty in a simpler manner by expressly 
adopting a single ruling substantive law ignores the political 
realities and bargaining difficulties that may make such an 
express choice impossible. 
Having explored the means whereby a governing law may be 
chosen or adopted, it is now possible to investigate the range 
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of possibilities open to parties and arbitrators seeking to 
fashion a substantive law. Knowing how they may choose, the 
obvious issue is what they may choose. 
ii. Variations of Delocalised Substantive Law 
The fundamental point, and one which has recently been 
obfuscated, is that the choice of the parties or the arbitrators 
is limited to the choice of an external legal system. Although 
the decision to contract is made by the parties alone and is a 
manifestation of their free will, once that decision has been 
made, the contract must be placed within a legal context. That 
context limits the discretion of the parties within their 
relationship and allows for the enforcement of their mutual 
promises. In the words of the Aramco arbitral tribunal: 
It is obvious that no contract can exist in vacuo, 
i.e., without being based on a legal system. The 
coriclusion of a contract is not left to the un-
fettered discretion of the Parties. It is neces-
sarily related to some positive law which gives 
legal effects to the reciprocal and concordant 
manifestations of intent made by the parties. 127 
127. Saudia Arabia v, Aramco, supra, note 81, 165. It must be 
admitted that this assertion by the Tribunal is very hard 
to reconcile with its later holding, at 168, that the 
"fundamental law" of the contract was the Concession 
Agreement itself. Perhaps the confusion arises because 
the Tribunal was unclear in what it meant by "fundamental 
law". The only coherent explanation is that the underly-
ing system allowed the full operation of party choice, 
meaning that the contract itself provided the necessary 
starting point in any evaluation of the parties' legal 
relationship. 
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This reality does no t pre clude the ex i s t e nce of communities 
governed by implicit norms that are, i n a sense , legal. 12 3 The 
"system" of law may be a customary system. Nor d o es it mean 
that all contracts arise from a pre-supposed system of law 
{grundlegung). The govern ing system of law can be freely chose n 
by the parties, The point is simply t hat contractual relatio n-
ships, although they acquire their initial existence through the 
will of the parties, are subsequently molded by an exterior 
system of law which upholds the contract and requires its 
performance. Ideally, this system shoul d be cho sen e xpressly by 
the parties, but if not, if may be implied. 
The crucial importance of an anc horing ,system of law has 
been recognised by innumerable jurists of high distinction 
including Professors We il, 1 29 Fr iedman l30 and 
128. Communities such as social clubs, sports teams, Faculties 
of Law, or Oxbridge Colleges. 
1 29. Weil, supra, note 35, 181-2: 
Le principe pacta sunt servand a et celui de l'auto -
nomie de la volo nte e ux-memes ne fl o tte nt pas d a ns l e 
vide, et il faut un sys teme de dro it p o ur leur co nfe -
rer f o rce ju r i d ique. 
130. w. Friedman, The Changing Structure of International Law (1964) 175. 
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Se idl-Hohenveldern, 131 and Dr Mann. 13 2 National courts have 
reached the same conclusion. 133 The policy underlying the 
requirement of attachment has been formulated clearly by 
Professor David: 
[U]n accord general regne pour penser que la 
volonte des particuliers, pour produire des effets 
juridiques, doit se rattacher a un systeme de 
droit, la vue contraire ne pouvant aboutir qu'a 
consacrer l'arbitraire ou la force. 134 
The guiding principles of an external system chosen by the 
parties are required to prevent abuses of power by the parties, 
and to encourage them to abide by their undertakings. Without a 
compendium of external control mechanisms, which may be denomi-
nated the "Rule of Law" or "community sanction" or whatever, the 
idea of contract would be reduced to a simple power relation-
ship. 
131. Seidl-Hohenveldern, speaking in the Colloquium, supra, 
note 99, 569: 
Now most authors agree that a contract cannot be a law 
to itself. There must be some outside force binding 
the partners, extraneous to their will . 
See also Thomas, supra, note 58, 141 . 
132. Mann, speaking in the Colloquium, supra, note 99, 562: 
Every contract is necessarily governed by a specific 
legal order. Or, to put it negatively, an understand-
ing which is not governed by a specific legal system 
is not a contract. 
See also Mann, supra, note 48, 196-7. Dr Mann takes the 
argument further than is here advocated , for he believes 
that every contract is governed by a pre-supposed state 
system of law which may allow or disallow party choice. 
133. See,~, Orion Compagnia Espanola de Seguros v. Belfort 
MaatschaJ?..2i. [1962] 1 Lloyd's L. Rep. 257 (Q .B. D.) 264 
(U.K.), ~ Megaw J. 
134. David, supra, note 57. 
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There are those who would advocate exactly t hat view. 
Because of the increasing emphasis upon the "autonomy of the 
will" in twentieth-century arbitral practice, certain authors 
have denied the necessity for any external legal system to shape 
the relations of the parties to an international contract. It 
has been suggested that the parties may choose to be governed 
simply by the "law" of their own contract. As a matter of 
principle and practicality, this view should be rejected. 
Although in the majority of cases Mr Lew might be correct in 
suggesting that" [t]he actual contract provisions provide the 
essential ingredients necessary to resolve any dispute between 
contracting parties," 135 a supporting system of law will often 
be required to fill gaps in the contract, to establish under-
lying principles and to provide means of sanction for non-
performance or unsatisfactory performance. 
The leading proponent of the contrary view has been 
Professor Verdross who for many years has argued that the law 
governing a state contract is uniquely the lex contractus, the 
law arising from the will o f the parties: 
135. 
One cannot justify the assertion that every agree-
ment must be based on the legal order of a pre-
existing legal community. It is likewise possible 
that such a legal community is established by the 
agreement itself. 13 b 
Lew, supra, note 21, 494. 
136. Verdross, The Status of Foreign Private Interests Stemming 
From Economic Development Agreements with Arbitration 
Clauses (1958) 18 Zeitschrift fUr aus. offen . Recht und 
Volkerrecht 635 (translation). 
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He characterised the insistence upon an external s y stem as a 
"positivist prejudice". 137 But one need not embrace positivist 
dogma in order to require that the parties to a contract choose 
a governing system of substantive law. First, such a system 
need not be a state system. Secondly, and as menti o ned 
previously, it is possible for a system of customary law to 
provide the necessary foundation. Thirdly, one need not deny 
that the initial agreement between the parties is a form of law, 
for any agreement, even a tacit one, constitutes a purposive 
structuring of human relationships. The assertion is simply 
that a contract will not be binding and enforceable as those 
terms are commonly understood, without the support of some legal 
context exterior to mere party preference. Professor Verdross 
has argued in reply that the rea s o n that the lex contractus is 
binding is solely the existence of the principle pacta sunt 
servanda and related "general principles of law". 1 3 b The 
content and appropriateness of such g e neral princip les will be 
explored in detail below. For now, o ne need only point out an 
odd aspect of Professor Verdross's approach. Although pacta 
sunt servanda in his view points to the exclusive application of 
the lex contractus, he admits that law to contain gaps which 
must be filled by r esort to und e rlying "general p rinciples". In 
effect, the methodology is very similar to more traditional 
137. See,~' Verdross, supra, note 7, 231. 
138. Ibid. 
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approaches, with the simple replacement of an established system 
by vague "general principles". 
The complete detachment of a contract from any supporting 
system of law has been advocated in some academic commentary 13 ~ 
and in certain recent arbitrations, primarily by foreign 
investors seeking desperately to preclude the application of the 
national law of a state party. 140 The jurisprudential founda-
tion of this approach is to be found in the decision of Judge 
Pierre Cavin in the Sapphire arbitration. Judge Cavin found 
that the concession agreement between a Canadian corporation and 
the National Iranian Oil Co. was not a "normal" contract, that 
no particular legal system could apply and that any lacunae in 
the contract could be filled using "principles of law generally 
recognized by civilized nations." 141 The persuasive value of 
this award is highly questionable because the award was never 
enforced. Moreover, in a closely argued judgment of the Court 
of First Instance of Tehran, rendered i n 1963, the court 
declared the arbitral award to be null and void. In obiter 
dicta, the Court specifically rejected Judge Cavin's conclusions 
139. See,~' Bourquin, Arbitration and Economic Development 
Agreements [1960] Bus . Law. 860. 
140. Reports from the B.P. v. Iran arbitration indicate that 
British Petroleum has been advancing the argument that no 
"system" of law is applicable to the concession agreement 
between the two parties. A similar argument was employed 
by the Amoco Corporation in its arbitration with Iran. 
Information from Counsel in the cases. 
141. Sapphire, supra, note 42, 175. 
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concerning the choice of substantive law. 14 ~ 
The weight of authority clearly does not support Professor 
Verdross in his argument that a contract constitutes its own 
proper law. Pacta sunt servanda is a powerful concept and it is 
the cornerstone of all major systems of contract. But it is not 
a system of itself. In the words of Professors Sohn and Baxter: 
No contract or concession exists in a legal vacuum. 
It draws its binding force, its meaning, and its 
effectiveness from a legal system, which must be so 
developed and refined as to be capable of dealing 
with the great range of problems to which the 
performance and violation of promises gives rise. 
'Pacta sunt servanda' is undoubtedly the basic norm 
of any system of law dealing with agreements, but 
the principle speaks on such a high level of 
abstraction that is affords little or no guidance 
in the resolution of concrete legal disputes 
relating to agreements.1 43 
A contract, even a state contract, derives its effectiveness 
from a chosen or implie d system of substantive law. The next 
step in the argument is clearly to evaluate what systems of 
substantive law potentially are applicable to contracts 
involving states and foreign private parties, and in arbitra-
tions arising from the breach of such contracts. 
Many options are open to parties attempting to select a 
governing law and to arbitrators seeking to determine a govern-
ing law if the parties have failed to make an express choice . 
142. Sapphire International Petroleums Ltd. v. National Iranian 
Oil Co., decision of 1 December 1963, reprinted in (1970) 
9 I.L.M. 1118 (Branch One, Court of First Instance, 
Tehran) 1123 (Iran). 
143. Quo ted from the Harvard Draft on the Responsibility of 
States in Bockstiegel, supra, note 9, 61. 
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It must be reiterated that, as Professor Bockstiegel's study has 
shown, it is very often the case that parties to a state 
contract will not have selected a governing law. 144 This 
conclusion is supported by Mr Broches's study of ICSID arbitra-
tion clauses. 145 The most difficult problems typically arise 
for arbitrators who have been given little guidance as to the 
"proper law". The results in such cases also tend to be more 
unpredictable, for an arbitrator operating post facto is likely 
to be more audacious in the choice of substantive law than are 
parties in the heat of negotiations. The only real limitation 
upon an arbitrator's "creativity", apart from his own role 
appreciation and good judgment, is the prospect than an overly 
novel approach to the law may raise difficulties with compliance 
and enforcement. This fact is yet another reason why, as 
suggested above, the actual fate of an award -- whether it has 
ever been complied with or enforced is relevant to any 
assessment of the award's persuasive value. 
Assuming the extreme, though not uncommon, case where an 
arbitrator has been given absolutely no guidance by the parties 
to a state contract as to the system of substantive law that the 
arbitrator is to apply to resolve a dispute, what are the 
options open to him? At the risk of pedantry, it may be wise to 
144. Bockstiegel, ibid., 47. 
145. Broches, The Convention on the Settlement of Investment 
Disputes Between States and Nationals of other States 
(1972) 136 Ree. des cours 331, 390. 
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set out a comprehensive list of these options before proceeding 
to a fuller discussion. The list incorporates possib ili ties 
suggested by, amongst others, Professors Lalive, Schwarzenberger 
and Bockstiegel, 146 and by the Institut de droit inter-
national. 147 In the absence of specific direction, an arbitra-
tor would be confronted with the following choices. He could 
apply, either singly or, when not mutually exclusive, in 
combination: 
a. The national law of the state party; 
b. The national law of the state of the foreign private 
party; 
c. The national law of another "neutral" state; 
d. More than one system of national law or the 
"principles" common to more than one system; 
e. A national law in combination with general principles 
of law (such as "good faith" or "justice"); 
f. A national law in combination with international law; 
g. The general principles of law recognised by civilised 
nations; 
146. Lalive, Contracts Between a State or a State Agency and a 
Foreign Company (1964) 13 Int'l & Comp. L.Q. 987, 992; G. 
Schwarzenberger, Foreign Investments and International Law 
(1969) 5; and Bockstiegel, supra, note 9, 58. 
147. Institute of International law, supra, note 105, art. 2, 
at 195. It must be noted, however, that the Institute 
conceived oE its various options as choices that could be 
made by the parties alone. In the absence of any express 
choice, art. 5 of the 1979 Resolutions provides that "the 
proper law of the contract shall be derived fr om indica-
tions of the closest connection of the contract." It will 
be seen, infra, that contemporary arbitrators have not 
believed themselves to be bound by any such rule. Indeed, 
in most major arbitrations, the discussion simply does no t 
focus upon the issue of connecting factors at all. 
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h. International law; 
j. General principles and usages of international 
commerce, ie. a lex mercatoria. 
The same options would, of course, be available to parties 
negotiating the applicable proper law, and in addition, they 
could authorise arbitrators to act ex aequo et bono (as amiables 
compositeurs) • 148 It would be highly unlikely for any arbitra-
tor simply to assume that right, for amiable composition is not 
a common phenomenon in international arbitration. 149 It will 
not be addressed here both because it is very rare and because, 
although controversial, especially in the common law world, 
amiable composition does not raise important theoretical 
148. For a comprehensive discussion of amiable composition, see 
Simont, "Amiables Compositeurs and their- Reasoning" in 
c. Schmitthoff, International Commercial Arbitration 
(1974-1980) 109 (an updated looseleaf system). 
149. Arbitrators do sometimes seem, albeit very rarely, to eh"'<",_ 
a~gaTe to themselves the role of amiable compositeur 
even when it is not expressly granted to them. In a case 
before the Iran-u.s. Claims Tr-ibunal, a majority in 
Chamber Two refused to apply the law expressly chosen by 
the parties to a contract because the result would have 
been unfair. The Chamber majority stated magisterially: 
"Our search is for justice and equity". CMI Interna-
tional, Inc. v. Ministry of Roads and Transportation, et 
a 1 • ( l 9 8 3 ) 4 Iran- U • S • C • T • R • 2 6 3 , 2 6 8 • This f e is t y 
attitude may perhaps be explained by the remarkably 
expansive choice-of-law provision contained in the Treaty 
establishing the Tribunal and by the unique political 
considerations which condition its operation. The general 
rule is rather closer to the situation as described by Mr 
Delaume: 
(T]he parties to transnational contracts may, by 
clearly stipulating the law applicable to the 
relationship between them, have the reasonable expec-
tation that their choice will be left undisturbed. 
Delaume, supra, note 20, Vol. I, eh. 1, 1. 
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difficulties. If arbitrators are told that they may act ex 
aeguo et bono, they will simply decide the issues based upon 
their notions of fairness. This approach is entirely distinct 
from the operation of "Equity" as a moderating influence within 
a system of legal rules. In an arbitration ex aequo et bono, no 
legal system is relevant, not even the principles contained in 
the contract itself, if those principles are deemed to have an 
inequitable result. Whether or not such a process is a "legal" 
process is a moot point. 150 
The classical attitude towards the choice of substantive 
law was that the arbitrators in an arbitration arising out of a 
state contract must perforce apply the substantive law of a 
single national system, most commonly the law of the state 
party. The touchstone for this traditional view is the judgment 
of the Permanent Court of International Justice in the Serbian 
Loans case, where the Court asserted that all contracts which 
are not between states {the only subjects of international law, 
it was assumed) must be founded in a national law. 1 ~ 1 This 
150. The lack of guidance given to arbitrators who are directed 
to act as amiables compositeurs may have few deleterious 
effects within a developed and homogenous legal system 
where there exists a fundamental congruence of values. In 
such a case, it mak e s s e nse to instruct arbitrators, in 
the manner of the Netherlands Coffee Trade Association, to 
act "like good men and true". See Arbitration Rules of 
the Netherlands Coffee Trade Association, Art. 12(1), 
quoted in Lew, supra, note 21, 225. In an international 
setting where no basic congruence of values may be 
presumed, such an instruction is less meaningful. 
151. Case Concerning the Payment of Various Serbian Loans 
Issued in France, supra, note 101. 
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presumption has received significant academic support. 
Professor Schwarzenberger, in his major work on the interna-
tional law of foreign investments, stated explicitly: 
In substance, if not necessarily in form, public 
contracts are consensual engagements between 
subjects and objects of international law. The 
presumption is in favour of these contracts being 
governed by municipal law. 152 
Professor Lalive has also written that "a domestic system of law 
chosen by the parties should in principle govern the substance 
of ••• international contracts." 1 ~ 3 One must assume that even 
without such an express choice, Professor Lalive would favour 
the application of national law. 
There is significant disagreement, however, even amongst 
proponents of national law, concerning which national law should 
apply to a transnational arbitration. Some commentators and 
arbitrators have argued that a state may never be presumed to 
have submitted to a foreign jurisdiction. Therefore, the only 
law that may be assumed to apply is the law of the state party. 
In the Lena Goldfields arbitration, the Tribunal held that any 
issues that could conceivably fall within the domestic jurisdic-
tion of the Soviet Union had to be decided under that law. 154 
Indeed, it would seem that the o nly reason the Tribunal held 
152. Schwarzenberger, supra, note 146, 5. 
153. Lalive, suora, note 146, 993. 
154. Lena Goldfields Ltd. v . Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics, decision of 3 September 1930, reprinted in 
(1950) 36 Cornell L.Q. 42. 
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that it could evaluate certain questions under "general princi-
ples of law" was that the Soviet Union had refused to partici-
pate in the arbitration. 1 ~~ In 1930, the exact nature and rule-
content of the Soviet legal system was undoubtedly a mystery to 
most Western observers. In order to avoid a finding of non 
liguet, 1 ~ 6 the Tribunal was forced to apply genera1 principles 
in the absence of pleadings that could have established the 
content of Soviet law. 
Professor Schwarzenberger and Mr Delaume have also argued 
that a sovereign state cannot be presumed to have subjected a 
contract to which it is a party to any legal system other than 
its own. 1 ~ 7 Mr Delaume has taken the argument a step further, 
by asserting that even when choice-of-law clauses in a contract 
include reference to national law and to principles such as 
"good faith", this should not be read as an incorporation of 
external general principles: 
Failing an explicit reference to international law 
or to the general principles of law in an agreement 
between a developed country and a foreign investor, 
it would occur to no one to construe a reference to 
155. See Nussbaum, The Arbitration Between the Lena Goldfields, 
Ltd., and the Soviet Government (1950) 36 Cornell L.Q. 31, 
36. 
156. For a forceful argument as to why international tribunals 
can and should avoid holdings of non-liquet, see Sir H. 
Lauterpacht, The Function of Law in the International 
Community (1933), passim, but especially at 63-5. 
157. Schwarzenberger, "The Arbitration Pattern and the Protec-
tion of Property Abroad" in P. Sanders, ed., International 
Arbitration Liber Amicorum for Martin Domke (1967) 313, 
317-8; and Delaume, supra, note 20, Vol. 2, eh. 14. 
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'good faith' otherwise than as a reminder of an 
elementary rule of contract law. Why should a 
different solution prevail when the contracting 
state is a developing nation whose law is capable 
of supplying the basic legal framework of the 
transaction? 158 
The emphasis placed upon the disparity in attitudes towards 
contracts involving developing and developed states is an 
important point that will be treated below . 15 9 
English courts and commentators have also tended to cling 
to the notion that state contracts must be governed by the 
national law of a particular state, but the applicable law is 
usually presumed to be that of the lex fori, especially when the 
forum has been chosen by the parties themselves. According to 
Dicey and Morris: 
When the arbitration clause is part of a contract, 
there is a very strong presumption that the proper 
law of the contract (including the arbitration 
clause ) is the law of the country in which the 
arbitration is to be held. 160 
This approach was expressly adopted by the English Court of 
Appeal in Tzortzis v. Monarck Line A/ B. 161 Professor Park has 
noted that "English judges traditional ly have given the lex loci 
arbitri greater significance than their French and ~~erican 
brethren." 162 The American brethren recognised this difference 
158. Delaume, ibid., 38. 
159. See infra text accompanying notes 230 to 233. 
160. Morris, supra, note 106, Vol. 2, 1127. 
161. [1968) W.L.R. 406 (C.A.) (U.K.). 
162. Park, supra, note 1, 24. 
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themselves when, in a decision which was calculated to encourage 
a broader, internationalist approach to arbitration, the Chief 
Justice noted the contrary English attitude which he described 
as a "general rule in English courts that the parties are 
assumed, absent contrary indication, to have designated the 
forum with a view that it should apply its own laws." lb 3 Even 
in England, however, some case law indicates that the tradi-
tional link between the situs and the substantive law may be 
eroding. 164 
Describing the assumption that some form of state law is 
to apply to international arbitrations as the "classical" or 
"traditional" view should not be seen as an implication that 
there are no contemporary adherents to that position. Indeed, 
in many of the recent concession or investment agreements cited 
at the outset of this Chapter, the parties expressly opted for 
the application of the substantive municipal law of the state 
party.l6S Many developing nations insist upon the application 
of their own national law to contracts with foreign 
163. M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., supra, note 47, 522, 
fn. 15. 
164. See Cie d'Armement Maritime S.A. v. Cie Tunisienne de 
Navigation S.A. (1971] A.C. 572 (U.K.). This case is 
still the only authoritative English decision in which the 
choice of forum was held not to determine the proper law 
and the facts were particularly strong in leading to that 
conclusion. Nevertheless, Thomas believes that the 
English common law is slowly drifting towards a position 
of greater flexibility regarding the proper law to be 
applied in arbitrations. See Thomas, supra, note 58. 
165. See the agreements cited supra, notes 11-19. 
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investors. lbb For example, a majority of the Latin Ame rican 
nations still manifest a strong distrust of any dispute resolu-
tion procedure which removes final legal control from the 
domestic legal system. 
"Calvo clauses" which require foreign 
investors to seek redress of grievances "only through local 
judicial and administrative remedies" are still employed in many 
Latin American state contracts. 167 It is, however, less and 
less common to read assertions that t he substantive lex loci 
arbitri should apply to an internatio nal arbitration. It would 
appear that the primary justification for the application of 
national law is the sovereign dignity of the state party. That 
dignity is equally offended by the application of a foreign 
municipal law as by resort to some form of delocalised law, so 
although the application of national l aw remains common, even 
predominant, in international arbitral practice, lbb it will tend 
166. See Teson, supra, note l; and Greenwood, supra, note 80. 
167. Broches, supra, no te 145, 373. For general discussions of 
the attitude (and some recent changes in attitude) of 
Latin American nations towards international arbitration, 
see Abbott, Latin America and International Arbitration 
Conventions: The Quandry of Non-Ratification (1976) 17 
Harv. Int'l L.J. 131; Paulsson, Le tiers monde dans 
l'arbitrage commercial international [1983) Rev. de l'arb. 
l; and Straus, Why International Commercial Arbitration is 
Lagging in Latin America: Problems and Cures ( 19 78) 33 
Arb. J. 21 (No. 1) • 
168. Professor Bockstiegel, supra, note 9, 64 has suggested 
that 
[t)he application of national l aw as the proper 
substantive law of the contract is of course the most 
c ommon not o nly in c o ntracts and arbit rations between 
(cont'd.) 
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to be the national law of the state party that is applied. 
Contemporary arbitral practice is rich also in alternative 
approaches to the substantive law. Although parties and 
arbitrators are always free to choose a single state law, the 
variety of attitudes expressed by arbitral tribunals indicates 
that such a choice is no longer presumed. 169 Indeed, if the 
parties are silent, given the context of international arbitra-
tion, it is difficult to discern any congruent implied intention 
in the parties. The interests of a state and a foreign investor 
are often fundamentally contradictory when an investment 
agreement or concession has collapsed. For this reason, many 
arbitral tribunals have refused to apply solely the substantive 
law of the state party, for that law, being within the unique 
private enterprises, but also in international 
commercial contracts and arbitrations involving states 
and state controlled corporations. 
169. The principles governing state con t~acts must here be 
distinguished from those which may apply in cases such as 
Amin Rasheed Shipping Corp. v. Kuwait Insurance Co. (1984] 
l A.C. 50 (H.L.) (U.K.). In that case , the contracting 
parties (both private entities) had chosen to conclude 
their contract using what was described by their Lordships 
as an outdated Lloyd's standard contract of insurance for 
charterparties. When such an express choice is made, it 
is fair to assume, as did their Lordships, that English 
law should apply to regulate the terms of the contract, 
for the contract has little meaning outside the legal 
system in which it was created . See Mann, supra, note 48, 
193. But Mann would use this case to draw more general 
propositions against the possibility of delocalisation. 
The Amin Rasheed facts, however, bear no relation to a 
situation where two parties , one of them a state, freely 
negotiate a contract of development or investment. The 
nature of the contract itself points to no local law. 
Moreover, the "intention of the parties" is no adequate 
guide for the reason set out in the text. 
- 173 -
control of the state, may be entirely self-serving. Ll u This 
realisation has encouraged the application of vario us forms of 
delocalised substantive law. 
The selection of a delocalised substantive law either by 
the parties or by arbitrators must be viewed primarily, then, as 
a method of "contractual stabilisation". 171 Before exploring in 
detail the techniques employed to achieve that end, the end 
itself must be evaluated. 
The importance of contractual stabilisation has been 
emphasised in many of the most important ad hoe arbitral awards 
rendered in the 1970s and early 1980s. In the Aminoil arbitra-
tion, the Tribunal stressed that although a negotiated stabili-
sation clause could not be presumed to eliminate a state's 
sovereign right to modify its undertakings, it would bind the 
state "to respect the contractual equilibrium." 172 Stabilisa-
tion was accorded an even more powerful role in the TOPCO and 
170. Delaume, supra, note 4, 790. 
171. See,~' Van Hecke, Les accords entre un Etat et une 
personne privee etrangere (1978) 57 Ann. de l'Institut de 
dr. int'l, t. II, 106, 110: 
La tendance a soumettre les contrats entre ~tats et 
personnes privees etrangeres a un syst~me de droit 
autre que celui de l'ttat contractant s'explique p a r 
le desir du contractant etranger d'echapper a une 
modification unilateralemnt apportee au contrat par 
l'Etat dans l'exercice de son pouvoir legislatif ou 
executif." 
See also Luzzatto, supra, note 30; Sanders, supra, note 
26; Paulsson, supra, note 6; Straus, supra, note 4; and 
Wetter, supra, note 121, Vol. 1, 407. 
172. Aminoil, supra, note 61, 1024. 
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LIAMCO arbitrations, where the arbitrators held that foreign 
private parties should be protected against any "unilateral and 
abrupt modifications of the legislation in the contracting 
State" td use the words of Professor Dupuy. 173 In the latter 
two cases, the arbitrators chose to invoke delocalised substan-
tive law proprio motu. Professor Verdross has advo cated the 
application of delocalised law precisely because, in his view, 
the contractual relationship would not then be "subject to the 
legislative power of the contracting State and thus (could not] 
be altered unilaterally. 11 17 4 
It will be seen presently that, no matter what form of 
delocalised ,law is chosen, it may in fact be impossible fully to 
"stabilise" the law governing concession or investment contracts 
between states and foreign private parties. It may be, however , 
that efficacy is not the primary concern. Delocalisation 
provides foreign investors with a sense -- even if a false sense 
-- of security. It is reassuring to know that international or 
transnational standards will be applied by an arbitral tribunal 
in evaluating any dispute which arises under a contract. Even 
if complete stabilisation is not possible, there at least 
remains a feeling that the state party will not have its own way 
with total impugnity. An award rendered in a corporation's 
favour and based upon delocalised legal standards may also have 
173. TOPCO, supra, note 78, 454. See also LIAMCO, supra, note 
77. 
174. Verdross, supra, note 7, 236-7. 
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some use as a bargaining chip with the state party and as 
evidence of the corporation's good faith if it seeks the 
diplomatic protection of its own government. 
a. Applying General Principles of Law 
The form of delocalised substantive law that has caused 
the most controversy in the international legal community is the 
resort to "general principles of law" which has found its most 
extreme expressions in the work of Professor Verdross and i n 
Professor Dupuy's holdings in the TOPCO arbitration. 
Professor Verdross has long argued that state contracts 
could not be governed by the law of the state party, nor were 
they treaties governed by international law. Such contracts 
formed a special, sui generis class of agreeme nts, "quasi-
international", or "transnational" -- the specific name was 
immaterial. The important point was this: state contracts were 
not concluded within the context of any pre-exis ting legal 
system, but simply "on the basis of the principle pacta sunt 
servanda and other general principles of law only." 1 7~ 
A similar, but not exactly comparable, approach has been 
recognised by two other jurists of distinction. Professor 
Lalive, although preferring the application of s ome municipal 
substantive law, has suggested nevertheless that general 
175. Ibid., 230-1. 
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principles "may already be considered as a separate l egal 
system." 1 76 Lord McNair argued similarly: 
[I)t is submitted that the legal system approp r iate 
to the type of contract under consideration [stat e 
contracts) is not public international law bu t 
shares with public international law a common 
source of recruitment and inspiration, namely , 'the 
general principles of law recognized by c i vilized 
nations.' 1 7 7 
It is important to note that for Professor Lalive and Lord 
McNair, "general principles" constituted a system o f law whereas 
Professor Verd ross would not view general principles as a system 
but merely as a set of rules that could be used to fill lacuna e 
in the lex contractus. Professors David and O'Connell also 
accept the systemic nature of general principles, and have 
advocated their application in arbitrations involving states and 
foreign private parties. 1 7 b Al l of these jurists, with the 
exception of Professor O'Connell, would agree that "general 
principles", whether syste.rrtc or not, are not equivalent to 
internatio nal law per se. International law could no t apply 
whe n o ne of the parties t o an investment or c o n c e s sion c o ntrac t 
is not a state. 1 7 9 Professor O'Connell would reject that 
analysis simply because, as a practical matter, "general princi-
ples" are incorporated into international law under art. 38 of 
176. Lalive, supra, note 146, 992. 
177. McNair, supra, note 74, 6. 
178. David, suera, note 57, 484; a nd D. O'Connell, Interna-tional La~, 2d ed. ( 1970) 983. 
179. See, 
~, McNa ir, suera, n o te 74, l O. 
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the Statute of the International Court of Justice "and the 
arbitral process is not affected in the slightest by a dispute 
as to whether the contract is governed by internationa l law or 
the general principles, or whether the latter be regarded as a 
system or not." 180 Although Professor O'Connell is probably 
correct in suggesting that the "arbitral process" will be 
unaffected by such a controversy, the resolution of the debate 
c6ncerning the application of international law to state 
contracts has profound implications for the nature and scope of 
international law itsel f. These implications will be discussed 
at the conclusion of this Chapter. 18 1 
There exists a body of arbitral authority which supports 
the application of "general principles of law" (eithe r alone or 
in conjunction with a national law) to state contracts, but for 
many reasons, this authority must be judged as weak and 
unpersuasive. In the Sapphire Arbitration, the Tribunal held 
that an oil concession agreement between a Canadian corporation 
and the National Iranian Oil Company was int e nded to be governed 
by "principles of law generally recognized by civilized 
nations ." 1 8 ~ The justifications for his holding were distinctly 
180. O'Connell, suora, note 178, 982. 
181. See infra, text accompanying notes 201 to 279. 
182. Sapphire, supra, note 42, 175. See also the decision of 
Lord Asquith of Bishopstone in Petroleum Development Ltd, 
v. Sheikh of Abu Dhabi, decision of September 1951, 
reprinted in (1951) 18 I.L.R. 144, 149 where the arbitra-
(cont'd.) 
V 
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idiosyncratic, not to say untenable, 1 83 but having convinced 
himself, the arbitrator went on to say that from these general 
principles he would "try to disentangle rules of positive 
law." 184 The source and nature of such "positive law" remains 
distinctly unclear but it was argued that "rules" could be 
extracted from the notions of pacta sunt servanda and "good 
faith". 185 It should be reiterated t hat the Sapphire award was 
set aside by an Iranian court in a well reasoned judgment. 186 
tor held, without discussing the possible application of 
international law per se, that in the absence of suffi-
cient relevant principles in the law of Abu Dhabi, resort 
should be had to "principles rooted in good sense and 
common practice of the generality of civilised nations --
a sort of 'modern l a w of nature.'" This statement appears 
to be the only express reference to a natural law of 
arbitration to be found in the extensive literature on the 
subject. 
183. The Sapphire Tribunal employed four justifications for the 
direct application of general principles of law: (a) a 
"foreign" arbitrator was provided for in the contract and 
such a person was unl ikely to apply Iranian l aw ; (b) the 
Agreement was to be carried out under the principles of 
good faith and good wi ll, rendering incompatible the 
strict application of any particular national law; (c) the 
only reference in the Agreement to substantive law was a 
mention of force majeure which was to be defined by inter-
national, not Iranian, law; and, most peculiar of all (d) 
the Agreement in question was similar to a number of other 
Iranian concession contracts. These contracts called 
expressly for the applica tion of general principles of 
law, so this contract had to be interpreted in the same 
manner. Sapphire, ibid., 172-4. 
184. Sapphire, ibid., 175. 
185. Sapphire, ibid., 181-3. 
186. Supra, note 141. 
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The Tribunal in the Lena Goldfields Arbitration also 
applied general principles but only to issues outside the 
domestic jurisdiction of the Soviet Union and then only because 
of the state-party's failure to appear, a failure which 
inhibited the Tribunal's understanding of Soviet law. 187 In the 
LIAMCO Arbitration, Sole Arbitrator Mahmassani applied general 
principles as the substantive law of the contract without any 
express justi.fication, 1 88 Professor Dupuy, in his TOPCO 
judgment, seemed to oscillate between two positions, sometimes 
implying that he was using general principles as part of an 
"international law of contract", 189 at other times indicating 
that general principles constituted an independent system of 
law 190 which had been chosen expressly by the parties, In 
either case, general principles were required both to fill gaps 
in the state law and to allow for stabilisation of the 
contractual relationship. 191 With respect, the greatest 
difficulty with the TOPCO award on the merits is its lack of 
consistency; it is difficult to decipher its coded reasoning. 
Indeed, it is fair to say that none of these arbitral 
authorities are strongly persuasive on the point at issue. 
18 7. Lena Goldfields, su12ra, note 154, so. 
188. LIAMCO, su12ra, note 77. See also Greenwood, su12ra, note Fu,tf(J •. 
189. TOPCO, su2ra, note 78, 447-8. 
190. TOPCO, ibid., 453-4. 
191. TOPCO, ibid., 454. 
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As one observer has noted, with a lmost whimsic a l under-
statement, "the search for general p r incipl e s is no t easy." 192 
Indeed, in the absenc e of any governing legal system with a 
structured view of legal sources, the search for "general 
principles" may be a Sisyphian task. As more and more states 
with differing socio-economic systems develop sop histicated yet 
diverse regimes of c o ntract law, it will become increasingly 
difficult to elaborate principles that are sufficiently common 
and sufficiently specific to govern factual situations. For 
example, in the common law world, the anticipato ry r e pudiation 
of an exe cutory contract typically give s rise to a no tional 
election in which the injured party may elect to terminate the 
contract unilaterally or may choose to perform and to demand 
more substantial damages than he would receive if he chose to 
terminate . In civi l i a n syste ms, no automatic right of termina-
tion ever exists; an application to a court is required. 
Another example is offered by Nicholas, who demonstrates 
convincingly that the seemingly close conne ction between civi l 
law force majeure and common law frustration in fact masks 
important dissimilarities in the underlying principles. 1 9 3 
Without any hierarchy of sources, a rational and predictable 
proces s of adjudicatio n b e comes unte n able when c o nfronted with 
192. Lalive, supra, note 146, 1010. See also Verhoeven, Droit 
international des contrats et droit des gens (1978) ~-
Rev. belge dr. int'l 209, 218. 
193. Nicholas, Force Majeure and Frustration (19 79 ) 27 Am. J. 
Comp • L. 2 3 1 • 
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conflicting rules, This is not t o argue that we s hould return 
to the days oE "classica l" internatio nal law when t he reso lute 
p ursuit o f formalism directed all attention to the essentially 
misplaced concern for the elaboration of rigid hie r archies of 
"sources" and "participants" in international law. It has been 
recognised increasingly that the higher goal of i n ternational 
law is t o articulate and promote community values. However, the 
articulation of global community values is not li kely , in the 
short term at least, to provide much g u idance in the narrower 
task of contractual interpretation. 
Moreover, state prac t ice may dilute general principles so 
greatly as to nullify any contractual security sought for the 
no n-state party. If "general principles" alone a r e to apply, 
and if the term is to be given its usual meaning so that only 
those principles generally recognised are to govern , contract 
principles may increasingly be affected by the national rules o f 
states that have little interest in t h e ultimate sec urity of 
internatio nal c o ntracts . It i s of t e n s uggested that a ll sta t es 
have a similar interest in the security of contract and property 
because it is only that security which maintains t he flow of 
foreign investment. 1 ~ 4 But the capital r esources o f cer tain 
develo ped nations are such that dome stic marke t c onst r aints and 
the possibilities of high returns prompt investment a c tivity 
beyond national borders. In addition, the search f or cheap 
labour and supplies of raw material may en c ourage investme nt 
194. See,~' Broches, supra, note 145, 343. 
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even where potential contractual insecurity exists. If that be 
the case, the market c o nstraints upon developing states may no t 
be as significant as has been suggested. The tendency may be to 
tolerate the evolution of "general principles of law" which 
unduly discount investor security. The search for stabilisation 
through general principles may be illusory if "general princi-
ples of law" actually all ow for the unilateral modification of a 
state contract by the state party. 
The recent Aminoil award reveals in full measure the often 
illusory "protection" offered by g eneral principles. 1 95 The 
Tribunal was confronted with an oil concession that had been 
abrogated unilaterally by the state party. In its reference to 
general principles, the Tribunal seems impliedly t o have equated 
state contrac ts with forms of public contract found in municipa l 
law sys tems, particularly with the "contrat administratif" of 
French law. l 9 b Under the general theory of public contracts, 
the state is granted authority, because of its special role as 
guardian o E the public interest, un i la terally t o requi re a 
v a riation of the o ther party's obligations and even to abrogate 
195. 
196. 
Aminoil, supra, note 61. 
See,~, Teson, supra, note 1, 346: 
ATfnough the Tribunal carefully avoided the 
expression, it is clear that it considered the 
concession agreement, in the f o rm it had taken by 
virtue of the changes described, to have bec ome s o me -
thing very similiar to an administrative contrac t. 
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the contract entirely should the public interest require it. 19 7 
The Tribunal therefore found that, even under general principles 
of law, a state could unilaterally revoke a contract with a 
foreign private party. General principles si~ply failed to 
serve the function of stabilisation. 
A final, more theoretical, objection to the application o f 
"general principles" to govern state contracts is the misleading 
sleight-of-hand often performed by advocates of that method-
ology. In almost all of the arbitrations discussed above, the 
only "general principles" referred to are pacta sunt servanda 
and "good faith". Professor Verdross also selected these 
concepts as the key general principles of law. Professor 
Sanders has written that in his "opinion the generally accepted 
principle of 'pacta sunt servanda' may be invoked for the 
binding force of the parties' contract." 198 In a similar vein, 
a recent ICSID tribunal held that an ag reement between a state 
and a foreign private party was to be construed under "the 
fundamental principle pacta sunt servanda". 199 The problem with 
this analysis is that it encourages the confounding of contracts 
197. See the description of the "contrat administratif" 
contained in the TOPCO arbitration, supra, note 78, 463. 
For a full discussion of public contracts, including 
"contrats administratifs", see infra, Chapter III. 
198. Sanders, supra, note 26, 263. 
199. Amco Asia Corp. et al. v. The Republic of Indonesia, ICSID 
Award on Jurisdiction of 25 September 1983, reprinted in 
(1985) 10 Y.B. Comm. Arb. 61, 62. 
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with international treaties. As it applies to states, pacta 
sunt servanda is a principle of international treaty law with an 
attendant body of rules, and although its basic premise --
perform your agreements -- applies equally to contracts, the 
danger is that by employing the same terminology to cover 
entirely distinct types of relations h ips, the distinction itself 
will progressively be erased. For example, a treaty cannot be 
terminated unilaterally by one of the parties, but a state 
contract may be terminated by the state through the sole 
operation of municipal law. Clearly, pacta sunt servanda does 
not mean the same thing for treaties and for contracts. 200 If 
international law is to retain its systemic integrity, the 
confusion of these two situations should not be encouraged. 
This problem can be discussed more profitably after exploring 
the second major means of delocalisation of substantive law, 
that is the application of international law per se. 
b. Applying International Law 
The first authoritative advocate of international law as a 
potential proper law for state contracts was Dr Mann. Although 
his preference has always been for the application of a "system 
200. Even a strong supporter of the application of 
international law (including general principles) to state 
contracts has admitted that pacta sunt servanda "re9oit un 
contenu different dans le cas d'un contrat et dans celui 
d'un traite." Weil, "Droit international et cont rats 
d'Etat" in Melanges offerts ~ Paul Reuter: Le droit 
international: unite et diversite ( 1981) 549 , 569. 
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of municipal law chosen by the parties", 201 Dr Mann acknowledged 
as long ago as 1944 202 that the private law system of conflicts 
which he assumed must govern every arbitration could authorise 
the parties to select a delocalised proper law. The only 
possible delocalised system, according to Dr Mann, was interna-
tional law. 203 The theoretical justifications he offered for 
his view are as follows: 
201. 
202. 
203. 
204. 
The commercialization of treaties as well as the 
internationalization of contracts are different 
aspects of the same fundamental idea. It is no 
longer attractive to suggest that public interna-
tional law and private international law respec-
tively have fields of application, which are clear-
ly and perhaps even inflexibly defined and which 
are determined by a priori or conceptualist 
reasoning, such as the formula that public interna-
tional law is applicable only as be tween interna-
tional persons or that relationships between inter-
national persons are necessarily subject to public 
international law. Both branches of the law are 
branches of the same tree. They apply in confor-
mity with the demands of reasonable justice and 
practical convenience. They overlap and pervade 
each other. Both are called upon to contribute to 
the progressive evolution of the law. 204 
Mann, The Proper Law of Contracts Concluded b~ Interna-
tional Persons (1959) 35 Brit. Y.B. Int'I L. 4, 4~ere-
inafter The Proper Law]. 
Mann points out his long association with the theory of 
delocalisation based upo n international law in Mann, supra 
note 48, 196. 
Mann, The Proper Law, supra, note 201, passim; Mann , 
supra, note 8, passim; and Mann, The Aminoil Arbitration 
(1983) 54 Brit. Y.B. Int'l L. 213, 216. 
Mann, The Proper Law, ibid., 56. 
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At a more practical level, Dr Mann ha s suggested t ha t the "real 
justification" for "inte r nationalisation " of the s ubstantive law 
of a state contract "is provided by t h e require ment s o f int e rna-
tional intercourse"; often, he asserts, no other solution would 
work. 20 ~ 
Prompted by a growing fear that the notio n of "interna-
tionalisation" was expanding beyond safe constraints, Dr Mann 
has on occasion attempted to soften, almost to retract, his 
support for the delocalisation of the s ubstantive law. 206 How-
ever, Dr Mann has found it difficult to stop the expanding use 
of his earlier proposition tha t s ubsta ntive inte rna ti o nal l a w 
may be chosen as the proper law of a state contract. That view 
has received significant doctrinal support, including such 
eminent obse rvers as Professor s Jennings, 207 Weil, 2 oa David 2 09 
and O'Co nnell. 210 More importantly, it has been adop t ed 
205. ]bid., 46. 
206. See, ~' Mann, supra, no te 48 . 
207. Jennings, speaking in the Colloquium, supra, note 99, 592. 
208. Weil, supra, note 35, 185-9. Pcofessor Weil s ta tes that 
the sources for an international law of contracts would be 
identical to the sources of generally applicable 
international law. 
209. Da vid, supra, note 57. 
210. O'Connell, supra, note 178, 979. See also Greenwood, 
supra, note 80, 48 and 79; and the comments of Teson, 
supra, note 1, 329 who suggests that "the majority of 
Western writers" support the application of inte rnationa l 
law t o state contrac ts but tha t the majority o f deve lop ing 
s tates do no t. 
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implicitly 211 or expressly 212 in a significant body o f arbitral 
tribunal opinion, and has been sanctioned by some domestic 
tribunals. 213 It is likely that foreign corporations will 
211. In the Aminoil arbitration, supra, note 61, the arbitra-
tors held that altho ugh Kuwaiti substantive law applied in 
general, as "the law most directly involved", that fact 
did "not carry all-embracing c o nsequences". As a r e sult, 
international law could apply because of the specific 
wording of the arbitration Agreement, art. III(2), which 
~eferred to "the principles of l aw and prac tice ~revailing 
1n the modern world" and because the law of Kuwait was so 
sophisticated that the incorporation of interna t ional 
standards could be presumed. This latter argument is a 
neat twist on older arguments which allowed for the 
application of international standards because the 
domestic law of a, usually developing, state was not 
sophisticated enough to govern a complex contract. See, 
~, Petroleum Development Ltd. v. Sheikh of Abu Dhabi, 
supra, note 182. On the Aminoil case, see also Teson, 
ibid., 336 who notes that 
~~the (Aminoil] tribunal did not plainly declare the 
internationalization of the c o ntract, yet conclude d 
that ..• domesti c a nd inte rnat i onal (law) forme d an 
integrated legal system applicable to the merits of 
the dispute. 
212. As noted, supra, te x t accompanying notes 190-1, Professor 
Dupuy in the TOPCO arbitra t ion, although manifesting some 
confusion on the point, seemed to allow for t he applica -
tion of gene ral principles as part of public internat i o nal 
law. 
(!Jn this case 'the legal order from which the binding 
nature of the contract derives' is international law 
itself and 'the law which governs the contract' is the 
two-tier system provided for by the parties .•• 
TOPCO, supra, note 78, 443. See also Greenwood, supra, 
note 80, 50. Although less explicitly than did Professo r 
Dupuy, Judge La g e rgre n in B.P. v. Libya, supra, note 49, 
also allowe d f o r the potential app lication of public 
international law to state contracts if the parties so 
directed. 
213. See,~, Orion Compagnia Espanola de Seguros v. Belfort 
Maatschappij, supra, note 133, 264 (~ Megaw J.) where 
the court stated: 
(I]t may be, tho ug h pe rha p s i t would be unusual, tha t 
the parties c ould validly a g r e e that a pa r t, o r t he 
(co nt'd. ) 
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continue to argue for the "internationalisation" of their 
contracts with states or state agencies and will attempt to 
negotiate an express choice of international law at least as a 
supplementary proper law.2 14 / 
However, the possible application of public international 
law to state contracts is by no means a universally accepted 
proposition. Professor Lalive has suggested that any submission 
to international law would have to be limited to an "interna-
tional law of contractual interpretation and that the inter-
whole, of their legal relations should be decided by 
the arbitral tribunal on the basis of a foreign system 
of law, or perhaps on the basis of principles of 
international law; for example, in a contract to which 
a Sovereign State was a party. 
214. In formulating contractual choice-of-law provisions, the 
parties are free to negotiate for the application of rules 
from more than one system, for example a particular 
national law supplemented by rules of public international 
law. See~, the choice of law clause at issue in 
Kuwait v. Aminoil, supra, note 61. Professor Lalive has 
also acknowledged this possibility, Lalive, supra, note 
146, 992. See also the comments of Professor Deelen in 
the Colloquium, supra, note 99, 587: "A contract can be 
subject to more than one legal order." 
Emphasising the principle of the autonomy 
(severability) of arbitration clauses, it has even been 
suggested that an arbitration clause "may be governed by a 
distinct and separate proper law", although English law, 
at any rate, would allow the proper law to be so split 
only "in exceptional circumstances." Thomas, Proper Law 
of Arbitration Agreements (1984] 2 L.M.C.L.Q. 304, 310. 
Application of a distinct proper law to the arbitration 
clause itself would seem an unnecessarily complex approach 
to an already complicated issue and for that reason alone, 
should be discouraged. 
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national responsibility of the state could not be engaged . 21 ~ 
This point is crucial and will be dealt with at length below. 
An even more fundamental attack on the theory has been under-
taken by Luzzato, who has argued that 
[i]n princ iple, there can be l ittle doubt, if any, 
that international arbitrations arising from a 
dispute between States and foreign subjects, under 
a contractual relationship between the parties, 
should be put on the same level as arbitrations 
between two private parties, and not as arbitra-
tions between States which are governed as such by 
public international law. 216 
The justification for this view is two-fold, First, as a matter 
of theory, to apply international law to state contracts is to 
equate foreign private parties with states and this would 
suggest that the international responsibility of a state could 
be engaged vis-a-vis a foreign corporation or individual 
investor. This suggestion raises fundamental policy issues that 
will be examined near the close of this Chapter. 
A second, purely practical, objection to the application 
of international law is that the corpus of public international 
law simply does not contain rules that are applicable to the 
regulation of complex private contractual relationships. It has 
been suggested that the arbitral decisions which support the 
"internationalisation" of substantive law have not disclosed 
215. As reported in the Institute of International Law, supra, 
note 105, 194. 
216. Luzzatto, supra, note 30, 87. 
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many legally relevant principles. 217 It is certainly true that 
the major arbitral decisions to date have dealt largely with 
fact patterns involving complete contractual repudiation amount-
ing to fundamental breach. Such cases have not provided an 
opportunity for the elaboration of detailed contractual rules to 
govern such problems as contracting inter absentes, anticipatory 
breach or frustration. A troubling possibility is that such 
rules simply do not exist in international law. That was the 
conclusion of Professor Batiffol in his comments before the 
Institut de droit international. 218 Julien Lew reached a 
similar conclusion after his study of the law applicable to 
commercial arbitration: "[P]ublic international law neither aims 
nor is equipped to regulate the commercial relations and activi-
ties of private individuals and organisations in the interna-
tional arena". 219 Even jurists who support the possibility of 
"internationalisation" admit that "international law is ill-
adapted to the hazards of commercial activity" 220 and that "[JJ 
l'heure actuelle, ce chapitre nouveau du droit international n'a 
sans doute atteint encore ni une grande richesse ni une reelle 
217. See,~, Greenwood, supra, note 80, 64; and Suratgar, 
supra, note 25, 276. 
218. As reported in the Institute of International Law, suora, 
note 105, 194. 
219. Lew, supra, note 21, 403. See also Amerasinghe, State 
Breaches of Contracts With Aliens and International Law 
(1964) 58 Am. J. Int'l L. 881, 906. 
220. O'Connell, supra, note 178, 976. 
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precision". 22 1 A good case in point is the pro blem o f c o ntra c-
tual frustration. When has the purpose of a con t ract b e come so 
frustrated that the parties should no longer be he ld to their 
mutual promises to perform? The private law of contract, 
particularly in the common law world, has developed sophis-
ticated and detailed answers to that q uestion, but one would 
look in vain for applicable principles o f pu b lic international 
law. 222 
Some commentators have argued that this practical diffi-
culty -- the paucity of detailed rules -- is less p roblematic 
than might at first a p p e ar. Mann, 22 3 J ennings 22 4 and Seidl-
Hohenveldern225 have all suggested that in the majority of cases 
221. Weil, supra, note 35, 191. 
222. The argument i s no t that there are "gaps" in interna ti o na l 
law that would preclude a tribunal from giving judgment. 
Sir Hersch Lauterpacht demonstrated long ago that, as a 
matter of legal theory, no system of law can be presume d 
to contain gaps. In particular, o ne cannot simply di v i de 
the problems facing the internatio nal community into t hose 
that are "le gal" and those tha t are "politica l" and hence 
incapable of judicial resolution. Laute r p acht, suhra , 
note 156, 85 and 139. The fact of the matter is tat 
international law is complete within its sphere but that 
it cannot be made to encompass the entire legal universe . 
It simply does not apply in certain contexts. To take t h e 
extreme case, no-one would argue that customa ry interna-
tional law contains rules relevant to a case c o ncerning an 
appli ca tion f o r an alimentary pe nsion upon a divorce in 
the United Kingdom. 
223. Mann, supra, note 201, 34-5. 
224. Jennings, State Contracts in Inte r national Law (1961) 37 
Brit, Y.B. Int'l L. 156, 175. 
225. Seidl-Hohenvelde rn, Comments in t he Colloqu ium, supra , 
note 99, 569. 
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that are likely to confront arbitcal tribunals, one can 
successfully compensate for the lack of guiding rules by resort 
to the general principles that are a recognised source of inter-
national law under art. 38 of the Statute of the International 
Court of Justice. The obvious objection is that if there are in 
fact no relevant rules in treaties or in customary international 
law and resort must be had to "general principles", all of the 
same practical and theoretical difficulties arise as when 
general principles are argued to operate as a system independent 
from international law. It would seem that the only advantage 
in allowing for the application of international law, if indeed 
it is necessary to fill lacunae with general principles, is that 
such "general principles" could be evaluated as a component of a 
system of law. They could therefore be overruled or offset by 
other sources of international law; an element of control and 
predictability would be retained. 
Whether or not it is necessary to resort to general 
principles to fill lacunae in the system of customary and treaty 
law, a significant practical problem remains with the concept of 
"internationalisation". It would appear that "international-
ising" the substantive law of a state contract will simply fail 
in its primary obj ec tive which is contractual stabilisation. To 
stabilise a state contract effectively using international law, 
the foreign investor would have to show that international law 
forbids the unilateral exercise of state legislative power to 
alter or renounce a contract. This would amount to proving that 
- 193 -
international law forbids nationalisation. 226 There is an over-
whelming body of authority in contemporary international law 
supporting the proposition that international law (including 
general principles) does not preclude the interference with or 
expropriation of foreign owned property, as long as a public 
purpose is served, no discrimination is practiced and fair 
compensation is offered. 227 The only controlling influence that 
could be asserted by international law is in relation to the 
standard of compensation, but even here little guidance can be 
offered because the standard for compensation in international 
law is the subject of a furious continuing debate. 22 8 
Despite the unsettled status of the interna tional rules 
concerning compensation for expropriation, heroic efforts have 
226. See Teson, supra, note 1, 340. 
227. See,~, the important contribution of a former 
President of the International Court of Justice, Jimenez 
de Arechaga, State Responsibility for the Nationalization 
of Foreign-Owned Property (1978) 1 1 N.Y.U.J, Int'l L. & 
Pol. 179. See also the Declaration on Permanent 
Sovereignty Over Natural Resources, United Nations G.A. 
Res. 1803, 17 U.N. GAOR, Supp. ( No, 17) 15, U.N. Doc. 
A/5217 (1962); and the Declaration on the Establishment of 
a New International Economic Order, United Nations G.A. 
Res. 3201, 6 (Special) U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 1) 3, U.N. 
Doc, A/ 9559 (1974). 
228. The debate surrounding the l as t draft o f the American Law 
Institute , Restatement (Revised) of Foreign Relations Law 
(1984) which rejected any customary status for the 
traditional American formulation of the compensation rule 
("prompt, adequate and effective") has been bitter. See, 
~, Clagett, Protection of Foreign Investment Under the 
Revised Restatement (1984) 25 Va J. Int'l L. 73; 
Schachter, Compensation for Expropriation (1984 ) 78 &~. J. 
Int'l L. 121; and Gann, Compensation Standard for 
Expropriation (1985) 23 Col . J. Trans . L. 615. 
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been made by certain arbitrators and by counsel to transnational 
corporations to argue for the almost automatic application of 
international law t o all state contracts. 
The first line of attack, articulated most forcefully by 
Professor Weil 229 and accepted by Professor Dupuy in the TOPCO 
arbitration, was to characterise many state contracts as 
"economic development agreements" to which special, interna-
tional, rules would apply. 230 If this argument were limited 
strictly to the issue of finding an implied common intention to 
choose international law as the proper law of such a contract, 
it might have some merit. It could be argued that parties to a 
major development contract might intend their relations to be 
governed, at least in a supplementary manner , by international 
law. Even here, such an assumption should probably not weigh 
heavily in the evaluation, for one could argue with equal force 
that, especially when major economic agreements are concerned, a 
state is not likely tacitly to give away legal control over the 
project . But if the characteri sation as an "economic develop-
ment agreement" is used to justify the automatic application of 
international law divorced from any intention, the argument 
becomes both illogical and dangerous in pri nciple . The applica-
229. See, ~, Weil, supra, note 200, 580. 
230. TOPCO, supra, note 78, 455. The TOPCO award was 
criticised harshly by Professor Fatouros because of its 
perceived insensitivity to the needs and aspirations of 
developing states. Fatouros, International Law and the 
International Contract (1980) 74 Am. J. Int'l L. 134. 
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tion of international law would then become dependen t upon the 
overall economic situation of the state party. As Teson points 
out: 
[I)n the absence of express or i mplied internation-
alization, a tribunal should be reluctant to take 
such a serious step. In particular, the theory 
that state contracts are "economic develooment 
agreements" appears indefensible. It impl i es that 
an oil concession contract between, for e xample, a 
Saudi investor and the British government would be 
subject to British law, while a similar contract 
between the Saudi government and a British i nvestor 
would benefit from the protection of international law.231 
Such a result would be, to say the least, odd. 
It is clear that an economic development agreement cannot 
be presumed to be "internationalised". First, and as Teson 
implies, the argument never even arises that a major f oreign 
inves tment in a developed nation i s gove rned by inter natio nal 
law. Imagine the consternation of the United Kingdom Government 
if a Saudi Arabian investme nt in North Se a oil exploration was 
said to be regulated by international law. Would t he Canadian 
g overnme nt be any more li kely to tole rate such a suggestio n if 
applied to a French-built aluminium smel t er in Quebec? Would an 
investor nation even have the temerity to make the suggestion? 
A Legal Adviser to the U.S. Department of State stated frankl y 
that whe n a foreign inves t o r c omes to the Unite d Sta t e s "he does 
so understanding that the U.S. laws are going to apply to him 
231. Te s o n, supra, no te 1, 332. 
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just as to any other enterpreneur." 232 On principle, a similar 
argument should apply to all sovereign states , developed or 
developing. Secondly, even in the developing world , many 
investment contracts are concluded which specifically call for 
the application of the municipal law of the host state. 233 
There is nothing inherently "internationa lised" about an invest-
ment contract or development agreement . 
Recently, an even broader claim has been advanced by 
foreign investors who argue for the application of international 
law to state contracts. Corporations have begun to assert that 
when a state contracts with a foreign private party, interna-
tional law will apply automatically because of the nature of the 
contract, even if the parties expressly have chosen another 
(usually municipal) system of law to govern t heir undertakings . 
Needless to say, in the absence of an express choice of law, the 
argument would run that "internationalisation" must be presumed. 
It follows from this claim that the breach of a state contcact 
engages the breaching state in the fu l l panoply of state 
responsibility und e r international law and that the foreign 
private party itself possesses standing to prosecute a claim 
based upon state responsibility. 
232. United States , Senate . Committee on Foreign Relations, 29 
March 1966, reprinted in (1966) 5 I.L.M. 649, 666 
(Statement of Leonard C. Meeker, Legal Adivser, Department 
of State, questioned by Senator Church regarding the 
effect of the ICSID Convention upon U.S. law). 
23 3. See,~' the agreements cited at the outset of this 
Chapter, supra, notes 11-19 . 
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A small number of arbitral tribunals have been seduced by 
these arguments. In the Aminoil arbitration, the Tribunal had 
been granted a wide discre tion by the parties to determine the 
appropriate substantive law. 234 The discretion was employed in 
a striking manner. Having held that prima facie the concession 
should be governed by Kuwaiti law, the Tribunal went on to hold 
that because Kuwait law was a modern system, it incorporated 
international law and further, that international law incorpo-
rated general principles. Hence these "general principles" were 
the true source of law t o be applied by the Tribunal. 23 ~ This 
methodology was also adopted by the arbitration panel in S.P.P. 
(Middle East) Ltd. v. Egypt 236 but was applied in an even more 
extreme manner, for in that case the parties had agreed in their 
234. Article III(2) of the Arbitration Agreement of 23 June 
1979 reads as follows: 
The law governing the substantive issues between the 
Parties shall be determined by the Tribunal, having 
regard to the quality of the Parties, the trans-
national character of their relations and the princi-
ples of law and practices prevailing in the modern 
world. 
Reprinted in ~~inoil, supra, note 61, 980. 
235. Aminoil, ibid., 1000-1. The only coherent practical 
explanation for the choice of this methodology was that 
the Tribunal had not been asked to determine whether or 
not nationalisation was per se legal. The only issue was 
the value of compensation and damages (plus interest) due . 
Perhaps the wide measure of agreement between the parties 
encouraged the Tribunal to assume that both parties (and 
particularly the State party) would tolerate the devious 
application of "general principles". 
236. S.P.P., supra, note 39. The award was, of course, quashed 
1n Arab Republic of E9.Y£!:. v. S.P.P., supra, note 39 by the 
Cour d'appel de Paris. Its authoritative value is, 
therefore, minimal. 
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pleadings that Egyptian law would govern the contract at 
issue. 23 7 Like the panel in Aminoil, the S.P.P. Tribunal held 
that the national law of the state party would apply but that 
Egyptian law incorporated general principles of law through its 
incorporation of international law: 
[W)e find that reference to Egyptian law must be 
construed so as to include such principles of 
international law as nay be applicable and that 
national laws of Egypt can be relied upon only in 
as much as they do not contravene said principles. 238 
Other arbitral tribunals have manife sted a similarly cavalier 
attitude toward the choice of a national legal system. 239 The 
logica l conclusion of such decisions is that "internationalisa-
tion" is always to be presumed .in state contracts and that to 
prevent it, international law would have to be expr essly 
excluded. Such a position turns international law on its head , 
for the assumption has long been that a state may never be 
presumed to have foregone its legal sovereignty. 
The common justification for such automatic "i nterna-
tionalisation" is that, in contracting wi th a foreign private 
party, the state confers upon that party a limited international 
237. S.P.P., ibid., 768. 
238, S.P.P., ibid,, 771. Again, the broad measu r e of party 
agreement may have emboldened the Tribunal to make such a 
holding. 
239, See,~, Revere Copper and Brass, Inc. v. Overseas 
Private Investment Corporation, AAA decision of 24 August 
1978, reprinted in (1978) 17 I.L.M. 1321; and CMI Interna-
tional, Inc. v. Ministry of Roads and Transportation, et 
al., supra, note 149. 
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personality. 240 It would be an odd situation indeed if a single 
member of the international community could singlehandedly 
bestow international status upon a private individual or 
group. 241 The large body of rules relating to recognition would 
be rendered superfluous. Such a major change in the interna-
tional system cannot lightly be presumed. It is of course true 
that in recent years the subjects oE international law have, for 
specific purposes, been expanded to include not only states but 
international organisations and even individuals. Moreover, 
states are no longer the sole actors in the global process of 
law formation. 242 The expansion of the role of non-state actors 
240. See, ~' Schwarzenberger, supra, note 146, 6; and 
B6ckstiegel, supra, note 9, 72-3 and 75. 
241. Professor Friedmann found the prospect of "groups of 
governments and private parties establishing autonomous 
legal orders of their own" a "frightening" one. 
Friedmann, supra, note 128. 
242. The expanding participation of non-state actors in the 
international legal process has been acknowledged and 
applauded by numerous scholars of high distinction includ-
ing Sir Hirsch Lauterpacht, The Development of Interna-
tional Law by the International Court (1958) 179; Clifford 
Jenks, The Prospect of International Adjudication (1964) 
428; and Elias, "Modern Sources of International Law" in 
W. Friedmann, L. Henkin & 0, Lissitzyn, eds, Transnational 
Law in a Changing Society[:) Essays in Honour of Philip c. 
Jessup (1972) 68. Of course, the leading contemporary 
proponents of an inclusive view of membership in the 
"international" community are the members of what 
Professor Falk has called the "New Haven School". For a 
complete, if somewhat heady, introduction to the work of 
that school, see M. McDougal, et al., Studies in World 
Public Order (1960). A more succinct statement may be 
Eound in McDougal, Lasswell & Reisman, Theories About 
International Law: Prologue to a Configurative Juris-
( cont'd.) 
- 200 -
has been accomplished largely through the vehicle of multi-
lateral treaties. In other words, states themselves collecti ve -
ly have consented to specific alterations in the law. In the 
realm of human rights, individuals have been granted direct 
access to international protection under the European Convention 
for the Protection of Human Rights and FundameAtal Freedoms, 243 
the American Convention on Human Rights, 244 and most important-
ly, under the United Nations International Covenaht on Civil and 
Political Rights 245 when read together with its Optional 
Protocol. 246 Cases brought by individuals contribute to the 
further development of the law of human rights. International 
organisations have also contributd widely to the fo rmulation of 
new legal principles, notably in trade law 24 7 and in the 
prudence (1968) 8 Va J. Int'l L. 188. The clearest, least 
jargon-filled, exposition is to be found in Higgins, 
Policy Considerations and International Judicial Process 
(1968) 17 Int'l & Comp. L.Q. 58. 
243. (Done 4 November 1950) 213 UNTS 222, especially art. 25. 
244. (Done 22 November 1969) 36 OASTS 1, O.A.S. Off. Ree. 
OEA/Ser. L/V/ II. 23, doc. 21, rev. 6 (English), especially 
art. 44. 
245. United Nations G.A. Res. 2200, 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp . (No. 
16) 52, U.N. Doc. A/ 6316 (1967), reprinted in (1967) 6 
I.L.M, 368. 
246. United Nations G.A. Res, 2200, 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 
16) 59, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1967), reprinted in (1967) 6 
I.L.M. 383. 
247. See especially the work of UNCTAD, UNC ITRAL and GATT. For 
example, UNCITRAL, Arbitral Rules, reprinted in (1977) 2 
Y.B. Comm. Arb. 161. 
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humanitarian law of armed conflict. 248 
It is difficult to point to an exactly comparable role 
played by transnational corporations. 249 It is true, of course, 
that two institutions have been set up which do permit corpora-
tions to pursue claims directly against states. In bo th cases, 
however, this specific capacity was granted under the terms of 
treaties negotiated between states, treaties which were neces-
sary specifically because international law recognises no such 
general corporate capacity. The World Bank Convention on the 
Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals 
of Other States 2 ~U set up an arbitration centre to provide 
direct access for foreign corporations wishing to sue state 
contractual partners and it established special enforcement 
procedures. The Claims Settlement Declaration negotiated 
between Iran and the United States set up the Iran-u.s. Claims 
Tribunal to hear, inter alia, claims of foreign private corpora-
248. Aside from the obvious contributions of the League of 
Nations and the United Nat ions, see, ~, International 
Committee of the Red Cross, Fundamental Rules of Interna-
tional Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts 
(1978) 206 Int'l Rev. Red Cross 248. 
249. For an interesting discussion of the role of corporations 
in the international legal system, see Charney, Trans-
national Corporations and Developing Public International 
Law [1983) Duke L.J. 748. Charney's position is more 
favourable to an expansive role for corporations than that 
adopted here. 
250. (Done 18 March 1965) 575 UNTS 159. 
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tions against a state, 2 ~ 1 but it has a "mixed" vocation and 
certain aspects of the traditional rules of diplomatic protec-
tion are retained. 2 ~2 But such corporate capacity remains 
highly exceptional. There has been no burgeoning of "corporate 
rights" to match the contemporary explosion in individual human 
rights, It would be a mistake to see i n two isolated instances 
a general trend towards corporate participation in the interna-
tional lawmaking process. 
More importantly, even if corporations, like individuals 
and international organisations, do possess some strictly 
limited international personality, they do not gain thereby the 
right to act~ states nor to benefit from obligations which may 
be owed to states under international law. The first point is 
that contracts are not to be equated with full-scale 
treaties. 2 ~ 3 The importance of this principle is manifest. If 
251. Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and 
Popular Republic of Algeria, Concerning the Settlement of 
- Claims by the Government of the United States of America 
and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran (19 
January 1981), reprinted 1n (1982) 7 Y.B. Comm. Arb. 255, 257. 
252. See Case A-18, Iran-u.s. Claims Tribunal Award of 6 April 
1984, reprinted in (1984) 23 I.L.M. 489 and in (1984) 5 
Iran-u.s. C.T.R. 251 [hereinafter c ited to I.L.M.]; and 
the discussion infra, Chapter IV, text accompaying notes 1 
to 104. See also Jones, The Iran-United States Claims 
Tribunal: Private Rights and State Responsibility (1984) 
24 Va J, Int'l L. 259, 260-1. 
253. This was the holding of the International Court of Justice 
in the Anglo-American Oil Company Case (1952] I.C.J, 112. 
Even proponents of "internationalisation" are careful not 
to equate contracts and treaties f or all purposes. See, 
(co nt'd.) 
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a foreign corporation cannot gain the status of a s t ate by 
contracting with a state, it follows that the remedies availab le 
to the corpo ration are solely tho se t hat flow from i t s contract. 
A breach would not itself amount to a breach of international 
law. 254 The contract may, of course, provide tha t the proper 
~g., Weil, supra, note 35, 188; and Professor Dupuy in 
~TOPCO arbitration, supra, note 78, 457. Mr Greenwood 
interprets Professor Dupuy as deciding merely "that a 
State may confer upon a private party a measure of 
capacity vis-~-vis that State," Greenwood, supra, note 
80, 49. As noted above, however, no single state 
possesses authority to grant any international personal-ity, 
254. It has been demonstrated supra, Chapter 1, that even 
resort to specialised institutions such as ICSID does not 
imply that a contractual relationship between a state and 
a foreign private party will be come fully "international-
ised". Even though state parties to the ICSID Convention 
have agreed to suspend (but not t o eliminate ) t heir rig h t 
of diplomatic protection as f a r as inves tment disputes are 
co ncerned, municipal rules are not excluded completely. 
The most notable example is the municipal rules concern ing 
sovereign immunity from execution, which are still 
permitted to operate even within the ICSID regime, The 
argument against full internationa l legal status is even 
stronger in the c a se of ad hoe arb it r ation, whe re no 
international treaty has modified the traditi onal rules of 
state respons i bility and diplomatic protection. It is 
asser t e d he re that even when ad hoe arbitrators are 
instructed to apply "internationai-1aw" to a contractual 
dispute between a state and a foreign private party, tha t 
does not imply that t he foreign pa r ty can itself invoke 
the international state responsibility of the opposing 
state. The "international law" to be applied include s, 
primarily, r e l e v a nt rules concerning inte r p retation and, 
secondly, rules r elating to the modalities of contractual 
performance. The arbitrators need not and cannot evaluate 
an "international wrong" when one of the parti e s h a s no 
standing to assert such a wrong. For a discussion of 
these problems in relation to ICSID arbitration, see 
Benvenuti et Bonfant srl v. People's Republic of the 
Congo, ICSID a ward, reprinted in (1983) 8 Y. B. Comm. Arb. 
(cont'd.) 
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law is international law or the principles of a particular 
domestic legal system in common with international law. The 
corporation then has the right to plead interna tional law for 
the purposes of obtaining a contractual remedy. If, however, 
the contractual remedies fail, for whatever reason, even the bad 
faith of the state-party, the foreign corporation has no 
capacity to invoke the public international responsibility of 
that state. The same would be true if the contract contained no 
reference, express or implied, to public international law. 
Then the corporation could not even plead public international 
law in support of its contractual remedies. In either case --
if there is no choice oE public international law or if that 
choice has been made but the remedy fails -- the corporation has 
no further personality to act or to demand reparations on i ts 
own . 
The reasons for this limitation are obvious. First, if 
corporations are not fully subjects of international law, they 
can have no standing to assert international l aw rights ; indeed 
they possess no such rights. Secondly, to allow corporations to 
144. In the context of ad hoe arbitration, see,~, 
Arnerasinghe, supra, note 219, 897: 
[A] breach of contract by a contracting state is not 
£er sea breach of international law. There must be 
some other factor, such as the refusal of means to 
secure redress in a municipal court, to give rise to 
such a breach of international law. 
Indeed, even Professor Dupuy in TOPCO stated explicitly 
that "unlike a State, the private person has only a 
limited [international] capacity" and his rights are o nly 
those "which he derives from the contract." TOPCO, ibi d ., 458. 
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invoke the responsibility of a state party under internationa l 
law would actually be unjust, because the corporation would be 
subject to no equivalent burden. Those who advocate the limited 
international personality of corporations typically limit that 
personality to the exercise of "rights" without accepting an 
imposition of correlative "duties". Allowing corporations t o 
invoke the international responsibility of a state party to a 
state contract is patently unfair because there is no mutuality 
of obligations. 255 In a sense, the parties would not be governed 
by the same law. Instead, the corporation must go to its own 
national government and ask it to press an international 
claim. 25 b Admittedly, the claim then takes on a political 
nature which the corporation may have wished to avoid, l 57 but 
contemporary international law precludes any other result. 
A third argument from principle against any supposed 
rights of corporations to invoke state responsibility relates to 
the role of the corporation's own national state. The national 
state possesses a right of dipl omatic protection (unless 
255. See Amerasinghe, ibid., 898 and 905 . 
256. See,~, R. Lillich, International Claims: Postwar 
British Practice (1967) l [hereina fter P.B.P.J . See also 
Amerasinghe, ibid., 899; Bockstiegel, supra , note 9, 71; 
and Broches, supra, note 145, 344. For more general 
discussions of international claims, see R. Lillich, 
International Claims: Their Adjudication by National 
Commissions (1962); and R. Lillich & B. Weston, Interna-
tional Claims: Their Settlement by Lump Sum Agreement (1975). 
257. Li llich, B.P.B., ibid., 132. 
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suspended under the ICSID regime) and t he state may wish to 
control the prosecution of any "international" claim. It may 
want to accept a global settlement or to trade off the claim Ear 
other negotiated benefits. 2 ~ 8 Moreover, if more than one 
corporation from a state has been expropriated, the state of 
nationality may want to adopt its own position regarding the 
lawfulness of expropriation under international law. That 
interest will be even greater if there is a question of treaty 
interpretation involved. To allow corporations to take matters 
into their own hands and to assert international claims directly 
could have a disruptive effect upon the policy of their own 
states. 
To phrase the proposition bluntly, corporations simply are 
not equivalent to states, The United Nations General Assembly 
has repeatedly emphasised the special status of statehood while 
underscoring the U.N. Charter goal of the political self- deter-
mination of states and peoples. 25 ~ Closely linked to that goal 
is the declaration of state permanent sovereignty over natura l 
258. Of course, if a claim is traded for other benefits, the 
national state may be responsible under its international 
constitutional law to indemnify the expropriated party. 
For a discussion of such issues, see,~' Dames and 
Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981) {U,S.A. ); and Behring 
International, Inc. v. Imperial Iranian Air Force, 699 
F. 2d 657 {3d Cir. 1983) (U.S.A.). 
259. United Nations Charter, art. 1(2) and art. 55. See 
especially the Declaration on the Granting of Independence 
to Colonial Countries and Peoples, United Nations G.A. 
Res. 1514, 15 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 66 , U.N . Doc. 
A/ 4 6 8 4 ( l 9 6 0 ) • 
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resources. 2 b U The New International Economic Order, proclaimed 
by the General Assembly, 2 b 1 stresse s the s o vereign equality of 
states a nd the need for state economic independence. It is 
widely assumed that states need room to manoeuvre when confront-
ing economic challenges. Only other states have a right to 
question the decisions made, and then only when their own 
interests have been damaged directly. 
Despite growing challenges from academic commentators who 
note the increasing factual integration of the world commu-
nity, 262 the entire tenor of international law still emphasises, 
for good or ill, the special status due to states under the 
principle of sovereignty. For example, the much vaunted 
N.I.E.O., with its almost nineteenth-century state-centrism, is 
in reality a manifestation of c o nce rn for the protectio n of the 
fr agile state authority of developing nations. Any contextual 
assessment of the role of the corporatio n in international law 
must grapple with this stubborn fact. That is perhaps why, 
despite the hopes of many -- usually Western -- jurists who h a ve 
260. Supra, note 227. 
261. Supra, note 227. And see the Programme of Acti o n on the 
Establishment of a Ne w International Economic Order, 
United Nations G.A. Re s. 3202, 6 (Special), U. N. GAOR, 
Sup p • ( No • 1 ) 5 , U • N • Doc • A/ 9 5 5 9 ( 1 9 7 4 ) • 
262. See, e.g., McDougal & Reisman, "International Law in 
Policy-Oriented Perspective" in R. Macdonald & D. 
Johnston, eds, The Structure and Process of International 
Law: Essays in Legal Philosophy, Doctrine and Theory 
(1983) 103; and Richard Falk's characteristi c ally 
challenging paper, The Future of Internatio nal Law (1981 ) 
75 Pr oc. Am. Soc. Int l L. 8. 
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argued that the only adequate protection for corporate invest-
ment is to provide for the direct application of international 
law to state contracts, 263 very little authority can be mustered 
to support even an attenuated version of the proposition. 
c. Applying a "Lex Mercatoria" 
Perhaps because of the failure to find effective 
"stabilisation" through the invocation of general principles or 
international law, 264 or perhaps because of the enormous 
theoretical difficulties raised by such attempts, some Western 
263. See, ~, Bockstiegel, COffiI'lents in the Colloquium, supra, 
note 99, 587; and Jennings, supra, note 224, 162, where he 
argued that: 
there is no reason at all to prevent international law 
from holding that what is no breach of contract in the 
proper law is nevertheless deemed to be a breach of 
contract for purposes of international law. 
It roust be noted that Jennings appears to have been 
envisioning a situation where the proper law of a state 
contract was a system of municipal law alone; he would 
then suggest that international law might also apply to 
prevent unilateral contractual modification by the state. 
It is possible that this result could also be achieved by 
finding an implied intention to invoke international law 
rather than holding that international law applies of its 
own force. But Professor Jennings does not seem to have 
applied himself to this distinction and his stated 
approach would lead to great confusion: an act not 
amounting to breach under the proper law would somehow 
become a contractual breach under a law which prima facie 
did not apply. It is submitted that Professor Jenning's 
suggestion could not be logically consistent unless he 
were pushed a step further to argue explicitly that 
international law may apply to state contracts of its own 
force and independent of any contractual undertaking. It 
is this logical connection that is resisted vigorously 
here. 
264. See,~, Beguin, supra, note 108, 483. 
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commentators embarked upon a different approach to delocalisa-
tion. A number of distinguished jurists have posited the 
existence of "des regles proprement commerciales, qui forment, 
d'autre part, une sorte de jus mercatorium, ou de droit interna-
tional du commerce." 26 ~ Commonly called a lex mercatoria, the 
term used by Professor Schmitthoff, 266 this body of. pr i nciples 
that may be chosen by parties to govern international commercial 
relations is to be found, it is suggested, in (a) "interna-
tional" rules of commerce; (b) state law that may apply; and {c) 
trade usages in each branch of commerce (a "droit spontan§"). 26 7 
Although the theory has prompted heated debate since at least 
the 1940s, 268 it has been invoked expressly in some arbitral 
265. Fouchard, L'Arbitrage Commercial International (1965) 401. See also David, supra, note 57, 7; Krishnamurthi, "Some thoug h ts on a new convention o n international arbitration" in J. Schultsz & A. Van den Berg, eds, The Art of Arbitra-tion: Essays on International Arbitrat i on Liber Amicorum Pieter Sanders 12 September 1912-1982 (1982) 211; and Carbonneau, Rendering Arb1tral Awards with Reasons: The Elaboration of a Common Law of International Transactions (1985) 23 Col. J. Trans. L. 579. 
266. As reported by Goldman, La Lex Mercatoria dans les contrats et l'arbit~e internationaux: realite et perspectives (1979) 106 J. dr. int ' l 475, 476. 
267. Goldman, ibid., 478-9. 
268. See,~, Kronstein, Business Arbitration -- Instrument of Private Government (1944) 54 Yale L.J. 36; Beguin, supra, note 108, 479; and Goldman, La bataille judiciai re autour de la lex mercatoria [1983] Rev. de l'arb. 379. 
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awards. 269 Indeed, proponents of the lex mercator~ place a 
great reliance on arbitral tribunals as the primary means of 
articulation for such an international commercial law. 27 0 They 
therefore encourage the formulation and publication of reasoned 
awards. 271 
Some advocates of the application of a lex mercatoria have 
b een e ve n more bold, claiming not only that parties may choose 
to apply the lex mercatoria, but that when there is no choice, 
269. See,~, Pabalk Ticaret Ltd v. Norsolor, S.A., award of 
26 October 1979, reprinted in (1984) 9 Y.B. Comm. Arb. 109 
(I.c.c. Award 3131) 110, where a distinguished panel 
including the eminent civilian contracts theorist 
Professor Ghestin held: 
(T]he Tribunal considered that it was appropriate, 
given the international nature of the agreement, to 
leave aside any compelling reference to a specific 
legislation, be it Turkish or french, and to apply the 
international lex mercatoria. 
The Tribunal found that one of the lex rnercatoria's 
guiding principles was "good faith", hardly a bold or 
challenging conclusion. The award was rendered in Vienna 
and a challenge before the Austrian Supreme Court was 
rejected because in applying "good faith", the Tribunal 
"applied a principle inherent in the private law systems 
whi~h in no way is contradictory to st r ict l e gal regula-
tions of the c o untry concerned." Norsolor S.A. v. Pabalk 
Ticaret Ltd, Oberster Gerichtshof, 18 November 1982, 
reprinted in (1984) 9 Y.B. Comm. Arb. 159 (Austria). One 
wonders if the court decision would have been the same if 
the Tribunal had adopted a less cautious attitude in 
applying the lex mercatoria. 
270. See,~, fouchard, supra, note 265, 401; David, supra, 
note 57, 485; and Kitagawa, "The method of unification of 
arbitration laws and rules in the light of the increasing 
importance of technical disputes" in Associazione Italiana 
Per L'Arbitrato, Commercial Arbitrations: Essays in 
Memoriam Eugenio Minoli (1974) 257, 259. 
271. See, ~, Carbonne au, supra, note 265, 53 1 ; and David, 
ibid., 455-6. 
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the mere fact that parties have resorted to internat i onal 
arbitration is eno ugh t o indicate an i mplied cho i c e of that body 
of rules and principles. Professor Carbonneau has stated that 
[t]he parties' engagement in a transnational 
commercial venture and invocati o n of the inter-
national arbitral process constitu te an implied 
submission to the law which governs all trans-
national commercial ventures. 272 
If the point was not apparent before, this type of claim reveals 
that the entire idea of the lex mercatoria is geared toward the 
resolution of purely private disputes. Indeed, the lex 
mercatoria is often described as the law governing the "soci§t§ 
internationale des commer9ants" 273 or the "community of inter-
national merchants". 274 Although it may be true t hat two 
private parties to a transnational c o n tract may be pre sumed t o 
have intended that the usages of their trade a nd g e ne ral princi-
ples of faicne ss or equity should govern their relations, no 
such intention may be imputed to a state, 27 ~ especially when the 
c ontract in question is not a simple contract of sale but an 
272. Carbonneau, ibid., 597. See also Goldman, supra, note 
266, 480-1. Professor Weil has invoked a similar argument 
to justify the implied choice of international law as the 
proper law oE an international con t ract. Weil, suora, 
note 35, 153-6. 
273. Fouchard, supra, no te 265, 403. 
274. Carbonneau, supra, note 265, 589. 
275. It has already been noted that whe n a contract collapses, 
the "inte ntions" of t h e two parties to a state co ntract 
may be entirely d i stinct. The sta te may wish to apply its 
nati o na l law whereas t he fo r e ign private p a rty will 
commonly wish to a void any r e f e rence to the state's juridical system . 
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investment or concession contract that relates to important 
goals of state policy. Leaving aside, then, the impoctant 
questions whether one can really point to a coherent body of 
rules thdt can be described as a lex mercatoria, 276 or whether 
such an assertion would present a challenge to the integrity of 
international law, 277 one can simply say that the so-called lex 
mercatoria has little application to state contracts because the 
assumptions upon which it is based do not mesh with the reality 
of such contracts. States should not be presumed to intend to 
apply any law but their own. Moreove r , the needs and impera-
tives of states are often entirely different from those of the 
"community of international merchants." Although invocation of 
a lex mercatoria probably could serve the function of 
"stabilisation", it would do so because it cannot be properly 
sensitive to the whole range of state activity and state 
interests. The stability and expansion of international 
commerce are not the only relevant goals of any state's policy, 
yet they are necessarily the only goals of the lex mercatoria. 
That simple fact renders any resort to the lex mercatoria simply 
inappropriate, not to say nonsensical, in most arbitrations 
276. For criticism going to the very foundations of the lex 
mercatoria, see Weil, supra, note 35, 184; Mann, supr a , 
note 33, 264; and Luzzatto, supra, note 30, 24. See""also 
the discussion of the Tribunal in ICC Case No. 4237, Award 
of 27 February 1984, reprinted in (1 984) 10 Y.B. Comm. 
Arb. 52, 55 where it stressed that the contents of ~he 
supposed lex mercatoria "are not easy to determine." 
277. See generally Beguin, supra, no te 108. 
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involving states and foreign private parties, 278 
It is possible now to draw together a number of conclu-
sions from this study of the immensely complicated problem of 
the delocalisation of substantive law, Using a comparative law 
methodology to determine appropriate choice of law rules will 
result in a first principle of party autonomy. The parties to a 
state contract are free to choose any proper law, including a 
proper law that is in some manner delocalised. Failing such a 
choice, no delocalisation of the substantive law should be 
presumed, This admonition does not in fact cause great hardship 
to foreign private parties because recent arbitral practice 
reveals that neither the invocation of "general principles" nor 
of international law per se can effectively accomplish the 
primary goal of proponents of delocalised substantive law, that 
is to "stabilise" the contractual relationship to prevent 
unilateral modification or termination of the contract by the 
state, 
--------------
278, The situation would, of course, be different if the 
arbitration involved a state trading agency and a foreign 
party and concerned simply the breach of a sales contract. 
A stronger argument may then be made out to support the 
application of trade usages and general principles. Even 
here, however, if the abrogation of the contract was due 
to a shift in state policy based upon rational public 
policy evaluatio ns, it is difficult to see how the lex 
mercatoria could react with any sophistication, An~-
approach more in tune with international reality (and 
theory) would be for the arbitral tribunal to apply (in 
the absence of party choice) the law of the state party, 
If that law caused a prejudice t o t he foreign party, he 
could seek the aid of his national state in espousing his 
claim. 
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If effective stabilisation is not possible, t he presump-
tive applicat ion of "international law" or "general principles" 
should be discouraged because it causes major theoretical 
difficulties without providing commensurate benefits. Great 
confusion has already resulted; extravag ant claims have been 
made by foreign corporations who assert that they possess inte r -
national personality and that breaches of contracts are 
equivalent to breaches of treaties. The fact nevertheless 
remains that if contractual stabilisation techniques fail and 
the state acts unilaterally to the detriment of the foreign 
private party, refusing furthermore to comply with an arbitral 
award rendered against it, the foreign corporation may be thrown 
back upon the protection of its own national government if 
enforcement under the New York Convention is not possible. 27 9 
That government must press any claim, for the claim will have 
ceased to be grounded upon t he contractual relationship, 
although it arose out of that relationship; it may instead ha ve 
been transmuted into an international wrong, calling into play 
the international responsibility of the state, a responsibility 
owed, under the existing system of international law, only to 
other states and not to transnational corporations. Al though 
279. It must also be noted that many states have not ratified 
the New York Convention; its enhanced enforcement regime 
will not always be applicable. Moreover, the public 
policy exception to enforcement may be used to prevent the 
en f o rcemen t of an arbitral award, so that the state 
espousal of a claim will still be required. These issues 
will be discussed in detail infra, Chapter III, especially 
in the text accompanying text notes 105 to 131. 
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this result ~ay appear to be insensitive to the fears of inter-
national business people, any other result does extreme violence 
to the structure of international law, by confounding private 
rights and public interest, by conflating contract and treaty 
and by confusing the status of various participants in the 
international legal system. Moreover, and perhaps most impor-
tantly, recognising the implied delocalisation of all state 
contracts and the international personality of multinational 
corporations would deprive developing nations oE their only 
effective means of control over economically powerful foreign 
investors. It could potentially deprive such nations of their 
justly valued sovereignty over indigenous resources. 
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CHAPTER III: RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF 
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRAL AWARDS 
To anyone acquainted with the law of international 
arbitration, the reference to "international" awards in the 
title of this Chapter may seem surprising. Since at least 1958 
and the conclusion of the New York Convention, 1 and probably 
dating back to before the 1927 Geneva Convention, 2 commentators 
have tended to look at questions of recognition and enforcement 
in relation to what commonly is called a "foreign" award. It 
will be argued that this terminology, although officially 
adopted in the relevant multilateral conventions, is misleading 
if applied to mixed arbitrations. Awards involving a state and 
a foreign private party are now enforceable even when they are 
not "foreign" in the traditional sense. In addition, it will be 
suggested that the emphasis upon recognition and enforcement by 
national courts of "foreign" awards has limited unduly the scope 
of study in this area . In most writings, of both academic 
commentators and practitioners, the field of vision is limited 
to the relationship between the arbitral award and its "enforce-
ment" by national courts. But enforcement should be considered 
in a broader context: it can signify also the specific orders 
1. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign 
Arbitral Awards (signed 10 June 1958; entered into force 7 
June 1959) 330 UNTS 38, reprinted in (1968) 7 I.L.M . 1046. 
2. Convention on the Execution of Foreign Arbitral Awards 
(signed 26 September 192 7; entered into force 25 July 1929) 
92 LNTS 301, reprinted in M. Hudson, ed., International 
Legislation (1931), Vol. III, No . 183, at 2153. 
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made by an arbitral tribunal and the myriad means by which a 
tribunal may seek to bring its judgment into operation. In 
other words, "enforcement" presupposes some understanding of 
remedies. 
Of course, one should not downplay the question of 
enforcement within specific national jurisdictions. Such 
enforcement is a crucial practical issue which concerns all 
successful parties to an arbitration. The point is simply that 
one should broaden the scope of inquiry into problems of 
enforcement by envisioning it as a two-stage process. One must 
ask initially what it is that is sought to be enforced. Only 
then does the issue of enforcement by national courts arise, and 
in that context, one may also wish to investigate independent, 
non-municipal, enforcement mechanisms, If, as was argued in the 
previous Chapter, state-foreign private party arbitrations can 
now be "delocalised", that is, divorced for most purposes from 
any national rules of procedure, 3 the attempt to treat interna-
tional awards as "foreign" awards is misconceived. It causes 
one to look at but a single aspect of enforcement by assuming 
that the only relevant inquiry relates to the intervention of 
national courts. The arbitral award itself is treated as a fait 
accompli, the possibility for careful analysis of arbitral reme-
3. It was suggested that the principle of autonomy of the will 
permits the delocalisation of arbitral procedure. Substan-
tive law may be a more difficult problem, in part because of 
the lack of any relevant international law or general prin-
ciples which adequately could regulate complex contractual 
relationships. 
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dies is ignored, and rigorous study is undertaken only in rela-
tion to a potential second stage of the enforcement process --
the mechanics of state-sanctioned enforcement. 
This Chapter will begin with an investigation of the 
problems traditionally emphasised in connection with enforce-
ment, and it will be demonstrated that under existing law, 
procedurally "delocalised" awards are fully enforceable within 
national jurisdictions. Special problems confronting national 
courts in dealing with awards resulting from "mixed" (state 
versus private party) arbitrations will be canvassed. Then the 
focus will shift to the prior, and less explored, aspect of 
enforcement: arbitral remedies, A discussion of the potential 
for independent, non-municipal enforcement mechanisms will be 
postponed until the next Chapter when the issues involved in the 
use of such mechanisms will be highlighted by the experience of 
the Iran-u.s. Claims Tribunal. 
A. The Policy Favouring Recognition and Enforcement of 
"Foreign" Arbitra l Awards 
In the twentieth-century, a growing recognition of the 
exigencies of international commerce has prompted various 
a ttempts to support the efficacy of arb itral awards. Primarily, 
this desire has been manifested in the elaboration of multi-
lateral conventions enhancing the possi b ility for enforcement of 
arbitral award s rendeced ou tside the borders of the s ta te ~here 
recognition and enforcement are s o ught. Such conventions were 
necessary because, under traditional principles of international 
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customary law, no state was under an obligation to recognise or 
enforce foreign arbitral decisions. 4 
It should be noted at the outset that, despite the contin-
uing use of both words, recent doctrine has emphasised that 
there is rarely any practical distinction to be made between the 
concepts of "recognition" and "enforcement". In 1939, the 
Permanent Court of International Justice did posit such a 
distinction, holding that "[rJecognition of an award as res 
judicata means nothing else than recognition of the fact that 
the terms of that award are definitive and obligatory."~ 
Luzzatto, in his important Hague lectures, referred to this 
"traditional distinction whereunder recognition signifies solely 
that an award is binding", whereas enforcement implies "the 
capability of the award and that enforcement proceedings are 
initiated upon it. 116 However, Luzzatto went on to point out 
that the distinction "is devoid of practical significance in the 
usual practice of international commercial arbitration," 7 and 
4. Broches, The Convention on the Settlement of Investment 
Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States (1972) 
136 Ree. des cours 331, 401. 
5. Societe Commerciale de Belgique, P.C.I.J. Ser. A/ B, No. 78 (1939) 176. 
6. Luzzatto, International Commercial Arbitration and the 
Municipal Law of States (1977) 157 Ree. des cours 9, 68. 
7. Ibid. The notion of recognition as a concept independent 
from enforcement may have some meaning in the context of 
purely "declaratory" awards, but such awards are very rare 
in cases involving commercial disputes . See infra, note 
225. 
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one could add, in the contemporary practice of national courts. 
Van den Berg suggests that the retention of the words "recogni-
tion and enforcement" in contemporary international conventions 
is nothing more than the repetition of a traditional clause de 
style.~ It may be, however, that the distinction between recog-
nition and enforcement does retain some vestigal meaning with 
reference to arbitral awards rendered against a state. Due to 
the possibility of a successful plea of sovereign immunity which 
will block execution, it may be that an award rendered against a 
state will be "recognised" by a state court but that "enforce-
ment" will not be possible. 9 It will be argued below that such 
an interpretation would not accord with the intention of the 
parties in submitting their dispute to impartial arbitral 
adjudication and should therefore be rejected. 10 The distinc-
tion between recognition and enforcement would then have no 
currency even in arbitrations involving states. It should be 
8. A. Van den Berg, The New York Convention of 1958 (1981) 
244. 
9. Von Mehren & Croff, "International Arbitration Between 
Private Parties and Governments: Treaty and Statutory 
Developments", in G. Aksen & R. Von Mehren, International 
Arbitration Between Private Parties and Governments (1982) 
94-5 (Handbook 399 of the U.S . Practicing Law Institute). 
The authors point out, at 102, that the ICSID Convention 
also emphasises the distinction between recog nit ion and 
enforcement, in large part because the Convention retains 
the tcaditional deference to state rules concerning 
sovereign i!llillunity vis-a-vis execution against state owned 
property. 
10. See infra, text accompanying notes 132 to 169. 
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reiterated, however, that this very distinction was retained by 
the drafters of the ICSID Convention and is that regime's 
grea test weakness.11 
Having stated that customary law recognises no duty to 
enforce foreign arbitral awards, it is fair to ask why it was 
believed necessary to construct the elaborate framework of 
multilateral arbitration conventions that now exists. In other 
words, why is recognition and enforceme n t by national legal 
systems thought to be so i mportant? The answer has little to do 
with any theory of international law and much t o do with the 
entirely practical desire to ensure that an arbitral award will 
be effective. The framework within which this discussion 
operates, one must remember, is that of ar.bitral awards result-
ing from mixed arbitrations involving a state and a foreign 
private party. Awards in such cases often involve very large 
sums of money and , if an award is rendered against a state, it 
may often be necessary to enforce the award outs ide the 
jurisdiction of the state party, for the state may try to 
prevent enforcement within its own jurisdiction by legislative 
fiat. 
In the absence of any independent, non-municipal, 
enforcement mechanism, it may become necessary to enforce an 
award in the territory of other states where the arbitral 
tribunal will have no power to enforce performance, As Park and 
Paulsson have put it, "(a] legal system mus t therefore legiti-
11. See suora, Chapter I. 
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mize the arb itrator's authority if t h e award is t o be more t ha n 
an unenforc eabl e attemp t at c onciliation." 12 Altho ugh this 
p hrasi ng is infelici tous for it calls i n t o qu e stio n the 
"authority" of the arbitrator, an authority which is derived 
from the will of the parties and not, as implied, from the 
operatio n of national law, the basic po int remai ns i ncontro vert-
ible. It is often ne cessary to employ the enforcement mecha-
nisms of a national legal system in order to make an award 
effective. To adopt the language of t h e English Court of 
Appeal: "[A]ny award against a person who is unwilling to obey 
it can be enforced o nly by the ma c h ine ry of some system o f 
law." 1~ To be more precise, an award can oEten be enforced on l y 
through the machinery of a national legal system unless a 
specif ic a greement of the parties has create d an ind e p endent 
method o f e nfo r cement. 1 4 This hard fact should c ome as no 
surprise to any student of contemporary i n ternational or trans-
12. Park & Paulsson, The Binding Force of International 
Arbitral Awards (1983) 23 Va J. Int'l L. 253, 253. 
13. Dalmia Dairy Industries Ltd v. National Bank of Pakistan 
[1978] 2 Lloyd's L. Rep. 227 (C.A.) ~ Megaw L.J, (U.K.). 
14. See also the comments of de Vries, International Commercia l 
Arbitration: A Contractual Substitute for National Courts 
(198 2 ) 5 7 Tul a ne L. Re v. 42, 47; a nd Van den Berg, supra, 
note 8, 5. Carbo nneau adds o ne important c aveat, however, 
noting that because "international" arbitration is 
"essentially autonomous",· it is a process that "needs 
judicial support only when coercive public jurisdictional 
authority is absolutely essential". Carbonneau, Arbitral 
Adjudication: A Comparative Assessment of Its Re me dial and 
Substantive Status in Transnational Commerce (1984) 19 
Te xas Int'l L.J. 33, 99. 
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national institutions. 
In his seminal study, Professor Falk emphas ised the 
weakness of the central institutions of the international 
community, especially the judiciary, and he suggested that 
domestic courts may be required at times to help "to overcome 
this structura l weakness in the international legal system." 1 ~ 
On the other hand, many lawyers, especially of the common law 
variety, tend to see a legal system too easily as the mere 
equation "law equals courts". It would be wise to remember t hat 
a system of law may opeiate without any heavy emphasis upon 
court structures. For example, de Vries stresses the fact that 
in private trade association arbitrations, "reliance on the 
courts to enforce ••• is rare. The traditional sanction in 
self-contained groups for refusal to honor an award is a 
disciplinary proceeding or even expulsion rather than court 
action." 16 Similarly, it has been reported that in over ninety 
per cent of I.C.C. awards, compliance has been voluntary. 1 7 It 
is unlikely that such a favourable statistic could be gleaned 
from the experience of arbitral awards rendered against states. 
The point remains valid that in contemplating the problems oE 
15. R, Falk, The Role of Domestic Courts in the International 
Legal Order (1964) xi, See also Lil l ich, The Proper Role 
of Domestic Courts in the International Legal Order (1970) 
11 Va J, Int'l L. 9, 12. 
16. de Vries, supra, note 14, 44. 
17. Paulsson, Le tiers monde dans l'arbit rage commercial 
international (1983] Rev , de l'arb. 1, 20. 
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enforcement, although the role of national courts remains 
dominant, it should not he treated as exclusive. 
It is often observed, in connection with private trans-
national commercial arbitration, that enforcement is not as 
enormous a problem as in the case oE foreign court judgments 
because the parties, usually two business entities, "may perhaps 
be more inclined to obey the award of a tribunal of their own 
choice than they are to obey the decision of a court." 1 b 
Parties may also fear that they will be injured in their trade 
reputation if they do not comply with an arbitral award. Both 
of these considerations apply equally to states that have 
engaged in commercial arbitration, but the considerations of 
free choice and the desire to protect reputation do not overcome 
the fact that for many reasons -- o ften political or economic 
rather than strictly legal -- states sometimes do refuse to 
comply voluntarily with arbitral awards and it does become 
necessary to institute domestic enforcement proceedings. The 
enormously expensive multi-state litigation required in the 
attempt to enforce the award in Libyan American Oil Co. v. The 
Government of the Libyan Arab Republic (Merits) 1 ~ is a good 
example of the difficulties that may arise iE a state refuses t o 
18. J, Morris, gen. ed., Dicey and Morris on the Conflict of 
~. 10th ed., (1980), vol. 2, 1126. 
19. Decision of 12 April 1977, reprin ted in (1981) 20 I.L.M. 1. 
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comply with the terms of an award. 20 Expensive and complicated 
it may be, but there can be no doubt that at present "[s)tate 
coercion •.• plays an irreplaceable role" in the enforcement of 
arbitral awards.21 
State action, then, is often essential, and in order to · 
impose some uniformity in approach, it was thought necessary t o 
negotiate international conventions on the recognition and 
enforcement of "foreign" arbitral awards. The impact of these 
conventions will be discussed presently. First, it is important 
to point out that on questions of enforcement, the conventions 
concluded do not cover the field entirely. Individual states 
may still enact rules or negotiate bilateral treaties governing 
enforcement that are more comprehensive than the regimes 
established in multilateral treaties to which such states are 
parties. 22 For example, in the United Kingdom, an arbitral 
20. Enforcement proceedings were instituted in France, Sweden, 
Switzerland, and the United State s. The diversity of the 
approaches taken by national courts reveals that despite 
attempts at international codification, enforcement remains 
a difficult and sometimes unpredictable undertaking. If 
international arbitration is ever to fulfill its promise as 
a true alternative to national court adjudication, courts 
in enforcement jurisdictions will have to approach their 
role with deference to the decisions of freely chosen 
arbitral tribunals. 
21. Luzzatto, supra, note 6, 66. 
22. Article VII (1) of the New York Convention, supra, note 1, 
provides that parties to international arbitrations have 
the right to avail themselves of national rules of 
recognition and enforcement more generous than those set 
down in the Convention. See also Paulsson, Arbitration 
Unbound: Award Detached from the Law of its Country ~f 
Origin (1981) 30 Int'l & Comp. L.Q. 358, 373; and Van den 
Berg, supra, note 8, 81-8. 
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award whose enforcement is not governed by any international 
convention to which the U.K. is a party may nevertheless be 
enforceable at common law. 23 In Belgium, the Cour de cassation 
has held that parties are not deprived of the more favourable 
enforcement rights set out in bilateral treaties simply because 
Belgium is also a party to multilateral enforcement conven-
tions,24 On the other hand, a particular national jurisdiction 
may interpret its obligations under a relevant convention in 
such a way as to make enforcement more difficult. As always, 
the wording of a convention is not the end, but rather the 
beginning, of the necessary inquiry. Quigley points out that 
the fate of any given international arbitral agree-
ment or award is uncertain. The crucial factor in 
any controversy will be that of jurisdiction. The 
court of the country first obtaining jurisdiction 
will apply its own national policy, within the 
limitations of its international obligations, to an 
international arbitral agreement or award brought 
before it. 25 
In short, any evaluation of the possibilities for enforcement of 
an international arbitral award must take into account the 
peculiarities of domestic legal systems and of national court 
23. Morris, supra, note 18, 1124-6. 
24. Audi-NSU Auto Union A.G. v. S.A. Adelin Petic & Cie (28 
June 1979; Cour de cassation), reprinted in (1980) 5 Y.B. 
Comm. Arb. 257 (Belgium). 
25. Quigley, Accession By the United States to the United 
Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of 
Foreign Arbitral Awards (1961) 70 Yale L.J, 1049, 1055. 
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interpretations of the governing multilateral convent ions. Lb 
Are there any general interpretive principles that may be 
of aid before a detailed examination of the governing conven-
tions is undertaken? A very helpful theoretical framework has 
been elaborated by Professor Von Mehren in the context of the 
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments; it provides 
useful ordering principles that have equal application to issues 
involving the enforcement of international arbitral awards. 27 
Professor Von Mehren has described the decision whether or not 
to enforce a for~ign judgment as resting, ultimately, upon a 
balancing of the principles of "correctness and repose": 28 
26. It is for this reason that Dr Mann has argued so forcefully 
that it is not possible t o separate the law governing an 
arbitration from the procedural law of a national legal 
system. See Mann , speaking in the Colloquium, Contrats 
entre etats et personnes privees etr~eres (1975) 11 Rev. 
belge de dr. int'l 562, 589. For the reasons elaborated in 
the previous Chapter, it is asserted that Dr Mann is wrong 
to hinge his entire analysis of the procedural law govern~ 
ing international arbitrations on the question of enforce-
ment, but he is no doubt correct in pointing to enforcement 
as an issue which must be dealt with fully and honestly in 
any theoretical approach t o governing law. But as will be 
argued infra, text accompanying notes 35 to 199, there is 
nothing in the solutions which are available to the 
problems of enforcement which necessarily denies the 
possibility of "delocalisation" oE procedure in arbitra-
tions involving states and foreign private parties. 
27. Clearly, for certain purposes , most notably the application 
of national public policy, there have been significant 
distinctions between the enforcement of judgments and the 
enforcement of arbitral awards. However, in attempting to 
draw out s ome principles of general relevance, the Von 
Mehren scheme discussed in the text has application to both 
fields. 
28. Von Mehren, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign 
,Judgments -- General Theory and the Role of Jurisdictional 
Requirements (1980) 167 Ree. d es cours 9, 22. 
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The principle of correctness expresses the concern 
that legal justice as understood by the society in 
both substantive and procedural terms, be done; the 
principle of repose accepts the inherent impe rfec-
tion of human knowledge and institutions and the 
need t o put to rest quarrels and disputes that have 
arisen so that the energies of individuals and the 
resources of society can be devoted to more 
constructive tasks.~ 9 
These two principles fit within a larger philosophical problem 
-- the balancing between ideal justice, and certainty or 
finality. 3 u In the legislative elaboration of national laws 
governing enforcement of international arbitral awards and in 
the judicial interpretation of treaty obligations concerning 
enforcement, these two principles will come into play. With 
these principles in mind, it may be easier to comprehend the 
specific choices made by judges and draftsmen. 
No doubt, the contemporary trend in the enforcement of 
international arbitral awards is to place increas ingly greater 
weight upon the principle of repose. Since the adoption of the 
New York Convention of 1958, the tendency is for "foreign" 
awards to be e nforced without significant re-examination or 
alteration. 31 "[T]he courts are inclined to grant recognition 
29. Ibid. 
30. This "philosophical problem" ha s practical implications f o r 
courts in the day-to-day ente rprise of adjudication. See 
Pionee r Shipping Ltd v. B.T.P. Tioxide Ltd (The Nema) 
TT982] A.C. 724 (H.L.) (fJ,K.). 
31. See,~, the Letter of Submittal from Nicholas DeB. 
Katzenbach of the United States Department of State to 
President Johnson recommending accession to the New York 
(cont'd.) 
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and enforcement whenever possible. In general, the courts fav o r 
international commercial arbitration and it is seldom that 
recognition and enforcement under the New York Convention is 
refused." 32 
Convention, reprinted in (1968) 7 I.L.M. 1043; Bockstiegel, 
Arbitration of Disputes Between States and Private Enter-
prises in the International Chamber of Commerce (196~9 
Arn. J. Int'l L. 579, 585; Carbonneau , book review, (1984 ) 
24 Va J. Int'l L. 527, 528; Quigley, supra, note 25, 1049; 
and Paulsson, The Role of Swedish Courts in Transnational 
Commercial Arbitration (1981) 21 Va J. Int•{ L. 211 who, at 
230, emphasises that for Swedish courts, "the desire to 
maintain the integrity of the institution oE arbi tration 
predominates and, as a result, every effort is made to give 
effect to an award". Von Mehren, supra, note 28, 35 
suggests that the s a me emphasis upon "repose" is developing 
in cases concerning the recognition of foreign judgments. 
He sees this development as resulting from the wish to 
protect successful litigants from harassment, though, at 
36, he posits a wider "international" justification for 
giving relatively greater weight to the principle of repose 
than to t he principle of c o rrec tness: 
If an international order lacking a supra-
national administration of justice is to be 
reasonably efficient and just, plaintiffs must 
be able to select a forum for litigation without 
according , in the general run of cases, decisive 
weight to whether the resulting judgment can, as 
a practical matter, be enforced locally. 
A similar "international" justi fica tion for repose can be 
offered regarding the enforcement of a non-domestic 
arbitral award: because there is no supranational enforce-
ment mechanism, state courts should do all that is possible 
to enforce an arbitral award which results from an arbitra-
tion undertaken as a result of the free agreement of the 
parties to a contract. Consensual submission t o third 
party ad judication at the international l evel (here 
invo lving one state and forei gn private party) should no t 
be discouraged. 
32. Sanders, A Twent~ Years' Review_of the Convention on the 
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards 
(1979) 13 Int'l Law. 269, 270. Pavlis has pointed out what 
is probably the basic justification for simplified judicial 
en forcement of arbitral awards: "Vigorous judicial respect 
(cont'd.) 
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Yet, the New York Convention has not erased all doubts. 
First, although quite widely ratified, the Convent ion is by no 
means universal in application. 33 Secondly, there are important 
exceptions to the general principle of facilitated enforcement. 
These exceptions are to be found in art. V of the Convention. 
Lastly, when examining "commercial" arbitral awards rendered 
against states, to which the New York Convention clearly does 
apply, 3 ~ the special issues of sovereign immunity and Act of 
for arbitral awards fulfills the e xpectations of the 
contracting parties who choose arbitration, thereby 
encouraging its use in future international commercial 
agreements". Pavlis, International Arbitration and the 
Inapplicability of the Act of State Doctrine (1981) 4 
N.Y.U. J. Int'l L. & Pol. 65, 111. In the more 
politically-charged environment of arbitrations between 
states and foreign private parties, one might question 
whether states, in particular, really do want to see award s 
enforced. It may be that the agreement to arbitrate is a 
politically sensitive compromise designed solely to avo i d 
the submission of contractual disputes to foreign courts. 
Nevertheless, it is crucial to uphold the presumed inten-
tion of the parties to have their agreement and the result-
ing award enforced even if that intention is, to some 
extent, a fiction. Otherwise, no foreign private party 
would ever agree to arbitration and both contracting 
parties would be deprived of the option of a fl e xible 
dispute resolution mechanism (o ne which may represent t he 
only politically acceptable jurisdictional arrangement). 
33. At present, the Convention is ratified by sixty-seven 
states, including most industrialised Western nations. See 
the List of Contracting States to the New York Convention 
of 1958 in (1984) 9 Y.B. Comm. Arb. 327; and infra, note 
62. 
34. Van den Berg, supra, note 8, 279. It should be noted, how-
ever, that between the CMEA states of Eastern Europe, the 
Moscow Convention of 26 May 1972 replaces the New York 
Convention in governing the recognition and enforcement of 
commercial awards. See Van den Berg at 100-1. 
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State will arise. It is therefore important to examine the law 
as established in the New York Convention in greater detail. 
B. The Regime of the New York Convention and Some Comparisons 
With Institutional Regimes of Enforcement 
The impact of the New York Convention cannot be doubted. 
Luzzatto has called it "the true world charter of international 
commercial arbitration". 3 ~ Troobhoff and Goldstein have pointed 
out that it 
represents the culmination of efforts by such 
organizations as the International Chamber of 
Commerce to secure a multilateral treaty providing 
businessmen with an effective and trustworthy 
method of insuring that the manner in which they 
have chosen to resolve their transnational disputes 
will be effective. 36 
To understand the seminal importance of the treaty, it is first 
necessary to glance briefly at the legal position before its 
conclusion. 
Because there was no obligation under international 
customary law to enforce arbitra l awards, and because of the 
increasing demands of international commerce in the early 
twentieth-century, the Geneva Convention on the Execution of 
35. Luzzatto, supra, note 6, 19. Harnik has called the Conven-
~ "one of the more spectacular success stories in the 
slowly moving area of creating judicial order and uni-
formity in the field of private international law". 
Harnik, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral 
Awards (1983) 31 Am. J. Comp. L. 703, 703. 
36. Troobhoff & Goldstein, Foreign Arbitral Awards and the 1958 
New York Convention: Experience to Date in U.S. Courts 
(1977) 17 Va J. Int'l L. 468, 468. 
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Foreign Arbitral Awards 37 was concluded in 1927. The 
signatories were, for the most part, European states 38 and 
subsequent ratifications and accessions were limited largely to 
the continental states of Europe. 
The Convention established, in art. I, that contracting 
parties should undertake to recognise as binding and therefore 
enforce "in accordance with the rules of the procedure of the 
territory where the award is relied upon" any arbitral award 
covered by the Protocol on Arbitration Clauses of 1923. 39 How-
ever, to obtain such recognition it was necessary for the party 
relying upon the award to prove that the submission to arbitra-
tion had been valid under applicable law; that the subject 
37. Supra, note 2. 
38. Germany, Austria, Belgium, Great Britain, Denmark, the Free 
City of Danzig, Spain, Estonia, France, Italy, Luxembourg, 
the Netherlands, Roumania, Sweden, and Czechoslovakia. The 
Treaty was also signed by Nicaragua and New Z2aland. 
39. 27 LNTS 157, reprinted in M. Hudson, ed., International 
Legislation {1931), vol. II, No. 98, at 1062. In brief, 
the parties to this Protocol express their willingness to 
recognise the validity of an agreement to arbitrate between 
parties under the jurisdiction of different contracting 
states in relation to contractual disputes or to other 
matters capable of arbitration (art. 1). They may limit 
this recognition to arbitration agreements involving 
commercial contracts. In art. 3, the parties agree "to 
ensure the execution by its authorities and in accordance 
with the provisions of its national laws of arbitral awards 
made in its own territory ••.. " The 1927 Convention was 
necessary to broaden the scope of enforcement into states 
where the award was not "made". For a survey of the 
history of the 1923 Geneva Protocol and a comparison with 
the provisions of the 1958 New York Convention, see R. 
David, L'arbitrage dans le commerce international (1982) 
199-205. 
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matter was capable of settlement by arbitration "under the law 
of the country in which the award is sought to be relied upon"; 
that the arbitral tribunal had been duly formed; that the award 
was "final" in the country where it was made; and that enforce-
ment would not be contrary to the public policy of the forum or 
enforcing state. Under art. IV, it was the duty of the party 
seeking to enforce the award to adduce all relevant documentary 
evidence. 
Even if all the conditions of art. I had been fulfilled 
and were proved, art. II of the Geneva Convention authorized 
courts to refuse enforcement if the award had been annulled 
where made; if there was no due notice of the arbitration 
proceedings communicated to the party against whom the award was 
rendered; or if the award dealt with matters beyond the juris-
diction of the arbitral tribunal. Under art. III, the party 
challenging the award could also raise any other defence to 
enforcement based upon improper procedure, but that party would 
bear the burden of proof concerning such issues. 
It should be clear that although the 1927 Geneva Conven-
tion was a significant advance upon earlier state practice, it 
still made enforcement of a foreign arbitral award very diffi-
cult for the party seeking to rely upon such an award. To adopt 
Professor Von Mehren's terminology, the Geneva Convention 
continued to emphasise the value of "correctness" rather than 
"repose". No significant advances were made for over thirty 
years, until the conclusion of the New York Convention. 
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The single most important change codified in the Conven-
tion of 1958 40 was the reversal of the burden of proof. Article 
V sets out the grounds upon which refusal to enforce may be 
based and makes it clear that "[r]ecognition and enforcement of 
the award may be refused, at the request of the party against 
whom it is invoked, only if that party furnishes to the 
competent authority where recognition and enforcement is sought, 
proof" that one of the grounds for refusal is applicable. 41 As 
Van den Berg notes, 
the party seeking enforcement need only adduce 
prima facie evidence of the existence of a valid 
award to which the Convention applies. The 
challenging party is then required to prove why 
enforcement should not be ~ranted according to the 
grounds listed in Art. v. 4 
Luzzatto notes that the Convention has thus granted "a very 
remarkable procedural advantage [to] the party seeking enforce-
ment."43 In many instances, the shifting of the burden of proof 
will increase substantially the likelihood of enforcement. 
It has been suggested that the New York Convention marked 
another significant advance by reducing the number of grounds 
40. Supra, note 1. 
41. Broches, supra, note 4, 402 says that "[t]he great improve-
ment brought about by the 1958 New York Convention was to 
reverse the burden of proof. The moving party merely need 
furnish a copy of the arbitration agreement and award." 
See also Luzzatto, supra, note 6, 81; and Quigley, supra, 
note 25, 1066. 
42. Van den Berg, supra, note 8, 247. 
43. Luzzatto, supra, note 6. 
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upon which refusal to recognise and enforce could be based, 44 
but a careful comparison of the Geneva and New York conventions 
must call into question that suggestion. Indeed, although 
listed in distinctive orders and phrased somewhat differently, 
the grounds for refusal to enforce are almost identical in both 
conventions. Because the burden of proof is shifted, the New 
York Convention grounds for refusal are phrased positively, so 
the party against whom an award is invoked must prove its 
grounds for demanding refusal to enforce. 4 ~ But there is no 
significant reduction in the number of those grounds . Under 
art. V(l), recognition and enforcement may be refused if it is 
proved (a) that the parties to the arbitration were not 
competent or that their agreement to arbitrate was not valid; 
(b) that no proper notice of the appointment of arbitrators or 
of the arbitral proceedings was communicated to the party 
against whom the award is invoked; (c) that the award rendered 
was beyond the jurisdiction of the arbitrators; (d) that the 
composition of the tribunal was not in accordance with the 
44. See,~., Broches, supra, note 4, 402. 
45. Perhaps it was this positively-phrased restatement of the 
grounds for refusal of enforcement that caused Delaume to 
write that "[o]ne of the greate st accomplishments of the 
New York Convention of 1958 is a simplification of the 
conditions for the recognition and enforcement of foreign 
arbitral awards." Delaume, "Transnational Commercial 
Arbitration" in C. Schmitthoff, International Commercial 
Arbitration (1982), vol. III, 115. Considering the almost 
identical list of conditions in the 1927 Geneva Convention 
and the 1958 New York Convention, no other general 
simplification is apparent. 
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agreement or with the law of the coun t ry where the arbitration 
took place~ that the procedure was i mproper; or (e) that the 
award is not yet binding or has been set aside in the country 
where rendered. In addition, under art. V(2), recognition and 
enforcement may be refused if the subject matter was not capable 
of arbitration under the law of the country where enforcement is 
sought or if enforcement of the award would be contrary to the 
public policy of the enforcement jurisdiction. In total, then, 
there are ten grounds for refusing to enforce contained in the 
New York Convention. 4 6 In the Geneva Convention, t here were 
nine, although certain of them were admittedly more open-ended 
and more liable to justify non-enforcement. 47 
The only sense in which it can be said that t h e New York 
Convention reduces the grounds for refusal is that there is no 
provisio n comparable to art. 3 of the Geneva Convention which 
allowed a party challenging enforcement to raise additional, 
unenumerated, grounds upon the conditi o n that it prove any such 
ground. 4 8 The grounds for refusal to enforce listed in art. V 
46. Most of these grounds are invoked rarely and, in any case, 
they provoke very little theoretical controversy. The most 
problematic grounds for the refusal of recognition and 
enforcement will be discussed infra, text accompanying 
notes 105 to 199. 
47. In Government of the State of Kuwait v. Sir Frederick Snow 
and Partners [1983] 1 Lloyd's L. Rep. 596 (C.A.), Kerr L.J. 
noted, at 600, that one could argue that the grounds for 
refusal of enforcement under the New York Convention might 
actually be wider than those provided f o r under the Geneva 
Convention. 
48. Van den Berg, sup r a , no te 8, 26 5. 
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are exhaustive. It should be emphasised that the g rou nds do no t 
include any provision justifying non-enforce ment based upon an 
arbitrator's mistake of fact or law. Apart from eliminating the 
broadly-phrased anti-enfo rcement provision of art. 3 o f the 
Geneva Convention, the New York Convent i on represented little 
real progress in attempting to limit the grounds upon which 
national courts might base their refusal to enforce a foreign 
arbitral award. 
At this stage of the discussion it is important to refer 
to two other multilateral conventions which are relevant to the 
recognition and enforcement of international arbitral awards, 
even though their importance is circumscribed by their limited 
application. The 1961 European Convention on International 
Commercial Arbitration 49 was conceived and drafted in part as a 
response to the perceived inadequacies of the New York 
Convention, although the primary aim of its drafters was to 
facilitate trade between Eastern and Western Europe. 50 The 
European Convention is open for signature or acce ssion by member 
states of the Economic Commission for Europe and by countries 
49. (Signed 21 April 1961) 484 UNTS 349 [hereinafter the 
European Convention]. 
50. See ,~, Bentele r v. Belgian State (18 November 1983), 
reprinted in (1984) l J. Int'l Arb. 184 [an ad hoe arbitral 
Tribunal which included Professor K.-H. B0ckst1egel]; and 
Van den Berg, supra, note. 8, 92-3. Mr Van den Berg 
reveals, at 93, that t h e aims of the Convention's drafters 
have been larg ely frustrated in this r e spect becaus e "the 
Conventio n has virtually never b e en applied in East-West 
relations." 
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admitted to the Commission in a "consultative capacity." ~1 
The European Convention limits the grounds for refusal of 
enforcement by national courts set out in the New York Conven-
tion, for although the European Convention links itself to the 
enforcement regime of the New York Convention, it restricts the 
application of art. V(l)(e) of the 1958 Convention. ~2 That 
provision justifies a refusal to enforce whenever an award is 
set aside, for whatever reason, in the country where the award 
was made. 53 In the European Convention, refusal to enforce 
based upon the quashing of an award by a court in the country 
where rendered is allowed only when the award has been set aside 
for reasons enumerated in art. IX(l). The Convention is 
explicit: 
IX(2) In relations between Contracting States that 
are also parties to the New York Convention on the 
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral 
Awards of 10th June 1958, paragraph 1 of this 
Article limits the application of Article V(l)(e) 
of the New York Convention solely to the cases of 
setting aside set out under paragraph 1 above. 
There are six grounds for refusal to enforce set out in art. 
X(l): (a) incapacity of the parties or a party to the arbitra-
tion agreementr (b) invalidity of the arbitration agreement 
under the chosen law, or failing a choice, under the law of the 
51. European Convention, Article X(l). 
52. See,~' Carbonneau, supra, note 14, 91. 
53. Sanders views this ground for refusal with disapproval. 
Sanders, Trends in the Field of International Commercial 
Arbitration (1975) 145 Ree. des c o urs 205, 282-3. 
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country where the award was made; (c) improper notice of 
proceedings to the party requesting the setting aside of the 
award; (d) impermissible extension of the award beyond the terms 
of the agreement to submit to arbitration (except where any such 
aspect of the award may be severed in which case the remainder 
of the award may stand); (e) improper constitution of the 
arbitral tribunal; and (f) inadequacy of the arbitral procedure 
due to non-conformity with the agreement to arbitrate or the 
terms of the Convention. 
Altogether, the approach taken by the drafters of the 
Euro ean Convention on International Commercial Arbitration is 
more supportive of arbitral awards than is the regime of the New 
York Convention. There are, however, serious drawbacks in the 
wording of the Geneva Convention for it is often so vague as to 
call its practical import into doubt. 54 Van den Berg has put 
the matter succinctly, describing the wording of the Convention 
as simply "too complicated." 55 Moreover, the 1961 Convention is 
of restricted relevance due to its geographic limitations. In 
particular, the European Convention will have no application to 
the majority of arbitral awards between states and foreign 
private parties because the majority of such awards result from 
agreements between Western corporations and less developed 
countries that will not be parties to the Convention. 
54. See,~, Luzzatto, supra, note 6, 48. 
55. Van den Berg, supra, note 8, 93. 
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A more recent agreement of potentially greater relevance 
to the immediate discussion is the World Bank-sponsored Conven-
tion on the Settlemenl of Investment Disputes between States and 
Nationals of Other States 56 which was examined in Chapter One 
and so can be treated briefly here. State parties to the ICSID 
Convention have agreed to waive certain prerogatives of national 
court jurisdiction. Under art. 54(1), "[e]ach Contracting State 
shall recognize an award rendered pursuant to this Convention as 
binding and enforce the pecuniary obligations imposed by that 
award within its territories as if it were a final judgment of a 
court in that State." In short, under the ICSID Convention the 
traditional problems of recognition and enforcement, still 
current under the regime of the New York Convention, simply 
should not arise: 
(T]he award is valid and enforceable in the 
jurisdiction of all Contracting States as a final 
judgment of their own courts. Noncompliance would 
be in violation of treaty obligations under the 
Convention which implies di~ect recourse to 
international law remedies. 57 
56. (Signed 18 March 1965; entered into force 14 October 1966) 
575 UNTS 160 [hereinafter the ICSID Convention]. 
57. Vuylsteke, Foreign Investment Protection and ICSID Arbitra-
tion (1974) 4 Ga J. Int'l & Comp. L. 343, 360. Presumably 
the "international law remedies" to which Vuylsteke refers 
are remedies available to other state parties to the ICSID 
Convention. It is a difficult question whether the foreign 
corporation which is party to an arbitration can purport to 
demand, on its own behalf, international law remedies for 
breach of state responsibility. The conclusion reached in 
the previous Chapter is that they cannot do so. On the 
other hand, it really is the corporation that suffers 
damage if the state party to an arbitration refuses to 
comply with an award. Article 27 of the ICSID Convention 
(cont'd.) 
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To gain recognition and enforcement of an ICSID award, all that 
is required is the presentation to the enforcing court of a copy 
of the award certified as authentic by the ICSID Secretary-
General.58 
To benefit from this "self-contained system", 59 a system 
which establishes clearly the "binding" nature of an award with-
out reference to legal sources outside the ICSID Convention 
itself, 60 it is necessary that a contracting state conclude a 
written agreement with a national of another contracting state 
submitting a dispute to the International Centre for Settlement 
of Investment Disputes [ICSID] • 6 1 There are, then, two limiting 
preconditions for application of the ICSID Convention regime. 
seems to contemplate diplomatic protection and espousal of 
claims in cases where the state party to an a rbitration 
"shall have failed to abide by and comply with the award 
rendered" in a dispute. By implication, the private party 
is not deemed itself to have access to international 
remedies, 
On the recognition and enforcement regime of the ICSID 
Convention generally, see Broches, supra, note 4, 349; and 
Schmidt, Arbitration Under the Auspices of the Interna-
tional Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes 
(ICSID): Implications of the Decision on Jur1sd1ct1on in 
Alcoa Minerals of Jamaica, Inc. V. Government of Jamaica 
{1976) 17 Harv. Int'l L.J. 90, 105. 
58. ICSID Convention, supra, note 56, art. 54(2). See also 
Broches, ibid., 400. 
59. Luzzatto, supra, note 6, 98. 
60. See Delaume, Foreign Sovereign Immunity: Impact on Arbitra-
tion (1983) 38 Arb. J. 34 (No. 2) 36 [hereinafter Foreign 
Sovereign Immunity]. 
61. ICSID Convention, supra, note 56, art. 25. 
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First, the state party t o any contractual arrangement must ha ve 
ratified the Convention; so too the na t i onal state of the 
private party. Secondly, the parties to the contractual 
arrangement must expressly have chosen to submit t o the juris-
diction of ICSID and have manifested that intention in writing; 
this submission cannot be withdrawn unilaterally : 
In fact, as was discussed in Chapter One, the application 
of the ICSID Convention has been limited severely oy the second 
of these two preconditions. Despite the fact that, as of 1986, 
eighty-eight states had ratified the ICSID Convention, 6 2 by 1984 
only sixteen cases had been submitted by agreement in writing to 
the arbitral jurisdiction of ICSID. 63 In its entire history, 
only four arbitral awards have been rendered under I CSID 
auspices. 64 Clearly, despite wi de ratification of the 
62. See [1986) Rev. de l'arb. 144 (No. 1). Indeed, the ICSID 
Convention is more widely ratified than any other inter-
national convention that deals with transnational arbitra-
tion. The same issue o f the Revue de l'arbitrage also 
notes that the New Yo rk Convention has be en ratifie d by 
only sixty-seven states. 
63. International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, 
Annual Report (1984) 6Two other cases were submitted to 
ICSID Conciliation proceedings. 
64. Ibid., 8-9. The writers of the ICSID Annual Report take 
comfort in the fact that from 19 6 5-81, nine case s were 
submitte d to ICSID, whereas from 1981-84 a furthe r nine 
were submitted. It was thought that "[t]his marks a 
significant growth in the number of cases submitted to 
ICSID in recent years." Ibid., 8. Although some progress 
is being made in encouraging acceptance of ICSID jurisdic-
tion, one might question that nine cases in four years 
marks "significant growth". 
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ICSID Convention, it is the New York Convention which continues 
to govern the main issues in the recognition and enforcement of 
most international arbitral awards. 
C. "International" Arbitral Awards and Problems Under 
the New York Convention 
i. The Requirement that Awards be Binding 
Any proponent of the possibility of procedurally 
"delocalised" or "internationalised" arbitral awards 65 must at 
some point confront the express terms of art, V(l)(e) of the New 
York Convention which states that an award may be refused 
recognition and enforcement if: 
(t]he award has not yet become binding on the 
parties, or has been set aside or suspended by a 
competent authority of the country in which, or 
under the law of which, that award was made. 66 
It seems that the drafters of this provision presumed that 
arbitral awards would result only from a specific system of 
65, See supra, Chapter II. 
66. Paulsson sees art. V(l)(e) of the New York Convention as 
"[t]he heart of the debate concerning the existence of a 
transnational award". Paulsson, supra, note 31, 235. It 
is important to note that the binding nature of an award is 
a condition for enforcement, and not vice versa. In his 
separate opinions in Case Nos 6, 51 etc. before the Iran-
u.s. Claims Tribunal, (1983) 1 Iran-u.s. C.T.R, 284 (deci-
sion of 5 November 1982), Howard Holtzman suggested, at 
289, that "[a) binding contract is one which is enforce-
able". Even when discussing the underlying contract, this 
approach would appear to be circular. A contract is bind-
ing because it is enforceable and a contract is enforceable 
because it is binding • . It is only the latter proposition 
which is defended here, both in relation to contracts and 
to arbitral awards. A contract or an award must derive its 
quality as a "binding " juridical act from a source indepen-
dent of the mere prospects for enforcement. In the inter-
national arbitral context, that source is generally the 
express will of the parties, 
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national procedural law. That presumption no longer reflects 
accurately the contemporary legal reality, as was discussed in 
the previous Chapter. The question remains whether art. V(l)(e) 
can accommodate that new reality. The standard reading of art. 
V(l)(e) seems to be that the first and second clauses are 
conjunctive, that is, that the "binding" nature of an award is 
to be determined "by a competent authority of the country in 
which, or under the law of which, that award was made."b7 By no 
means is this the only logical reading. Because of the use of 
the conjunction "or", it is eminently reasonable to suggest that 
the two clauses are, in fact, disjunctive, that an award can be 
refused enforcement if it is not "binding" or if it has been set 
aside in the country where made. One must then ask what is 
meant by a "binding" award. 
As a preliminary point, it may be asserted with vigour and 
assurance that the use of the word "binding" in the New York 
Convention does not impose a requirement that the award be 
confirmed by a court in the country where the award is rendered 
because that would mean that the award could potentially be 
subject to the imprimatur of two courts, first in the country 
where the award was rendered and again in the enforcement juris-
diction. This "double exequatur" is precisely what the New York 
67. See,~. Paulsson, ibid.: "Under this provision, foreign 
awards are enforceable unless the challenging party can 
show that the award is not 'binding' in the country where 
rendered." 
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Convention was designed to preclude.~& The word "binding" was 
chosen to replace the word "final" in the 1927 Geneva Convention 
specifically because "final" had been interpreted by national 
courts as requiring court recognition in the state where the 
award was rendered and in the enforcing state.b~ 
In attempting to seek a more positive form of definition, 
one is confronted with the obstacle that the word "binding" is 
not defined in the Convention except to the extent that context 
can be used as an interpretive guide. The ordinary meaning, 
according to the Oxford English Dictionary is "(t]he state or 
68. This interpretation has now become conventional wisdom for 
almost all courts seeking to interpret the Convention. See, 
~' Fratelli Variola S.p.A. v. Danaos Shipping Co. (28 
January 1982 date of filing; Corte di Cassazionne), 
reprinted in (1984) 9 Y.B. Comm. Arb. 423, 425 (Italy); 
Official Receiver in the Bankruptcy of Lanificio Walter 
Banci s.a.s. v, Bobbie Brooks Inc (15 April 1980 date of 
filing; Corte di Cassazionne), reprinted in (1981) 6 Y.B. 
Comm. Arb. 233, 235-6 (Italy); Joseph Muller A.G. v. 
Bergesen (26 February 1982; Federal Supreme Court), 
reprinted in (1984) 9 Y.B. Comm. Arb. 437, 439-41 
(Switzerland); and for a summary of the position adopted by 
courts in the United Kingdom, Morris, supra, note 17, vol. 
2 , Ru 1 e 2 0 0 , at 113 4 • 
69. See Van den Berg, supra, note 8, 333 et seo. Some states 
still require court approval of arbitral awards based upon 
legal rather than commercial considerations (~. the 
arbitrate rituale of Italy). Such requirements raise the 
question whether or not court approval transforms or merges 
the award into a court decision thereby excluding the 
application of the New York Convention which covers only 
arbitral awards. Van den Berg argues that no such "merger" 
should affect the recognition and enforcement of awards 
under the Convention. Because a primary goal of the 
Convention was to eliminate the so-called "double 
exequatur", outmoded provisions of national law should 
simply be ignored in the international context. Van den 
Berg, supra, note 8, 347-8. This position is fully 
supported by the overall tenor of the Convention. 
- 246 -
condition of being bound" and to be bound is "to be under an 
obligation, to have it as a duty, moral or legal, to do some-
thing."7u The verb is passive; the subject is affected by an 
external action. The source of that action is irrelevant to the 
state of being bound. 
In the context of international arbitration, Harnik 
asserts that the word binding "is today universally recognized 
to mean that the award, in the rendering country, is not open to 
arbitral or ordinary judicial review, irrespective of the 
admissibility of an action to set aside." 71 In a sense, this 
definition does not advance the inquiry very far, for Harnik, 
like the drafters of art. V(l)(e) itself, seems to assume that 
all arbitral awards will be linked to a national legal system. 
If one rejects Harnik's assumption that there will always be a 
"rendering country" and instead accepts the concept of a 
delocalised award (at least in its procedural aspect), the 
remainder of his definition is helpful and in conformity with 
the ordinary dictionary meaning of the word "binding". A 
"binding award" would then include any award that imposes 
definitive obligations upon the parties and that is not itself 
open to further arbitral or judicial appeal. An application to 
set aside is not such an "appeal", so an award is "binding" f o r 
the purposes of the New York Convention even if a disgruntled or 
70. J. Murray, et al., eds, The Oxford English Dictionary, 
Oxford: The Clarendon Press (1933). 
71. Harnik, supra, note 35, 708-9. 
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dilatory party has instituted new proceedings to set aside the 
award. 72 This pro-enforcement interpretation, underscoring Von 
Mehren's principle of "repose", has been adopted by national 
courts in The Netherlands, 73 France, 7 4 and the United States. 75 
The position was expressed most clearly by the District Court of 
Amsterdam in S.P.P. (Middle East) Ltd v. Arab Republic of 
Egypt: 
It results from both the legislative history of the 
Convention and the text of Arts. V, para. 1 under 
e, and VI, that the mere initiation of an action 
for setting aside ••• does not have as a conse-
72. The writers of the Fifth Report of the Private Interna-
tional Law Committee in the United Kingdom went even 
further while considering the domestic context. They 
suggested that a municipal arbitral award was "binding" if 
the parties had no further recourse to another arbitral 
tribunal. The fact that a regular appeal might exist to a 
court of law was not thought to undercut the binding nature 
of an award. Cmnd 1515 (1961), para. 14, discussed in 
Morris, supra, note 18, vol. 2, 1151. 
73. S.P.P. (Middle East) Ltd v. Arab Republic of EQYPt (12 July 
1984; District Court of Amsterdam), reprinted in (1985) 10 
Y.B. Comm. Arb. 487 (The Netherlands). 
74. Michel Warde c. Societe Feedex International Inc. (13 April 
1984; Tribunal de grande instance de Paris), reprinted in 
[1985] Rev. de l'arb. 155 (No. 1) (France); and Cie de 
Saint Gobain - Pont a Mousson c. Fertilizer Corp. of India 
(10 May 1971; Cour d'appel de Paris), reprinted in (1971) 1 
Y.B. Comm. Arb. 184 (France) [the relevant considerations 
actually arose at first instance and are reported at the 
same place. By the time the case reached the cour d'appel, 
an Indian Court had upheld the award. Nonetheless, the 
Cour d'appel nowhere casts doubt upon the determinations of 
the Tribunal de grande instance which had held that an 
award is binding even if subject to a proceeding to set 
aside). 
75. Fertilizer Corp. of India v. IOI Management, Inc., 517 F. 
Supp. 948 (S.D. Ohio, W.D. 1981) 958 (U.S.A.). 
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quence that the arbitral award must be considered 
as not binding. An arbitral award is not binding 
if it is open to appeal on the merits before a 
judge or an appeal arbitral tribunal. 70 
The Austrian Supreme Court has held that any challenge concern-
ing the binding nature of an award under Art. V(l)(e) must be 
raised by the opposing party and will not be addressed by the 
Court proprio motu. 77 
The condition of being "binding" can certainly be 
fulfilled by "delocalised" awards, as the decision in the French 
Gotaverken case demonstrates. 78 Even the numerous LIAMCO 
enforcement cases illustrate that an award not procedurally 
connected to the arbitral forum may still be binding. In 
Sweden, the award was enforced, 79 and the refusals of French, 
Swiss and United States courts to enforce the award were based 
upon considerations which did not call into question its binding 
76. Supra, ryote 73, 489. 
77. Oberster Gerichtshof [Supreme Court), 21 February 1978, 
reprinted in (1985) 10 Y.B. Comm. Arb. 418 (Austria) (parties not indicated). 
78. General National Maritime Transport Co. v. Societe 
Gotaverken Arendel A.B. (21 February 1980; Cour d'appel de 
Paris), reprinted in (1981) 20 I.L.M. 884, 885 (France). 
In that case, the Paris court refused to arrogate to itself 
any supervisory jurisdiction over an award that had "no 
connection whatsoever with the French legal system" even 
though the arbitration took place in Paris. Because no 
adjudicative review was possible, the award was final and, 
perforce, binding. In such a case, the "binding" quality 
of the award results from the original agreement of the 
parties. 
79. Libyan A~erican Oil Co. v. Socialist People's Arab Republic 
of Libya (18 June 1980; Svea Court of Appeals), reprinted 
in (1981) 20 I.L.M. 893 (Sweden). 
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nature. 80 It would appear, therefore, t hat a procedurally 
"delocalised" arbitral award rendered in an arbitration 
involving a state and a foreign private party can be described 
as "binding" for the purposes of the New York Convention. The 
first clause of art. V(l)(e) would not, then, provide a ground 
for non-enforcement of the award. It must be pointed out, 
however, that even though an award may be "binding" under art. 
V(l)(e), enforcement may still be delayed (not refused) under 
art. VI, pending the final determination of a court in the host 
state of the arbitration upon any application to set aside the 
award. 81 This practical provision is designed to prevent 
precipitous enforcement. If an award is set aside, the second 
part of art. V(l)(e) may then be applicable. 
80. In France and Switzerland, the courts refused to attach 
Libyan property, holding that the Libyan state was entitled 
to claim sovereign immunity. See Procureur de la Repu-
blique v. Societe LIAMCO (5 March 1979; Tribunal de grande 
instance de Paris), reprinted in (1979) 106 J. du dr. int'l 
857 (France); and In re Socialist Libyan Arabic Popular 
Jamahiriya v. Libyan American Oil Co. (19 June 1980; 
Federal Supreme Court), reprinted in (1981) 20 I.L.M. 151 
(Switzerland). In the United States, a Federal District 
Court held that the Act of State Doctrine precluded any 
attachment of Libyan assets. See Libyan American Oil Co. 
v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahirya, 482 F. Supp. 
1175 (D.C.o.c. 1980). All these cases will be discussed in 
greater detail later in this Chapter. 
81. Fertilizer Corp. of India v. IOI Management Inc., supra, 
note 75. Any application to delay confirmation or enforce-
ment proceedings should only be granted if the application 
is in good faith and is not merely dilatory. See the 
discussion of a U.S. Circuit Court in Imperial Ethiopian 
Government v. Baruch-Foster Corp., 535 F. 2d 334 (5th Cir. 
1976), especially at 337 (U.S.A.). 
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The second clause of art. V(l)(e) contains the stipulation that 
refusal to enforce may be justified if the party resisting 
enforcement can prove that the award has been set aside by a 
competent authority in the country where the award was made. 
This provision creates a link with national law, for it is 
domestic law which would determine whether an award wo uld be s e t 
aside in the country where it was rendered. 82 Although it is a 
fact that in many cases annulment proceedings are instituted by 
losing parties solely as a delaying tactic 83 and that most such 
requests are rejected, art. V(l)(e) ne verthele ss establishes a 
nexus between an international arbitration and local law which 
seems out of place in a Convention wh i ch is otherwise supportive 
of transnational arbitration. Yet the connection cannot be 
wished away. 
Some proponents of "denationalised" arbitration have 
argued that "floating" awards should be enforceable outside the 
c o untry where they are made even if the award has been annulled 
by a competent authority in that country. The argument may be 
constructed as follows. Because art. V(l)(e) allows a court to 
refuse enforcement of an award that has been "set aside or 
suspended by a competent authority of the country in which, or 
under the law of which, the award was made," and because a 
82. Sanders, supra, note 53, 274. See also Van den Berg, 
supra, note 8, 355; and Hirsch, The Place of Arbitration 
and the Lex Arbitri (1979) 34 Arb. J. 43 (No. 3) 44. 
83. Sanders, ibid., 283. 
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delocalised award is "made" under no national procedural law, it 
is not "made" in any country. If it is governed by an anational 
law, the local court has no authority to set the award aside and 
so any such setting aside should have no effect at the time of 
prospective enforcement. 84 The reasoning is positively 
.Jesuit ical. 
Given the fact that in arbitrations involving states and 
foreign private parties the situs of an arbitration will often 
be entirely fortuitous, chosen simply for the sake of neutrality 
or for the convenience of the parties or the arbitrators and 
with no intention that the local law should govern, it would 
seem that enforcement in other states should in no way depend 
upon the peculiarities of the local law. Yet under the 1958 
Convention it seems to do so, and Professor Park, who is a lead-
ing expert in the field, points out that he "knows of no award 
enforced after explicit annulment where rendered. 1185 In fact, 
since Professor Park wrote those words, at least one highly 
authoritative court decision has indeed allowed enforcement of 
an award despite its annulment by a court in its country of 
origin. In Pabalk Ticaret Ltd v. Norsolar S.A., the French Cour 
de cassation effectively used art. VII of the New York Conven-
84. See the descriptive commentary of Park & Paulsson, supra, 
note 12, 256 where they disapprove of any such claim. See 
also the almost identical objections in Park, The Lex Loci 
Arbitri and International Commercial Arbitration: When and 
Why it Matters (1983) 32 Int'l & Comp. L.Q. 21, 24. 
85. Park, ibid., 27. 
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~ to ride roughshod over art. V(l)(e). 86 Article VII was 
interpreted to allow a party to avail himself of any arbitral 
award to the full extent allowed by the country of enforcement. 
Because the Cour de cassation found that French law provided for 
enforcement no matter what the status of the award in the 
country where it was rendered, the applicant was entitled to 
enforcement. This decision is so singular and, with respect, 
audacious, that one might still be inclined to follow the more 
circumspect analysis of the present state of the law which is 
offered by Professor Park. 
In accepting this fact, however, one need not -- as 
Professor Park does call into question the very idea of a 
delocalised award. It is only the inflated claim of proponents 
of delocalisation that is defeated by the wording of the Conven-
tion. A delocalised award can still exist and, as has been 
shown, be binding. In most cases where an award has been 
rendered under a delocalised procedure, there will simply be no 
cause for a court of the situs to quash the award. Indeed, it 
can be argued further that because annulment in the country 
where an award has been made can prevent enforcement elsewhere, 
national courts should be wary to agree to annulment lest they 
defeat the openly-expressed intentions of the parties to benefit 
from a mutually convenient, non-municipal adjudicative process. 
86. Pabalk Ticaret Ltd v. Norsolar S.A., (9 October 1984; Cour 
de cassation), reprinted in (1985) 24 I.L.M. 363 (France). 
See also the case note by Gaillard in (1985) 24 I.L.M. 360. 
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The possibility of annulment exists for all awards -- whether 
delocalised or rooted in the procedural system of a single state 
-- and the mere possibility cannot logically be employed as an 
argument against delocalisation per se. One can only hope that 
in a future convention, this vestigal manifestation of state 
interference will be abolished. 
Mr Van den Berg has argued forcefully that the present 
wording of the Convention is adequate and that "[a) losing party 
must be afforded the right to have the validity of the award 
finally adjudicated in one jurisdiction. 1187 He suggests that a 
"final" determination of the local court would prevent a multi-
plicity of spurious enforcement actions around the globe. The 
goal of finality and certainty is in many legal contexts a valid 
objective. But it is not a transcendent good. Indeed, in the 
context of international arbitration, a process quite distinct 
from the national legal order, certainty should not be pursued 
entirely at the expense of flexibility or to the exclusion of 
the express will of the parties who chose arbitration as a means 
to settle their dispute. In any case, allowing for the setting-
aside of an award by a court in the country where the award was 
made simply does not accomplish the task of providing certainty. 
The winning party will still seek to enforce the award elsewhere 
in the hope that a national court will, like the French Cour de 
cassation in Pabalk Ticaret, hold that it is not bound to refuse 
87. Van den Berg, supra, note 8, 355. 
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enforcement. A strong argument can be made that t he goal o f 
certainty will be enhanced most by ma k ing enforcement of a b i nd-
ing award as simple as possible so that enforcement is likely t o 
be obtained in the first jurisdiction where it is sought. If 
the arbitral tribunal has egregiously breached fundamental 
standards of fairness, the parties can be protected at the stage 
of enforcement through the invocation of public policy, as will 
be discussed below. 88 
ii. The Requirement that Awards be Foreign 
The official title of the 1958 Convention is misle adi ng, a 
point which becomes obvious as soon as one reads art. I. The 
Convention is not only concerned with "foreign" awards, but with 
awards considered to be "not domestic" as well. 89 The Conven-
88. See infra, text accompanying notes 105 to 131. For a 
recent example of the invocation of public policy to defeat 
an application for enforcement, see Arab Republic of Egypt 
v. S.P.P. (12 July 1984; Cour d'appel de Paris), reprinted 
in (1985) 10 Y.B. Comm. Arb. 113 (Franc e) where the c o urt 
found that Egypt was not even a party to the arb itratio n 
agreement that had resulted in an award rendered against it. 
89. Article I(l) of the New York Convention, supra, note 1, 
reads: 
This Convention shall apply to the recogn i ti o n and 
enforcement of arbitral awards made in the t errito r y of 
a State othe r than the State whe re the r e c ognitio n and 
enforcement of such awa rds are sought, and arising out 
of differences between persons, whether physical or 
legal. It shall also apply to arbitral awards not 
considered as domestic awards in the State where 
recognition and enforcement are sought. 
In the original ECOSOC draft o f the New York Co nvention, 
the term "international awa rd" was used, but this was no t 
acceptable to many states. Se e Van den Be r g , supra, note 8, 8. 
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tion applies both to awards rendered in a country other than 
that where enforcement is sought and to "arbitral awards not 
considered as domestic awards in the State where their recogni-
tion and enforcement are sought." It is well documented that 
the second branch of the test for applicability was added to the 
Convention largely at the behest of Civil Law countries of 
Continental Europe that sought the flexibility to refuse the 
enforcement of any award that they deemed to be domestic even if 
it had been rendered in another country. 90 This ability would 
prevent parties to an essentially domestic dispute from seeking 
to avoid the application of national law by seeking resolution 
outside their own country (the notion o f fraude a la loi). 
Authoritative judicial decisions have recently extended 
the ambit of the second branch of the Covention's applicability 
test. On its face, the Convention does not preclude its 
application to awards that are rendered outside the procedural 
system of any state. 91 A "delocalise d" award will almost 
90. See,~, Brown, Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards 
(1984) 14 Ga J. Int'l & Comp. L. 217, 228; and Van den 
Berg, supra, note 8, 19. 
91. Contra Van den Berg, New York Convention 1958: Commentary 
Cases (1984) 9 Y.B. Comm. Arb. 3 29. Van den Berg argues , 
at 342, that for the purpos es o f determining the applica-
bility of the Convention, awards "not considered as 
domestic" cannot possibly include "denationalised" awards 
"in view of the references to the applicable law in Art. V, 
para. l" of the 1958 Convention. This argument improperly 
conflates two separ~te ideas. Article V{l) refers to the 
competence to conclude and the validity of an agreement t o 
arbitrate, which, perhaps r e grettably, is submitted to 
domestic jurisdiction. There i s no need t o p r esume t hat 
(cont'd.) 
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certainly not be considered "domestic" in the state where 
recognition and enforcement are sought. The Gotaverken and 
Societe AKSA cases 92 emphasise that an award will not necessari-
ly be considered "domestic" even by courts in the same country 
where the award was rendered. 93 German courts have adopted a 
similar position 94 as has, more recently, the United States 
Federal Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. The case of 
Bergesen v. Joseph Muller Corp. 9 ~ is the first notable American 
departure from the territorial principle whereunder only 
arbitral awards rendered outside the United States could be 
enforced by U.S. courts under the New York Convention. In the 
Bergesen case, an arbitration involving two foreign entities 
took place in New York and the Second Circuit held that the 
award was enforceable in the U.S. under the 1958 Convention 
national control over the resulting award is also required 
for the Convention to cover enforcement of the award. The 
only express reference which provides for national juris-
diction over awards, as opposed to agreements, is the 
second clause of art. V(l)(e), discussed supra, text 
· accompanying notes 82-85. 
92. Gotaverken, supra, note 78; and Societe AKSA S.A. v. 
Societe NORSOLOR S.A. (9 December 1980; Cour d'appel de 
Paris), reprinted in (1981) 20 I.L.M. 887 (France). 
93. See generally, Quigley, supra, note 25, 1060-1; Luzzatto, 
supra, note 6, 71; and Jeantet, note to the Gotaverken 
case, (1981) 20 I.L.M. 883. 
94. See,~, Delaume, supra, note 45. 
95. Bergesen v. Joseph Muller Core., 710 F. 2d 928 (2d Cir. 
1983) (U.S.A.). See also the case note by Feldman, An 
Award in New York Can Be a Foreign Arbitral Award (1984) 39 
Arb. J. 14, especially 15-6. 
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because it was "not considered domest i c." 
Developments in France, Germany and the United States 
indicate, therefore, that the New York Convention allows for 
almost complete national discretion in determining what will be 
classified as a non-domestic award. There are no restrictions 
as to subject matter, nor are there nationality or residence 
requirements imposed upon the parties to an arbitration. As 
Luzzatto points out, even under the first branch of the 
applicability test -- which requires enforcement of awards 
rendered in another state -- "[p)urely domestic disputes can 
be referred to foreign arbitration and lead to awards recogniz-
able and enforceable under the convention." 96 State courts 
might still try to preclude such a result by applying the second 
branch of the applicability test to consider such an award as 
being essentially "domestic". In practice, the problem of 
fraude a la loi simply has not arisen to any meaningful extent. 
The more important point is that the Convention prov ides great 
leeway to allow states to enforce arbitral awards and there is 
nothing in the wording of art. I which would require non-
enforcement of a procedurally delocalised award, whether 
rendered inside or outside the state where enforceme n t is 
sought. 
Moreover, there is no necessary condition of reciprocity, 
A state may bind itself to recognise and enforce arbitral awards 
96. Luzzatto, supra, no te 6, 75-6. See also Feldman, ibid., 
18. 
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even when they are rendered in states not party to t h e Conven-
tion. On the other hand, art. !(3) allows a state party to make 
an express declaration "that it will apply the Convention to the 
recognition and enforcement of awards made only in the territory 
of another Contracting State." 97 Many states have in fact 
entered such a declaration with their ratifications or 
accessions. 9 8 Even when state parties require reciprocity, 
however, this condition does not preclude the enforcement of 
awards rendered under a delocalised procedure. National court 
decisions discussed below have held that a recipro city condit ion 
valid under the Convention may only require that an award be 
"made ••• in the territory of another Contracting State." An 
internationalised award can still be made in the territory of a 
state party to the 1958 Convention even if it results from a 
delocalised procedure and will not be subjected to national 
97. Article I(3) also contains another reservation which may be 
invoked by parties and which states that the Convention 
will apply only to arbitrations "arising o ut o f legal 
relationships •.• which are c o nsidered c o mmercial." 
Twenty-three states had made such a reservation as of 1984, 
See (1984) 9 Y.B. Comm. Arb. 327. This reservation recalls 
the law as it stood under the regime of the 1927 Geneva 
Convention and the 1923 Protocol which contai ned a similar 
reservation. See supra, no te 39. 
Today, any contract involving buy ing and selling is 
clearly a "classic c ommercial relationship " and therefo r e 
falls within this pro vision, but "commercial relationship" 
is often given a much wider interpretation. See Siderius 
v. Compania de Acero del Pacifico S.A., 453 F. Supp. 22 (SDNY 1978) (U.S.A.). 
98. Luzzatto, supra, note 6, 71. As of 1984, forty-two of the 
sixty-six contracting states have based their adhere nce t o 
the Convention upo n the reciprocity decla r atio n. Se e ( 1 9 8 4 ) 9 Y. B • Comm • Arb • 3 2 7 • 
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court review in that country. 
If one accepts that an arbitral award rendered under a 
delocalised procedure can be "binding", and "made" in another 
country or "not domestic" for the purposes of the New York 
Convention, it is difficult to accept Mr Delaume's view that 
the attempt to remove the arbitration proceedings 
from the lex loci arbitri and to "internationalize" 
or "delocalize" the proceedings may have its price. 
It may deprive the parties of the benefit of the 
liberal provisions of multilateral Conventions 
regarding the recognition and enforcement of 
"foreign" as opposed to "international" awards. 99 
Delaume's position is not consonant with the spir i t of the 
recent French and U.S. court decisions discussed above, nor with 
the express holding of the Dutch Hoge Raad (High Council) in the 
case of Societe Europeenne a•gtudes et d'Entreprises v. 
Yugoslavia. 100 In that case, the f ac ts of which are well known, 
the Hoge Raad quashed a decision of the Hague Court of Appeal 
which had held that because The Netherlands had entered a 
reservation under art. I(3), the enforcement of an arbitral 
award under the 1958 Convention requi red that the award be 
"made" in the territory of another Contracting state. It 
further held that this was not simply a geographical requirement 
99. Delaume, State Contracts and Transnational Arbitration 
(1981) 75 Am. J. Int'l L. 784, 813 [hereinafter Delaume, 
State Contracts]. See also Delaurne, Foreign Sovereign 
Immunity, supra, note 60, 43-4. 
100. S.E.E.E. v. Yugoslavia (26 October 1973; Hoge Raad), 
reprinted in (1975) 14 I.L.M. 71 (The Netherlands). 
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but instead imposed a condition that the award should be made 
according to the municipal procedural law of the country where 
it was rendered. Because the award in question, although never 
set aside per se, had previously been declared by a Swiss Court 
not to be an "award" within the provisions of the lex loci 
arbitri, that of the Canton de Vaud, lOl the award was held by 
the Hague Court of Appeal not to have been "made" in 
Switzerland. This reasoning was rejected in its entirety by the 
Hoge Raad which held that Art. I(l) of the 1958 Convention could 
not bear the construction imposed upon it by the lower court. 
The case was remanded and decided finally upon other grounds 
which, pace Delaume, have no bearing upon the theoretical 
possibility of "delocalised" procedure. 1 02 the decision of the 
101. Societe Europeenne d'~tudes et d'Entreprises v. Republique 
Populaire Federative de Yougoslavie (12 February 1957; 
Tribunal de Vaud), reprinted in (1958] Rev. crit. de dr. 
int'l prive 359, aff'd (18 September 1957; Tribunal 
Federal), reprinted in (1958] Rev. crit. de dr. int'l 
prive 367 (Switzerland). 
102. Delaume has argued that . in a subsequent appeal, the Hoge 
Raad reverted to "considerations that, in addition to the 
place of making of the award would seem to 'renationalize' 
the award by bringing it within the legal system of the 
country in which the award is 'made'." Delaume, Foreign 
Sovereign Immunity, supra, note 60, 44. In fact, the 
second Hoge Raad decision was based expressly on one of 
the conditions justifying non-recognition set out in art. 
V of the 1958 Convention (art. V(l)(a)). The burden of 
art. V(l)(a) is simply that non-recognition is justified 
if, "failing any indication" by the parties of the law 
governing the arbitration, the agreement to arbitrate is 
found to be invalid under the law of the country where the 
award was made. In other words, the problem can be 
avoided by declaring expressly that the arbitration is not 
to be governed by the local law. Nothing in the Hoge 
(cont'd.) 
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Hoge Raad is mirrored in the latest instalment of the French 
enforcement saga in the case of the Societe Europeenne d'Etudes 
et d'Entreprises c. Republique de Yougoslavie 103 where even Mr 
Delaume admits that "the Court takes the position that the New 
York Convention applies to 'anational' awards 'made' •.• in 
another Contracting State. 11104 Neither the requirement that an 
award be "binding" nor the requirement that it be non-domestic 
or "made" in another country, would seem to preclude the 
enforcement under the New York Convention of a procedurally 
"delocalised" arbi tral a.ward. 
iii. The Domestic Public Policy Justification for Refusal 
to Enforce a Non-Domestic Award 
Unlike the ICSID Convention .which expressly excludes any 
domestic public policy defence to the enforcement of an arbitral 
award rendered under its auspices, 105 the New York Convention 
103. 
Raad's second decision then, is fatal t o t he idea of 
procedural delocalisation. Moreover, the first and more 
directly applicable decision is supportive of the concept. 
See also Luzzatto, supra, note 6, 78 who, although 
professing doubts about procedural delocalisation, empha-
sises nevertheless that: 
it is noteworthy that the New York Convention does not 
require that arbitral awards are [sic] connected with 
the procedural system of the State in whose territory , 
or under the laws of which, they are made, 
(13 November 1984; Cour d'appel de Rauen), reprinted in 
[ 1 9 8 5 ) Rev • de 1 ' a r b • 11 5 ( No • 1 ) ( France ) , 
104, Delaume, Note, (1985) 24 I.L.M, 345. 
105. See ICSID Convention, supra, note 56, arts, 53-4; and 
Delaume, ICSID Arbitration and the Courts (1983) 77 Am. J, 
Int'l L, 784, 80l, 
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allows national courts to deny enforcement if it "would be 
contrary to the public policy of that country." 1° 6 For arbitra-
tions involving states and foreign private parties that are not 
conducted under the ICSID regime -- still the vast majority of 
such arbitrations -- this public policy defence to enforcement 
could have created severe difficulties. That it has not done so 
is a testament to the widespread desire to make the New York 
Convention work as forcefully as possible for the benefit of 
international commercial arbitration, to enhance the principle 
of repose. As it stands, the public policy justification for 
non-enforcement exists solely as the ultimate safeguard against 
extreme breaches of procedural fairness. 107 Van den Berg 
reported that as of 1981, "out of some 140 decisions (he 
reviewed], enforcement of an arbitration agreement and an 
arbitral award was refused in five decisions only on account of 
public policy." 108 
On its face, the public policy defence t o enforcement of 
arbitral awards under the New York Convention allows almost 
completely unfettered discretion to a national court wishing t o 
106, New York Convention, supra, note 1, art. V(2)(b). 
107. See Carbonneau, supra, note 14, 65 who asserts that 
Court supervision (of arbitration] should be limited to 
the fundamental concerns of procedural fairness: the 
need to curb the abusive exercise of excessive arbitral 
authority and the need to protect the rights of third 
parties in the private proceeding between the contrac t-ing parties. 
108. Van den Berg, supra, note 8, 366. 
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apply local public policy to defeat a binding arbitral award. 
Indeed, this provision is not really a "defence" at all, for 
unlike the specific defences to enforcement set out in art. 
V{l)(a)-(e), the public policy ground for refusal to enforce 
need not be proven by the challenging party. The court in the 
country where recognition and enforcement is sought may raise 
public policy issues proprio motu. 
There is, of course, a compelling practical reason why 
most domestic courts in enforcing jurisdictions -- especially in 
developed countries where most attempts at enforcement are 
launched -- would not wish to use domestic public policy to 
defeat an arbitral award, especially when the award was rendered 
against a state in a dispute between the state and a foreign 
private party. To date, most arbitrations of that type have 
arisen out of factual situations involving the 'nationalisation' 
of property of the foreign private party, typically a multi-
national corporation. If the court in t he country where enforc-
ement is sought chose to apply notions of domestic public policy 
rigorously, it might thereby deprive the foreign private party 
of its only means of gaining compensation for the expropriation 
of its property. 109 
109. It is interesting to note that, in older editions of Dicey 
and Morris, the editors saw fit to note that there might 
be occasions on which it would be contrary to public 
policy for English courts to recognise the decrees of 
foreign states purporting to "nationalise" property. Even 
today, courts in certain developed nations might find it 
(cont'd.) 
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Public policy can, of course, comprehend both matters of 
substance and of procedure. 110 But, in discussions concerning 
the recognition and enforcement of foreign court judgments, it 
has been argued that fair procedure is the touchstone in 
evaluating a breach of public policy. The United States Second 
Restatement of Conflict of Laws was explicit: 
A valid judgment rendered in a foreign nation after 
a fair trial in a contested proceeding will be 
recognized in the United States so far as the 
immediate parties and underlying cause of act ion 
are concerned. 111 
Clearly, the notion of a "fair trial" relates to specific 
conceptions of procedural fairness. Even in the context of 
foreign court judgments, this broadly phrased provision has been 
criticised strenuously, primarily because it seems to impose 
upon the party seeking recognition the burden of proving that a 
particular court proceeding in a foreign country was "fair" by 
necessary to grit their proverbial teeth before recognis-
ing a foreign nationalisation decree, but the same upset-
ment would not be caused in recognising an arbitral award 
compensating for loss sustained as a result of such a 
decree. See,~, A. Dicey & J. Morris, eds, The 
Conflict of Laws, 8th ed. (1967) 76. 
110. It is unlikely that in the context of international 
commercial arbitration the substance of a decis i on will 
offend domestic public policy. Of course, the result 
might be questioned in some quarters, but it is enti rely 
unlikely that any award r e ndered in such a context would 
so offend the sensibilities of the enforcing court as t o 
prompt it to invoke public policy to defeat the applica-
tion of the award. An offensive -- here read "non-court-
like" -- procedure is a more likely spark for non-
enforcement. 
111. American Law Institute, Restatement (Second) of Conflict 
of Laws (1971), s. 98. 
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American standards, 112 such standards being linked inexorably 
with liberal-democratic conceptions of adjudication, 
In dealing with a non-domestic arbitral award, any 
approach based upon the position adopted in the Second Restate-
~ would be even less appropriate, for at least two reasons. 
First, as has been discussed above, 113 it is clear that the 
drafters of the New York Convention intended that the primary 
burden of proof regarding enforcement of a non-domestic award 
should lie squarely on the party seeking to prevent enforce-
ment,114 Even though the public policy justification for non-
enforcement contained in art. V(2)(b) of the Convention certain-
ly allows the court itself to raise public policy issues, it in 
no way imposes an obligation on the party seeking enforcement to 
prove the fairness of an arbitral procedure. Secondly, the very 
notion of "fairness" must be evaluated with great care when 
dealing with a non-judicial dispute resolution procedure. 
Parties may have chosen to resort to arbitration at least 
in part because they did not wish the procedure to be subjected 
to the full panoply of procedural minutiae that is thought to 
guarantee fairness in many Western legal systems. Flexibility 
may have been an important goal which should not be frustrated 
112. See,~' Peterson, Foreign Country Judgments and the 
Second Restatement of Conflict of Laws (1972) 72 Col. L. Rev, 220, 249, 
113. Supra, text accompanying notes 40 to 43. 
114. See Art. V(l). 
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by the imposition of a fully "judicialised" procedure. It is 
probably for this reason that there is wide agreement among 
commentators and in the case law that, to quote a recent and 
important United States decision: 
[T]he [New York] Convention's public policy defense 
should be construed narrowly. Enforcement of 
foreign arbitral awards may be denied on this basis 
only where enforcement would violate .the forum 
state's most basic notions of morality and justice, 115 
That holding has been supported and followed in courts across 
the United States. 116 American courts will almost always refuse 
to uphold a public policy exception to enforcement. It used to 
be that certain issues were classified as inherently unarbitra-
ble under U.S. notions of public policy, the best example being 
cases involving "antitrust" issues. In a major decision, the 
United States Supreme Court recently reversed this position, 
holding that an international arbitral award could be enforced 
115. Parsons and Whitmore Overseas Co. v. Societe Generale de 
l'Industrie du Papier (23 December 1974; 2d Cir.), 
reprinted in (1975) 14 I.L.M, 504, 507-8 (U.S,A,). This 
approach was justified by the Court, at 507, on the basis 
of comity and reciprocity principles and in view of the 
"pro-enforcement bias" of the entire Convention. 
116. See~~' Marc Rich & Co. A.C. v •. Andros Compania 
Marit1ma S.A., 579 F. 2d 691 (2d Cir. 1978) (U,S,A,); 
Waterside Ocean Navigation Co. v. International Navigation 
Ltd, 737 F. 2d 150 (2d Cir. 1984) (U.S.A.); Sonatrach v. 
Shaheen Natural Resources Co., 585 F. Supp. 57 (S,D.N.Y. 
1983), aff'd 733 F. 2d 260 (2d Cir. 1984) (U,S,A.); 
Imperial Ethiopian Gov. v. Baruch-Foster Corp., 535 F, 2d 
334 (5th Cir. 1976) (U.S.A.); Antee Shipping Co. v. 
Sidermar, S.A., 417 F. Supp. 207 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (U.S,A,); 
and Konkar Indomitable Corp. v, Fritzen Schiffsagentur und 
Bereederungs GmbH, (S.D.N.Y. 1981), reprinted in (1984) 9 
Y.B. Comm, Arb. 468 (U.S.A,). 
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even if it dealt with questions of U.S. antitrust law. 1 17 The 
Supreme Court's decision undersc o res the contemporary trend 
which limits the public policy justification for non-enforcement 
to fundamental issues of procedural fairness. Coing states that 
public policy now relates only to "the most elementary and basic 
principles of fair trial." 118 Feldman suggests that United 
States courts "are loathe to impose preconditions of public 
policy or natural justice except in the most egregious 
cases. 11119 The reticence is not confined to United States 
courts alone. 1 2 u 
117. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., Supreme Court, 2 July 1985, reprinted in (1985) 24 ~M. 1064 (U.S.A.), rev'g. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. v. Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 723 F. 2d 155 (1st Cir. 1983) (U.S,A,), 
118. Coing, "The Substantive Law and the Law of Arbitration Procedure" in C. Schmitthoff, International Commercial Arbitration (1974-80) 75, 88 [the author is a past Director of the Max Planck Institute]. See also Luzzatto, supra, note 6, 84; and Feldman, supra, note 95, 20. For a general discussion of the "pro-enforcement bias" bf American courts, see Lynch, Conflict of Laws in Arbitra-tion Agreements Between Developed and Developing Countries (1981) 11 Ga J, Int'l & Comp. L. 669, 679. 
119. Feldman, ibid., 21, 
120. See,~' European Grain and Shipping Ltd v. Seth Oil Mills Ltd (29 January 1983; High Court of Bombay), reprinted in (1984) 9 Y.B. Comm. Arb. 411 (India); Arkhbaief v. Entreprise Roumaine d'Etat (10 March 1981; Cour de cassation), reprinted in [1982] Rev. de l'arb. 429 (France); and Societe Bruynzeel Dunrenfabriek N.V. v. Ministre d'Etat aux Affaires Etrangeres de la Republique Malagache (30 June 1976; Cour de cassation), reprinted in [1977) Rev. de l'arb. 137. 
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Certain authors have argued t hat the res t rictive a pplica-
tion of public policy by national courts has resulted from the 
acceptance of an entirely new concept, that of "international 
public policy". International public policy is, Professor 
Sanders suggests, "confined to violations of really fundamental 
conceptions of the legal order in the count r y concerned." l2l It 
would appear to emphasise procedural rather than substantive 
norms. Van den Berg also employs this distinction between 
international and domestic public p o licy and has explained t hat 
the distinction "means that what is conside red to pertain t o 
public policy in domestic relations does not necessarily pertain 
to public policy in international relations," and that 
consequently "the number of matters c onsidered t o fall under 
public policy in international case s is smalle r t han that in 
domestic ones." 1 22 Other commentato rs have upheld this 
distinction, 1 2 3 which is based primarily upon dicta in a number 
121. Sanders, supra, note 53, 224. 
122. Van den Berg, supra, note 91, 388. See also Van den Berg , 
supra, note 8, 360. 
123. See,~, Stein & Wotman, International Commercial 
Arbitration in the 1980s: A Comparison of the Major 
Arbitral Systems and Rules (1983) 38 Bus. Law. 1685; 
Wilner, Determining the Law Governing Performance in 
International Commercial Arbitration: A Comparative Study 
(1965) 19 Rutgers L. Rev. 646; and Carbonneau, Rendering 
Arbitral Awards With Reasons: The Elaboration of a Common 
Law of International Transactions (1985) 23 Col. J. Trans. L. 579. 
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of French cases. 124 Even accepting the substance of the argu-
ment, one might wish that it had been phrased in a more careful 
manner. There is no doubt that when courts confront proceedings 
involving a dispute over an international arbitral award they do 
not usually feel free to apply the full range of domestic public 
policy considerations to a non-domestic arbitral procedure. 
There is a widespread policy to uphold agreements to arbitrate 
by buttressing the resulting award. 12 ~ But to call this reluc-
tance to intervene an "international public policy" is a 
complete misnomer. 12b 
The New York Convention's public policy exception to 
enforcement relates explicitly to "the public policy of that 
124. 
125. 
126. 
See,~, Denis Coakley Ltd v. Societe Michel Reverdy, (23 July 1981; Cour d'appel de Reims), reprinted in (1984) 9 Y.B. Comm. Arb. 400 (France); and Arab Republic of Egypt v. S.P.P., (12 July 1984; Cour d'appel de Paris), reprinted in (1985) 10 Y.B. Comm. Arb. 113, 114 (France) (where the court found that an arbitral award had been rendered in violation of "international cultural public policy" and therefore refused enforcement). 
See,~, Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974), reprinted in (1974) 13 I.L.M. 974 (U.S.A.); and Rhone Mediterranee Co. v. Lauro, 712 F. 2d 50 (3d Cir. 1983) (U.S.A.). See also the discussion of Mirabito, The United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforce"=" ment of Foreign Arbitral Awards: The First Four Years (1975) 5 Ga J. Int'l & Comp. L. 471, 474, and supra, notes 31 and 32. 
See J. Lew, Applicable Law in International Commercial Arbitration: A Study in Commercial Arbitration Awards (1978) 533; and Matray, "Arbitrage et ordre public inter-national" in J. Schultsz & A. Van den Berg, The Art of Arbitration: Essays on International Arbitration Liber Amicorum Pieter Sanders 12 September 1912-1982 (1982). 
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country", i.e., where recognition and enforcement is sought. 
Sanders recognises this fact when referring to "fundamental 
conceptions of the legal order in the country concerned." 
Domestic courts may engage in a wise, self-impo sed restraint in 
order to reflect the "pro-enforcement bias" of the 1958 
Convention, but this does not amount to any new "internatio nal" 
public policy, for it would be almost impossible t o elaborate 
any content to such a policy. One arbitral award rendered u nder 
the auspices of the I.c.c. attempted to set out t h e sources of a 
supposed "international public policy". The arbitrato rs 
suggested that one should look to (a) usages of international 
commel'."ce; (b) 1'."ules of international arbitration and; (c) the 
lex mercatot"ia. 127 The existence of the last source is highly 
debatable, the "rules of inte rnational arbitration" are 
disparate and, as Julian Lew points out, there is not even any 
"clearly definable international commercial community" out of 
which coherent generalised "usage s" could be ext r apolated. 1 28 
The Aus trian Supreme Co urt was, there fore, wise in rejecting 
the very notion of an "international" public policy. 1 29 Such a 
"policy" is l'."eally nothing more than the restraint of domestic 
127. Framatome et al. v. Atomic Enel'."gy 01'."ganization of Iran, 
ICC Award o f 30 Apt"il 1982, [1984] Clunet 58, reprinted in 
(1983) 8 Y.B. Comm. Arb. 94 (translation). 
128. Lew, supl'."a, note 126, 586-7. 
129. Oberstet" Get"ichtshof [Supreme Cout"t], 11 May 1983, 
reprinted in (1985) 10 Y.B. Comm. Arb. 421 (Austria) (parties not indicated). 
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courts which refuse to apply narrow conceptions of public policy 
when asked to enforce an arbitral award arising in an interna-
tional context. 
Yet the central point of Professor Sanders and Mr Van den 
Berg's analysis remains valid and in it they are supported by 
the preponderant weight of authority: Domestic courts usually 
will not be willing to use the public policy provision of art. 
V{2){b) of the New York Convention to refuse enforcement of an 
arbitral award which is otherwise immune from attack. Domestic 
public policy in the enforcing jurisdiction is not likely to 
interfere with an arbitral award even when rendered under a 
delocalised procedure. Such restraint on the part of national 
courts meshes neatly with Professor Falk's conception of the 
ideal role of domestic courts in the interna tio nal legal 
process. Although national courts may be required to function 
as surrogates for a central authoritative judicial structure in 
the international community, "[t] he i mmediate objec ti ve is to 
make judicial outcomes in international law cases as indepe ndent 
as possible of the nationality of the adjudicating tribunal." 130 
By avoiding an over-precise application of public policy in the 
enforcement of non-domestic arbitral awards, national courts 
will help to create a common sta ndard independent of national 
idiosyncracies. 
130. Falk, supra, no te 15, xii. 
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Nevertheless, as an instrument of potential control, non-
enforcement on grounds of public policy remains available to 
correct extreme breaches of "basic notions of morality and 
justice". 
It is for this reason, as was discussed in Chapter 
Two, that the public policy of the country where an award is 
rendered should not be relevant to the validity o f an award. If 
outrageous procedural breaches have occurred, the ultimate 
sanction is the refusal of enforcement in a potential enforc i ng 
jurisdiction, The fact that even i n this c o ntext , domestic 
public policy is rarely invoked testifies t o t he generally high 
standards maintained by arbitrators. High standards should come 
as no surprise. Any adjudicati ve body which relies on the free 
will of the parties for its initial e x istence and its c o ntinued 
smooth operation will almost cert a inly attempt t o select o r 
create a system of procedural rules which is seen as being fai r 
by its clientele -- the parties to the dispute. Co urts at the 
situs of the arbitration will have no cause t o i mpose narrow 
concep ti o ns of public policy and courts in the enforcement 
jurisdiction, following the spirit of the New York Convention, 
will intervene only to sanction glaring breaches of procedural 
fairness. 1 31 
131. See, ~' the Parsons and Whitmore case, supra, note 115 
where a domestic court in the enforcing jurisdiction 
refused to apply d omestic public policy b roadly 
conceived -- to defeat the operation of an arbitra l a wa r d. 
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iv, The Sovereign Immunity Defence to Recognition and 
Enforcement of International Arbitral Awards 
No facet of international l aw has underg one such scrutiny 
and consequent modification during the last twe nty years as has 
the doctrine known as "sovereign i mmunity". 1 32 From a positi o n 
which acknowledged the absolute i mmunity of state s and state 
agencies from both suit and executi o n in fore i gn states, 1 33 
there has evolved a more fle x ible principle under which immunity 
is granted o nly after the requirements of a purposive test are 
met. States now are granted immunity, in most We stern leg al 
systems at least, only for trans a ctio ns invo lv i ng a ma nifesta-
tion of sovereignty and not for transactions o f a commercial 
nature. 134 
132, For an outstanding review o f the c o ntemporar y law o f sta te 
immunity, which includes a high ly s o phist i cated attempt t o 
seek out and illuminate first principles, see Crawford, 
International Law and Forei n Soverei ns: Distin uishin 
Immune Transactions 1983 54 Brit. Y.B. I n t L. Fo r 
a creative discussi o n of the o ften overlooked linkages 
between the issue s of sovereig n immunity a nd economic 
deve lopment, s ee Delaume, Ec o nomic Development and Sove -
reign Immunity (1985) 79 Am. J. Int'l L , 319. Finally , 
Professor Lillich has provided an excellent account of t h e 
historical development of the United States approach to 
sovereign immunity in Lillich, supra, note 15. 
133. See,~, The Parlement Belge ( 1880) P.D. 197 (U,K,); 
Rahimtoola v. Nizam of Hyderabad (1958] A.C. 379 (P.C, ) 
(U.K.); The Congo v. Ve nne (1971] S.C.R. 998 (Canada); a nd 
older editio ns o f Dicey and Morris,~, supra, no te 109, 126. 
134, State Immunity Act 1978, 1978 (U,K.), c. 33; European 
Convention on State Immunity (done 16 May 19 72), reprinted 
in (1972) 11 I.L.M. 470; United States, Foreign So vere ig n 
Immunities Act of 1976, 28 u.s.c. §1610(1) (Supp. 
(cont' d .} 
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The distinction between that which is commercial and t hat 
which manifests sovereignty is no t always easy to draw, a nd 
whether one should look at the "purpose" of a transaction or at 
its "nature" remains a moot point. 1 35 However, the tenor of 
recent developments in the field is such that one can argue with 
conviction that sovereign immunity will not no r mally be 
available as a defence to initial jurisdiction or to enforcement 
of an arbitral award rendered against a state. 
As far as immunity from suit is concerned , the position is 
clear. The submission of a state to arbitration is treated as 
an implicit waiver of jurisdictional immunity. 1 36 For that 
reason, the refusal of a state to participate in an arbitratio n 
to which it had formerly agreed is no t fatal to the arbitratio n. 
The proceedings can commence ex parte the st a t e . 137 The 
position concerning immunity from execution is somewhat more 
complicated. The New York Convention does not refer explicitly 
t o the doctrine of sovere ign immuni ty as a bar t o enforcement o f 
1982); I Congresso del Partido (1981] 3 W.L.R. 328 (H.L.) 
(U.K.); S.E.E.E. v. Yugoslavia, supra, note 100; and N.V. 
Cabolent v. National Iranian Oil Co. (28 November 1968; 
The Hague Court of Appeal), reprinted in (1970) 9 I.L.M. 
152 (The Netherlands). 
135. See,~' G. Delaume, Transnational Contracts: Applicable 
Law and Settlement of Disputes, re-issue (1985), Vol. II, 
Ch. 11, 30-1. 
136. Delaume, ibid., Vol. II, Ch. 14, 10. 
137. Ibid., 15. See,~' Libyan American Oil Co. v. The 
Government of the Libyan Arab Republic (Merit s ), decision 
of 12 April 1977, reprinted in (198I) 20 I.L.M. 1. 
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a non-domestic arbitral award, but it has been argued t hat art. 
V(2)(b), the public policy exception to enforcement, justi f ies a 
refusal to recognise and enforce a non-domestic award if 
sovereign immunity can be pleaded. Of course, in cases before 
municipal courts the issue of sovereign immunity will be pleaded 
with reference to the relevant national legislation, but fr om 
the perspective of international law, the state's authority to 
regulate such matters derives from a state's power to pursue its 
national public policy, That is why the public policy exception 
to enforcement was fully recognised in the New York Convention. 
The public policy exception has been dealt with in detail 
above 138 and, for present purposes, the argument can be phrased 
as follows, Whatever the theoretical justification for the 
doctrine of sovereign i mmunity, 13 ~ it is f o rmulated ultima t ely 
as an issue of public policy, Either for reasons of interna-
138. See, supra, text accompanying notes 105 t o 131. 
139. It has been suggested tha t there are at least two di stinc t 
theoretical f o undations for the doctrine of sovereign 
immunity. First, there is a justification founded upon 
principles of international law under which immunity for 
foreign sovereigns is "seen as a product of comity and 
respect for the dignity of personal rulers." The second , 
and more recent, justification for the do ctrine is t hat 
constitutional principles of executive independence (o r 
crown prerogative) require that the executive have a f ree 
hand in directing foreign affairs. Courts refrain from 
entering into disputes when such action might compromise 
the policies of the executive, The second justificatio n 
may relate more directly to the Ame~ican system of const i -
tutional law where the doctrine of the separation of 
powers is well entrenched, See Cohen, et al., The Iranian 
Hosta e A reement Under International and United State s 
Law (1981) 81(1) Col. L, Rev, 822. 
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tional comity 140 or of internal constitutional s t ructure, it i s 
believed that the courts should not complicate potentially 
sensitive foreign policy issue s by "interfering" to order execu-
tion against property vested in a foreign state. 
If this basic position is adopted, there are two ancillary 
complicating factors. First, it becomes necessary t o de l ve in t o 
the newly-important distinction between s o vereign acts (jure 
imperii) and commercial acts (jure gestionis). This difficulty 
was presented to the Tribunal de gra nd instance de Paris i n 
Procureur de la Republigue v. Societe LIAMCO. 141 In attempting 
to enforce an arbitral award rendered in LIAMCO's favour against 
the Libyan Arab Republic, the corporation sought to attach 
Libyan assets located in France. The French c o urt initially 
imposed an attachme nt order but th i s wa s chal lenge d by the 
French procureur general on the ground of Libyan sovereign 
140. Comity was the primary justificatio n used by the Tr i b unal 
de grande ins tance de Paris for its refusal to allow 
execution of an arbitral award where execution was sough t 
against Nigerian property located in France. See 
Procureur de la Republique v. S.A. Ipitrade Internatio nal 
(12 September 1978 ) , reprinted in (1979) 106 J. de dr. 
int'l 857, 858 (France). On almost identical facts, a n 
American court held that e xecution would be approp r ia t e . 
See infra, note 159 and accompanying t e xt. In any case, 
the French d e cision seems out of step with recent 
developments in other states where important centres of 
transnational arbitration are located. See infra, text 
accompanying notes 159-168. 
141. (5 March 1979; Tribunal de grande ins tance de Paris ) , 
reprinted in (1979) J. du dr. int'l 857 ( France). 
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immunity which was claimed to be absolute, 142 The Tribunal de 
grande instance did not endorse the doctrine of absolute 
sovereign immunity. Rather, it said that without investigation 
it was impossible to determine whether "sovereign" or "comme r-
cial" assets were being attached and it lifted the attachment 
orders pending the outcome of a court-supervised inquiry into 
the nature of the Libyan assets in France, The Court held that 
"la simple invocation d'un benefice relevant de l'ordre public 
interne et international est suffisante pour justifier la levee 
des mesures de contrainte que la Societe LIAMCO a pu dans un 
premier temps, envisager de prendre dans son interet propre." 14 3 
A settlement was concluded before the investigation of Libyan 
assets had been completed and it is impossible t o know under 
what circumstances the Court would have allowed attachment. It 
is clear, nevertheless, that the Court perceived the distinction 
between assets used for sovereign or for commercial purposes to 
be relevant. How such a distinction c an be drawn with any 
clarity, especially in a world divided by competing socio-
economic theories, is a difficult issue, one which was not 
142. The justification for absolute immunity was based, not on 
domestic constitutional considerations, but on notions of 
international comity. Ibid., 859. 
143. Ibid., 861: "The simple invocation of national or interna-
tional public policy is sufficient to justify the removal 
of the attachments that LIAMCO was granted at first 
instance to protect its own interests." [trans. by 
author]. 
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addressed by the Court. 144 
And yet the distinction retains great curre ncy. In t he 
United Kingdom State Immunity Act 1978, s. 13(4)(b), l4 S the 
legislator has allowed an exception to the general, and it will 
be argued outmoded, position that s overeign immunity will 
preclude enforcement against forei gn sta~e-owned p roperty 
located in the United Kingdom. 14 6 Section 13(4) provides for 
the issuance of process directed at property "wh ich is for the 
time being in use or i n tended for use for c ommercial purpo ses". 
In an important article, Lady Fox has criticise d the test, 
arguing that it is just as "unworkable" in this c o ntext as in 
the context of immunity from suit. 147 She has suggested t h at a 
144. B!rmann has suggested that "it will always be a matter of 
great diffi c ulty t o dis t ing ui s h be tween wha t a r e ca lled 
jus imperii and ius gestionis." B!rmann, "Limits of 
Arbitral Jurisdiction" in c. Schmitthoff, International 
Commercial Arbitration (1974-80) 40, 48. See also 
Schmitthoff, "Introduction" in c. Schmittho ff, Interna-
tional Commercial Arbitratio n (197 4-80) 1, 18. Pro f e sso r 
Simmonds has be e n more exp l ic i t in d r awing ou t t he c a uses 
o f this "grea t difficulty": " I suspec t t hat many o f us, 
whatever s ocio-eco nomic system we liv e under, would agree 
that to seek to define with clarity a 'commercial' act as 
opposed to an 'official' or 'sovereign' act, is bound t o 
result, in present world conditions, in an i ncreasingly 
subjective appraisal of foreign state trading activities". 
Simmonds, "Extraterritoriality and Arbitration Proce e d-
ings" in C. Schmitthoff, International Commercial Arbitra-
tion (1974-1980) 136, 140. 
145. State Immunity Act 1978, 1978 (U,K.), c. 33. 
146. See,~ the discussion in Alcorn Ltd v. Republic of 
Colombia (1984] 2 W.L.R, 750 (H,L,) (U,K, ) , 
147. Fox, Enforcement Jurisdiction, Foreign State Property and 
Diplomatic Immunity (198 5 ) 34 Int'l & Comp, L.Q. 115, 1 25. 
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bette r test wou l d be to investigate the origin of the property 
sought to be subject to execution rather than its "present use 
or future destination". 148 Any such reformulation is little 
more than a stop-gap measure which would still permit states to 
escape legitimately-imposed sanctions determined by an arbitral 
tribunal to which the state had submitted, presumably in good 
faith, A better answer is to remove the unfair protection of 
sovereign immunity from execution in almost all cases where a 
state has submitted to arbitration, an a~proach t h at will be 
elaborated upon below, 
The second distinction which also retains importance if 
sovereign immunity is treated as an aspect of public policy f or 
the purposes of the New York Convention is the generally 
irrelevant distinction between immunity from recogn ition and 
immunity from enforcement, In a sense, the justifications for 
this distinction are broadly similar to those that are thought 
to compel a distinction between immun i ty from suit and from 
execution; recognition, like a suit, does not require the use of 
force to compel performance of an obligation . Recognition is 
merely declaratory, The argument has been well put by Lady Fox 
who has emphasised that the distinction between immunity from 
suit and immunity from jurisdiction is "widely recognized and 
observed. " 14 9 She went on to assert that 
148. Ibid., 139. 
149, Ibid., 123. 
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[t]he basis of the distinction is entirely prac-
tical. Whereas a court proceeding leading to 
judgment may be conducted in the absence of the 
foreign State and produces no immediate hindrance 
to that State's conduct of its affairs, execution 
of the judgment involves, in the last resort, the 
use of force against a foreign State by the seizure 
of assets. 150 
That argument, although it may be eminently reasonable in the 
case of a court judgment, is less compelling in the context of 
arbitration to which a state has submitted voluntarily . The 
dispute resolution process of arbitration may be rendered 
illusory if a state can escape obligations it assumed voluntari-
ly. Moreover, because it is not a judgment of a state court 
that is being enforced, but that of a neutral arbitral tribunal, 
the issue of comity does not arise. One state is not sitting in 
judgment upon another. That is perhaps why enforcing courts 
will almost never grant immunity to assets of state trading 
agencies. It is clear in such cases that only commercial assets 
are involved and that comity is not a relevant consideration. 
Greater problems arise, however, c oncerning the enforcement of 
awards rendered against governments of states. 
The decision of the French Court in the LIAMCO case is 
once again of relevance. When the arbitral award was first 
brought to the Tribunal de grande instance de Paris, the 
President granted exequatur . 15 1 In other words, the award 
150. Ibid. 
151. Procureur de la Republigue v. Societe LIAMCO, supra, note 
141, 859. 
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itself was recognised as valid and binding. And yet, as has 
been discussed, the award was held subsequently to be unenforce-
able, at least against Libyan property dedicated to sovereign , 
as opposed to commercial, ends. In the context of sovereign 
immunity, the otherwise obsolete distinction between recognit i on 
and enforcement may be resurrected wi th the result that o ne 
cannot assume with confidence that a binding award resulting 
from the free agreement of the parties will be e nforceable. 
Delaume has expressed this concern forcefully: 
The rules regarding sove reign immunity from execu-
tion are in even greater d isarray t han tho se 
concerning immunity from suit. Certain legal 
systems continue t o deny execu t ion against the 
property of foreign states e ve n after rendition of 
a judgment or award against t he state involved. 
Other systems subject execution to prior approval 
by the executive branch of government. 1 52 
Delaume emphasises that d ispara te rules ma y lead t o "forum 
shopping" 153 and this sort of "disarray" reinforces his belief 
that only under the ICSID arbitration procedure can the f o reign 
private party hope t o ensure succes s ful enfo r c e ment of an a wa rd 
rendered against a state or sta t e instrumentality. 
Yet even the ICSID Convention does not settle the problem 
conclusively, for although it is true that a state party 
consents irrevocably in advance to treat a n ICSID award a s 
152. Delaume, Foreign Sovereign Immunity, supra, note 60, 45-6. 
See also the almost idential o bservation in Delaume, State 
Contracts, supra, note 99. 
153. Delaurne, supra, note 132, 340. 
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binding 1 ~~ and the state is for that reason unlikely to contest 
enforcement, the doctrine of sovereign immunity is not excluded 
from application in enforcement proceedings. 15 ~ The Cour 
d'appel de Paris has added a further wrinkle by holding that 
even when an ICSID award has been recognised by a French court, 
the court may nevertheless stipulate that execution against 
assets of a foreign state may be subject to prior authorization 
by the court. 156 It is clear that the ICSID Convention was not 
intended to prevent the invocation of sovereign immunity in the 
context of enforcement proceedings. In their Report on the 
Convention, the Executive Directors of the World Bank said 
plainly: 
154. 
The doctrine of sovereign immunity may prevent the 
forced execution in a State of judgments obtained 
against foreign States or a~ainst the State in 
which executio n is sought. 1 7 
ICSID Convention, supra, note 56. 
Foreign Sovereign Immunity, supra, 
Delaume, ibid., 343. 
Se e also Delaume, 
note 60, 38; and 
155. See Vuylsteke, supra, note 57, 360; and Luzzatto, supra, 
note 6, 99. 
156. Benvenuti & Bonfant Co. v. Government of the People's 
Republic of the Congo (6 June 1981; Cour d'appel de 
Paris), reprinted in (1981) 20 I.L.M. 878 (France), and 
see the Introductory Note by Delaume, at 877. 
157. International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 
Report of the Executive Directors on the Convention on the 
Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and 
Nationals of Other States (18 March 1965), reprinted in 
(1965) 4 I.L.M. 524, 530. Because the doctrine of 
sovereign immunity is not excluded in relation to enforce-
ment, Delaume has become a strong proponent of restrictive 
immunity, believing that it "can only contribute to giving 
(cont'd.) 
- 283 -
The answer to the problem of enforcement in the face of 
sovereign immunity claims is not to be found in the ICSID 
Convention. Delaume's response to this continuing problem is to 
suggest that parties to state contracts should "deal directly 
with issues of sovereign immunity by way of express stipulations 
in the contract." l:ia 
There exists, however, a more forceful response directed 
not to the parties (who would be prudent of course to take up 
Delaume's suggestion), but to national courts dealing with 
matters of enforcement. It is a response that has already been 
articulated by national courts themselves and reiterated by 
eminent , publicists. It is a response that, in the context of 
arbitrations between states and foreign private parties, makes 
it unnecessary to distinguish between im.rnunity from recognition 
and immunity from execution or between absolute and restrictive 
immunity. The response is simple and cogent: the enforcement of 
an arbitral award against the contracting state is not precluded 
by sovereign immunity, because the agreement to arbitrate 
constitutes a waiver of that immunity. 
a new practical significance to ICSID Awards." Delaume, 
ICSID Arbitration and the Courts (1983) 77 Am. J. Int'l L. 784, 800. 
158. Delaume, State Contracts, supra, note 99, 817. 
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The leading case is Ipitrade International S.A. v. Federal 
Republic of Nigeria, 159 where an American court held that a 
state's "agreement to adjudicate all disputes arising under t he 
contract in accordance with Swiss law and by arbitration under 
International Chamber of Commerce Rules constitutes a waiver of 
sovereign immunity" under the relevant United States legisla-
tion.160 There is nothing in the applicable sections of the 
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act 161 which renders this judicial 
decision a "cas d'esp~ce", Moreover, the Ipitrade decision by 
no means stands alone. Its principles have been followed in the 
United States by courts in Maritime International Nominees 
Establishment v. Republic of Guinea, 162 in Libyan American Oil 
Co, v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya 163 and in Birch 
159, 465 F. Supp. 824 (D.D.C, 1978), reprinted in (1978) 17 
I.L.M. 1395 (cited to F. Supp.] (U.S.A,). See also the 
much earlier case of Socobelge v . Greek State (1957) 18 
I ,L,R. 3 (Belgium), 
160, Ipitrade, ibid., 826. 
161. 28 u.s.c. §1605(a)(l), 
162. 505 F. Supp. 141 (D.D.C, 1981) (U.S,A,), 
163. 482 F. Supp. 1175 (D,D,C. 1980) (U.S,A,). This position, 
that agreement by a state to arbitration should amount to 
a waiver of sovereign immunity, was suppor t e d strenuously 
by the United States Government in its amicus curiae brief 
entered in the appeal of this case, an appeal that was 
withdrawn after settlement. See Brief for the United 
States as Arnicus Curiae in Libyan American Oil Co. v. 
Socialist Pea le's Lib an Arab Jamahir a (D.C.C,A. 1980, 
Nos 80-1207 and 80-1252), reprinted 1n (198 1 20 I.L.M, 161, 162. 
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Shipping Co. v. Embassy of the United Republic of Tanzania. 164 
Strikingly similar conclusions have been reached by courts in 
The Netherlands, 16 ~ Sweden 166 and, with an important caveat, in 
Switzerland. 16 7 
164. 507 F. Supp. 311 (1980) (U.S.A) [a case concerning 
garnishment of an Embassy bank account which manifests an 
approach radically different to that of the House of Lords 
in Alco~ Ltd. v. Republic of Colombia, supra, note 146). 
165 . See S.E.E.E. v. Yugoslavia, supra, note 100; and N.V. 
Cabolent v. National Iranian Oil Co., supra, note 134. 
166. Libyan American Oil Co. v. Socialist People's Arab 
Republic of Libya, supra, note 79. 
167. See the seminal case Republique Arabe Unie v. Dame X, 
(10 February 1960; Tribunal Federal), reprinted in (1961) 
55 Am. J. Int'l L. 167 (Switzerland). More recently, 
although the Swiss Federal Court in In re Socialist Arabic 
Popular Jamahiriya v. Libyan American Oil Co., supra, note 
80, 158-9, held that , on principle, where there is no 
immunity from suit (arbitra tio n) there is no immunity from 
execution, the Court went on to modify t he principle by 
holding that in order to gain execution in Switzerland it 
is "necessary that circumstances exist which tie the legal 
relationship to such an extent to Switzerland that it is 
justified to bring the f o reign state before Swiss authori-
ties." See also Kingdom of Greece v. Julius Bar & Co . 
(1960) 23 I.L.R. 195 (Switzerland). In LIAMCO, this 
caveat seemed to be based upon notions of public policy: 
"The interests of Switzerland do not require such a 
procedure [of enforcement]; they could, on the contrary, 
easily cause political and other difficulties ." For a 
discussion of the need for "jurisdictional links" in the 
context of West German law, see In re National Iranian Oil 
Co., Federal Constitutional Court , reprinted in (1984) 23 
I.L.M. 1281 (F.R. Germany). This type o f public policy 
objection to enforcement in the context of sovereign 
immunities was rejected expressly in a case parallel to 
the Swiss LIAMCO case by the Svea Court of Appeals in 
Sweden. See Libyan American Oil Co. v. Socialist People's 
Arab Republic of Libya, ibi9...!_, 895. The more general 
grounds for refusal to enforce based upon national public 
policy have been canvassed supra, tex t accompanying no t es 105 to 131. 
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The recent French case of Societe Europeenne d'ttudes et 
d'Entreprises c. Republique de Yougoslavie, lbb is consonant with 
the pro-enforcement position adopted in Ipitrade and like cases, 
but the Cour d'appel de Rauen utilised rather idiosyncratic and 
unfortunate reasoning. The Court did not hold simply that the 
agreement to arbitrate constituted a waiver of immunity for the 
purposes of enforcement. Rather, it reasoned that the state's 
agreement to arbitrate manifested its willingness to be treated 
like a private party. Because, moreover, the underlying 
transaction was entirely commercial, no immunity should be 
granted to the state. In other words, the Court retained the 
dichotomy between commercial and sovereign natures but instead 
of applying that test to the property against which enforcement 
was sought (the usual approach in enforcement cases), it applied 
the test to the underlying transaction (usually the approach 
when evaluating immunity from suit). With the greatest respect, 
the reasoning of the case is so confused as to s uggest that it 
may have been rendered per incuriam. Nevertheless, the central 
point remains that a French court has found that sovereign 
immunity does not necessarily preclude enforcement of a non-
domestic arbitral against the property of a state. 
The authoritative American, Dutch, Swedish and Swiss cases 
have encouraged distinguished scholars to conclude that a 
state's initial agreement to arbitrate now constitutes a 
168. (13 November 1984; Cour d'appel de Rouen), reprinted in 
(1985] Rev. de l'arb. 115 (No. 1) (France). 
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complete waiver of sovereign immunity, even at the stage 
of enforcement. In the words of Professor Bowett: 
[I)n most jurisdictions, a Sovereign State's agree-
ment to arbitrate is deemed to be a waiver of 
immunity for the purposes of arbitration and, in 
addition, the waiver is generally regarded as 
extendinq to enforcement and execution of any 
award. 1 6 "9 
Such an implied waiver is necessarily inferred from the consen-
sual nature of arbitrations arising out of state contracts and 
is an inverse corollary to the basis premise t hat "consent to 
arbitration excludes all other remedies." 170 If all other 
remedies are excluded , principles of justice and p lain common 
sense require that nothing should be allowed to defeat the 
intention of the parties to resol ve their differences through 
arbitration. For the same reason, the notion of "commercial" 
assets should be conceived of in an expansive sense, to allow 
enforcement against a broad range of state-owned property. Only 
when execution would interfere with an essential sovereign 
operation of a state should enforcement be refused, f o r here the 
principle of comity has its strongest claim to relevance. 
169. Bowett, Contemporary Developments in Legal Techniques in 
the Settlement of Disputes (1983) 180 Ree. des cours 169, 
220. See also Luzzatto, supra, note 6, 93; Perlman & 
Nelson, New Approaches to the Resolution of International 
Commercial Disputes (1983) 17 Int'l Law. 215, 230; and 
Feldman, Waiver of Foreign Sovereign Immunity by Agreement 
to Arbitrate: Legislation Proposed by the American Bar 
Association (1985) 40 Arb. J. 24 (No. 1). 
170. Luzzatto, ibid., 93. 
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If, after agreeing to submit to the exclusive jurisdiction 
of an arbitral tribunal, a state c o uld effectively prevent 
enforcement of an award by a claim of sovereign immunity, t he 
manifest intention of the parties at the time of the conclusion 
of the agreement to arbitrate would be destroyed. 
It should be 
noted that this analysis is not based upon the notion of 
implicit submission to state courts by virtue of the agreement 
to arbitrate. The relevant fact is simply submission to 
impartial, third party adjudication. 
It matters not whether t h e 
particular arbitration to which a state agrees is procedurally 
rooted in the law of a state or is ttdelocalisedtt. The analysis 
holds true in each case. By submitting to third -party adjudica-
tion, a state must be presumed to have consented to the means of 
enforcement that are necessary t o bring an award into effect. 
Otherwise, the initial agreement t o arbitrate is vitiated. 
Sovereign immunity should not be allowed and commonly is not 
allowed to operate under the rubric of public policy to preven t 
enforcement of a no n-domestic arbitral award unde r the Ne w York 
Convention. 
v. The Act of State Defence to Recognition and 
Enforcement of International Arbitral Awards 
It should be s a id at the outset that good s e nse al o ne 
should suggest that the Act of State Doctrine has no place in 
any catalogue of defences to enforcement of non-domestic 
arbitral awards under the 1958 Convention. The only r e as o n t hat 
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it is being discussed here is that in 1980 a United States 
Federal District Court for the District of Columbia rendered a 
very odd decision. In Libyan American Oil Co. v. Socialist 
People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 171 the court ruled out any 
application of the doctrine of sovereign immunity. It went on 
to decide, however, that enforcement of a non-domestic award 
could be prevented under art. V(2)(a) of the New York Conven-
tion. 172 The court suggested that the "subject matter of the 
difference" was "not capable of settlement by arbitration" 
because the American court could not itself have ordered arbi-
tration at the outset. And why not? "[B]ecause in so doing it 
would have been compelled to rule on the validity of the Libyan 
nationalization law" 173 which, of course, constituted an act of 
state. It is difficult to know where to begin a discussion of 
such tortured reasoning. 
First, it might be helpful to review, in broad outline, 
the history and theory that lies beh ind the contemporary Act of 
State Doctrine. The most'authoritative recent review of the 
development of the doc trine is to be found in Lord Wilberforce's 
171. Supra, note 163. 
172. The Convention is cited supra, note 1. 
"Art. V(2) Recognition and enforcement of an 
arbitral award may also be refused if the 
competent authority in the country where recog-
nition and enforcement is sought finds that: 
(a) The subject matter of the differe nce is not 
capable of settlement by arbitration under 
the law of that country •.. ". 
173. Supra, note 163, 1178. 
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magisterial House of Lords speech in Buttes Gas and Oil Co. v. 
Hammer. 174 In his Lordship's view, the doctrine originated in 
the English Courts, specifically in the case of the Duke of 
Brunswick v. King of Hanover, 17 ~ but was "adopted and general-
ised in the law of the United States," l?b As re-phrased by the 
United States Supreme Court in the la~e nineteenth-century, the 
doctrine was formulated as follows: 
Every sovereign state is bound to ·respect the 
independence of every other sovereign state, and 
the courts of one country will not sit in judgment 
on the acts of the government of another done with-
in its own territory,17? 
More recently, the Supreme Court of the United States has 
modulated the rigid tone of the doctrine as stated by its 
nineteenth-century forbears by refusing to lay down or to 
reaffirm "an all-encompassing rule." 178 The more flexible 
approach has attained wide currency in other United States 
courts, In National American Corp. v. Federal Republic of 
174. (1981] 1 W,L,R, 787 (H,L,) ( U. K,) , 
175, (1844) 6 Beav, l, (1848) 2 H,L, Cas , 1 (U.K , ), 
176. Supra, note 174, 804. 
177, Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250 (1897) ~ Fuller 
C,J, (U,S,A.), 
178, Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 367 u.s. 398 (1964), 
11 L.ed. 2d 804, reprinted in (1968) 7 I.L.M, 22 and 460 
[hereinafter Sabbatino; cited to L,ed.J 824 (U.S,A.). 
Nevertheless, the end result of the Sabbatino case was 
classically rigorous: the Court held, at 825, that "the 
act of state doctrine is app l icable even if international 
law has been violated" by the action of the state. Any 
violation of international law was not directed against an 
individual but against a state, The individual had no 
standing to raise the issue. 
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Nigeria, a Federal District Court pointed out that the Act of 
State Doctrine should not be viewed as a "talisman" affording 
"blanket protection" from all consequences flowing from any 
particular state action.17 9 
Traditionally, there have been a number of theoretical 
justifications advanced to uphold the Act of State Doctrine. 
The first justification was based upon principles of comity in 
international law. It was somehow improper, if not dangerous, 
to call into question t h e acts of a foreign sovereign. To do so 
would be to undercut the very idea of national sovereignty , the 
linchpin of the existing international legal system. This 
explanation is now largely discredited, at least so far as it 
implied any binding rule of judicial deference t o all acts of 
foreign states. 180 The second just ifica tion related to concepts 
of private international law whereunder a court would refuse to 
review transactions which were better evaluated by the local 
law, even if the transactions contravened the law or public 
policy of the forum. This justific ation was re jected by the 
U.S. Supreme Court in the Sabbatino case. 181 A third explana-
179. 448 F. Supp. 622 (S .D.N. Y. 1978), reprinted in (1978) 17 
I.L,M. 1407 (U.S.A.) [cited to I.L.M,) 1414. 
180. Zander, The Act of State Doctrine (1959) 53 Am. J, Int'l 
L. 826, 837. 
181, See the analysis of Longo, Limiting the Act of State 
Doctrine:~ Legislative Initiative (1982) 23 Va J. Int'l 
L. 103, 108-13. See also Henkin, Act of State Today: 
Recollections in Tranquility (1967) 6 Col. J, Trans. L. 
175, 178 for a lucid review of basic conflicts principles 
affecting analysis in this area. 
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tion for the doctrine is grounded in domestic constitutional 
law, specifically in the relationship between the executive and 
the judiciary, and owes its existence largely to the U.S. 
doctrine of the separation of powers. 182 It has been argued 
that the courts should refuse to review any act of a foreign 
sovereign state, for such a review could compromise foreign 
policy objectives which can be pursued legitimately only by the 
executive, 183 
It is apparent that the justifications advanced in support 
of the Act of State Doctrine are remarkably sim i lar to those put 
forward to shore up the old theory of absolute sovereign 
immunity. 184 The two concepts can, however, be distinguished. 
Absolute sovereign immunity is a claim that a national court 
cannot exert in personam jurisdiction over a foreign sovereign. 
Act of State is a denial of jurisdiction ratione materii 
relating to a specific challenged act of a foreign state. 
Despite this distinction, it would be fair to say that, just as 
restrictive immunity has replaced absolute immunity, a more 
restricted formulation of the Act of State Doctrine has now come 
into vogue. 
182. See,~' Fraser, Adjudicating Acts of State in Suits 
A ainst Forei n Soverei ns: A Political Question Analysis 
(1983) 51 Fordham L, Rev, 722, 722-3. 
183. See,~, the doctrinal review undertaken by Fuller C.J. 
in the Sabbatino case, supra, note 178, 821. See also the 
review of older Supreme Court doctrine undertaken by 
Pavlis, supra, note 32, 77-8. 
184, See Zander, supra, note 180, 850-1. 
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The contemporary grounding of the Act of State Doctrine 
is, in a sense, a modified combination of the olde r interna-
tional law and constitutional law justifications. The U.S. 
Supreme Court held expressly that the doctrine was "compelled by 
neither international law nor the Constitution, its continuing 
validity depends on its capacity to reflect the proper distribu-
tion of functions between the judicial and political branches of 
the Government on matters bearing upon foreign affairs." 185 In 
Buttes Gas and Oil, 186 the House of Lords carried this flexible 
approach one step further and, with an uncharac teristic borrow-
ing from recent United States Circuit Court case law, held that 
the Act of State Doctrine could be justified in the most simple 
terms: courts should refuse to render judgment on acts of 
foreign states when there are "no judicial or manageable 
standards by which to judge" in a domestic court t he issues 
presented. 181 If there are manageable judicial standards t o 
enable a court to evaluate state conduct -- standards which may 
be derived, presumably, from international custom as well as 
from express treaty commitments -- a national court is under no 
obligation to refuse to review a foreign act of state. 
185. Sabbatino, sut;ra, note 178, 823 [emphasis added], See 
also Zander, ibid., 834; and Cohen, et al., supra, note 139, 871. ~~ 
186. Supra, note 174. 
187. Ibid,, 810, 
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It should be pointed out that even express treaty provi-
sions will not always be enough to ensure that a court will find 
justiciable standards. In Kalamazoo Spice Extraction Co. v. The 
Provisional Military Government of Socialist Ethiopia, 188 the 
court of first instance held that the provision for "just 
compensation" after nationalisation found in a U.S.-Ethiopian 
treaty of amity was so vague that it could not fall within the 
so-called "treaty" exception to the Act of State Doctrine , 
whereunder the act of a foreign government can be evaluated by 
U.S. courts if they are so authorized by an applicable treaty. 
With respect, this decision exemplified extreme judicial 
timidity, probably based upon an unfamiliarity with the subject 
matter. 189 It was wisely reversed by the Sixth Circuit Court of 
Appeals 190 which held that the rele vant treaty provided an 
adequate standard by which to litigate the issues . The case was 
remanded to the District Court for further deliberations. 191 
188. Kalamazoo Spice Extraction Co . v. Provisional Military 
Government of Socialist Ethiopia, 543 F. Supp . 1224 (W.D. 
Mich. 1982) (U.S,A,). 
189. Courts in the Western District of Michigan could not be 
expected to possess the same expertise in international 
commercial case as, for example, courts in New York. 
190. Kalamazoo S ice Extraction Co. v. Provisional Military 
overnment o Socia 1st Et 1opia, 729 F. 2d 422 (6th Cir, 1984) (U.S.A.). 
191. Upon remand, the Government of Ethiopia moved to have the 
case dismissed on the grounds (a) that the Court lacked 
subject matter jurisdiction; (b) that the Treaty of Amity 
and Economic Relations deprived the Court of authority to 
hear the case; (c) that the Court lacked personal 
(cont'd.) 
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In Buttes Gas and Oil, the House of Lords held that o n t h e 
facts the Act of State Doctrine did apply. I n trying the actio n 
for damages before it, a United Kingdom c o urt would have been 
compelled to rule on a counterclaim alleging conspiracy to 
defraud involving the procurement through bri bery and influence-
peddling of various acts of foreign states. Ind eed, the major 
issue concerned a maritime boundary dispute between Sharjah and 
Umm-al-Qaiwain. According to Lord Wilberforce, such facts "have 
only to be stated to compel the conclusion that these are no t 
issues upon which a municipal c o urt can pass." 19 2 In the end , 
Lord Wilberforce's real concern may have been more with judicial 
propriety than with the absence of c lear standards. It wo uld 
simply be improper for a court t o question the c onduct of 
foreign government officials when no c lear inte rna t i o na l 
standards of conduct had been elabora ted. Ne vertheless, t he 
central point remains, that in Buttes Gas and Oil, the Act o f 
State Doctrine was defined most narro wly, not as a general r u le 
of international law, but as rule based upo n t he actual 
inability of a court to define proper judicial standards of 
evaluation. 
jurisdiction over Ethiopia; and (d) that the venue was not 
proper. This preliminary motion was dismissed. Kalamazoo 
Spice Extraction Co. v. Provisional Military Government o f 
Socialist Ethiopia, 616 F. Supp. 660 (D.C. Mich. 198 5) (U.S.A.). 
192. Supra, note 174, 810. 
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With this contemporary test for the application of the Act 
of State Doctrine in mind, it is now possible to assess more 
fully the decision of the United States court in the LIAMCO 
case. 193 First, it may be asked if there is any determination 
involved in an application for enforcement of a non-domestic 
arbitral award that would require a court to decide issues 
without any "judicial or manageable standards." Clearly, courts 
in Sweden, France and The Netherlands, and other u.s. courts, 
h f d d . ff. 1 . d. . h d d l 9 4 ave oun no 1 1cu ty 1n 1scover1ng sue stan ar s. The 
difficulty perceived by the U.S . Federal District Court was that 
it felt itself obliged to rule on the underlying issue of the 
Libyan nationalisation of the American oil company, 19 ~ or, to 
put it more precisely, the Court believed that it would have had 
to rule upon that issue if it had been asked at the outset to 
compel arbitration, 
This reasoning is, with respect, faulty. Although 
nationalisation may very well amount to an act of state, the 
Court was simply not required (or asked) to rule on that matter . 
Indeed, it need never have dealt with the issue, for even if it 
had been asked to enforce an arbitral clause (as opposed to 
------- ---- -
193. Supra, note 171. 
194. See the cases cited, supra, notes 159, 162, 165 and 166 
where courts enforced non-domestic arbitral awards 
involving states without concerning themselves with the 
Act of State Doctrine. They felt perfectly able to apply judicial and manageable standards. 
195. LIAMCO, supra, note 163, 1178. 
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enforcement of the subsequent award ) , the Court need only have 
examined the validity oE the contractual agreement to arbitrate. 
To do so would not have required any ruling upon the national-
isation which brought the clause into operation. An argument 
might be advanced that to enforce the arbitral clause, the Court 
would be forced to determine whether or not the clause was meant 
to cover the case of nationalisation or only lesser breaches of 
contract, but such an argument could not really be made in all 
honesty because it is quite impossible to imagine a modern 
concession or investment agreement containing an arbitral clause 
that would not cover the case of nationalisation. Seizure of 
assets is the most obvious risk faced by a foreign investor. To 
exclude that risk from the ambit of an arbitration clause would 
require an express stipulation. In any case, even if a national 
court felt compelled to determine the ambit of an arbitral 
clause, the issue would still not be the act of state per se but 
the interpretation of the clause, and it is generally conceded 
that arbitrators are fully capable of interpreting their own 
jurisdiction. Any egregious error in that regard can be 
sanctioned through the vehicle of public policy at the time of 
an application for enforcement. The interposition of arguments 
relating to Act oE S t ate is unnecessary and merely confusing. 
It was clear in the instant case that Libya and LIAMCO had 
agreed in the concession contract to resolve major disputes by 
resorting to arbitration. Once the award was rendered, there 
was no question of a court in the United States having to 
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evaluate the legality of the Libyan nationalisation decrees . 
That issue had been settled by arbitration -- the means of 
dispute resolution chosen expressly by the parties to the under-
lying contract. 
In performing the function of recognition and 
enforcement, a court ttdoes not adjudicate the validity of the 
foreign governmental act. tt 196 Moreover, there was no pecu-
liarity in the Libya-LIAMCO concession agreement that made 
disputes arising under that contract inherently incapable of 
settlement by arbitration as the process is conceived in U. S. 
law. 
If the parties have agreed to arbitration, that agreement 
can be acted upon and a resulting award should be enforced. 
That simple statement reflects the spirit of the New York 
Convention, a spirit founded upon the governing principle of 
ttrepose". The decision of the Federal District Court in the 
LIAMCO case ignored that spirit by patently misapplying art . 
V(2)(a) and by refusing to enforce a binding arbitral award . 
The decision was, quite simply, wrong, and it is for this reason 
a pity that a settlement was reached before a Federal Circuit 
Court of Appeal could correct the error of the trial court. 197 
It should be pointed out, however, that the decision of the 
Federal Dist r ict Court was vacated at the request of the United 
196. Pavlis, supra, note 32, 81. 
197. The United States Government was plainly convinced that 
the District Court judgment had offended the letter and 
soirit of the New York Convention . See the Brief for the 
U~ited States as Amicus Curiae, supra, note 163, which was 
submitted in the abortive appellate proceedings in the 
LIAMCO case. 
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States Government, so the decision retains no authoritative 
value. 198 
Further consolation may be found in the fact that the 
LIAMCO case stands very much in isolation and, as Professor 
Bowett has observed , 
[o]ne can see that courts will be reluctant to 
accept this plea of act of State as a bar to 
enforcement of an arbitral award. For, if immunity 
has been waived by the agreement to arbitrate, to 
allow a State to avoid execution of the arbitral 
award by relying on the act of State doctrine is, 
in a sense, to rely on the same 'sovereignty' to 
escape from the arbitral award. 199 
If a state submits voluntarily to arbitration in a consensual 
arrangement with a foreign private party, there is no rule of 
international law or, generally, of domestic legal systems, 
which would require courts to deny their in personam enforcement 
jurisdiction under the d octrine of sovereign immunity or their 
subject-matter jurisdiction under the Act of State Doctrine. No 
public policy of the forum or inherent incapacity should cause 
national courts to invoke either doctrine to preclude enforce-
ment of a non-domestic arbitral award under the New York Conven-
tion. 
198. Vacated without opinion at 684 F. 2d 1032 (D.C. C.A. 
1981) (U.S.A,). 
199. Bowett, supra, note 169, 221. 
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D. Remedies Available to International Arbitral Tribunals 
From the foregoing review of the legal reg i me estab lish e d 
by the New York Convention, it e~erges that arbitral awards 
rendered under a ttdelocalisedtt procedure are fully capable of 
enforcement. No specific provision of, nor general policy 
enunciated expressly in, the Conventio n signals its non-
applicability to delocalised awards. But an enquiry c o ncerning 
recognition and enforcement of arb itral awards would be peremp-
tory if it were to end with that straightforward conclusion, f o r 
parties to arbitrations resulting from state c o ntracts may no t 
wish to rely solely on the enfo r c ement possibilities prese nted 
by the 1958 Convention. Parties may seek to desig n institu-
tional methods by which awards can be enforced without reg ard t o 
any state legal system. Such methods will be disc us sed in t he 
next Chapter. Even if enforcement in a national jurisdictio n is 
ultimately required, however, it is important to examine the 
issue of enforcement from a broader perspective, by investigat-
ing the remedies tha t may be o rdered by arbitral tribunals. 
These remedies are collectively what is sought to be enforced. 
To discuss the mechanism of enforcement without reference to 
content would present a clouded picture, especially in light o f 
the fa c t that the autono my o f arb itral tribunals is recognised 
increasingly by national courts, meaning that arbitral remedies 
are often exclusive of any other form of relief. 
It is surprising ho w little atte ntion has bee n paid by 
academic commentato rs t o the i ss ue of arbitra l remedi e s. In o ne 
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of the very few recent studies of t he subject, the author under-
took her project by asking the disarming questi on , "Is There An 
International Law of Remedies?" 20 0 Her respo nse was nega ti ve . 
In his leading textbook on international law, Pro fessor Brownl ie 
devotes seven-and-a-half pages to t h e topic o f "rep aration " a nd 
this is discussed solely within t he framewo rk o f "state respo n-
sibility", with primary emphasi s plac e d upo n c ompensatio n for 
"wrongs" committed by states. In his separate d iscussion of 
"Injury to Persons and Property of Al i ens", Brownlie's treatme nt 
of compensation is focussed almost entirely upon t he general 
question whethe r o r not international law pro vide s f o r a 
"national" or "internatio nal minimum" standard o f compensatio n. 
No discussion of the a ppropriateness o f part i cula r arbitral 
remedies is undertaken. 20 1 Professor O'Co nnell's textbook 2 u 2 
c ontains an entire chapte r on c o ntrac t s and state responsi-
bility, emphasising problems invol v ing contracts between state s 
and foreign private parti e s, but eve n here the d isc ussion of 
remedies is ancillary , s e ri o us c o nsiderat ion be ing give n only t o 
the qu e stion of interna tional law guarantees concerning specific 
performance versus damages in the case of contractual breach . 2U3 
200. Gray, Is There An Internatio nal Law of Remedi e s? ( 19 86 ) 56 
Brit. Y.B. Int'l L. (forthcoming). 
201. I. Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, 3d 
ed. (1979) 457-64, and 518 et se q . 
202. D. O'Connell, International Law ( 1970) 976. 
203, Ibid., 997. 
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In neither wo rk is attention paid to the measure o f damages or 
to other significant issues in remedies, such a s possibilities 
for granting provisional relie f . Wh ethe r or not it is a ppro -
priate for international arbitral tribunals t o app ly remedial 
standards which have e volved in the municipal law context is a 
question which is not even broached. Indeed, Bro wnlie state s 
quite categorically t hat "[i]n the ordinary type o f claim t he 
object is similar to that of an actio~ in the mu n icipal 
sphere." 204 One may well ask if t hat evaluation is correct i n 
the context of arbitrations arising out of state contracts. 
Most of the major state contrac t a rbitrati ons in recent 
years have resulted from fact patterns involving "national isa-
tion" of foreign-owned business enterprises, a nd although 
arbitrations resulting f r om o ther types o f fact p atterns ca n 
e a sily be imagine d, the "natio nalisatio n" setting provides t he 
most common state-private party arbitral experience to date. 
Such nationalisations may not be equated with mere breach o f 
contract but are be t t er ana l ysed a s a mas sive rep udiat ion of an 
entire legal and socio-political relationship. If it becomes 
necessary for a state to espouse the claim of its national, the 
violation of state contracts by t h e respondent gove rnment would 
be treated in international law no t as a c o ntrac tual breach , but 
as a refusal to accord appropriate protection to foreign 
nationals, a tortious or delictual act. Liability would then be 
---------- ---
204. Brownl i e, supra , no t e 20 1 , 4 58. 
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evaluated on the basis of such an "international wrong'' which 
might require the incorporation of contractual and delictual 
principles of damage assessment. 205 Clearly, in the interna-
tional context, it is not possible to establish a rigid dicho-
tomy between a contractual breach and a tortious or delictual 
act, 
The first tends to run into the latter, a fact which makes 
it very difficult to apply municipal law principles to interna-
tional cases. 
It may be best to view international remedies as 
a unified field, without explicit subdivisions. A party whose 
undertaking has been nationalised, for example, will seek 
compensation for contractual breach, for the loss of real and 
personal property, and possibly for damage suffered because of 
the wrongful acts of the expropriating state. It is probably 
impossible to establish distinct heads of damages with any 
coherence. 
Moreover, when a breach of a state contract is alleged, 
the resulting claims may contain a large "political" component. 
From the perspective of the foreign corporation which has seen 
its real and personal (immovable and movable) property 
"patriated" by the host state, and has seen its contractual 
rights devastated, a claim may have a double purpose. Obvious-
ly, there is a desire for economic compensation, but there may 
also be an attempt to ensure that an award is so favourable as 
to encourage voluntary compliance or negotiated settlement. A 
205. See M. Whiteman, Damages in International Law (1936), Vol. 
III, 1579, 
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strongly-worded award which aligns the equities with the foreign 
corporation may also be used as a lever by the corporation to 
encourage its own national government to espouse a claim if 
compliance is refused. The state which nationalises foreign-
owned industrial property is also likely to invest an arbitra-
tion with an important political function. Nationalisation is a 
political as well as an economic act which may be undertaken at 
least partly in an effort to advance an internal political 
d 
, 2 LJ 6 agen a or even for reasons of national pride and prestige. 
It may be felt that the very possibility of national survival is 
at stake: 
An example is Cuba, which has $1.8 billion in 
claims pending before the settlement commission. 
This is well beyond any capacity to pay. Its 
perception was that it needed to transform the 
country by eliminating foreign ownership. If this 
had been perceived in terms of paying $1.8 billion 
there would have been no nationalizations. In 
their view, it was a choice between nationalization 
206. See,~, the collection of Documents and Legislation 
Concerning Expropriation of La Brea and Pa rinas Oilfield s 
in Peru (1922-68), reprinte d in (1968) 7 I.L.M. 1202. One 
can sense the enormous political impact of nationalisation 
and its emotional power in the following words of Dr 
Allende, then President of Chile: 
It is easy to pronounce the word 'nationalization', 
and it might be a good banner for political agitation. 
But to carry out a policy of nationaliza tion of 
natural resources requires an attitude by the nation 
of continued determination, a high l e vel of perfor-
mance and intelligence. Economic independence, as 
well as political independence, is not gained through 
mere words, but by work and effort, and excelling at 
all levels. 
Chile. President Allende's Statement on Negotiations for 
Government Acquisition of Anaconda Co. Properties (26 J une 
1969), reprinted in (1969) 8 I.L.M. 1073, 1077. 
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without compe nsation, or starvation. The y chose t o 
nationalize, wh ich was an en t irely ratio na l and 
necessary act from Cuba's pe r s pective, Ameri c an 
investors had been there si nce 19 00 ea r n ing great 
profits which had long since been r emoved f rom t he 
island. Foreign inve~tors, now as in 1900, have to 
take their chances. 201 
The nationalising state will seek an independent benediction f o r 
its policy, or it may refuse to participate in an arb itration , 
believing that its s o vereignty is u nder threa t. An arbitral 
tribunal, in deciding upon remedies, may find itself bala nci ng 
its concept of justice against harsh external realities. 208 
Needless to say, these consideration s will no t ope r ate in t he 
typical action "in the municipa l sphere". 
To determine the remedies that are available t o any gi ve n 
arbitral tribunal, one must look both to the rules (be they 
municipal, institutiona l or ad hoe) under whi ch t h e tri b u nal 
ope rate s a nd to any specific arrangement of the parties subm it-
ting the dispute to the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribu-
207. Rabinowitz, Remarks, (1983) 77 Proc. Am. Soc. Int'l L. 343. 
208. For an example of what may hap pen when an arbitral tribu -
nal igno res the political realities that c o nfront it, an 
example drawn admittedly from a state-state a r bitrati o n, 
s e e the Beagle Channel Arbitration (Arg entina v. Chile), 
reprinted in (1978) 17 I.L.M. 632, 738 and 1198, The 
award in that arbitration was simply ignored by the dis-
satisfied party and no successful resolution of the terri-
torial dispute was achieved until early in 1985, after a 
new effort at negotiations employ ing the g ood offices o f the Pope. 
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nal. 209 If the potential remedies are not listed or in any way 
limited by express agreement, the arbitral tribunal will have to 
choose the remedies that it feels are available and appro-
priate. 210 
The major institutional systems of arbitral rules do not 
circumscribe the remedies available to tribunals set up under 
their auspices. 
Indeed, in none of the most important systems 
of rules is any listing of potential remedies undertaken . Reme-
dies are regulated only obliquely, by reference to the clause 
prescribing the substantive law to govern disputes. In the 
Rules of the International Chamber of Commerce, t he parties are 
left free to determine the substantive law "to be applied by the 
arbitrator to the merits of the dispute", but in the absence of 
any indication of choice, the arbitrator retains the power to 
designate the proper law "by the rule of conflict which he deems 
apprbpriate." 211 Remedies will thus be determined by the 
substantive law chosen by the parties or the arbitrator. The 
209. In Ad hoe arrangements, there may be only one source of 
remedial power -- the agreement of the parties which both 
creates the tribunal and sets the matters in dispute before it. 
210. These remedies may be found in municipal law, interna -
tional law, or in general principles of law depending upon 
the approach taken by the tribunal to the issue what 
substantive law governs the contractual relationship 
between the parties. See supra, Chapter II . 
211. International Chamber of Commerce, Rules of Conciliation 
and Arbitration, reprinted in (1976) 1 Y. B . Comm. Arb. 157, art. 13(3;. 
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UNCITRAL Rules of Arbitration are to the same effect, 21 L as are 
the rules of the Inter-American Arbitration Commiss ionL 13 and of 
the International Arb itration Centre of the London Court o f 
Arbitration, 214 both of which are modelled upon the UNCITRAL 
system. The set of arbitral rules promulgated by the Eastern 
European CMEA countries also contains no express limitation upon 
the remedies available to arbitral tribunals. 21 ~ 
No matter what substantive law is held to apply to a 
particular arbitration, whether institutional or ad hoe, Greig 
is certainly correct in stating that "[i]n most cases heard 
before international tribunals the appropriate remedy is an 
award of damages." 216 Although , in theory, restitutio in 
integram is the primary international remedy to compensate for 
212. UNCITRAL, Arbitration Rules, reprinted in (1977) 2 Y.B. 
Comm. Arb. 161, art. 33,l. 
213. Inter-American Commercial Arbitration Commission, Rules of 
Procedure, reprinted in (1978) 3 Y.B. Comm . Arb. 231, art. 33 .1. 
214. London Court of Arbitration, International Arbitration 
Centre, International Arbitration Rules (1982) 7 Y.B. 
Comm. Arb, 223, art. 13. 
215. CMEA, Uniform Rules of Procedure in the Arbitration Courts 
at the Chambers of Commerce, reprinted in (1976) 1 Y. B . Comrrt. Arb. 14 7. 
216. D.W. Greig, International Law, 2d ed. (1976) 596. Greig, 
in referring to tt1nternat1onal tribunals", was of course 
contemplating the traditional tribunal adjudicating state 
or state-espoused claim~, but the basic point applies 
equally to contemporary arbitrations between states and 
foreign private parties. 
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the commission of an illegal act, 217 in the transnational 
context, such a remedy will often be inappropriate or illusory . 
~oreover, even traditional international law did not view 
specific performance as the appropriate means to provide 
restitution in cases of lawful expropr iation. 218 
Because of the important political element in many 
arbitrations involving states and foreign private parties, it is 
not at all likely that an arbitral tribunal will seek to order 
any remedy which might impinge upon t he sovereign power of a 
state to regulate and control its own territory and natural 
resources. 219 For example, in a dispute involving an oi l 
concession, despite the v iews of Prof. Dupuy expressed in the 
TOPCO arbitration, 22 0 it is highly inappropriate for an arbitral 
217. See, ~, Case Concerning the Factory at Chorzow 
(Indemnity Merits) P.C.I.J., Ser. A., No. 13 (1928) 47. 
218. Ibid. 
219. This sovereign power has been clar ified and forcefu lly 
re-asserted in recent years. See, e.g., Declaration on 
Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural l<esources, UNGA Res. 
1803, 17 UNGAOR, Supp. (No. 17) 15, U.N. Doc. A/5217 
(1962); Declaration on the Establishment of a New 
International Economic Order, UNGA Res. 3201, 6 (Special) 
UNGAOR, Supp. (No. 1) 3, U.N. Doc. A/9559 (1974); Charter 
of Economic Rights and Dutie s of States , UNGA Res. 3281, 
29 UNGAOR, Supp. (No. 29) (1974); a~d Ar§chaga, State 
Responsibility for the Nationalization of Foreign Owned 
Property (1978) 11 N.Y.U.J. Int'l L. & Pol. 179. 
220. Texaco Overseas Petroleum Co. and California As iatic Oil 
Co. v. The Government of the Libyan Arab R~bli_£ 
(Merits), decision of 19 January 1977, reprinted in 53 
I.L.R. 389, 422 (1979) at 511. 
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tribunal to order specific performance. 221 Money damages are a 
far less politically sensitive remedy. 
In awards rendered against a state it wo uld appear that 
the preferred method of compensation is monetary damages. This 
approach accords with the position of the common law which 
prefers the awarding of money damages to orders for specifi c 
performance because "enforced performance may be thought to 
impose strains on the machinery of law enforcement which are too 
severe when balanced against the benefit derived by the creditor 
from enforced performance. 11222 A fortiori is this the case in 
international law where enforcing specific performance against a 
state would cause enormous strains upon the limited enforcement 
mechanisms available to the international community. It is, of 
course, entirely possible for an arbitral tribunal to order 
specific performance against a foreign private party, for in 
such a case the political and enforcement difficulties would not 
be as serious. Specific performance could be a viab le remedial 
221. See, e.g., Libyan American Oil Co. v. The Government of 
the Libyan Arab~ublic (Merits), decision of 12 April 
1977, reprinted in (1981) 20 I.L.M. 1, 66-7; and B.P. 
Exploration Co. (Libya) v. Government of the Libyanl\rab 
Republic (Merits), decision of 10 October . 1973 and 1 
August 1974, reprinted in 53 I.L.R. 297 (1979) 351-3. 
222. Treitel, "Remedies for Breach of Contract" in Interna-
tional Association of Legal Science, International 
Encyclopedia of Comparative Law (1976) 8. 
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option, 223 
Two important points must now be made more explicit: 
Although damages awarded at the end of an arbitration are the 
most common remedy ordered by tribunals adjudicating state 
contracts, they should not be viewed narrowly, nor should they 
be perceived as the sole available remedy. 
The first point is 
semantic and reveals again the complicated inter-relationship 
between contract and delict that exists in the international 
legal system, The word "damages" need not be limited to the 
payment of money which is ordered by a tribunal after the breach 
of a contractual undertaking. Many commentators, including 
Greig in the passage cited above, would include in the notion of 
damages the payment of money ordered by a tribunal to remedy a 
seizure of property or other interferences with proprietary 
rights, 
In this context, the word "damages" could be replaced 
by the more general term "compensation" and it is in this sense 
that the word is used here. 
223. Once again, the tone of this discussion reveals the essen-
tial inequality of state-foreign private party arbitral 
proceedings. Most of the important political advantages 
are possessed by only one party -- the state -- and this 
may cause an imbalance in remedial options available to an 
arbitral tribunal. This is not to say that the state is 
always in a stronger position, As was emphasised in the 
discussion of "delocalised" awards contained in the 
previous Chapter, a major multinational corporation may be 
in a much stronger position during contractual negotia-
tions when compared with a small, developing state. The 
state's advantage may only come into play after a dispute 
has arisen and an arbitral tribunal is attempting to 
fashion an award that will encourage enforcement. This 
advantage may be seen as a simple SL,Uid pro quo for the 
earlier advantage of the foreign corporation. 
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The second point is emphasised by Van den Berg who notes 
that although money damages are the most common arbitral remedy, 
it always remains possible, even under the existing enforcement 
regime of the New York Convention, to enforce awards containing 
injunctions or ordering specific performance,LL 4 Even purely 
declaratory awards may be recognised,2LJ This ability to 
fashion relief to suit the exigencies of a particular case i s a 
characteristic also of domestic arbitrations. 2Lb It is this 
flexibility which is one of the major attractions of arb itra-
tion, although it must be reiterated that remed ies are limited 
to those available under the applicable substantive law unless 
the tribunal has been granted specific remedial powers or broad 
powers to act as amiable compositeur. 227 If the applicable 
224. Van den Berg, supra, note 91, 342. 
225. Ibid. It is here that one may find one of the two 
relevant distinctions between "recognition " and "enforce-
ment" under the New York Conven tion. Because a declara-
tory order in the commercial context merely establishes or 
confirms rights between the parties and does not order any 
act or prescribe any action , it cannot be "enforced " in 
any usual sense of that word. See also the comments 
supra, note 7. The other distinction may arise in the 
context of a state's plea of immunity from execution. If 
such a plea is accepted, an award could be "recogn ised " 
without being enforced. 
226. See,~' Meyerowitz, The Arbitration Alternative (198 5) 
71 A.B,A. J. 78 (February) 80. 
227. The major sets of rules which may be chosen to govern an 
international arbitration all provide that arbitrators are 
to be governed strictly by the applicable substantive law 
unless the parties have agreed expressly that the arbitra-
tors are to act as amiables compositeurs. See, ~~, the 
UNCITRAL Rules, supra, note 212, art. 33. 2; and the ICC 
( cont 'd.) 
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substantive law is international law, Greig suggests that 
specific performance is unlikely to be avail ab le, 2 28 primar ily 
because of the enforcement difficulties alluded to above. In 
any case, it is highly doubtful that international law can be 
the appropriate governing law for state contracts or resulting 
arbitrations, 229 Specific performance might well be available 
under other potentially applicab le legal systems although 
political practicalities may prevent its application. Moreover, 
if it is accepted that there is now a right to nationalise 
foreign-owned property, specific performance could never be an 
appropriate remedy in such cases of lawful nat i o nalisation . 
Let it be assumed, then, that money damages are the 
preferred arbitral remedy. That straightforward evaluation does 
not carry the discussion very far , f or as long ago as 1936 
Marjorie Whiteman noted the "extreme dearth of col l ated material 
on the subject of the methods and theories of measuring damages 
in international cases." 23 ° Few advances have occurred since 
Rules, supra, note 211, art. 13(3). Note, however, that 
certain sets of arbitral rules also provide that the 
tribunal may take into consideration "usages of the trade 
applicable to the transaction " in deciding upon the mer its 
of the case. See art. 33.3 of the UNC I TRAL Rules and the 
same article in the Rules of the Inter - Amer ican Cormnercial 
Arbitration Commission , supra, note 213. Might such 
usages affec t appropriate remedies? On principle, i t 
would be difficult to argue that they cannot do so. 
228. Greig, supra, note 216, 606. 
229. See supra, Chapter II, t ext accompanying notes 201 to 263. 
230. Whiteman, supra, note 20 5, Vol. I, V. 
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she wrote those words. Indeed, t he basic question still remains 
whether or not the measure of damages can be based upon existing 
principles of international law. In a recent study , Christine 
Gray noted that any attempt to articulate coherent principles of 
damage assessment in international law is hampered by "a 
remarkable collection of conflicting [judicial] decisions". 
Even the major arbitration awards in the oi l concess i on cases of 
recent years have reflected completely contradic tory approaches. 
She concluded that "it may not even be possible for tribunals to 
evolve a set of general rules" of damage assessment . 2 31 Gray 
specifically rejected the possibility of resorting to general 
principles derived from municipal systems of law because such 
principles would have to be so ge neral "as to be no guide at 
all". ! Despite that warning, t here is one grea t advantage in 
examining principles derived from the municipal context . 
Certain municipal systems of law have evolved highly sophisti-
cated theories of damage assessment. Because the international 
system is so bereft of sophistication, an analysis of municipal 
theor ies may be necessary t o point the problems and t o revea l 
the important questions. Such a study may not lead to the 
articulation of "general principles", but fresh insights are 
needed and an analysis o f municipal systems of damages may be 
one means of reviving a moribund branch of international law. 
An important caveat must be reiterated. Although municipal 
systems of law commonly differentiate quite clearly between the 
------- -----
231. Gray, supra, note 200. 
- 314 -
interests protected by damage assessment principles applica b le 
in cases of contract and in tort or delict, it is not possible 
to categorise so neatly in international cases. In t he 
following discussion, some overlap between normally distinct 
principles is inevitable. 
Damage assessment is an immensely complex topic which is 
analysed differently in various national legal systems. One can 
only agree with the English jurist . who noted, with significant 
understatement, that "the assessment of damages is not a n exact 
science". 232 For the purposes of this necessarily limited 
discussion, primary emphasis will be accorded to the English 
system of contractual damages, although some reference will be 
made to Continental systems as well. The English system is, of 
course, a well articulated system which has been replicated , 
with modifications, throughout the common law world, but it is 
chosen primarily as a convenient paradigm to reveal difficulties 
that may arise if principles of d omes tic law are adopted whole-
sale in a transnational context. The difficulties are high-
lighted when one attempts to apply principles of a Western legal 
system to disputes involving non-Western states that may neither 
share, nor even respect, the values inherent in the Western 
legal tradition. 
The cardinal principle governing the awarding of contrac-
tual damages in England is that the purpose of such damages is 
solely to compensate a plaintiff for loss occasio ned by the 
232. Quoted in Treitel, supra, note 222, 73. 
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defendant; 233 the plaintiff should not be enriched by a recovery 
which accords him more than he has lost.23 4 This principle 
would appear to be largely unobjectionable in the interna tional 
context as well. 23 ~ To say, however, that compensation is the 
key concept in damage assessment does not advance the argument 
very far. As Fuller and Perdue demonstrated in their seminal 
article, 23 b it is necessary to establish the specific purposes 
that are to be served by an award of compensation. For example, 
in the English law of torts, the principle has been that the 
injured party should be put back, as far as possible, in the 
state that existed before the tortious act occurred. In 
addition, tortious damages have been used to punish wrongdoers 
to discourage tortious conduct. The purposes served by 
contractual damages are conceived to be different. Although it 
will be stressed that different classes of interests may be 
protected by contractual damage awards, their dominant purpose 
is usually described as the protection of the "expectation 
interest". 237 The "expectation interest" is the benefit that 
233. See,~, G. Treitel, An Outline of the Law of Contract, 
3d ed. ( 1984) 305; and A. Ogus, The Law of Damag_es Tf9-i3-) 
18. See generally, H. McGregor, McGreg_or on Damages, 14th 
ed. (1980). 
234. See, Treitel, supra, note 222, 25. 
235. See,~, Greig, suora, note 216, 599, 600. 
236. Fuller & Perdue, The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages 
(193&-7) 46 Yale L.~ and 373. 
237. Ibid., 58-9. 
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the plaintiff may reasonably have expected to gain had the 
contractual bargain been performed. 
Even if one were to accept the expectation interest as the 
only possible measure o f contractual damages, it is apparent 
that in complex international cases involving, for example, the 
nationalisation of property, it may be necessary to integrate 
both tortious and contractual principles of compensation. A 
case in point is the issue of punitive damages. 
In a domestic contractual case, it has not been usual to 
impose punitive damages for, unli ke in t ort , damages awarded in 
contract are not designed to encourage good social conduct in 
the future, but only to compensate for the loss of benefits from 
a bargained-for agreement. 238 In contractual claims involvi ng 
an international element, the principle against punitive damages 
must be modified somewhat. In an arbitration arising from the 
breach of a state contract, there would appear to be no reaso n 
to award punitive damages. Compensation is the key concept, not 
punishment. There can be no "punishmen t" for a nationalisation 
which is entirely lawful under international law. The nation-
alised party is simply entitled to fair compensation. However, 
if an arbitral award runs against the state party and the state 
refuses to comply, the claim may then be espoused by the 
national state of the private party. The claim is transformed 
into an international claim on the plane of full-scale state 
238. Treitel, supra , no te 233, 307. 
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responsibility. 239 It has become, as noted above, an 
"international wrong" often termed the "denial of justice", and 
punitive damages may be claimed by the espousing state. 2 40 
Miss Whiteman's assessment remains largely accurate, however, in 
that "[t]here is an apparent desire on the part of international 
tribunals to avoid punitive or exemplary damages." 2 4 1 The 
reason for that reticence may be the desire to avoid offending 
239. The process of transformation of a contractual claim from 
an essentially private claim into a public claim between 
states is described fully in the Case Concerning the 
Factory at Chorzow (Indemnity Merits), supra, note 217; 
and in the important series of Hague Lectures delivered by 
the ex-President of the International Court of Justice, 
Jiminez de Arechaga, International Law in the Past Third 
of a Century (1978) 159 Ree. des cours 1, especially at 
267. The traditional practice of certain major Western 
states (especially the U.S,A, and the U.K.) had been that 
the state would not easily be convinced to espouse a claim 
of its national arising out of a contractual breach by 
another state. The justifications for this position were 
well articulated by Professor Borchard: (a) that the 
citizen entering into a contract does so volunta~ily and 
assumes certain risks; (b) that by going abroad, a citizen 
subjects himself to local law and to the local judiciary; 
and (c) that "every civilized state may be sued for breach 
of contract." E. Borchard, The Diplomatic Protection of 
Citizens Abroad or The Law of International Claims (1915) 
281-5 . However, Borchard notes, at 293, that when the 
private party was faced with a massive repudiation of the 
contract, his national state was more likely to step in to 
espouse the claim, especially if local judicial remedies 
were denied, In almost all cases where an international 
claims commission was established, they were granted 
jurisdiction over contractual claims. See Borchard at 
296; and Whiteman, supra, note 205, Vol. III, 1558. 
240, Greig, supra, note 216, 598. See generally, Mann, State 
Contracts and International Arbitration (1967) 42 Brit. 
Y.B. Int'l L. 1, especially at 37. 
241. Whiteman, supra, note 205, Vol. III, 1874. 
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the sensibilities of a state and to prevent any concomitant 
enforcement difficulties. 
In addition to the difficulties that may arise when 
contractual and tortious standards of damage assessment are 
combined, one may confront problems caused by the differing 
interests that may need protection even i n a purely contractual 
context. It has already been established that in the English 
private law of damages, the so-called "expectation interest" has 
been the dominant justification for compensation. In England, 
"[i]n actions for breach o f contract, the prima Eacie object [of 
damages] is to put the plaintiff in the position he would have 
been in if the contract had been satisfactorily performed." 242 
In determining the loss for which he may be compensated, the 
plaintiff's "overall position in consequence of the breach" must 
be evaluated 243 and compared to the position that the plaintiff 
would have occupied if the contract had been performed. The 
breach must be placed within the surrounding commercial context. 
The justification for the adoption of this contex tual approach 
is that a court will not wish t o award damages which would in 
fact place the plaintiff in a better position than if the 
defendant had performed the contract. 244 For example, in a 
contract for the sale and purchase of a commodity, with the 
----- - -· - ·- - - - -
242. Ogus, supca, note 233, 18. 
243. Treitel, supra, note 233, 307. 
244. Ibid. 
- 319 -
price to be determined by the market at a set time, if the 
market is falling when the breach occurs, damages should be 
assessed on the basis of the falling market. 24 ~ The law seeks 
to protect the expectations of the parties to a contract, 2 4 0 but 
only the realistic and objectively evaluated expectations. The 
ideal means of protecting the expectation is, of course, to 
order specific performance of a contract, for then the expecta-
tions will be met without having to engage in any approxima-
tions, If specific performance is not possible, the loss of 
future profits may be compensated as an element of the expecta-
tion interest, subject to the rule preventing recovery of 
damages that are too remote. 247 The troubling issues that arise 
in the context of awards for lost future profit will be examined 
shortly. 
The "expectation interest" is not the only available 
measure of damages in contractual actions in England, or, for 
that matter, in the rest of the common law world. Two other 
distinct interests have been identified as possible sources of 
justification for the awarding of contractual damages. If a 
plaintiff has been induced by the defendant's promise to confer 
some benefit upon the defendant and he has subsequently failed 
245. Sale of Goods Act 1979, 1979 (U.K,) c. 54, s. 51. 
246. Treitel, supra, note 222, 27-8. 
247, See Hadley v. Baxendale (1854) 9 Exch. 341 (U.K.); and The 
Heron II sub nom. Koufos v. c. Czarnikow Ltd [1969) 1 A--:-c; 
350 (H.L,) (U.K,) 
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to perform his promise, the defendant may be forced to retu rn, 
as damages, the benefit he received. Such an award is said to 
protect the "restitutionary interest". 248 Of greater present 
relevance is the so-called "reliance interest" which would 
justify an award of contractual damages whenever a plaintiff has 
been harmed because of his reliance on the unperformed promise 
of the defendant. 249 This reliance may include actual expendi-
tures or foregone opportunities. Neither of these measures of 
damage has challenged the place accorded to the protection of 
the "expectation interest" in English law. In particular, 
damages based upon the "reliance interest" are commonly said to 
be inadequate. 
An approach to damages under which compensation is based 
upon contractual expectations (as if the contract had been 
performed) does not fit neatly with the r e ality of contemporary 
state contracts for a number of reasons. First, although the 
original transaction may indeed be a contract, it is often an 
agreement which provides for rights which tend to change and 
develop independently of the founding contract. For example, in 
the Arn.inoil arbitration, the arbitrators made much of the fact 
248. See Fuller & Perdue, supra, note 236, 53-4. The 
restitutionary interest may be particularly relevant in 
cases involving intangible loss. See~, Dawson, 
General Damages in Contract for Non-Pecuniary Loss (1983) 
16 N.Z.U.L. Rev. 232; and Bridge, Contractual Damages for 
Intangible Loss: A Comparative Analysis (1984) 62 Can. Bar 
Rev. 323. 
249. See Fuller & Perdue, ibid., passim; and Treitel, supra, 
note 222, 28. 
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that since the conclusion of the underlying co ntract, the 
parties had altered the entire structure of rev enue distr ibu ti o n 
from the concession even though the express terms o f t he 
contract had not been amended. 2 ~u What are the legitima t e 
expectations in such a situation? 
Another concrete example will be helpful in highl i g h ti ng 
the point. In the arbitration between the British Petrole um 
Company and the State of Libya which resulte d from the Li byan 
nationalisation of B.P.'s oil concession, the British comp a ny 
claimed not only that the Libyan government was guilty o f a 
breach of contract but also that B.P. enjoyed f u ll p r operty 
rights in the installations it built in Liby a a nd in its share 
of the crude oil extracted from the concession area. 2 5 1 The 
measure of damages for the latter part of the c l aim could no t be 
based upon future expectatio ns but upo n r e storation of the 
status quo ante, the measure of damages commonly applied in tort 
or delict. One would then ha ve t o establish t he value of t he 
tangibl e assets at the time of indemnificati o n 252 as well as 
250. The Government of the State of Kuwait v . The American 
Independent Oil Co. [Aminoil J , Final Award of 24 Marc h 
1982, reprinted in (1982) 21 I.L.M. 976. See especiall y 
the Tribunal's discussion of the "Abu Dha b i Formula". 
251. B.P. Exploration Co. (Libya) v. Government of the Libyan 
Arab Republic (Merits), decision of 10 October 1973 and 1 
August 1974, reprinted in ( 1979) 53 I.L.R. 297, declara-
tions no. 1 and no. 5. 
252. Case Concerning the Factory at Chorzow (Indemnity Mer i ts), 
supra, note 217, 47-8. 
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property rights. 2 ~ 3 Such a claim mixes contractual damage 
principles based upon an "expectation interest" with principles 
of compensation that would seek to measure damage solely at the 
time of indemnification. Factoring out the applicable measure 
would be most difficult in a complex economic relationship. 
Furthermore, even if one ignores the dual nature of many 
claims arising from the breach of state contracts, and focusses 
upon the purely contractual aspect, complications exist which 
make the atavistic reliance upon municipal law measures of 
damage unwise, particularly when they are based upon the expect-
ation interest. For example, in England, compensation for loss 
of the "expectation interest" in a breached contract often 
involves the award of damages for "loss of profits". 2 ~ 4 The 
only significant limitation is that no damages will be awarded 
for loss of profits that are speculative. 2 ~~ Given the uncer-
tainty of the international political situation and the volati-
lity of international markets, a reasonable argument can be made 
that international profits are almost always speculative. Even 
as concerns municipal law, Fuller and Purdue argued cogently 
that the expectation interest could not be a basis for recovery 
253. See Greig, supra, note 216, 599. 
254. See,~, Treitel, supra, note 233, 317. 
255. McRae v. Commonwealth Disposal Commission (1950) 84 C.L.R. 
337, 411 (High Court) (Australia). See also Treitel, 
ibid., 311. 
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when that interest was too "uncertain". 256 Perhaps in the 
international milieu, where profits are almost inherently uncer-
tain, the reliance interest should be the prima facie starting 
point for the measure of damages. Another justification for 
that view may be gleaned from Fuller and Purdue. They demon-
strated that damages based upon the expectation interest were 
typically refused in municipal law when to award them would 
place too heavy a burden upon the defendant. 2 ~ 7 When a develop-
ing state nationalises a large industry, to award the foreign 
claimant a huge amount of money for the loss of future profits 
would undoubtedly constitute an oppressive burden for the 
defendant state. 
A yet more fundamental challenge may be made to the 
appropriateness of the expectation interest as a justification 
for contractual damages in international cases. When adjudi-
cating contractual agreements involving non-Western state 
parties, arbitral tribunals may be confronted with deep resent-
ment if they seek to award damages against the state based upon 
corporate loss of profits. An attorney in the U.S. State 
Department has emphasised that all "legal issues regarding in-
vestment have a political or economic component." 2 ~b Nowhere is 
that component more apparent than in the i ssue of compe nsation 
for lost profits. Following Fuller and Purdue, Ogus has framed 
256. 
257. 
258. 
Fuller & Perdue, supra, note 236, 373. 
Fuller & Perdue, ibid., 377. 
Hackney, Remarks, (1983) 77 Proc. Am. Soc. Int'l L. 296. 
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the problem neatly: 
The question may legitimately be posed why in a 
contractual action the law is prepared to adopt a 
measure which seeks to do more than merely to 
restore the plaintiff to the status quo ante as in 
tort. The answer lies deeply rooted in the 
economic foundations of the law of contract in 
Western capitalist societies. Enforcement of the 
expectation interest, it has been said, stimulates 
economic activity, facilitates reliance on business 
agreements and protects the 'credit system'. 
Indeed, in societies which do not share the same 
economic philosophies it is by no means obvious 
that recovery of lost anticipated profits is always 
to be tolerated. 2 ~ 9 
Again, political reality may require that an arbitral award 
seeking to compensate for breach of a state contract should not 
be couched in terms of compensation for the loss of profits. If 
it is, resistance to enforcement may be exacerbated. The 
expectation principle may simply be unworkable in international 
cases. 
Government resistance to the unmodified application of 
principles allowing for compensation based upon the expectation 
interest is not limited to regi~es in the developing world. A 
valuable source of analogies may be found in the law of a number 
of developed states governing issues of breach and compensation 
in public (administrative) contracts. In most Wes tern legal 
systems at least, limited distinctions are drawn between purely 
private contracts and contracts which are public in nature. The 
rationale behind such distinctions has been well articulated by 
Turpin: 
259. Ogus, supra, note 233, 285. 
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Even in its contractual relations an administrative 
authority retains its governmental character and 
its responsibility to safeguard the public inter-
est. Considerations of public policy, which have 
to be accommodated by special rules, are as much 
applicable to the contractual as to other activi-
ties of governmental bodies. 26 U 
It is this duty to protect the public interest -- and not the 
notion of sovereignty or of state prerogative -- 2 61 that 
differentiates private and administrative contracts. A private 
contractor who contracts with the government therefor "becomes , 
indirectly, a participant in the performance of some public 
service." 262 
Because of the public authority's duty to guard the public 
interest, most Western legal systems accord to the government 
party to an administrative contract more or less circumscribed 
special prerogatives. Even in common law countries, where the 
prerogatives are most limited "[i]t is impossible t o maintain 
that the government contract is exactly the same as the private 
contract .•• whilst at the same time admitting that the presence 
of extraneous discretionary powers may override established 
rules of the common law contract." 263 Discretionary powers 
260. Turpin, "Public Contracts" in International Association of 
Legal Science, International Encyclopedia of Comparative 
Law (n.d.) 27. See also Mewett, The Theory of Government 
Contracts (1959) 5 McGill L.J. 222, 223 . 
261. Pace Tschanz, Contrats d'Etat et mesures unilaterales de 
I'Etat devant l'arbitre international (19 85) 74 rev. crit. 
dr. int'l prive 47, 80. 
262. Mewett, supra, note 260, 224. See also A. de Laubadere, 
F. Moderne & P. Delvolve, Traite des Contrats Adminis-
tratifs (1983), tome 1, 699. 
263. Mewett, ibid., 240. 
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commonly vested in public authorities include (a) the ability t o 
vary contractual terms unilaterally; (b) t he power unilaterally 
to terminate the contract; and (c) the right inde pende ntl y to 
impose sanctions against the private contractor. 2 b~ The p ower 
of unilateral termination is recognised as inherent in French 
public authorities, and whilst not thought t o be inherent i n the 
U.K. or the U.S.A., is included in most standa rd f o rm gove r nment 
contracts. 26 ~ Though not all government contracts are public or 
administrative, usually the governmental authority possesses the 
sole power to determine when a given contract relates t o t he 
functioning of the publi c s e rvice and henc e is governed by 
public policy imperatives. 266 In France, the dominant test 
appears to be whether or not the contract contains clauses t hat 
are exorbitantes du droit commun. 2 b 7 Thus, i n France as i n 
Spain, 268 it is the esse ntial inequality of the parti e s, 
revealed in the clauses of the contract itself, that indicates 
whether or not a contract is truly public. 
264. See,~, Turpin, supra, note 260, 37. See also Tsch anz, 
supra, note 261, 78. 
265. See Turpin, ibid., 41. 
266. See,~, Mewett, supra, note 260, 22 6 ; and M.-A. Fl amme , 
Traite Theorique et Pratique des Marches Publics (1 969) 36. 
267. H. Street, Government Liability: A Comparative Study (1975) 83. 
268. See Flamme, supra, note 266, 89; and Turpin, supra, no te 260, 28. 
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A determination that a contract is "public" can have 
profound implications for the issue of contractual remedies. 
For example, it is commonly the case that when a government 
breaches a public contract, the remedy of specific perfo rmance 
will not be available to the aggrieved party. 26 ~ No doubt this 
derogation from general principles, especially notable in 
civilian systems of law where execution en nature is a basic 
contract remedy, is founded upon the notion of public policy. 
~fa public authority has the right unilaterally to alter o r to 
terminate a contract, then the remedy of specific performance is 
entirely inappropriate. An interesting parallel may be drawn 
here with emerging trends in the international law governing 
expropriations of foreign-owned property. Because it is now 
widely accepted that states can lawfully nati o nalise such 
property, 270 the remedy of execution en nature can have no 
application as an order against a breaching state. 
Although specific performance is usually not available 
against a public authority that breaches a contract, some 
compensation will normally be exigible. The most clearly 
articulated theoretical underpinning for such compensation, 
269. 
270. 
See, ~_g_._J Street, supra, note 267, 104; and Turpin, ibid •• ~. 
See, ~g., Arechaga, supra, note 230, 297-9. See also 
Unite~tions, Draft Code of Conduct on Transnational 
Corporations, U.N. Doc. E/ 1983/ 17/Rev. 1, Annex II, 12 
(Off. Ree. ECOSOC, 1983, Supp. No. 7), reprinted in (1984) 
23 I.L.M. 626, art. 54 which assumes the lawful nature of 
nationalisations. 
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normally assessed as liquidated damages, has been developed in 
the law of France. Doctrinal authors in the area of administra-
tive contracts refer to the notion of the "equilibre financier 
du contrat". 271 Because of the public authority's right to 
alter or terminate a contract unilaterally, the private party is 
put at risk. One means of maintaining the essential equilibrium 
of a contract is to allow for the awarding of damages for 
breach, Although in the case law it is established that the 
equilibre financier is to be evaluated at the moment of 
contracting, 272 so that the main doncern will be with the value 
of the consideration offered by the public authority, there is 
no reason why the ultimate availability of damages cannot be 
appreciated from the outset of the contractual relationship as 
an aspect of the contractual balance. 
In France, a further component of the equilibre financier 
is the ability of private parties to recover both damnum 
emergens and lucrum cessans in their contractual damage claim 
against a public authority. 273 The awarding of lost future 
profits is by no means a universal feature of Western legal 
systems in their treatment of public contracts. In the United 
States, for example, lost profits are generally not recoverable 
271. See,~, de Laubadere, Traite de Droit Administratif, 
Berne ed., (1980) 384; de Laubadere, Moderne & Delvolve, 
supra, note 262, 717; and Flamme, supra, note 266, 55-6. 
272. de Laubadere, Moderne & Delvolve, ibid. 
273, Ibid., 780, See also Flamme, supra, note 266, 55. 
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against a public authority which has breached a public 
contract. 274 
Finally, it must be emphasised that in most representative 
Western legal systems, the private party in a public contract 
may in certain circumstances find itself held accountable for 
excessive profits gained at the expense of the contracting 
government. English law provides the example of the Review 
Board for Government Contracts which possesses authority 
unilaterally to re-fix the profit rates negotiated in a public 
contract. 27 ~ In French law, the public authority unilaterally 
can lower the profits available to its co-contractant under an 
administrative contract.27b 
This brief review of the law governing public contracts in 
various Western legal systems reveals a number of important 
points that may cast some light upon the issue of compensation 
for the breach of state contracts in the international context. 
First, and most important, is the realisation that even Western 
legal systems presumably supportive of liberal conceptions of 
"the market" and "bargain" do differentiate between private and 
274, See,~, Colonial Metals Co. v. United States, 494 F. 2d 
1355 (Ct. Cl. 1974) (U.S,A. ); and Kalver Corp. v. United 
States, 543 F. 2d 1298 (Ct. Cl. 1976) (U,S,A,), cited in 
Turpin, supra, note 260, 41, 
275. H. Wade, Administrative Law, 5th ed. (1982) 679, 
276. de Laubadere, supra, note 271, 381. See also Turpin, 
supra, note 260, 43-4 who suggests that in Western legal 
systems it is common to provide for the recovery by a 
public authority of excess profits gained by a private 
party in the performance of a public contract, 
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public contracts, the latter being weighted in favour of public 
authorities because of their duty to protect the public 
interest. Secondly, in the context of public contracts, the 
expectation interest is not always perceived to be the a ppro-
priate measure of compensation when directed against a public 
authority. Specifically, the private party can never assume 
that a court will order specific performance of its contract. 
Moreover, there is a significant difference in approach regard-
ing the awarding of lost future profits against a government . 
In the United States, they are typically not awarded. Lastly, 
in major Western legal systems a private party may be called to 
account for excessive profits gained under a public contrac t. 
Clearly, when developing states that have breached state con-
tracts object to the awarding of damages based purely upon the 
"expec tation interest", their ob jections cannot be treated by 
any sensitive Western observer as "purely political". Western 
notions of public policy have been employed in the parallel 
context of public or administrative contrac ts to undercut many 
private law notions of fair bargain and appropriate compensa-
tion. Public policy, specifically the protection of the publ ic 
interest, may have to be used to similar effect in the interna-
tional community. 
There are other, even more practical, challenges under-
cutting the all-too-easy assumption that in the transnational 
context compensation can be based upon a straightforward 
application of expectation inte r est analysis which would allow 
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for full compensation for the loss of future profits. More 
precisely, it can be argued that the measure of damages must be 
far more subtle than the expectation interest alone. When 
international or transnational lawyers attempt to borrow prin-
ciples of law from municipal legal systems in order to fill in 
lacunae in the otherwise applicable international legal system, 
there is an unfortunate tendency to fasten on to the merely 
obvious, to cling to simple catch-phrases which tend to obscure 
the need for deeper analysis. Thus, an investigation of general 
principles of contract law will commonly lead to the ringing 
declaration that binding agreements must be performed or that 
parties must act in good faith. 
Recognition of first principles 
is, of course, important, but such principles can only serve as 
the touchstone for more subtle and specific investigations. 
Problems involved in a massive repudiation of a contractual 
concession will not be solved through the incantation of t he 
formula "perform in good faith". So it is with the measure o f 
contractual damages. It is often very difficult, for example, 
to evaluate the reasonable expectations of the parties, 
especially in the realm of future profits. 
Arrlerican economist: 
In the words of one 
It is clearly impossible to know in any absolute 
sense the earning which an asset will yield in the 
future. Rather, all that can be ascertained is a 
subjective probability distribution of anticipated 
future earnings. This distribution, and thus the 
expected value of earnings, will differ from 
individual to individual and from firm to firm, and 
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so the level of earnings which are [sic ) to be 
discounted will again v ary d epending on the owner 
of the asset nationalized. 27 7 
Although recognising that, on occasion, internatio nal tribu nals 
have awarded damages based upon lost future pro fits, 27 8 it 
remains true that such awards are often marked by obfuscato ry 
reasoning 279 that has done little to clarify t h e underly ing 
damage assessment principles. It i s no t t oo harsh t o say , with 
respect, that most international tribunals appear not to ha ve 
directed themselves to the specific issues, rely ing instead o n 
bland assertions of "general" rules. Moreove r, in most major 
arbitral decisions that have award ed compensati o n for loss of 
future profits, the persuasive value of the awards has been 
undercut by the fact that they have not been e nforced. 2 8 0 In 
277. 
278. 
279. 
280. 
Mintz, "Eco nomic Observatio ns o n Lump Sum Ag reements" i n 
R. Lillich & B. Weston, International Claims: Their 
Settlement By Lump-Sum Agreements (1975), Vol. 1, 26 4 , 266-7. 
See,~, The Government of the State o f Kuwait v . The 
American Independent Oil Co . [AMINOI L), Final Award o f 24 
March 19 8 2, reprint e d in (1982) 21 I.L.M, 976; a nd Libyan 
American Oil Co. v. The Government of the Libyan Arab 
Repul61c (Merits), supra, note 221. 
See,~, the LIAMCO decisi o n of Dr Mahmassani, ibid ., 
where tfie arbitrator relied upon the vague notion of 
"equitable compensation". And see the comments of Gann , 
Compensation Standard for Expropriation (1985) 23 Col. J. 
Trans. L. 615, 632; and Mende lson, Wh a t Price Expropri a -
tion? Corn ensation for Ex ro riation: The Case Law (1985) 
79 Am. J. Int'l L. 414, 418. 
See,~, Sapphire International Petroleums Ltd v . 
National Iranian Oil Co., 15 March 1963, reprinted in 
(1967) 35 I.L.R. 136; and LIAMCO, ibid. See also t he 
Table in Gree nwood, State Contracts""Tn Int e rnatio na l Law -
The Libyan Oil Arbitrations (1982) 53 Brit. Y.B. In t 'l L . 27 I 79, 
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addition, in each case the arbitral decision was rendered ex 
parte the state, so no contrary arguments were advanced. It 
should also be noted that in certain important awards, the 
arbitrators have adopted a completely contradictory position, 
holding that loss of future profits is not a valid head of 
damages in international law. 281 The justification for that 
approach has been simply that such damages are too uncertain. 282 
Again, a lack of sophisticated analysis is apparent, although 
one is compelled to agree with the logic that in the interna-
tional context, the evaluation of future profits is largely 
speculative. Western domestic markets are islands of stability 
when compared to the flux of international markets. One need 
only point to the vagaries of the crude oil market from 1970 to 
the present day to realise the enor~ous difficulty in evaluating 
the prospects for profits. Such uncertainty may be cause enough 
alone to recognise the need for stringent limits upon any claims 
for lost future profits on the international plane. 
281. See,~' the Alabama Claims Arbitration, reprinted in J. 
Moore, H1stor and 01 est of the International Arbitra-
tions to Which the United States has been a Partx (1898) 623, 646 and 658. 
282. Ibid. And see Whiteman, supra, note 205, Vol. III, 1863. 
Even in the LIAMCO arbitration, whe re loss of future 
profits was recognised as a valid head of damages, the 
arbitrator, Dr Mahmassani, held that compensation could 
only be ordered for damages which were "certain and 
direct." LIAMCO, supra, note 221, 82. At the end of the 
day, he awarded a lump sum of S66,000,000 (U.S.), a figure 
which compensated for all heads of damage and which was 
vastly inferior to the claim for lost profit alone that 
had been asserted by LIAMCO. 
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The clearest example of problems faced in reasona b le and 
fair damage assessment is to be f o und in arb itrations arisi ng 
out of investment contracts between states and private parties. 
Let it be supposed that a foreign multinational corporation has 
invested large sums of money in a mineral e x traction facility in 
State A and that the government of that state has nationalised, 
without discrimination, the entire mineral extraction s e cto r of 
the economy. What, then, are the compensatory options a v ailable 
to the company? Of course, the corporation wi ll invoke imme-
diately any arbitration clause in the mining c o ncession 
contract, but long before the resulting tri bu n a l has r e n d ered 
judgment the corporation will have, or should have, d o ne e very-
thing possible to mitigate its damages. 
There are a number of tools at its dispo sal. E'irst, 
de pending upon the intricacies of the tax laws o f the c o rpora-
tion's national state, the corporation will seek to write-o ff 
its plant and equipment losses and probably its operating 
losses, thus reducing its tax bu rden and at least partial l y 
c ompensating for the l o sses caused by nationalisation. 2 83 
283. In the United Kingdom, contractual damage assessment must 
typically take into consideration the tax b urden of t h e 
plaintiff, reducing an award by the amo unt that wo uld have 
been payable if the mone y had bee n taxabl e in his hands. 
See British Transport Commission v. Gourley [1956) A.C. 
185 (H.L.) (U.K.). See generally McGrego r, supra, note 
233, 321; Ogus, supra, note 233, 107; and Tre1tel, supra, 
note 233, 318. This principle presumes, of course , t h at 
the damages award ed will no t be taxable in the hands of 
the plaintiff, for o therwise a form of double taxation 
wo uld result. 
( c ont'd.) 
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Secondly, the corporation will seek to divert capital investment 
that would have been required for its operations in State A to 
other profitable ventures, thereby profiting from the release of 
otherwise committed capital and ingenuity.2 84 It would be 
patently unfair to award an investor damages for ttloss of 
profits" if the underlying capital sum has in fact been freed 
and re-invested for profit elsewhere. 
Lastly, a corporation may 
have been able to insure itself against certain contingencies 
arising in the context of nationalisation. For example, most 
corporations will have arranged for Protection and Indemnity 
insurance 285 to cover the seizure and arrest of ocean-growing 
transport vessels. Even more important and inclusive are 
government-sponsored insurance schemes which indemnify investors 
~ 
against the risk of for~ign expropriation. The United States 
The problem in the international context is that the 
corporation's tax benefit really means that it is trans-
ferring part of its loss to its national government. The 
interesting point arises whether or not the national state 
of the private party would be able to make an interna-
tional claim against the expropriating state to recover 
the lost taxes. 
284. A domestic parallel can be seen in damage principles 
governing building contracts where the owner prevents t h e 
builder from completing his work. The builder's costs, 
including lost payments for labour, must be reduced "if 
the defendant can show that the time made available to the 
plaintiff by the breach has been, or could have been, used 
by him in executing other profitable contracts with which 
he would not otherwise have been able to contend." 
McGregor, ibid., 601-2. 
285. Such insurance is normally arranged through mutual 
societies, called P & I Clubs, on the London Market. 
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Overseas Private Investment Corporation Scheme is a good 
example. 286 All of these mitigating factors should be o ffset 
against any damages awarded for the loss of future profits, so 
that even on a purely legal basis divorced from political 
considerations, it would not be correct to argue that the 
expectation interest can operate to ensure "full" compensation 
for loss of profits. 
The concept of mitigation is derived primarily from the 
common law tradition, but there exist analogous concepts in 
major civilian systems. 287 The mitigation principle has also 
been recognised and invoked as a general principle of law i n 
international arbitral awards 288 and by expert commentators. 2 b~ 
286. 
287. 
288. 
289. 
For an interesting discussion of O.P.I.C. practice, see 
the comments of an officer of the corporation in West, 
Remarks, (1983) 77 Proc. Am. Soc. Int'l L. 300. 
See,~' Carbonneau, "The Elaboration of Substantive 
Legal Norms and Arbitral Adjudication: The Case of the 
Iran-United States Claims Tribunal" in R. Lillich, ed., 
The Iran-United States Claims Tribunal 1981-1983 (1985) 104, 121-6. . 
See, ~.g., Syrian State Trading or1anization v. Ghanaian State~erpr1se, I.C.C. Award of 7 February 1984, 
reprinted in (1985) 10 Y.B. Comm. Arb. 52 (Case No. 4237; 
L.J. Malmberg, arbitrator). See also Goldman, La Lex 
Mercatoria dans les contrats et !'arbitrage inter-
nationaux: realite et perspectives (1979) 106 J. dr. Int'l 
475, 495 who argues that the "duty" to mitigate (a perhaps 
infelicitous phraseology) is a principle of the lex 
mercatoria, which can be derived from international 
arbitral awards. 
See,~, Carbonneau, supra, note 287, 120; and Goetz & 
Scott, The Miti ation Principle: Toward a General Theor 
of Contractual Obligation (1983) 69 Va L. Rev. 967, 96 • 
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In the context of t h e international sale of goods, t he r e l evant 
United Nations Convention is explicit: 
A party who relies on a breach of contrac t must 
take such measures as are reasonable in t he c ircum-
stances to mitigate the loss, including loss of 
profit, resulting from the breach. 2 9 o 
In an excellent entry in the International Ency clopedia of 
Comparative Law, Professor Treitel has set out the "three 
related ideas" that constitute the doctrine of mitigation. 
First, the plaintiff will not be a b le to recover damages which 
he ought to have avoided. Secondly, the plai n tiff must be made 
to account for any damages caused by his own c on tri butory 
negligence. Thirdly, and most importan tly for present purpo ses, 
"if the plaintiff actually gains some benefit in consequenc e of 
the defendant's breach, he may have to bring that benefit in t o 
account", 291 even if there was no "duty" t o mi t iga t e . 292 One 
may look at the existence of mitigation in fact when evalua t ing 
appropriate compensation. For example, any bene fits t o t h e 
plaintiff derived from the fact that he has been reli eve d of his 
own obligations due to the de f e ndant's breach must be t aken i nto 
account to reduce the plaintiff's compensati o n. 29 3 In other 
290. United Nations, Convention on Contracts f o r the Inte rna-
tional Sale of Goods, U.N. Doc. A/ Conf. 97/ 18 (10 Apri l 
1980), r epri n ted in (1980) 19 I.L.M. 668, art. 77. 
291. Treitel, supra, note 222, 75. 
292. See,~' British Westinghouse Electric and Manufactu r i ng 
Co. v. Underground Electric Railways Co. of London [1 9 1 2 ] 
A.C. 673 (H.L.) (U.K.) concerning the "d u ty" t o mitig ate . 
293. Treitel, supra, no te 222, 78. 
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words, the various means of self-help discussed above -- tax 
write-offs, re-investment, insurance, etc. -- should be included 
in any measure of compensation awarded to a private party who 
has seen his property nationalised. This requirement . is founded 
upon the idea of reasonable behaviour. A reasonable party will 
not sit idle when confronted by a repudiation of an economic 
relationship. In principle, and in the absence of any specific 
rules of the governing law, an arbitral tribunal must take all 
forms of mitigation, including the simple fact of an improved 
position, into consideration when setting down an appropriate 
damages award; only the real damages should be subject to 
compensation. 294 The "expectation interest" is therefore not 
fully compensated. 
So far, the discussion of remedies has focussed solely 
upon remedies that may be ordered in the final award of an 
arbitral tribunal. It may be, however, that provisional or 
temporary remedies are required before a tribunal can reach its 
final decision. In the absence of such provisional remedies, 
the final award may be incapable of any practical effect. Yet, 
very little attention has been paid to the issue of provisional 
remedies in international commercial arbitration and, perhaps as 
a result, there seems to exist a potential conflict between 
arbitral and national court jurisdiction to order provisional 
relief. 
294. See Treitel, supra, note 233, 327. 
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In fact, to state that there is a "potential conflict" is 
to put the case in too good a light, for there has traditionally 
existed substantial disagreement amongst the commentators as to 
whether or not provisional relief can be granted by courts in 
actions pending before arbitration panels. Recently, a 
doctrinal trend is perceptible which would recognise the ability 
of national courts to order provisional relief or interim 
measures of protection during the course of an arbitration. 
Trends in the case law, especially in the United States, are 
less clear-cut. Delaume has argued that 
[t)here is no incompatibility between submission to 
arbitration, as a means of settli ng transnational 
contractual disputes, and recourse to the judicial 
courts to secure provisional measures i nte nded to 
provide effective means of enforcing an arbitral 
award in the event that the award would be in 
favour of the party requesting the award. 29 ~ 
In this c o nclusion, Delaume is supported by McDonell and by 
Brower and Tupman, who are among the rare students of the 
subject, 296 by the express wording of the ICC Arb itration Rules 
which, in Rule 8 ( 5), allow either party "to apply to any 
competent judicial authority for interim or conservatory 
measures," 297 and by recent French doctrine. 29 b 
295. Delaume, ~upra, note 45, 84-5. 
296. McDonell, The Availability of Provisional Relief in Inter-
national Commercial Arbitration (1984) 22 Col. J. Trans. 
L. 273, 273; and Brower & Tupman, Court-Ordered Provi-
sional Measures Under the New York Convention (1986) 80 
Am. J. Int'l L. 24. 
297. Supra, note 211. 
298. See,~, Couchez, Note, (1985) Rev. de l'arb. 73 ( No. 
l); and Mendez, Arbitra e international et mesures conser-
vatoires (1985) Rev. de l'arb. 51 (No. 1). 
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Before examining the topic in detail, it should be pointed 
out that the most commonly requested and the most valuable form 
of interim relief is attachment of property. Attachment is a 
conservatory measure which "freezes" property so that it cannot 
be dissipated or alienated before adjudication of the dispute 
has been completed. The attachment ensures that the property 
will remain available as a means of enforcing the award. 
Although it is commonly accepted that arbitral tribunals may 
grant interim awards and make orders granting provisional 
relief, 299 they are not capable of ordering attachment, f or that 
power remains solely within the competence of national 
courts. 3 uo This limitation has probably evolved from the 
eminently practical conflict of laws rule that jurisdiction over 
immovable property will commonly be f o unded in the lex situs. 
The rule is convenient and realistic in the international 
context even for movable property, for, absent any reciprocal 
treaty arrangements, only courts in the jurisdict ion where 
299. See,~, McDonell, supra, note 296; and the various sets 
of institutional arbitral rules, including the I.c.c. 
Rules, supra, note 211, art. 8(5); the UNCITRAL Rules, 
supra, note 212, art. 26 and the Iran-u.s. Claims Tri b unal 
Final Rules of Procedure, 3 May 1983, reprinted in (19 73) 
2 Iran-u.s. C.T.R. 405, art. 26(1). See also the Lo ndon 
Rules, supra, note 214 which by their silence s e em to 
impose no ge neral restrictions upon the granting of 
interim relief by arbitral tribunals established under 
their auspices. However, it does appear that the parties 
may by agreement exclude from the tribunal's powers the 
ability to grant provisional relief (Schedule, C(lO)). 
300. Delaume, Foreign Sovereign Immunity, supra, note 60, 4 2; 
and Mendez, supra, note 298, 54; and Brower & Tupman , 
supra, note 296, 24. 
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property is located are able to exercise physical control over 
the assets, 
It is clear that arbitral tribunals cannot order 
attachment but must restrict themselves to other interim 
measures, 
For example, arbitral tribunals are capable of order-
ing the deposit of security for costs, 301 
The arguments do not end there, however, for there is a 
body of United States case law which holds that when a dispute 
is to go to arbitration, national courts no longer retain their 
right to grant provisional measures; even attachment is 
precluded. 
In Mccreary v. CEAT, 302 the Third Circuit Court o f 
Appeals held that pre-arbitration attachment is not available 
301. The Inter-American Rules, supra, note 213 and the UNC ITRAL 
Rules, supra, note 212-,~upon which the Inter-American 
Rules are based, both allow for one or more tr ibunal 
orders f or deposits to secure the payment of costs (ar t. 
41 in each set of rules). The London Rules, supra, note 
214, provide in the Schedule of Jurisd ic tion, para. C(ll), 
that an arbitral tribunal may "make interim orders for 
security" of costs, but the parties may exclude this power 
by agreement. The I.c.c. Rules, supra, note 211, in art. 
9(1), allow the Court of Arbitrati o n of the ICC to fix the 
amount of a deposit for security for costs, but it appears 
that no subsequent orders are permitted t o increase the 
initial deposit. This lacunae has encouraged some parties 
to seek further orders tor security in national courts and 
it would seem that courts do retain jurisdiction to order 
security for costs in international arbi tra tions. The 
English Court of Appeal has held, however, that this 
jurisdiction should only be exercised if "there is some 
more specific connection with this country .•• than the 
mere fact that the parties have agreed that any arbitra-
tion is to take place in England." Courts should be 
reluctant to interfere and should allow arbitral tri bunals 
to determine the necessary security for costs. Bank 
Mellat v. Helliniki Techniki S.A. (1983) 3 All E~42 8 (C.A.) (U.K.). 
302. 501 F, 2d 1032 (1974) (U.S.A.}, 
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from a U.S. District Court, even when the subsequent award would 
be enforceable in the United States under the New York Conven-
tion. This approach was followed in three cases arising in New 
York. 3 u3 The rationale was expressed most clearly by the New 
York Court of Appeals in the Cooper case: 
It is open to dispute whether attachment is even 
necessary in the arbitration context. Arbitration, 
as part of the contracting process, is subject to 
the same implicit assumptions of good faith and 
honesty that permeate the entire relationship. 304 
In his leading study of provisional relief in international 
COillinercial arbitration, McDonnell rejects such reasoning 
completely, arguing that "[t]he idea that an agreement to arbi-
trate implies a relationship of trust and confidence, making 
provisional relief unnecessary and inappropriate, confuses 
arbitration with conciliation." 30 ~ 
McDonnell's position that attachment and general provi-
sional relief should be available to parties in anticipation of 
arbitration is supported by American case law running completely 
303. Metropolitan Tankers Ltd. v. Pertambangan, 427 F. Supp. 2 
(S,D,N,Y. 1975) (U.S.A.); Atlas Chartering Services, Inc. 
v. World Trade Group, Inc., 453 F. Supp. 861 (S,D.N.Y. 
1978) (U.S,A,); and Cooper v. Ateliers de la Motobecane 
S.A., 442 N.E. 2d 1239 (N.Y,C,A. 1982) (U,S,A.), It 
should be noted that even courts which adopt a position 
against attachment before arbitral proceedings acknowledge 
that attachment is available in cases that would fall 
within admiralty jurisdiction if they had not been 
submitted to arbitration, See the Atlas Chartering case 
which cites Andros Compania Maritima, S.A. v. Andre & Cie, 
430 F. Supp. 88 (S,D,N.Y, 1977) (U.S.A,). 
304. Ibid. 
305. McDonell, supra, note 296, 273, 
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counter to that cited above. As early as 1944, the Second 
Circuit Court of Appeals decided that prejudgment attachment was 
available even if a court action had been stayed pending 
arbitration. 306 A tradition has long existed in the U.S. that 
courts dealing with admiralty matters will grant attachments of 
ships pending the outcome of arbitral proceedings. 307 In 1977, 
a U.S. District Court in California granted an attachment, in a 
non-maritime case, covering certain Californian assets of a 
French export company during the course of an arbitration 
proceeding taking place in New York, holding that the 1958 
Convention did not preclude prejudgment attachment. 3 ua Some 
commentators would not accept this interpretation, suggesting 
instead that art. II(3) of the New York Convention should be 
read as a requirement that only arbitrators grant provisional 
relief. 309 In practice, this would of course mean that no 
306. Murray Oil Products Co. v. Mitsui and Co., 146 F. 2d 381 
(2d Cir. 1944) ( U.S.A.), See also Cordoba Shipping Co. 
Ltd v. Maro Shipping Ltd, 494 F. Supp. 183 (Conn. DC 1980) (U.S.A,). 
307. Two recent examples are Drys Shipping v. Freights, 558 F. 
2d 1050 (2d Cir. 1977) (U.S.A.); and Andros Compania 
Maritirna S.A. v. Andre & Cie, supra, note 303. 
308. Carolina Power & Light Co. v. URANEX (ND CA 1977), 
reprinted in (1978) 17 I.L.M, 903, 910-1 and 914-5 (U.S.A.). 
309. McDonell, supra, note 296, 278 discusses and rejects this 
argument. It should be noted that the ICSID Convention, 
supra, note 56, does provide expressly in art. 26 that 
recourse to ICSID arbitration is exclusive, barring both 
parties from seeking provisional relief in national 
courts. See Delaume, Foreign Sovereign Immunity, supra, 
note 60, 42. 
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effective attachment could ever be ordered because arbitra tors 
do not possess powers of enforcement. 
Judicial decisions in various European j u risdictions als o 
support McDonell's argument that national courts can order pre-
arbitration attachments. In England, such attachments have been 
limited largely to maritime cases, 3 i u but in France the saisie 
conservatoire is widely available in the case of pre-arbitration 
applications for conservation of property. 3 1 1 Recent case law 
from the Federal Republic of Germany is to the same effect. In 
one notable case, the District Co urt of Frankfu r t-am-Main 
ordered the attachme nt o f millions of marks located in Iranian 
Government and National Iranian Oil Company bank accounts in 
Germany. 3 1 2 This order was made despite the relatively safe 
enforcement pro cedures available through the Secu rity Ac c o unt 
of the Iran-u.s. Claims Tribunal, t he tribunal under who se 
auspices the underlying arbitrations were pro ceeding. Although 
the ordering of attachments in tha t co ntext was certainly i n -
appropriate, the point remains t hat nati o na l c o urts are inc reas-
ingly sympathetic to requests for pre-arbitration attachment. 
310. See,~, Third Chandris Shipping Corp. v. Unimarine S.A. 
(1979] 2 All E.R. 972 (C.A,) ( U,K.) (whe re an e x parte 
Mareva Injunction was app lied c overing all asse ts of t h e 
defendant); The Rena K (1978] 3 W.L.R. 431 (Q.B.) (U.K,); 
and The Tuyuti [1984] 2 All E.R. 545 (C,A.) (U.K,), 
311. Stein & Wotman, International Commercial Arbitration in 
the 1980s: A Comparison of the Major Arbitral Systems and 
Rules (1983) 38 Bus. Law, 1685, 1690; and Brower & Tupman, 
supra, note 296, 38. 
312. William Brothers Int'l Corp. v, N.I.o.c., Frankfurt-am-
Main District Court, No. 3/ 14 0 11 / 80, 14 September 1981. 
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On balance, the approach recommended by McDonell is t o be 
preferred. 
Pre-arbitration attachment is a va l uable t ool wh ich 
cannot be employed by arbitral tribunals in t hei r own righ t , s o 
some form of national court attachment jurisdiction is useful. 
This recognition in no way undermines the possibility of a 
procedurally delocalised award nor does the jurisdiction o f 
national courts to order attachment interfere with the i nd epen-
dence of the arbitral tribunal. 31 3 It means simply that as a 
practical matter, enforcement of a resulting a ward will be made 
easier. Indeed, as has been noted already, t he Rules of t he 
International Chamber o f Comme rce allow pa r ti e s t o apply t o 
national courts for "interim or conservatory measures", 3 1 4 and 
the reading of art. II(3) of the New York Convention most 
consonant with the Convention's o verall s p irit is that it 
authorises arbitral tribunals t o make interim protecti ve o r ders 
but does not preclude action by national courts of a conserva -
tory nature. 31 ~ 
It must be note d that special pro bl e ms a ris e whe n 
attention is focuss e d upon applications for attachment in cases 
involving the assets of foreign states. Just as in the case o f 
the execution of an award, the spectre of sovereign iJJUT\unity can 
313. Mendez, supra, note 298, 63-4. 
314. ICC Rules, supra, note 211, art. 85(5). 
315. See Brody, An Ar urnent for Pre-Award Attachment in Inter-
national Arbitration Under the New York Co nvention (1 98 5) 
18 Cornell Int'l L.J. 99, 110-1. 
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arise to cloud the issue of pre-arbitration attachment. In 
England, a plea of state immunity succeeded in preventing the 
attachment of Egyptian government assets in S.P.P. (Middle East) 
Ltd v. The Arab Republic of Egypt et al. 310 In principle, a 
similar result could occur in the United States. 317 In France, 
however, the Cour de cassation held in the recent case of 
Societe E.U.R.O.D.I.F. c. Republique islamique d'Iran 318 that an 
attachment of commercial assets owned by a state could stand, 
pending the outcome of of an arbitration. Just as it was argued 
above that sovereign immunity should not preclude execution of 
an arbitral award, it is here asserted that the decision of the 
Cour de cassation is right in principle. If a state has agreed 
to arbitration in a freely negotiated contract, it should not be 
allowed to escape its obligations by effectively precluding 
execution through the removal of its assets from the potential 
enforcing jurisdiction. Attachment is the only method of guard-
ing against such bad faith. The French court was also wise, 
though, in limiting the possibility of attachment t o a state's 
commercial assets. It would be very unfortunate, for example, 
if an attachment were ordered covering all Embassy bank 
accounts. Given the delays often associated with arbitration, a 
316. (Court of Appeal, 19 March 1984), reprinted in (1985) 10 
Y . B • Comm • Arb . 5 0 4 ( U • K . ) , at 5 0 7 . 
317. See the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 u.s.c. §1610(1) (Supp. 1982). 
318. (14 March 1984; Cour de cassation), reprinted in (1985 ) 
Rev. de 1' arb. 69 (No. 1) • 
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state could be prevented from conducting essential diplomatic 
activity for some years. Such a result would offend not only 
comity, but common sense. 
Having accepted that the attachment jurisdiction of state 
courts will often be useful, it is still possible to hope that 
it need not be necessary. As was pointed out at the beginning 
of this Chapter, one should look at enforcement not simply as an 
ex post facto concern, but as an influential factor in institu-
tional design. Despite the presumption of good faith com-
pliance, parties are free to set out means of enforcement that 
are independent of state legal systems. Such designs may 
involve the posting of performance bonds or the establishment of 
escrow accounts. Because the enforcement mechanisms of the 
Iran-u.s . Claims Tribunal are among the most audacious yet 
designed and as that Tribunal is the subject of the ensuing 
Chapter, a full discussion of the potential for independent 
enforcement techniques will be postponed until the experience of 
that Tribunal has been canvassed. 
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CHAPTER IV: THE PARADIGMATIC UTILITY OF THE 
IRAN-UNITED STATES CLAIMS TRIBUNAL 
At the opening session of the Iran-u.s. Claims Tribunal 
held on 1 July 1981, the Tribunal's first President, Gunnar 
Lagergren, expressed great satisfaction with the Iranian-
American treaties which had created the Iran-u.s. Claims 
Tribunal: 
Two important nations have negotiated their way out of serious difficulties by agreeing to arbitration. They have thereby affirmed their belief in what a distinguished lawyer said at the end of the last century, namely, that international controversies may honorably, practically and usefully be dealt with by arbitration. 1 
Nor was President Lagergren alone in recognising the magnitude 
of the achievement of the negotiators who concluded the Algiers 
Accords. 2 Coping with an enormously complex and highly charged 
1. President Lagergren, Statement at the Tribunal's Opening Session (1 July 1981), quoted in Von Mehren, The Iran-U.S. Arbitral Tribunal (1983) 31 Am. J. Comp. L. 713, 729, 
2. The tripartite Accords, negotiated through the mediation of the Algerian Government, consisted of two Declarations and related Undertakings. The first Declaration included terms designed to end the existing crisis sparked by the forcible detention of United States nationals, including diplomatic personnel, in the Embassy in Tehran, and to lift certain of the economic sanctions imposed by the United States against the Government of Iran. The second, and more immediately relevant, Declaration was the Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria, Concern-ing the Settlement of Claims by the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran (19 January 1981), reprinted in (1982) 7 Y.B. Comm. Arb. 257 and (1982) 1 Iran-u.s. C.T.R. 4 [hereinafter Claims Settlement Declaration]. The Claims Settlement Declaration created the Iran-u.s. Claims Tribunal (Art. II(l)), established the scope of its jurisdiction (Arts. II and VI(4), read with Art. VII) and, in general terms, prescribed the applicable procedure (Art. III(2)) and substantive law (Art. V). It should be noted, however, that one crucial 
(cont'd.) 
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political and ideological confrontation, 3 the negotiators never-
theless managed to create an institution which has already 
called forth some remarkahly favourable rhetoric. A Legal 
Adviser to the U.S. State Department has written that "the Iran-
United States Claims Tribunal represents one of the most 
ambitious and complex international claims adjudication programs 
ever undertaken." 4 A distinguished American professor expert in 
element of the Tribunal process is governed by the first Declaration, for it is there that one finds provision for the creation of a "Security Account" by Iran out of which successful American Claimants are to be paid. See Declara-tion of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria (19 January 1981), reprinted in (1981) 1 Iran-u.s. C.T.R. 3 and (1981) 20 I,L,M, 223. 
3. See the description of the circumstances under which the Accords were negotiated in Belland, The Iran-United States Claims Tribunal: Some Reflections on Trying a Claim (1984) 1 J, Int'l Arb, 237, 237. The Tribunal arbitrators are also aware of the heavy political constraints that hampered the negotiating process. In the words of one of the Iranian arbitrators: 
[A) crisis of extreme complexity was created by the abrupt and radical rupture of all political and economic relations between Iran and the United States, two Governments which had been closely linked, particularly during the twenty years preceding the Iranian Revolution. Dissenting Opinion of Dr. Shafie Shafeiei on the Issue of Dual Nationality (Cases 157 and 211) (1983) 2 Iran-u.s. C.T.R. 178, 178. The close nature of the economic links between the u.s.A, and pre-revolutionary Iran is revealed by a comparison of trade statistics from 1970 and 1978. In 1970, Iran-U.S. trade was valued at $400 million (U.S.). By 1978, the figure had climbed to $6.5 billion (U.S.). Tonelson, Hostage Aftermath (1986) 257 The Atlantic 22, 22, 
4. Robinson, Recent Developments at the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal (1983) 17 Int'l Law 661, 661. The Tribunal falls within the tradition of international claims commissions that were typically set up to adjudicate post-
(cont'd,) 
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international claims has been even more fulsome in his pro-
nouncements: "The current effort in The Hague [ the home of the 
Tribunal] is the most significant international arbitration in 
history . 
•.. If not in number of claims, then certainly in 
amount of money and complexity of issues involved II 5 
One might question whether significance can be measured in 
advance without the benefit of historical perspective, but it is 
true that the Iran-u.s, Claims Tribunal would appear to be of 
potentially great importance, both as a vehicle for the elabo ra-
tion of substantive legal doctrines and as a paradigm whic h 
could contribute to a more sophisticated understanding of the 
process of international arbitration. An important caveat must 
be entered at this point, for it may be that the circumstances 
that prompted the creation of the Tribunal a nd t hat continue to 
condition its operation are so singular as to undercut the 
general application of lessons or insights derived from its 
practice. If the functioning of the Tribunal and the substa n -
tive rules it evolves are dictated by its unique purpose and 
status, one would be forced t o call into question its relevance 
as a paradigm. Such issues can only be addressed adequately 
war reparations claims, for example the U.S.-Italian 
Tribunal set up after World War II which produced the famous 
Merge award, infra, note 141. However, it will be seen that 
the role and nature of the Iran-u.s. Claims Tribunal is more 
complex than the models on which it may have been based. 
5. Lillich, Remarks, (1982) 76 Proc. Am. Soc. Int'l L. 5, 5-6. 
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after a thorough investigation of the Tribunal's operations and 
decisions. 
Oddly enough, to explore the Tribunal s uccessfully, one 
must grapple with a threshold question the answer to which 
should be self-evident, or at least readily apparent. Yet in 
reviewing the academic comment that has already appeared 
concerning the Tribunal and in reading Tribunal decisions and 
dissenting opinions, it soon becomes evident that there is a 
debate regarding the very nature of the institution. What was 
envisioned in the Algiers Accords? Is the Tribunal an 
'international' tribunal adjudicating issues of state responsi-
bility under international law? Is it really accurate to des-
cribe it as an arbitral tribunal at all? These questions must 
be confronted head-on if we are to construct any coherent 
picture of the Tribunal's potential impact, for on the answers 
will depend other crucial evaluations concerning the proper role 
of Tribunal arbitrators, the substantive law to be applied by 
the Tribunal and the persuasive value of Tribunal practice. 
A. The Nature of the Tribunal 
i. The Algiers Accords: Their Status and Effect 
"In January 1981, owing to the mediation of the Democratic 
and Popular Government of Algeria, the U.S. and the Iranian 
Governments agreed to settle their disputes amicably and signed 
the Algiers Declarations. The release and free transfer of 
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Iranian assets was an essential objective of the Declarations." 6 
That description, offered by one of the Tribunal's Iranian 
arbitrators, is in full accord with the emphasis given to the 
transfer of assets in the Algiers Accords. The resolution of 
disputes was also a crucial objective; the creation of the 
Tribunal was described by Professor Von Mehren as "an indispen-
sable element of the peaceful solution of the hostage problem." 
He noted that there were "vast claims at stake" and concluded 
that "it was highly unlikely that a negotiated settlement 
between the United States and Iran could have been reached" 
without an independent mechanism for claims adjudication. 7 From 
the American perspective, apart from the immediate goal of 
attaining release of the hostages, 8 it was important to provide 
some means of redress for United States nationals with outstand-
ing claims against Iran. On the Iranian side, at a time of 
intense economic disruption, and with the prospect of an 
expensive and protracted war with Iraq, it became crucial to 
regain control of the billions of dollars of Iranian government 
assets frozen under an American Executive Order. 9 
6. Dissentin Opinion of Dr. Shafie Shafeiei on the Issue of 
Dual Nationality, supra, note 3, 212. 
7. Von Mehren, supra, note 1, 729. 
8. See Lillich, "Preface", in~. Lillich, ed., The Iran-United 
States Claims Tribunal 1981-1983 (1984) vii, v11. 
9. Executive Order 12170 of 14 November 1979, 44 Fed. Reg., No . 
222 (1979) 65729, reprinted in (1979) 18 I.L.M. 1549 and 
subsequent regulations reprinted in (1979) 18 I.L.M. 1552-6. 
(cont'd.) 
- 353 -
In the first of the two Algiers Declarations, which dealt 
with the underlying political disputes, lU the United States 
Government agreed to release the Iranian assets held by the U.S. 
Federal Reserve Bank, U.S. private banks and by other United 
States individuals and institutions. In return, Iran promised 
to release the fifty-two United States nationals held in Tehran 
and to co-operate in setting up the Security and Escrow Accounts 
that were designed to lend efficacy to the separate Claims 
Settlement Declaration which was concluded on the same day. 11 
In independent "Undertakings", 12 the United States promised to 
release a specified amount of gold, dollars and securities to 
the Algerian Central Bank as Escrow Agent and Iran pledged to 
release the hostages and to transfer dollars to the U.S. Federal 
Reserve Bank to cover the principal and interest owing on all 
loans and credits made by bank syndicates in which U.S. banks 
Estimates of the value of the frozen Iranian Government 
assets range from eight billion to twe lve billion dollars. 
See Belland, supra, note 3, 237; and Tonelson, supra, note 3, 22. 
10. Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular 
Republic of Algeria, supra, note 2. 
11. Claims Settlement Declaration, supra, note 2. 
12. Undertakin s of the Government of the United States of 
America and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran 
with Res ect to the Declaration of the Government of the 
Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria (19 January 
1981), reprinted in (1981) l Iran-u.s. C.T.R. 13 and (1981) 20 I.L.M. 229. 
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had participated. 13 
The second Declaration, the Claims Settlement Declaration, 
was the means whereby the two governments sought to provide a 
forum for the resolution of legal disputes caused by the 
severance of economic relations after the Iranian Revolution and 
the hostage-taking. 14 Unfortunately, the Declaration was not 
phrased so as to indicate clearly the nature of the Tribunal it 
created. The nature of the Tribunal, and particularly its 
"international" status, is relevant to such issues as the 
substantive law to be applied by the Tribunal and the remedies 
available to successful claimants. Arguments concerning the 
13. The Undertakinos, ibid., create a special regime for the 
settlement of most"bank claims" and so they will not be 
the focus of the following discussion. Bank Claims are 
assigned to the Tribunal under para. 2(8) of the Under-
takings, not under the Claims Settlement Declaration, and 
satisfaction of Awards will be through the separate Dollar 
Account No. 2. From the very beginning of Tribunal Opera-
tions, separate settlement negotiations were taking place 
in London to try to resolve such claims. 
14. See Stew~rt & Sherman, "Developments at the Iran-United 
States Claims Tribunal: 1981-1983" in R. Lillich, ed., The 
Iran-United States Claims Tribunal 1981-1983 (1984) 1, T-=4, 
reprinted from (1983) 24 Va. J. Int'I L. I [hereinafter 
cited to Lillich}. As to the causality questions involved 
in the economic countermeasures pursued by the United 
States, see the Dissent of H.M. Holtzmann in Queens Office 
Tower Associates v. Iran National Airlines Corp. (1983) 2 
Iran-u.s. C.T.R. 247, 254. It is clearly the view o f the 
Iranian Government that the complete disruption of e conomic 
relations was proximately "caused" by the sanctions of the 
United States. The American Claimants argue that the 
sanctions were in turn "caused" by the actions of the 
Iranian Government in condoning -- at the very least -- the 
hostage-taking in Tehran. The issue is of crucial 
importance in cases involving assertions of contractual 
frustration. See also Haji-Bagherpour v. United States of 
America (1983) 2 Iran-u.s. C.T.R. 38. 
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status of parties in Tribunal cases, especially the status o f 
corporations, will also be affected by the e valuation o f t he 
status of the Tribunal itself. A preliminary, and ultimate l y 
inconclusive, point is that the Declaration is prima facie an 
agreement between two states through an intermediary, itself a 
state. As such, the written agreement is a treaty, fulfilling 
all customary requirements a nd the rules o f the Vienna Conv e n-
tion on the Law of Treaties, 1 ~ The Tribunal so held in Case 
A-l, 1 b But concluding that the Algiers Accord s are treaties 
does not necessarily lead to the further c o nclusi o n that the 
Tribunal created is an international tribunal. It wo uld be 
entirely possible for two states to agree to create and fund a 
tribunal designed solely to adjudicate cases i nvolving private 
parties and which would apply a municipal s y stem of law. The 
enabling instrument would be a treaty, but the resulti ng i nsti-
tution would not be "international" in any meaningful se nse, 
even though the states which created such a tr i bu nal woul d be 
under an international obligation t o r espec t t he tri b unal's 
decisions, as was sta ted by Chamber One in the RCA Global 
Communications case. 1 7 One must look more closely at the Claims 
15. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1 9 69), r e printed 
in (1969) 8 I.L,M, 679 and (1969) 63 Am. J. Int'l L. 87 5 , 
arts . l and 2 ( l ) ( a) • 
16. Case A-1 (1982) l Iran-u.s. C.T,R, 144 (First Phase), 
17. RCA Global Communications Disc, Inc. et al. v. The Islam i c 
Repubhc o Iran, et a . (l983) 4 Iran-u.s. C.T.R, 5 (Interim Award) 8. 
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Settlement Declaration itself to find further g uidance. 
In Art, II(l), the drafters of the Declaration seem to 
offer a straightforward answer to the question of characterisa-
tion. The article announces simply: 
An International Arbitral Tribunal (the Iran-United 
States Claims Tribunal) is hereby established for 
the purpose of deciding claims of nationals of the 
United States against Iran and claims of nationals 
of Iran against the United States ..•• 1 8 
It would seem quite clear that the Tribunal is "international". 
The remainder of the quoted sentence, however, should immediate-
ly suggest serious difficulties with that straigh tforward 
evaluation. The purpose of the Tribunal is in part to adjust 
claims by the nationals of one state party against the govern-
ment of the other. That fact would indicate that, under widely-
accepted legal definitions, the Tribunal is really "trans-
national"19 and concerned essentially with pri va te law rights. 
Supporting that conclusion is the fact that some private 
parties, under certain conditions, have direct access to the 
Tribunal, 20 avoiding in the first instance the general rules 
18. Claims Settlement Declaration, supra, note 2. 
19. The notion of "transnational law" was first elaborated by 
the outstanding American jurist Philip Jessup, s ometime 
Judge on the International Court of Justice, but the idea 
has since been adopted wide ly, especially in its applica-
tion to the law governing relations between states and 
foreign private parties and the law relating to multi-
national corporations. See P. Jessup, Transnational Law: 
Storrs Lectures on Jurisprudence (1956); and w. Friedmann, 
L. Henkin & o. Lissitzyn, Transnational · Law in a Changing 
Society: Essays in Honor of Philip c. Jessup (1972). 
20. Claims Settlement Declaration, supra, note 2, Art. III(3). 
- 357 -
concerning state espousal of claims under international law, 
And yet, the Nationality of Claims rules of international law 
have been retained, 21 even if some traditional rules have been 
modified. 22 Moreover, the Tribunal has also been granted juris-
diction to decide "official claims of the United States and Iran 
against each other arising out of contractual arrangements 
between them" and interpretational disputes involving the 
Algiers Declarations. 23 It is apparent, as is so often the 
case, that a straightforward textual analysis provides no clear 
answer to the question posed. To explore fully the nature of the 
Iran-u.s. Claims Tribunal, it will be necessary to review t he 
interpretations offered by the Tribunal as well as informed 
doctrinal commentary, 
21. Ibid,, Art. VII. 
22. The Tribunal rejected the traditional approach to j urisd ic-
tional issues involving claims brought before an interna-
tional or transnational tribunal by dual nationals in Case 
A-18, infra, note 32. See also the discussion, infra,~t 
accompanying notes 132 to 169. 
23. Claims Settlement Declaration, supra, note 2, Art. 11(2) 
and (3), and Art. Vl(4). "Official claims" which arise 
"out of contractual arrangements between" the state parties 
cannot comprehend non-contractual claims that do arise out 
of contractual relationships. In claims involving a 
private party (non-official claims) , the Tribunal has held 
that it does have jurisdiction over non-contractual claims, 
but it would appear that such jurisdiction is limited to 
claims that cannot be viewed as attempts to present a 
contract claim in a covering guise. See the cases cited 
infra, notes 122 and 123. 
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ii. An International Tribunal? 
There appears to be some measure of agreement amongst the 
American and third-country arbitrators on the Tribunal as to 
whether or not the Tribunal is "international", although t here 
is less agreement regarding the nature of arbitration per se. 
In a series of interviews conducted in September 1984, the 
writer asked five of the nine arbitrators then serving 2 4 t o 
discuss their conceptions of the nature of the Tribunal. The 
second President of the Tribunal was interviewed in October, 
1985, All of the arbitrators who were willing to go on record 2 ~ 
shared similar notions concerning the international status of 
the Tribunal. Mr George Aldrich was the most detailed in his 
response: 
The Tribunal does, of course, have a number of 
interstate claims, or, more likely, interstate 
disputes about the Algiers Declarations. It does, 
in fact, have some really commercial claims between 
the Governments, but those are just like any other 
commercial claims which happen to have Governments 
as parties. The great bulk of our work is claims 
24. President Gunnar Lagergren, Judge Nils Mangard, Mr Howard 
Holtzmann, Mr Charles Brower and Mr George Aldrich. At the 
time of the interviews, Professor Riphagen was indisposed 
and it was suggested that it would be inappropriate to seek 
access to the Iranian arbitrato rs for reasons which will 
become apparent below. 
25. Although agreei ng to be interviewed and willing t o speak 
frankly, Mr Boltzmann expressed concern that in the 
highly-charged environment of the Tribunal he did not wish 
to be quoted directly without his prior approval. There-
fore, in the following discussion, none of the general 
attributions of opinion should necessarily be held to 
represent the views of Mr Holtzmann unless he is referred 
to specifically in which case his comments will have been 
extracted from a public r ecord. 
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of individuals and companies against entities, some 
of which were Government agencies, others of which 
were not at the time the deal was made, but have 
since become controlled by the Government, so that 
the Government under the Algiers Declaration is 
responsible for the debt, and Article V of the 
Claims Settlement Declaration gives us a remarkable 
degree of flexibility in our choice of law, I 
must say, there is a question that we have to face 
that we really haven't faced up to squarely, I 
think (It) is the question of when we decide a 
case involving the taking of property, are we 
deciding it, a typical international law case of 
State responsibility for expropriation, or are we 
simply deciding a taking of property under general 
principles of law as a result of the Claims Settle-
ment Declaration, saying we have jurisdiction over 
actions affecting property rights. Certainly, we 
have used, in the few cases we have had, we have 
used international legal materials and argued from 
them, and I think we'll probably continue to do so, 
but, in fact, there is, of course, quite an argu-
ment available that one doesn't need to do that. 
Certainly, the requirements for international law 
with respect to the espousal of claims and the 
exhaustion of local remedies and those things don't 
apply, and it is certainly possible to argue that 
the mere taking of property, whether or not under 
international law illegal, is a claim we can deal 
with. 2 6 
It is apparent that Mr Aldrich conceives of the Tribunal as 
having a "mixed" nature, being a creature of public inter-
national law with jurisdiction to hear interstate cases, but 
with the primary duty to adjudicate private commercial disputes. 
He would appear to be willing to emphasise one or the other 
aspect of the Tribunal's nature depending upon the parties and 
facts before him. 
26. Mr G. Aldrich, transcript of interview (13 September 1984). 
On file with author. 
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This approach was accepted expressly by the Tribunal's 
second President, K.-H. Bockstiegel 27 and by Arbitrators Brower 
and Mangard as well. 28 In discussion, no Tribunal member openly 
rejected it. That being said, it is also clear that the 
ramifications of that characterisation have not been elaborated 
in any detail. For example, Mr Aldrich pointed out that the 
issue of the substantive law applicable to expropriation claims 
has not yet been addressed comprehensively. Moreover, there is 
significant disagreement amongst the arbitrators concerning the 
precedential or persuasive value of Tribunal judgments2 9 and 
27, President K.-H. Bockstiegel, transcript of interview (31 
October 1985), On file with author. 
28. Mr C. Brower, transcript of interview (13 September 1984); 
and Judge Nils Mangard, transcript of interview (14 
September 1984). On file with autho r. 
29. That disagreement comes to light most clearly in the 
controversy concerning the appropriate level of secrecy 
afforded to parties who seek to have their settlement 
agreements transformed into Awards on Agreed Terms. Unde r 
Art. 35(5) of the Final Tribunal Rules of Procedure (3 May 
1983), reprinted in (1983) 2 Iran-u.s. C. T .R. 405, all 
awards are to be made public 
except that upon the request of one or more arbitrating 
parties, the arbitral tribunal may determine that it 
will not make the entire award or other decision public, 
but will make public only portions thereof from which 
the identity of the parties, other identifying facts and 
trade or military secrets have been deleted, 
It has become common Tribunal practice to grant requests 
from arbitrating parties to maintain secrecy over entire 
settlement agreements which are used as the basis for 
Awards on Agreed Terms. That practice has been criticised 
roundly by the arbitrator H.M. Holtzmann. See Cases 15, 19 
and 387: Separate Opinions of H.M. Holtzmann (1983) 3 Iran-
U.S. C.T.R. 78 and the discussion infra, text ac companying 
notes 377 to 383 , On additional "problems" perceived by 
(cont'd.) 
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concerning the role of an arbitrator. 3 u Some of this disagree-
ment is prompted no doubt by dissimilar appreciations of the 
Claimants to result from Tribunal secrecy, see Clagett, 
"The Iran- United States Claims Tribunal: A Practitioners 
Perspective" in R. Lillich, ed., The Iran-United States 
Claims Tribunal 1981-1983 (1984) 129, 131-3. Implicit in 
Mr Holtzmann's criticism is the assumption that Tribunal 
Awards do have an important persuasive value. It is, in 
fact, a neat question whether, in an arbitral context, 
parties who seek to have their private disputes resolved 
are under any legal or moral obligation to allow the 
decision in their case to be made public. A case may be 
made that in international tribunals, decisions and plead-
ings should be made public so as to increase the certainty 
of the law, thereby providing guidance to other prospective 
parties and increasing the likelihood of resort to the 
peaceful settlement of disputes. Discouraging the use of 
force by promoting peaceful methods of dispute resolution 
may be imposed as a duty upon states as an extension of the 
basic principles of the United Nations Charter. It is more 
difficult to see the application of such a duty in a 
commercial context, however. Moreover, private parties are 
not directly susceptible to the obligatory force of inter-
national law. 
The belief of some Tribunal arbitrators -- one may say 
the fear -- that Tribunal decisions will be accorded prece-
dential weight by the international legal community is 
highlighted by the habit of s ome Tribunal members, most 
commonly the Americans, but some times the Iranians, to 
issue separate, concurring, opinions. There is clearly an 
assumption that Tribunal decisions will be followed as 
precedents and some members evince a strong desire to avoid 
association with certain holdings of the majority even 
though it may be necessary to concur in the result so as to 
provide a majority for an Award. See,~, ITT Indus-
tries, Inc. v. The Islamic Republic of Iran (1983) 2 Iran-
U.S. C.T.R. 348, 349 (Concurring Opinion of George 
Aldrich); Chas T. Main Int'l, Inc. v. MAHAB Consulting 
Engineers, Inc. (1983) 3 Iran-u.s. C.T.R. 270, 277 (Concur-
ring Opinion of Richard M. Mosk); Craig v. Ministry of 
Energy of Iran (1983) 3 Iran-u.s. C.T.R. 280, 293 (Concur-
ring Opinion of Richard M. Mosk); and Continental Grain 
Export Corp. v. Government Trading Cor2. (1983) 3 Iran-u.s. 
C.T.R. 319, 323 (Concurring Opinion of Mahmoud Kashani). 
30. The role of the arbitrator in the Iran-u.s. Claims Tribunal 
will be explored fully infra, text accompanying notes 300 to 340. 
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political constraints which affect the Tribuna l , but an 
additional and substantial impediment to consensus on impo rtant 
issues is clearly the differing emphases p laced upon t h e pub lic 
and private law aspects of the Tribunal by each arbitrator. 
In a thorough and balanced article prepare d in 1983, David 
Lloyd Jones of Cambridge lamented the "flaw in the jurisprudence 
of the Tribunal, that it has, to date, offe red little guidance 
as to its nature and function and has failed to identify t he 
exact role it is performing." 31 Subsequently , t he Tribunal has 
issued a major decision in Case A-18, 3 2 the s o -called Du al 
Nationality decision, where the nature of t h e Tribunal was a 
significant issue joined in the pleadings. In many ways, how-
ever, Jones's lament still rings true. 
In Case A-18 the Tribunal was faced with the diff i cult 
issue whe t her it could ass e rt juris diction o ver claims bro ugh t 
by persons who possessed both Iranian and United States na tion-
ality. For present purposes the i mportance of t he Tribuna l 
decision lies in its tentative e xp l o rat ion o f i ts o wn na t ure . 
The Iranian Governme nt had argued that the I ran-u .s. Claims 
Tribunal was a creation of public international law and was t o 
31. Jones, "The Iran-United States Claims Tr ibunal: Pr i va te 
Rights and State Re spon s ibility " in R. Lillich, ed., The 
Iran-United States Claims Tribunal 1981-1983 (1984) sr;-67, 
reprinted from (1984) 24 Va J. Int'l L. 259 [hereinafte r 
cited to Lillich]. 
32. Case A-18, 6 April 1984, reprinted in (1984) 23 I.L.M. 48 9 
(Iran-u.s. C.T.); and (1984) 5 Iran-u.s. C.T.R. 251 [here -
inafter cite d to I.L.M.). 
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be governed by and to apply primarily the rules of public inter-
national law. 33 As will be discussed more fully below, the 
result of the Iranian approach would have been the application 
of the traditional rules governing the nationality of claims 
which would have precluded, Iran asserted, all claims of dual 
nationals. 34 In their dissenting opinion, the three Iranian 
arbitrators underscored that position, arguing that the Algiers 
Declarations should be seen in the context of a long line of 
interstate agreements to establish mixed arbitral tribunals, as 
an exercise of diplomatic protection between states, to 
adjudicate "claims of their nationals against each other. 11 3 ~ 
Because the Algiers Declarations were interstate agreements 
designed to bring about "a peaceful solution t o an internatio nal 
crisis between the Iranian and United States Governments", 3 b any 
33. See,~, "Letter from Mr Eshragh [the Iranian Agent 
before the Tribunal] to Legal Adviser's Office, Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, the Netherlands Regarding the 
Applicability of Netherlands Arbitration Law to the Awa r ds 
of the Tribunal", undated, reprinted in (1984) 5 Iran-u .s. 
C.T.R. 405; and Mangard, supra, note 28 . 
34. See infra, text accompanying notes 161 to 168. 
35. 0 inion of the Iranian Arbitrators, 
1 ed 9 9 Tr1buna mimeograph copy on 
and (1984) 5 Iran-u.s. C.T.R. 275 
to the original]. 
36. Ibid., 28. It is fascinating to note that in the oral 
hearings in the case E-Systems, Inc. v. The Islamic 
Republic of Iran (1983) 2 Iran-u.s. C.T.R. 51, the United 
States Agent had argued that the Tribunal had been created 
by international law and was thus an "international 
tribunal" with its decisions being "part of internatio nal 
law". This position appears to have been abandoned in Case 
~, supra, note 32. See Jones, supra, note 31, 64. 
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claims brought to the Tribunal under those Declarations should 
be treated as "true inter-State claims brought before an inter-
national tribunal by means of the classic method of diplomatic 
protection". 37 
To the anticipated objection that the Tribunal could no t 
be viewed as a fully "international" adjudicatory body because 
certain claims could be brought directly by individuals and 
private entities, the Iranian arbitrators responded: 
[W]hether or not [a state] authorizes its nationals 
personally to present their claims in no way 
affects the nature of the diplomatic protection the 
government is extending. It is merely a matter of 
a simple procedural technique justified by the 
convenience it affords in view of the great number 
of claims. 38 
The position of the Iranian arbitrators, then, was that the 
Iran-United States Claims Tribunal is an "international" 
tribunal which must emphasise the role of international law in 
adjudicating disputes, As a first principle of internationa l 
law, the sovereign equality of states would perforce be an over-
riding considerati on in the decision-making process ; the rights 
of private parties would be correspondingly de-emphasised. 39 It 
37. E-Systems, Inc., ibid., 31. 
38. Ibid. Accord Jones, supra, note 31, 66 (the ability of 
1nd1viduals to file claims is only a "procedural device 
that cannot determine the substantive role of the 
Tribunal.") 
39. See,~' Iran, Statement of the Prime Minister of Iran, 
Mr Musavi, Regarding the Tribunal's Decision in Case A/ 18," 
24 April 1984, reprinted in (1984) 5 Iran-u.s. C,T.R. 428: 
"It is certain that Iran's j o ining the Algerian accord was 
based on the equality of the sovereignty of governments." 
(cont'd.) 
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would seem that, for the Iranian arbitrators, a n i mporta n t goal 
is to foster an essential equ ilibrium be tween t he rights a nd 
Another argument in favour of the posit i on adopted by the 
Iranian arbitrators can be extrapolated from certain j uris-
dictional decisions of the Tribunal. In E-Systems, Inc., 
ibid., 57, the full Tribunal held that it had an "inherent 
power" to issue conservatory orders to protect t he r igh ts 
of either party. Therefore, it was possible f o r t he 
Tribunal to "request" that any court proceedings i n Iran 
relating to a counterclaim be suspended until after the 
Tribunal had made its own evaluation o f t he merits o f t h e 
instant case (including the counterclaim) . See also t he 
decisions of Chamber One in QuesTech Inc. v . The Islami c 
Republic of Iran (1983) 2 Ira n-u.s. C.T.R. 96, following 
E-Systems, Inc., but in fact employing stro nge r lang uag e; 
and Rockwell Int'l Systems Inc v. Gov e rnment of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran (1983) 2 Iran-u.s. C.T. R. 369. And see the 
decision of Chamber Two in Watkins-Johnson Co. v. The 
Islamic Republic of Iran (1983 ) 2 Iran-u .s. C.T.R.~2. 
All these decisions are discussed infra, t e xt a c companyi ng 
notes 172 to 183, but for pre s e nt purposes the point i s 
simply that the Tribunal clearly sees itse l f as being 
vested with primary jurisdiction to e val uate claims and 
counterclaims before it. 
One reading of this s e ries of case s is t hat as an 
international tribunal operating under a valid treaty, t he 
Tribunal has precedence over Iranian and United State s 
courts. Probably t he better reading, howe ver, is simply 
that the U.S. and Iran have i mposed upo n private parties a 
choice of forum ag r e eme nt wh ich must be given effec t. The 
inherent nature of the Tribunal is o f no re leva nce i n t hi s 
con text; in e nforcing its jur i s d icti on the Tribuna l is 
simply enforcing the will of the parties to the Algiers 
Accords which it is bound to do. In a sense, the 
exhaustion of local remedies rule, that would apply under 
international law, has been turned on i ts head. Individua l 
claimants (including counterclaimants) mu s t exhaust the 
Tribunal remedies before see king remedies i n any other 
forum. This req uirement was created by t heir own national 
g o vernments in the exerci se of their r i g ht t o e spouse 
claims and does no t reflect any international legal s t atus 
inherent in the Tri b unal. This reading is supported 
by the fact that under U.S. law, specifically the Exec ut ive 
Order of Preside nt Reagan, a U.S. Claimant who is ultimate -
ly dismissed by the Tribunal on grounds o f i t s own lack o f 
jurisdiction still reta ins a r i ght t o r e s ume the a c t ion in 
a U.S. court. Executive Orde r 12294 o f 24 Feb ruary 19 81, 
s. 3, reprint e d in ( 1982) 7 Y.B. Comm. Arb. 260. 
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duties of the two states party to the Algiers Accords. Th is 
goal would affect decisions in all claims, even those invol v ing 
a private party and to which municipal law wou ld appl y . 
In the 
later discussion of the role of the arbitrators in the Trib unal 
it will become apparent that the t h ird-country arbitrators 
manifest some political, if not strictly legal, appreciatio n of 
the Iranian position, but that the American arb itrato rs re j ect 
the Iranian analysis entirely.4 u 
A majority of the plenary Tribunal in Case A-18 reach e d a 
conclusion contrary to that of the Iranian arbitrators. 
Although recog nising the fact that the Tribunal was establish ed 
by treaty and was, in a sense, a n international body, the 
majority went on to point out that "most disputes ... invo l v e a 
private party on o ne side and a Government or Governme nt-
controlled entity on the other, and many invo l ve primarily 
issues of municipal law and general principles of law.tt 4 l I t 
followed that the doctrine of espous a l o f claims did not apply: 
"(I]t is the [private) rights o f the claima nt, not of his 
nation, that are t o be de termined by the Tribunal." 4 2 The 
decision of the full Tribunal was in accord with the prior 
40. See infra, text accompanying notes 300 to 340. 
41. Case A-18, supra, note 32, 498. 
42. Ibid. See also the Concurring Opinion of w. Riphagen, at 509."" 
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holdings of Chamber Two. 43 It would seem that the majority of 
the plenary Tribunal was comfortable with the view that the 
nature of the Tribunal is "mixed". 
Although the Tribunal majority sought to distance itself 
from the specific arguments of the United States, it is obvious 
that the majority's reasoning concerning the nat ure of the 
Tribunal is in accord with the broad outline of the American 
position. The structure of the argument may conveniently be 
extrapolated 44 from an article written jointly by Ms Selby , 
then Deputy Agent of the United States, and Mr Stewart, the 
Administrator f or Iranian Claims of the u.s. State Department. 45 
43. See,~., Esphahanian v. Bank Tejarat (1983) 2 Iran-u.s. 
C.T.R. 157; and Golpira v. Government of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran (1983) 2 Iran-u.s. C.T.R. 171. It was 
stated expressly in Case A-18, ibid., that the prior 
decision of Chamber Two would stand no matter what the 
decision of the Full Tribunal on the issue of dual 
nationality. The implications of that holding will be 
discussed infra, text accompanying notes 134 to 138. 
44. Under the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal Rules, only 
the Orqers and Awards of the Tribunal and its Chambers may 
be made public. The oral pleadings remain c o nfidenti a l 
unless there is specific agreement to the contrary, See 
the Final Tribunal Rules of Procedure, supra,note 29, Art, 24(4). 
45. Selby & Stewart, Practical Aspects of Arbitrating Claims 
Before the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal (1984) 18 
Int'l Law. 211. Although this article contains a typ ical 
disclaimer that the vi e ws do not necessari l y represent the 
position of the State Department, one may assume that two 
civil servants who remained directly involved in the claims 
litigation were unlikely to adopt positions that they knew 
to be contrary to the "official" line of their government. 
Moreover, the article does not purport to be an independent 
academic commentary, its avowed purpose being to assist 
American lawyers in prosecuting their clients' claims. As 
(cont'd . ) 
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On the nature of the Tribunal, Selby and Stewart had this 
to say: 
Also as a result of the governing treaty instru-
ments, the Tribunal has both private and public law 
dimensions. On one level, it is an intergovern-
mental institution and a creature of public inter-
national law ...• On the other hand, the Tribunal 
in many respects resembles typical international 
commercial arbitration, handlinq ordinary commer-
cial debt and contract claims. 4 b 
The public and private aspects of the Tribunal were envisaged to 
"coexist and interact in a way which is unprecedented and, at 
times, unpredictable." 47 In other words, the nature of the 
Tribunal is "mixed". 
Having noted that the Tribunal majority seems largely to 
have accepted the U.S. view of the Tribunal's nature, it must be 
added that such a result was almost inevitable. Faced with 
constitutional documents (the Algiers Accords) that provided no 
adequate guidance on the question, and taking into consideration 
that the Tribunal was called upon to evaluate both interstate 
claims (and interpretational controversies) and private law 
claims between states and foreign private parties, the majori-
ty's holding that the Tribunal possesses a mixed nature was 
such, the article may be assumed to bear a strong similari-
ty to the arguments put forward by the United States in 
Case A-18. That conclusion is underscored by the obvious 
connections between the approach elaborated by Selby and 
Stewart and the positions adopted in the majority judgment 
of the Tribunal. 
46. Ibid., 217. 
47. Ibid., 218. 
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probably the only fully coherent result. The validity o f t he 
approach is underscored by the fact that t he traditi o nal i n ter-
national law rules governing exhaustio n o f local remedie s and 
espousal of claims do not apply in all their r i gour t o claims 
before the Tribunal, 4 ~ but that the national i t y of claims rules 
do operate in full, albeit with at least one major modifica tion 
imposed by the Tribunal's case law. 49 Moreover, although t he 
48. Under Art. III(4) of the Claims Settlement Declaration , 
supra, note 2, no claim could "be filed wi th the Tribunal 
more than one year after the entry into force of this 
agreement." Implicit in t h is rule i s that the r e i s no nee d 
to exhaust l o cal remedies, See also the Awa rd o f Chamber 
Three in Rexnord, Inc, v. The Islamic Republic of Iran 
(1983) 2 Iran-u.s. C.T.R. 6, 10, where the Chamber s t ated 
explicitly that "[t]he mere ava ilabil i t y o f a local remedy, 
whether judicial or otherwise, cannot precl ude the Tr ibu nal 
from jurisdiction." There are two justific ations f o r t he 
exclusion of the exhaustion of local remedies r u le. The 
first is the simple temporal r e ality tha t to ha ve i nsiste d 
upon exhaust ion of l ocal reme die s would ha ve delayed the 
Tribunal's proceedings immeasurably. The second reaso n is 
politically more sensitive. At the time of the conclusion 
of the Algiers Accords, anti-Americanism was running so 
high in Iran that access to Iranian courts for American 
claimants was prec luded as a practical mat ter . 
Claims o f over $250,000 (U.S.) are pre s en t e d by the 
Claimants thems e lve s und e r Art. III(3) o f the Cl aims 
Settlement De claration, thereby excluding t he espousal of 
claims doctrine of international law. The doctrine does 
apply, however, vis-a-vis small claims. 
49, See,~., the Claims Settlement Declaration, ibid. Art. 
VII and the extensive discussi o ns regarding corporate 
nationality in Flexi-Van Leasing , Inc. v. The Islami c 
Republic of Iran (1982) l Iran-u.s. C,T,R. 455; and Alcan 
Aluminum Ltd, v. Ircable Corp. (1983) 2 Iran-u.s. C,T.R. 
294 (discussed infra, text accompanying notes 184 to 186.) 
See also VSI Corp, v. The Government of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran (1983) 2 Iran-u .s. C.T.R. 31 (Order) 
following the decision in Flexi-Van, but a d ding o ne furt her 
requirement of proof, A good example of the p r oof req uired 
(cont'd.) 
- 370 -
vast majority of Awards involve primarily issues of pure fact 
and private law (aside from often perfunctorily raised issues of jurisdiction under the Claims Settlement Declaration) ,~ 0 certain 
claims have called into play various issues o f state responsi-bility under international law and the Tribunal has assumed its 
c ompetence to adjudge such claims. ~1 The preponderant weight of doctrinal authority also supports the characterisation of the Tribunal as "mixed", encompassing elements of private and public 
so. 
51. 
to establish corporate nationality may be found in Rexnord, Inc. v. The Islamic Republic of Iran, ibid., 9. The "modification" referred to in the text relates to the Tribunal's rejection o f the dua l nationality rules o f the traditional doctrine o f nationality of claims. See infra, text accompanying notes 132 to 153. 
See, e.g ., Gruen Associates , Inc. v. Iran Housing Co. (1983~Iran-u.s. C.T.R. 97; Woodward-Clyde Consultants v. The Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran (1983) 3 Iran-u.s. C.T.R. 239 ; Craig v . Ministry of Energy of Iran, supra, note 29; RayGo Wagner Equipment Co. v. Iran Express Terminal Corp. (1983) 2 Iran-u.s. C.T.R. 141; Queens Office Tower Associates v. Iran National Airlines Corp., supra, note 14; Pome roy Corp . v. The Gove rnme nt of the Islamic Republic of Iran (1983) 2 Iran-U.S. C.T.R. 391; and Morgan Equipment Co. v. The Islamic Republic of Iran (1983) 4 Iran-u.s. C.T.R. 72. 
See,~, Grimm v. The Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran (1983) 2 I ran-U.S. C.T.R. 78 (a claim for compensa-ti o n from Iran for fa ilure to t ake adequa te me asures to prevent the death by assassinat i on of the plaintiff's husband); Harza Engineering Co. v. The Islamic Republic of Iran (1982) 1 Iran-U.S. C.T.R. 499 (a claim based upo n expropriation of prope rty by Iran); and Starrett Housing Corp ., e t al. v. The Go vernment of the Islamic Republi c of Iran, et al. (1983) 4 Iran-u.s. C.T . R. 122 (Interim Award) (expropriatio n of r ea l property and contractual rights) . 
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Altogether, it would seem that to describe the Iran-United 
States Claims Tribunal as a "mixed" tribunal is a convenient and 
in reality it is no more than an evasion. 
tion. Yet the characterisation is ultimately unsatisfying for 
honest way to characterise what is admittedly a complex institu-
In Case A-18, the 
Tribunal recognised explicitly that it performs two functions 
and that it may have to apply different legal regimes in differ-
ing circumstances, yet the Tribunal failed to elaborate any 
guiding principles to shape its exercise of that dual function. 
As will be discussed below in the section on choice of law, s 3 
different Chambers have already employed contradictory 
approaches in seeking legal authority. vlhen dealing with 
similar questions, one Chamber has felt bound to apply only the 
rules of the proper law of the contract in question. Another 
Chamber has felt at liberty to modify strict contractual inter-
pretation by rejecting the expressly chosen law, employing 
instead rules of international law, Clearly, the mere pro-
nouncement that the Tribunal serves a dual purpose and is of a 
52. See, ~' Sohn, "The Iran-United States Claims Tribunal: 
Jurisprudential Contributions to the Development of Inter-
national Law" in R. Lillich, ed., The Iran-Un ited States 
Claims Tribunal 1981-1983 (1984) 92, 92. Professor Sohn 
sees the Tribunal as a somewhat inconvenient "marriage of 
an interstate tribunal with a commercial arbitral tribunal" 
facing "difficulties caused by trying to apply in tandem 
both the principles of commercial law and of international 
law." See also Jones, supra, note 31, 64-7. 
53. See infra, text accompanying notes 394 to 427. 
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mixed nature does not help to resolve inconsiste ncies in 
approach. If the Tribunal wishes to elabora te a cohere nt body 
of law, it must not only recognise its dual nature, it must 
grapple with it. Jones argues that the Tribunal must try to 
ensure that its two functions remain distinct~ 4 if the Tribu-
nal's decisions are to have any persuasive value outside the 
Tribunal's premises. It will be argued here that the Tribunal 
is probably incapable of such a clear division of function, that 
its nature is so mixed as to preclude legal clarity. Indeed, to 
strive for rigorous differentiation of functi o n at the expense 
o f fle x ibility might ve ry well lead to the demise of the 
institution. The full implications of that assertion will be 
examined in the final section of this chapter. j j 
There is one practical reason why the Tribunal has not 
been pushed to define its nature clearly nor to separate its 
various functions rigorously. That reason is the existence o f 
the Security Account. Provision for the Account was one of t h e 
most remarkable aspects of the Algiers Accords and its existence 
must always be borne in mind when evaluating Tribunal procedures 
and Awards. The Security Account will be discussed in some 
detail in the section on enforcement of Tribunal . awards, 56 but 
its operation must be outlined briefly in order to assess its 
54. Jones, supra, note 31, 67. 
55. See infra, text accompanying notes 359 to 429. 
56. See infra, text accompanying notes 359 to 373. 
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role in allowing the continued conflation of t he Tribunal's 
functions. 
Under the traditional doctrine of diplomatic protection 
(the espousal of claims) in international law, an injury done to 
an individual or corporate entity by a state is not directly 
actionable by the individual or corporate body , but must be 
pursued as a claim by the national state against the injuring 
state. Because international law traditionally has been viewed 
primarily -- though not exclusively 
as law between states, 
the doctrine evolved that an injury to a nati o nal was to be 
treated as an injury to his state, and only the state could 
prosecute the claim.~ 7 As has been noted, the Claims Settleme nt 
Declaration which set up the Iran-u.s. Claims Tribunal, to a 
certain extent dispensed with the diploma t ic protection rule, 
allowing parties with claims above $250,000 (U.S.) to act on 
their own behalf before the Tribunal.~ 8 
It would not be accurate, however, to say that the 
diplomatic protection rule has been excluded completely. First, 
claims of less than $250,000 (U.S.) must be pursued under the 
aegis of the State Agents to the Tribunal. More importantly , if 
one investigates provisions Eor the enforcement of Tribunal 
57. See,~' Oppenheim's International Law, 8th ed. (1955) 
(Sir H. Lauterpacht, ed.) 347, esp. fn. 2; and I. Brownlie, 
Principles of Public International Law, 3rd ed. ( 1979) 
480-1. See also Cohen, Krueger et al., The Iranian Hostage 
Agreement Under J;_nternatio~~~nd United States La\1 ( 1981 f-81 Col. L. R~22. 
58. See supra, note 48. 
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awards, it becomes apparent that there are ci r c umstances in 
which the espousal of claims rule could still operate, eve n i n 
the context of large claims. 
Under Art. IV(3) of t he Claims 
Settlement Declaration, any award rendered by t he Tribunal 
against either government "shall be enforceable against suc h 
government in the courts of any nation in acco rdanc e wi t h its 
laws." Under the law of certain nations it remains po ss i ble 
that particular court interpretations of the doctrines of save-
reign immunity and Act of State will preclude e nforce~ent of an 
award rendered by the Tribunal against o ne of the state parties 
t o the Algiers Accords, Moreover, s ome cou r ts might hol d t hat 
Tribunal Awards are "delocalised" and, in consequence, not 
enforceable under the New York Convention on the Recognition and 
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards. ~9 Although it has been 
argued 00 that such an i nterpretation of the New York Conventi o n 
is not correct, the possibility remains that a national court 
will mistakenly adopt that view. 
If foreign c o urts were to 
refuse enforceme nt o n whatever grounds, a "successful" Tr ibunal 
litigant would be forc e d back to the traditional rules of 
international law and would need to rely upon h is national state 
to espouse his claim, He would have no perso nal standing i n 
59. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign 
Arbitral Awards (signed 10 June 1958; entered into force 7 
June 1959), 330 UNTS 38, reprinted in (1968) 7 ILM 1046. 
See Jones, supra, note 31, 75. 
60, See supra, Chapter II. 
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international law to pursue the debtor state any further. 
Because the most appropriate form of dispute resolution --
arbitration -- will have failed to produce an enforceable award, 
it would seem that diplomatic negotiations (or failing that, 
political or economic sanctions) would be the only remaining 
avenue to settlement. Of course, in the present climate of 
Iranian-American relations, diplomatic negotiations would have 
little chance of success. The point is simply that the private 
American claimants are not able to assert "international" 
remedies directly. 
In its decisions so far, because of the easy enforcement 
procedures linked to the Security Account, the Tribunal has not 
had to confront this enforcement difficulty. As a consequence, 
it has been possible to hold to the comfortable, if ill-defined, 
notion that the Tribunal is a mixed creature of public and 
private law. If the Tribunal were forced to reflect upon the 
problems of sovereign immunity and the Act of State doctrine, 
with an attendant recognition that the enforcement of its awards 
could depend upon the exercise of pure diplomatic protection as 
traditionally conceived, it is possible that the Tribunal would 
more easily perceive its primary mandate as the resolution of 
the broad range of disputes between Iran and the United States, 
rather than as the settlement of individual, "private" claims. 
If so, the "international" aspect of the Tribunal's nature would 
be underscored. 
But despite the fact that, ultimately, every claimant 
could be forced to rely upon the good offices of his nati o nal 
- 376 -
state, the direct application of the diplomatic protection rule 
has been avoided owing, to the existence of the Security Account. 
That Account was created under para. 7 of the First Declacation 
of 19 January 1981 61 (not, oddly enough, under the Claims 
Settlement Declaration which otherwise governs the operations of 
the Tribunal). Iran was required to place one billion U.S. 
dollars in an interest-bearing "Security Account", the funds 
from which were to be used "for the sole purpose of securi ng the 
payment of, and paying, claims against Iran in accordance with 
the claims settlement agreement." 62 A further o bligation was 
accepted by Iran whereunder it agreed to replenish the Security 
Account (held in the Algerian Central Bank) "promptly" after 
awards are paid out so as to maintain a minimum balance of $500 
million (U.S.) • 63 Given Iran's seeming dissatisfaction with the 
operation of the Tribunal, 64 some u.s. claimants doubt that Iran 
will be inclined to fulfill the "topping-up" obligation. The 
consequences of a failure to do so would be enormous and the 
fragile equilibrium that has so far been maintai ned might very 
well collapse. 
61. See supra, note 2. 
62. Ibid., para. 7. 
63. For a discussion of the enforceme nt provisions of the 
Algiers Accords and their relevance to the general law of 
recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards, see infra, 
text accompanying notes 359 to 373. 
64. See infra, text accompanying notes 161 to 169. 
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Professor Lowenfeld has suggested that the existence of 
the Security Account has promoted "respect for the [Tribunal) 
process ••. at least for a time." 6 !:> Indeed, the practical 
importance of the Account cannot be overstated. Not only does 
it provide remarkable ease of enforcement, its existence 
undoubtedly encouraged many claimants to come to the Trib u nal in 
the first place. In this regard, it is important to recall 
that, although there were only a few hundred suits filed in U.S. 
courts against Iran when the Claims Settlement was being 
negotiated, 66 by the time the deadline for Tribunal claims 
passed, no less than 3,836 cases had been lodged, only ninety of 
which were state-to-state claims or interpretational cases. 67 
65. Lowenfeld, "The Iran-United States Claims Tribunal: An 
Int.e rim Appraisal " in R. Lillich , ed., The Iran-United 
States Claims Tribunal 1981-1983 (1985) 77, 91, reprinted 
from (1983) 38 Arb. J. 14 (No. 4) . 
66. See, ~' Hertz, "The Hostage Crisis and Domestic Litiga-
tion: An Overview" in R. Lillich, ed., The Iran-United 
States Claims Tribunal 1981-1983 (1985) 136, 137-40, and_ 147. 
67. Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, Annual Report: Period 
Ending 30 June 1983 (1983) (xerographic copy on hie with 
author) [hereinafter Annual Report 1). One American 
arbitrator went so far as to suggest that, due to the 
enforcement possibilities presented by the Security 
Account, some Claimants thought that the Tribunal would be 
a "free lunch", therefore bringing cases that "would ne ver 
be brought ••. to a normal court" , Aldrich, supra, note 
26. See also Iran-United States Claims Tribu nal, Annual 
Report: Period Ending 30 June 1984 (1984) (xerographic copy 
on file with author) [hereinafter Annual Report 2] 17. The 
Iranians certainly believe that the vast influx of 
unexpected cases indicates that many c laims are spurious. 
See NIC Leasing, Inc. v. The Government of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran (1984) 5 Iran-u.s. C.T.R. (Dissent of 
Mahmoud Kashani). 
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From a theoretical point of view, the importance of the Security 
Account is manifest, having rendered it so far unnecessary for 
the Tribunal to grapple with fine distinctions be twe en its 
public and private natures; such elaborations may never be 
required unless state sanctioned enforcement of Tribunal awards 
becomes an active issue involving the international law problems 
of Act of State and sovereign immunity. The nature o f the 
Tribunal is also of great importance when considering questions 
of substantive law, but again, so long as practical compromises 
can be worked out to allow Awards to be rendered, providing 
access to the ready money of the Security Account, the Tribunal 
may avoid any definitive pronouncements. 
Speaking in terms of "compromise" would no doubt raise the 
hackles of many Tribunal Claimants and even of certain indepen-
dent academic observers, for it is clear that the arbitrators 
have not been authorised generally to act as conciliators or 
even as amiables compositeurs (though they may be so authorised 
by the parties in a specific case). Article V of the Claims 
Settlement Declaration 68 appears to speak to the issue without 
equivocation: "The Tribunal shall decide all cases on the basis 
of respect for law " In fact, the uncertainties involved in 
the application of law by the Tribunal are myr i ad, undercutting 
the seeming clarity of this statement. But leaving aside, for 
the moment, questions of the substantive law to be applied by 
------ ------ -
68. Supra, note 2. 
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the Tribunal, 6 ~ the issue of "compromise" must still be 
addressed in any discussion of the nature of the Tribunal. for 
if the nature of the Tribunal in any sense determines its proper 
role, one must decide not only whether the Tribunal is an 
"international" forum but whether or not it is in any meaningful 
sense, an arbitral foruM, and if so, of what type. 
This examination may seem excessively theoretical, for it 
could be interjected that as a practical matter the Tribunal 
will operate and decide cases no matter what characterisation is 
accorded to it by academic observers. 
But it must be reiterated 
that the present investigation is in part an effort to explore 
the persuasive value of Tribunal practice. To do so will 
require that its field of application and its status be defined 
as clearly as possible. And so the following discussion, though 
continuing to focus upon the "nature" of the Tribunal, has 
intensely practical ramifications which will be elaborated in 
the final sections of this chapter. 70 
iii. An Arbitral Tribunal? 
When asked to comment upon the nature of the Iran-United 
States Claims Tribunal, one of the third-country arbitrators was 
69. for a discussion of issues involved in the choice of 
substantive law to be applied by the Tribunal, see infra, 
text accompanying notes 394 to 425. 
70. See infra, text accompanying notes 359 to 429. 
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adamant that the Parties to the Claims Settlement Declaration' 1 
had clearly agreed to create a traditional arbitral tribunal. 
In his estimation, "that's not really a court -- it's still 
called arbitration •.• it's intended to be arbitration, and you 
may know that in arbitration, you try to get those parties to 
agree, and to get a settlement .•• ". 72 Consider, then, the 
following statement of one of the America n arbitrators: " I 
think probably it was a misnomer to call this arbitration, in a 
sense. Arbitration, I'm sure you would agree, ru ns a gamut, a 
spectrum of possibilities, but this one is a very judicial type 
of arbitration bec a use we have so many cases •.. and our rela-
tions to the parties in any particular case are about the same 
as in a court when it deals with a case that comes before it. 1173 
It may seem incongruous that two distinguished jurists, engaged 
in a common pursuit, should entertain such patently antipathetic 
conceptions of the nature of their enterprise. Yet their 
division of opinion reflects what is , increasingly, the centra l 
enigma of international arbitration . 
With the ever-increasi ng tendency to formalise the 
arbitral process, the main symptom of which is the growing list 
o f arbitral institutions promoting sets of "Rules", it becomes 
more and more difficult to distinguish between arbitration and 
71. Supra, note 2. 
72. Mangard, supra, no te 28. 
73, Aldrich, supra, note 26. 
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full-scale court adjudication. Although it will be argued that 
this increasing institutionalisation, with its attendant 
formality, is an unfortunate trend, for the present it i s 
probably a mere distraction to ask whether either of the 
gentlemen quoted immediately above has articulated the "correct" 
view, A more fruitful line of inquiry is to accept that t he 
Iran-u.s. Claims Tribunal is a sui generis amalgam of court-like 
adjudication and arbitration and to explore the implications of 
that fact for the role of the Tribunal as a source of systemic 
legal authority. First, the two aspects must be distinguished 
further. 
The sheer scale of operations of the Iran-u.s. Claims 
Tribunal encourages comparisons with court structures, As noted 
previously, some 3,836 cases were initially submitted t o the 
Tribunal, 74 To process all of these claims, it has been foun d 
necessary to employ a Registry staff of eleven people, 7 ~ a 
translation staff of sixteen, 76 and a legal support staff 
consisting of three senior legal officers employed to a nalyz e 
the "small claims" of under $250,000 (budgeted for in 1983, but 
not appointed until 1984) , 77 three Chamber clerks, eleven 
74. Annual Report 1, supra, note 67, 16. 
75, See Annual Report 2, supra, note 67, 24. 
76, Ibid., 31. 
77, Ibid., 8. 
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secretaries, 78 and ten legal assistants who act as clerks and 
researchers to the nine Tribunal members. 79 The Administration 
is presided over by a Secretary-General who has one Assistant 
and a Secretary. 80 Perhaps the best indication of the scope of 
the Tribunal is the tantalising fact, buried in the Second 
Annual Report, that in an average month, the Tribunal generates 
roughly 125,000 photocopiesr 81 
But to define the nature of an adjudicatory institut ion 
with reference primarily to the size of the operations is t oo 
blunt an analytical dev ice, for one must remember that no matter 
how much the Tribunal looks like a large domestic court , it was 
nevertheless established as an arbitral Tribunal dependent for 
its existence upon the co-ordinated will of the contracting 
states. Similarly, to define the Tribunal's nature simply by 
relying upon the fact that its mandate is to decide cases "on 
the basis of respect for law" 82 is also too simplistic. An 
arbitral tribunal is just as much a legal institution as is a 
court, but that does not necessarily imply that an arbitral 
tribunal should be equated, for all purposes, with courts . 
------- --------
78. See Annual Reoort 1, supra, note 67, Annex XI. 
79. Ibid., 10. Ea ch arbitra tor has one legal assistant and the 
President has one additional assistant. 
80. Ibid., Annex XI. 
81. Annual Report 2, supra, note 67, 40. 
82. See the Claims Settlement Declaration, supra , note 2, Art. v. 
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The United States Agent at the Tribunal has complai ned 
about what he sees as a "systemic p rob lem [a t the Tri b unal ) ..• 
the t e ndency to compromise," going on t o exp lain: 
It is a long tradition in international arbitral 
practice that contentious questions be split down 
the middle, which means ignoring the legal argu-
ments in favor of reaching a political compromise 
satisfactory to both parties. This tend ency is 
exacerbated in a tribunal such as the p resent one 
where the judges must deal with the parties on a 
day-to-day basis. 83 
This concern is shared by other United States Government 
participants in the process. 84 Moreover, the American Arbitra-
tors have attempted to downplay any concepti on t hat the Tr ibunal 
should be a source of compromise solutions; they insist upon the 
importance of rigorously "legal" decisions, 8 5 a nd for them 
legality seems to be divorced from compromise. Although t he 
Tribunal has manifeste d some concern that i t s decisio ns no t be 
based upon purely "political" considerations, 86 there has be e n a 
83. Ravine, Remarks (1982) 76 Pro c. Am. So c. In t 'l L. 1, 5. 
84. The Administrato r for Iranian Claims i n the U.S. Sta t e 
Department has written in his private capacity that the 
requirement that Awards be made "on the basis of resp e c t 
for law" is crucial and must be obeyed (in a very lite r al 
and formal fashion it would appear) if t he Awards are to be 
accorded "their pro per preceden t ial weight". It should be 
reiterated that the ''proper precedential we ight" is an 
issue which has yet to be explored and no answe r c an 
legitimately be presuppose d. Stewa rt & Sh e r man, supra, 
note 14, 17. For a full discussion of the issue see infra, 
text accompanying notes 359 to 429. 
85. See,~-, Brower, supra, note 28; and Aldrich, supra, no t e 26. 
86. See,~, Hoffland Honey Co. v. Natio nal Iranian Oil Co. 
(1983) 2 Iran-u.s. C.T.R. 41, 42 (Chambe r Two) . 
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greater feeling of the necessity for some compromise than the 
American participants would desire. 
In any case, the objection to any degree of compromise is 
unrealistic and is not in conformity with underlying principles 
of international arbitration and of law in general. 
First, in 
the excerpt quoted above, the U.S . Agent himself pointed out 
\ 
that "compromise" is a tendency exacerbated "in a tribunal ... 
where the judges must deal with the parties on a day-to-day 
basis." 
In this statement, he recognises a powerful imperative. 
It will almost always be true that where there is any kind of 
continuing relationship, whether amongst the members of the 
tribunal itself or between the disputants, there will be a 
pressure to reach decisions that can accommodate all concerned 
parties. 
This pressure could alternatively be defined as a 
tacit form of customary law-making within a circumscribed 
community. 
The "continuing relationship" is recognised as an impor-
tant factor in decisions concerning the pursuit of municipal law 
contract claims where compromise , even involving a short term 
loss, may be preferred to the controversy of litigation. 
It is 
perhaps even more relevant in the transnational milieu where 
alternative markets may be limited and where cross-cultural 
relationships are difficult to forge. One American lawyer who 
has represented a number of claimants before the Tribunal has 
stated that "[t]he claimants who have settled well before a 
hearing appear primarily to be those whose continuing relation-
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ship is important to Iran [sic]." b? One could well add that the 
American claimants most eager to achieve amicable, compromise 
settlements are likely to be those who desire to continue 
commercial relations with Iran and who are economically powerful 
enough to assume the risk involved. && 
Just as settlements are 
more comraon between parties ,11ishin9 to e ncourage further commer-
cia l contact, some form of "compromise " in decision-making i s 
likely to evolve in a Tribunal where it is essential to ma intain 
at least formal civility between t he arbitrators and between the 
state representatives (the Agents and their staffs). 
Even more important in the pursuit of compromise is what 
the U.S. Agent recognised as "a long tradition i n international 
arbitral practice": the desire to reach solutions that are 
politically acceptable to both sides. This component in 
decision-making is to a certain extent masked in the I ran - u.s. 
Claims Tribunal because many of the most important claims are 
presented against a state by a pri va te party from the other 
state. The direct state-to-state political interests are not 
openly at issue. 
Yet it would be unrealistic to suggest that 
those political interests are not constantly in the mind of 
Tribunal arbitrators. To quote a perspicacious American l awyer 
who has participated in Tribunal proceedings: 
87. Belland, supra, note 3, 246, fn. 3. 
88, See,~., the s e ttlement confirmed in the Award o n Agreed 
Terms 1n ITT Industries, Inc. v. The Islamic Republic of 
~' supra, note 29. -
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Bear in mind that your case will be presented 
before a Tribunal on which the political 
pressures are enormous. No one, least of all 
the arbitrators who will hear your case, wishes 
to see the Tribunal collapse, and the withdrawal 
of Iran from further participation would 
virtually assure this. 89 
"No one .•• wishes to see the Tribunal collapse." That is the 
overriding consideration for all the members and for Tribunal 
staff. To ensure that no collapse occurs, some element of 
consensualism -- of compromise -- is inevitable. The reality is 
that the Tribunal depends for its continued existence, as it did 
for its creation, upon the will of the parties to the Algiers 
Accords. There is nothing to be gained in bemoaning that 
reality. 
Nor indeed is acceptance of the reality of compromise 
merely an unduly sanguine attempt to make a virtue out of 
necessity. The inability of the Tribunal to render decisions 
based upon "pure law", even accepting the entirely dubious 
proposition that such a creature exists, is an inevitable and 
not entirely undesirable manifestation of the co~plex nature of 
the Tribunal. It has already been stressed that the Tribunal 
has both public and private functions. Now it will be argued 
that its tasks are legitimately and expressly both legal, and 
broadly speaking, political. The relevant matter is not to 
89. Belland, supra, note 3, 247. See also W. Michael Reisman, 
Nullity and Revision: The Review and Enforcement of Inter-
national Judgments and Awards (1971) 111; and Audit, Le 
Tribunal des Differends Irano-Americains (1985) 112 .J. dr. int'l 791, 847. 
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castigate the dual legal and political functi on , but as was the 
case concerning the public and private law dichotomy, t o 
evaluate its implications. 
In a provocative article in the American Journal of 
International law, Stein has argued that traditional arbitration 
between states is a "tool of diplomacy". ~u In a sense the Iran-
United States Tribunal fits that description, for its existence 
is due to a diplomatic compromise resolving a complex political 
and ideological dispute. Yet private parties who prosecute 
claims before the Tribunal no doubt hope that their own claims 
will not be treate d as diplomatic tools but will be resolved 
fairly, according to a coherent body of legal rules. As the 
later discussion of substantive law applied by t he Tribunal will 
demonstrate, 91 that hope has sometimes been frustrated. 
Although the complex nature of the Tribunal almost guarantees 
some lack of clarity, parties do have a right to expect internal 
logical consistency in the Tribunal's resolution of disputes. 
Whether that consistency need be based on "purely legal" princi-
ples with broad precedential value is another matter. It may be 
that the great value of the Tribunal is not in the externally 
applicable "rules" it may formulate, but in the internal 
cohe rence oE the process itself. The parties will see their 
90. Stein, Jurisprudence and Jurist's Prudence: The Iranian-
Forum Clause Decisions of the Iran-u.s. Claims Tribunal (1984) 78 Am. J, Int'l L. 1, 49. 
91. See infra, text accompanying notes 394 to 425. 
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disputes being resolved fairly upon some rational basis. In 
itself, such a process enhances the Rule of Law, no matter what 
specific rules are being applied. 
Stein suggests that a sophisticated appreciation of the 
role of international arbitration will lead in any case to the 
rejection of a legalistic approach to conflict cesolution. This 
is especially true when, as is the case with the Iran-u.s. 
Tribunal, there is strong reason to believe that the parties' 
intentions in setting up a Tribunal were "not fully congruent". 
Then, according to Stein, "there may exist a special freedom for 
the tribunal to consider the parties' reactions to its judg-
ments."9~ Due to the existence of the Security Account, the 
Iran-u.s. Claims Tribunal has so far been spared worry concern-
ing whether or not its Awards will be respected. But there is a 
far deeper concern whether, given the enormous political 
pressures , the Tribunal itself can be held together. Although 
no one could argue seriously that an arbitral tribunal should 
always capitulate to a recalcitrant party simply to ensure its 
own survival, for the value of survival under such conditions 
would be subject to serious question, a sensitive tribunal will 
seek to lessen, not exacerbate, potential sources of conflict. 
To do so , some degree of compromise is essential, even when 
92. Stein, supra, note 90, 49. On the incongruence of the 
intentions of Iran and the United States, and their subse-
quent inability to build a consensus, see Mangard, supra, 
note 28. 
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"legal" issues ar-e at stake. 93 
A past chairrTlan of the American Bar Association Section on 
International Law has suggested that "[t)he success of any 
third-party mechanism depends largely upon its ability to 
convince the disputants to compromise on as many issues as 
possible". 94 Even if the parties fail to compromise, a distin-
guished expert in international arbitration, Professor Pieter 
Sanders, has pointed out that in the formal disposition of a 
case the arbitrators ar-e sometimes "for-ced to continue their 
deliberations until a majority, and probably a compromise 
solution, has been reached." 95 On occasion, various arbitrators 
at the Iran-u.s. Claims Tribunal have stated openly that a 
----------
93. An American Agent before the Tribunal has recognised this 
necessity as motivating many of the Tribunal's decisions, 
although he by no means applauds that fact: 
There is a tendency to try to find cases that the 
Iranians can win. The view appear-s to be that we don't 
want to displease them too much. We know how hard .it is 
for them to be defendants in all these cases. We don't 
want them to leave or to boycott the Tribunal, and so we 
will do what we can for them. 
Rovine , Remarks, (1983) 77 Proc. Am . Soc. Int'l L. 26, 30. 
94. Aksen, "The Iran-u.s. Claims Tribunal and the UNCITRAL 
Arbitration Rules - - an early comment" in J. Schultsz & A. 
Van den Berg, eds, The Art of Arbitration: Essays on Inter-
national Arbitration Liber Amicorum Pieter Sanders 12 
September 1912-1982 (1982) 1 , 5. See also M. Shapiro, 
Courts: A Comparative and Political Analysis (1981), passim. 
95. 
Pieter Sander-s, quoted in Ultrasystems, Inc. v. The Islamic 
Republic of Iran (1983) 2 Iran-u .s. C.T.R. 100, 114 (Concurcing Opinion of R.M. Mosk). 
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majority decision is the pcoduct oE compco,riise. % It o ne 
remembers that arbitral decisions are rarely ope n to appeal o n 
the merits, such compromise solutions will not seem at all 
improper. Views of arbitrators may validly differ and it is 
certainly the case, even in national legal systems, that app eal 
courts, especially courts of final appellate jurisdiction, will 
render judgments based upon some form of compromise. 97 
In the international milieu, the case law of the Inter-
national Court of Justice is replete with examples of solutions 
clearly based upon compromise. The clearest instances of 
compromise can be found in the sea boundary decisions which a r e 
based upon the concept oE "equitable delimitation". 98 These 
decisions demonstrate that even whe n a tribunal discovers the 
"applicable rules", the rules may be so lacki ng in precision 
that no "right" answers are apparent. The tendency to 
96. See,~., Starrett Housing Corp., et al. v. The Government 
of the Islamic Republic of Iran, et al., supra, note 51 
(Concurr1ng Op1n1on of H.M. Holtzmann) 159; Ultrasystems, 
~. v. The Islamic Republic of Iran (1983) 4 Iran-u.s. 
C.T.R. 77 (Final Award), (Dissenting Opinion of R.M. Mosk) 
80 at 82; and American International Group, Inc. v. The 
Islamic Republic of Iran (1983) 4 Iran~U:-~.R. 9-6~ 
(Award), (Concurring Opinion of R.M. Mosk) 111. 
97. See,~-, B. Woodward & s. Armstrong, The Brethren: Inside 
the Supreme Court (1979) passim; A. Paterson, The Law Lords 
(1982), especially at 98-121; and Stein, supra, note 90, 33. 
98. See,~-, The North Sea Continental Shelf Cases [1969] ICJ 
4; Case Concernin~e Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Libyan 
Arab Jamahiriya) [1982] IC.J 18; and the decision of the 
I.C.J. Chamber in Case Concerning D~limitation of the 
Maritime Boundary In The Gulf of Maine (Canada/United 
States of A..rnerica) [1984] ICJ 246. 
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compromise is accentuated. The "compromise" exists, therefore, 
on two levels: first, during the pleadings as the parties 
form a majority. 
the judgment when the judges give and take on various issues to 
negotiate their positions and secondly, during the drafting of 
If judicial decisions of national cou rts and 
of the World Court are sometime s e E Eec ted through a process of 
compromise, such a process has an even greater value in the 
context of an international arbitration where the congruenc~ of 
basic cultural values may not be presumed, Compromise will, o f 
course, be more difficult in such a context. As Stein points 
out, the very existence of the Iran - u .s. Claims Tribunal i s 
"derived from a crisis in which Iranian authorities had demon-
strated their disregard for what are probably the most inclu-
sively supported principles of international law." 99 Profoundly 
contradictory views cannot simply be ignored by the arbitrators. 
They must, during the decisional process, be assimilated to t he 
greatest extent possible, albeit wi t hout sacrificing bas ic 
principles, if both parties are t o retain confidence in the 
proceedings. 
Stein's conclusion is that, in evaluating the performa nce 
of international tribunals, one should not l ook simply at the 
99. Stein, supra, note 90, 37, Stein goes on to suggest, at 
37-8, that "[c]entral to the defining ethos of the Iranian 
Revolution is the rejection of Western li bera lism, an 
ideology in which secular rights-based legalism plays a 
central role." See also Selby & Stewart, supra, note 45, 
219 who recognise that the "daily operation" o f the Tri b u-
nal "is affecte d by competing politica l and ideologi cal goals ." 
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normative content of decisions, one "should expect international 
tribunals to draw upon consent, mediate solutions, law and 
office as partial substitutes for one another in an overall 
effort to elicit compliance with their decisions." luu In the 
case of the Iran-u.s. Claims Tribunal, all these aspects of 
decision-making are required, not so much to promote enforce-
ment, as to ensure survival, In a major dissenting opinion, the 
Iranian arbitrators openly called into question their commitment 
to the entire enterprise of international arbitration, asserting 
that Western "political and materialistic motives have permeated 
the institution," 1 01 A Prime Minister of Iran has accused "the 
great Satan, A.rriecica" of exerting "its acrogant influence", 
thereby "corrupting" the Tribunal. 1 u 2 In the face of such 
assertions, one is compelled to disagree with Stein's bland 
assumption that the Tribunal will play a "therapeutic and 
pedagogic" role in co-opting Iran into a Western-style legal 
process. 1 u 3 Without deep sensitivity and flexi b ility, Western-
dominated Tribunal majorities are more likely to drive Iran even 
further into isolation. In such circumstances, clinging to 
notions of rule-bound legality in the decisional process would 
------ - . - ·- - -- --
100. Stein, ibid., 35. 
101. Case A-18: Dissenting Opinion of the Iranian Arbitrators, 
supra, note 35, 84. 
102. "Statement of the Prime Ministe r of Iran", supra, note 39, 428-9. 
103. Stein, supra, note 90, 51. 
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be institutionally suicidal. 
There are important, but implicit, normative structures 
that condition the operation of the Tribunal. For the United 
States Agent to treat the "tendency to compromise" as a 
"systemic problem" 104 is to reveal an impoveris hed conception of 
legal institutions and to ignore the reality of the political 
situation confronting the Tribunal, there by threatening the very 
basis of its continued authority. The tensions besetting the 
Tribunal, hence the political contingency of many oE its 
decisions, are extreme. That being said, the troubling questibn 
remains whether, in the circumstances described and in view of 
its complex nature, the decisions of the Tribunal can be 
accorded much authoritative value outside the Tribunal itself. 
Responses to that question must be delayed pending a more 
compl e te investiga t ion of the Tribunal process, 
In the next 
section, certain relevant issues concerning the jurisdiction o f 
the Tribunal will be explored. 
8, Jurisdiction of the Tribunal 
Early in its deliberative history, the Iran-United States 
Claims Tribunal rendered a series of decisions in the so-called 
Iranian forum clause cases, 
In br ir:!E , the i ssue involved in t he 
cases ,vas whether or not certain foc,J ,n selecti.on cl,3.uses 
contai.ned in contracts i rnplicated in 1/3. ri.ou,; cl.ai ,:1s pr1~clu,ied 
Tr:ibun,3.l jurisdi.cti,)n, The clauses in question ,ver:e divecse , 
------ - - ---- ---
104. Ravine, supra, note 83. 
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some providing for the application of Iranian law, or for alter-
native venues for adjudication one of which was an Iranian 
court, or for various combinations of these options. Were such 
clauses, contained in binding contracts, to be treated as 
clauses "specifically providing that any disputes" relating to 
the contract "shall be within the sole jurisdiction of the 
competent Iranian courts", and thereby excluded from Tribunal 
juclsdiction under Art. II(l) of the Claims Settlement Declara-
tion? 105 The Tribunal decided that the issue was oE Eundame ntal 
importance -- it would undoubtedly aEEect ~any claims -- a nd 
that therefore it should be dealt wit h by t he f ull Tribunal. To 
facilitate uniformity of approach and to save precious Tri bu nal 
time, a system was established whereunder the various claims 
were scrutinized by the Chamber clerks 106 and a group of nine 
"test cases" was selected. 107 The cases were thought to be 
105. Supra, note 2. 
106, See Lowenfeld, supra, note 65, 81. 
107, The following cases were selected and decisions were 
handed down in each case on the same day, 5 November 1982: 
Dresser Industries, Inc, v. The Government of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran (1982) 1 Iran-u.s. C.T.R. 280; Zokor 
International, Inc. v, The Government of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran, et al. (1982) 1 Iran-u.s. C.T.R, 27 1 ; 
Stone and Webster Overseas Group, Inc. v. National Petro-
chemical Co. (1982) 1 Iran-u.s. -C.T.R, 274; Howard, 
Needles, Tammen & Bergendoff v. The Government of the 
Islamic Republic of Iran (1982) 1 Iran-u.s. C.T.R. 248; 
Gibbs and Hill, Inc. v, Iran Power Generation and Trans-
mission Co.~ et al. (1982) 1 Iran-U.S, C.T.R·. 236; 
H"°'alliburton Co. v. Doreen/IMCO (1982) 1 Iran-u.s. C.T.R. 
242; Drucker v. Foreign Transaction Co. (1982) 1 Iran-u.s. 
- (cont'd.) 
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representative oE the range of jurisdictional clauses that the 
Tribunal would be called upon to evaluate. The decisions of the 
Tribunal in the Iranian forum clause cases have now been 
commented upon widely, most authoritatively by Stein in his 
comprehensive article in the American Journal of Internationa l 
Law, 108 and no purpose would be served by delving into the 
minutiae yet again. In attempting to assess the nature of the 
Tribunal and its potential impact, all that is here requi red is 
that the broad outlines of the Tribunal's approach to jurisdic -
tion be traced. 
The effect of the Iranian forum clause decisions was that 
only a small proportion of American claims was held to be 
outside the Tribunal's jurisdiction. Only those clauses where 
the "plain wording ... fulfils the requirements 11 lu 9 of Art. II(l) 
of the Claims Settlement Declaration were interpre ted as 
excluding the Tribunal's jurisdiction. And it is clear that 
such wording had to be very plain indeed. The choice of forum 
clause would have to provide "specifically" for the "sole" 
jurisdiction of competent Iranian courts. Any ambiguity was 
interpreted so as to allow the Tribunal to retain jurisdic-
C.T.R. 252; TCBS, Inc. v. Iran (1982) l Iran-u.s. C .T.R. 
261; and Ford Aerospace ancrcommunications Corp., et al. 
v. The Air Force of the Islamic Republic of Iran, et al. (1982) l -fran-U.S.~R. 268. 
108, Stein, suora, note 90. See also Stewart & Sherman, supra, 
note 14, 18-20; Lowenfe ld, suor-a, note 65, 79 -86; and 
Sohn, supra, note 52, 95-100. 
109. Halliburton Co. v. Doreen/ IMCO, supra, note 107, 245. 
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tion. 110 Needless to say, the Iranian arbitrators were not in 
agreement wii:h i:hi.s restci.c,:i.ve i.ni: <~rpcei:ation oE the jurisdic-
ti.onal exclusion contained in Art. II(l). The Iranians were not 
entirely alone in challenging the majority's approach. 
I n one 
of the nine test cases, then-President Lagergren joined the 
three Iranian arbitrators in dissent and would have excluded the 
Tribunal's jurisdiction over contracts which p rovided that 
disputes be adjudicated "through the competent courts accordi ng 
to Iranian law". 111 The dissentients argued, inte r ~' that 
because the contract in question contained a separate choice-of-
law clause, the forum selection c laus e had to be read so as to 
confer sole jurisdiction on Iranian courts or the clause would 
be redundant. The majority preferred a more restrictive in ter-
pretation of the exclusion and held that "competent courts" did 
not necessarily imply the sole jurisdiction oE Iranian courts. 
In the forum clause cases t he American claimants did not 
succeed on all points. The Tribunal refused to adopt one argu-
ment which, from the perspective of the United States, was 
decisive in each and every case. 
It had been argued by counsel 
110. Gibbs and Hill, Inc. v. Iran Power Generation and Trans-
mission Co., et ~h·, ~upr~, note 107, 238. 
111. Howard, Needles , Tammen & Bergendoff v. The Government of 
the Is~ Re~~blic of Iran, supra, note 107, 251. 
Pre sident Lagergren also joined the Iranians in dissent in 
a casG in which a majority of the full Tri buna l decided 
that a non-profit, non-stock U.S. corpocation could pursue 
a claim before the Tri bunal. International School 
Services, Inc. v. National Iranian Copper Industrfes Co. (1984) 5 Iran-u.s. C.T.R. 338. 
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for ~~erican claimants, and supported by the U.S. Agent, that 
particular emphasis should be given to the word "binding " in 
Claims Settlement Declaration Art. II(l), which excluded claims 
"arising under a binding contract be tween the parties specifi-
cally providing that any disputes thereunder shall be within the 
sole jurisdiction of the competent Iranian courts" . The argu-
ment ran that none of the contracts could be considered "bi nd-
ing" at the time of the Claims Settlement Declaration because 
all had been nullified by a fundamental change in circumstances, 
the Iranian revolution, which effectively frustrated their 
purpose and rendered resort to hostile Iranian courts an 
illusory option. The Tribunal would therefore have jurisdiction 
over every O.S.-Iranian contract. In support of this conten-
tion, American claimants filed an affidavit from Warren 
Christo pher, one-time Deputy Secretary of State, who had been 
the chief U.S. negotiator during the hosta9e crisis. 112 He 
swore that the word "binding'' had i)een insert:-=~d in c.h,~ Declara -
tion, at ,\m,~rican ins i.stenc (~, S,?ecieically to ,'l.uthorisa the 
Tribuna l to reach a decision on the effect of the fundamental 
change of circumstance that purportedly had occurred. 
The Tribunal majority rejected the American contention, 
holding that Mr Christopher's affidavit was " ambiguous concern -
ing the clarity with which this intent was made known to the 
Algerian intermediary, there being no direct contact between 
112. See Lowenfeld, supra, note 65, 83. 
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the American and Iranian negotiators". 113 It followed that 
there was "not sufficient evidence that the t wo Governments came 
to an agreement as to the meaning of the word ' binding ','' and 
the Tcibunal refused to gi ve the wocd any eEfect. 1 1 4 Oddly 
enough, this decision seems to emphasise mightily the will of 
the pacti e s as the sole source of the TcLbunal's jucLsdiction, 
while at the same time ignoring an express jurisdictional 
requirement of the constitutional document created by the 
parties. 
Two of the three American arbitrators expressed their 
strong dissent from this aspect of the Tribunal's holding. ll 5 
Both Messrs Boltzmann and Mask seized upon one, perhaps 
unfortunately phrased, paragraph contained in some of the nine 
majority opinions in the forum clause cases to ground their 
dissent, To quote from the Interlocut ory Award i n the 
Halliburton Co. case: 
It is not generally the task of this Tribunal, or 
of any arbitral t r ibunal, to de termine the enforce-
abili ty of choice oE forum clauses in cont r acts. 
If the parties wished the Tribunal t o de t e cmine the 
~- - - ------ ----
113. Halliburton Co. v. Doreen/ IMCO, suora, note 107, 246. 
114. Ibid. See also Stone and Webster Overseas Group , Inc. v. 
National Petrochemical Co., supra, note 107, 276 ; and 
Drucker v. Forei92::. Transaction Co., supra, note 107, 255 . 
115. See Cases Nos 6, 51 etc.: Concurring and Dissenting 
Opinions of H.M. Holtzmann (1982) l Ira.n-u.s. C.T.R. 284; 
and Cases Nos 6, 51 etc--~Concurring and Dissenting 
Opinions of R.M. Mask (1982) 1 Iran-u.s . C.T .R. 305. 
Thes,~ dissent.s--ha"~~--c,;cf::iv,'!d some academic support, See, 
~., Stein, supra, note 90, 26. Note that Arbitrato r 
George Aldrich formed part of the majority. 
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enforceability of contcact clauses specifically 
providing for the sole jurisdiction of Iranian 
courts, it would be expected that they would be s o 
[sic] clearly and unambiguously. Thus, the 
Triounal would be reluctant to assume such a task 
in the absence of a cleac mandate t o do so in the 
Algiers accords. 11 b 
The Tribunal appears to be saying t hat it has pr ima facie juris-
diction to interpret forum selection clauses but no prima facie 
juri.sdiction to detecmine if they am binding. Phrased in such 
a manner, the Tribunal's holding flies in the face oE t he vast 
preponderence of contemporary authori ty which recognises t hat 
arbitral tribunals have full authority to determine their own 
jurisdiction, 117 which would of necessity include the right to 
determine the status of a relevant forum selection clause. 
Arbitrators Holtzmann and Mosk exploited t h is point to 
castigate the majority. In the words of Mr Hol tzmann: 
I am simply unable to understand the statement of 
the majority that [the Tribunal should not deter-
mine the enforceability of forum selection 
clauses] ...• In the context of these Cases, a 
determination of whether the forum-selectio n 
clauses are enforceable, i.e., binding , is neces-
sary in order to determine the Tribunal's jur i sdic -tion.118 
116. Halliburton Co, v, Doreen/IMCO, suora, note 107, 245, 
117, See,~' Saudi Arabia v. Arabian American Oil Co. 
(ARAMCO), decision of 23 August 1958, reprinted in (1963) 
27 I.L.R. 117, 146; and Texaco Overseas Petroleum Co. and 
Cal ifornia Asiati~ Oil Co. v. The Government of the Libyan 
Arab Republic (Preliminary Award), decision of 27 November 
1975, reprinted in (1979) 53 I.L.R. 389, 393 at 404. See 
also Stein, supra, note 87 , 16. 
118. Holtzmann, Dissenti ng and Co ncurring Op inions , supra, note 
115,295, fn. 26. 
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Mr Mask was even harsher, asserting that the majority's conclu-
sions were "devoid of factual and legal support." 11 9 Both 
arbitrators would have permitted the Tribunal to determine 
whether or not the clauses in question were binding. They would 
have interpreted "binding" to refer to the forum-selection 
clauses themselves, for such clauses, they asserted, could be 
severed from the contracts as a whole. 12 U Moreover, they would 
have accorded substantial evidentiary weight to the Christopher 
affidavit, 121 thereby holding that the Tribunal had been 
required by the parties to determine if there had been a 
fundamental change in circumstances in Iran which would render 
the choice-of-forum clauses providing for the sole jurisdiction 
of Iranian courts non-binding. Finally, they imply that such 
circumstances did exist. 
In concurring with the opinion of Messrs Mosk and 
Holtzmann that arbitral tribunals are masters of their own 
jurisdiction, one need not accept the remainder of their a naly-
sis. On the whole the Tribunal majority reached the best 
possible result; it should simply have been more careful in 
choosing its methods of justification. Rather than calling into 
question the Tribunal's right to evaluate its own jurisdictio n, 
119. Mask, Dissenting and Concurring Opinions, supra, note 115, 307 and 312. 
120. Ibid., 308. See also Holtzmann, Dissenting and Concurring 
Opinions, supra, note 115, 292. 
121. Mask, Dissenting and Concurring Opinions, ibid., 307. 
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the majority could have held that the ceference to "a binding 
contract" in Art. II(l) of the Claims Settlement Declaration was 
not directed to the forum clause alone, but as the words 
literally say, and as the Tribunal itself suggested en passant, 
to the "contract" as a whole. The issue whether or not changed 
circumstances had so altered Icanian court structuces as to 
render a forum-selection clause non-binding would simply not 
arise. The word "binding" in Art. II(l) would be given a 
meaning , which the Tribunal failed to do, and it would be a 
perfectly sensible meaning: Tribunal jurisdiction would on l y be 
excluded when a sufficiently express contrac tual forum selection 
clause had granted sole jurisd iction to Iranian courts and when 
the contract was binding upon the parties. 
If the contract was 
not binding, the Tcibunal could still retain jurisdiction over 
non -con tractual claims rela ting to, for example, unjust enrich-
ment (as long as the claim was not merely a masked contract 
claim) 122 or the taking of property. 12 3 For some reason, 
122. In Dames and Moore v. The Islamic Republic of Iran, et al. 
(198S)""4 Iran-u.s. C.T:-R:Lf2(Awar2ff-220--1, Chamber Three 
refused to entertain a claim based upon unj ust enrichmen t 
(quantum meruit) because the claim was really "for t he 
value of services rendered under the contract ." The 
Chamber underscored, however, that in principle the Tri b u-
nal could seize jurisdiction o ver non- contractual claims. 
See also TCSB, Inc. v. The Islamic Republic of Iran (1984) 5 Iran-rJ.s. C.T.R. 160. 
123. The Tribunal itself has cecognised its potent ial jurisdic-
tion over claims not grounded in contract. See e .g., 
Halliburton v. Doreen/IMCO, supra, note 107, 247:"The 
extent to which the claims asserted in this case ••. are 
not based in contract , and [are] thus within the 
(cont'd.) 
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although recognising this possi!Jle approach, the Tribunal s a w 
Eit not to follow wha t is a careEul and restricted analysis , but 
instead to adopt wide-ranging language improperly calling into 
question the power of the Tribunal to evaluate its own jurisdic-
tion. Admittedly, even if the interpretation suggested here had 
been adopted, the issue of rebus sic stantibus would still arise 
(most probably in its municipal law analogue of f rustration o r 
as an issue of ~force majeure"), 124 but then the change of 
circumstance to be evaluated would go to the possibility of 
performance of the contract and not to issues involving the 
fairness or otherwise of Iranian courts. 
Tribunal's jurisdiction, remain[s] to be determined by 
Chamber Two, the Chamber to which this claim is assigned ." 
In Isaiah V; Bank Mellat (1983) 2 Iran-fJ .S. C.T.R. 2 32, 
the Tribunal used this power and dete r mined that it did 
have jurisdiction over a claim founded in unjust 
enrichment. It should be noted that the situation is 
different for "Official Claims" of one state against the 
other. Under art. II(2) of t he Claims Settlement 
Declaration, the Tribunal may only adjudicate~"Of.Eicial 
Claims" relating to contracts for the sale and purchase of 
goods and services . Non-contractual claims could no t be 
heard . See Case B-24 (1984) 5 Iran-u.s. C. T . R. 97, 100; 
and Iranian Customs Administration v. The United States of 
America ITT84) 5 Iran-u.s. C.T.R. 94, 96. 
124. On the potential application of the doctrine of "force 
majeur", see Carbonneau, infra, note 390, 106-20. The 
doctrine of rebus sic stantibus has now been applied by 
the Tribunal in a manner ad vantageous to Iran. See 
QuesTech, Inc. v. Ministry of National Defence of the 
Islamic Republic offran~Award of ·20 September:- 1985, 
reported in (1986) 80 Arn. J, Int'l L. 362 (although the 
Tribunal took pains to point out that the Iranian 
termination of the relevant contract could be justified on 
the ground of changed circumstances only because the 
contract involve d services relating to national 
security) . 
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Here lies the central consideration that conditioned the 
majority's approach, the consideration that prompts the present 
writer to reject the analysis put forward by Arbitrators 
Holtzmann and Mosk. Given its status as, at least in part, an 
international arbitral tribunal, it was impossible for the 
Tribunal to hold expressly that the Iranian Revolution had so 
altered the legal system of Iran that it would be impossible for 
American claimants to find justice, That would have been the 
clear message contained in any decision which followed the Mosk-
Holtzmann line of argument and it is a message that would have 
been completely unacceptable to Iran -- so unacceptable that, as 
Professor Lowenfeld points out, the atmosphere at the Tribunal 
would almost certainly have been irremediably poisoned. 125 
Professor Lowenfeld is joined in his overall support for the 
majority's position by Professor Von Mehren of Harvard. He 
suggests that "in matters of jurisdiction the Tribunal has been 
especially careful, cognizant that it draws its jurisdiction 
solely from the fragile agreement of the two unfriendly 
states." 126 Two important ideas can be extrapolated from Von 
Mehren's insight. The first is that, as an arbitral tribunal, 
the Iran-u.s. Claims Tribunal derives its authority solely from 
the agreement of the two state parties as expressed in the 
125. See Lowenfeld, supra, note 65, 81. 
126. Von Mehren, supra, note 1, 720. 
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Algiers Accords. 127 There can be no residual jurisdiction, 
another factor that distinguishes the Tribunal from domestic 
superior courts. 
Secondly, because arbitral tribunals derive 
their authority from the will of the parties to the constit ut ing 
instrument, some care will normally be taken to avoid offending 
the sensibilities of the parties. Of course, in some contexts , 
an arbitration (usually ad hoe) will proceed even where one 
party has expressed the ultimate in contempt, by refusing to 
participate. 128 But the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal is 
unique; as an enduring institution it retains a continuing 
sensitivity to the legitimate concerns -- and even the simple 
pride -- of the parties. 
The decision of the majority in the forum clause cases 
reveals much about the nature of the Tribunal. Stein has 
complained that "the Tribunal's essential re sponse to the legal 
127. The Tribunal has spoken clearly and unequivocally on the 
source of its jurisdiction: 
[I)t is an undisputed fact that the extent of t he 
Tribunal's jurisdiction has been de t ermi ned by Iran 
and the United States in the Algiers Declarations, 
which contained detailed provisions on the jurisdic-
tion of the Tribunal and that, consequently, t h e 
Tribunal has no jurisdiction over a ny matter not 
conferred on it by these Declarations. 
Case A-1, supra, note 16, 152. 
128. See,~' B.P. Exploration Co. (Libya) v. Government of 
the Libyan Arab Republic (Merits), decision of 10 October 
1973 and 1 August 1974, reprinted in 53 I.L.R. 297; and 
Texaco Overseas Petroleum Co. and California Asiatic Oil 
Co. v. The Government of the Libyan Arab Republic 
(Merits), decis ion of 19 January 1977, reprinted in 53 I.L.R. 389, 422. 
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issue s was to refuse t o confront t hem", 129 but t hat evaluation 
is not quite fair, or at l e ast not sensiti ve e nough t o t he rea l 
constraints under which the Tr i bun a l operates. The o nl y i ssue 
effectively avoided by the Tribunal was the q uestion of t he 
meaning of the word "binding" in Art. II(l) of t h e Claims 
Settlement Declaration. As suggested above, tha t difficult 
issue could have be en handled with equal po l i t ica l s e nsiti vity 
without sacrificing rigorous analysis, as the maj o rity was 
disposed to do. However, in the end, the decisio ns reached by 
the Tribunal are fair. Professor Lowenfeld h a s e ven advanced a 
gloss on the major ity's opinio n reg arding t he r equire me nt t ha t 
contracts be "binding" that leads to the concl usion that t he 
Tribunal's decision "was the righ t outcome, not on ly in t e r ms o f 
the institutional character of the Tribunal, b u t in t e r ms of 
law." 1 3 0 He argues t hat because the Tri b unal deri v es its 
authority from the Accords between the two states and not from 
the agreement of the parties to any i mpugned und erlying 
c o ntract, t he "binding " quality should be e va l ua t ed fr om t he 
time of the sig ning of t he Ac c o rds (January 19 81) and t hat since 
then no fundamental change of circumstances has occurred, the 
Revolution obviously pre -dating the Accords. 
Even if one is no t pre p a red to go q uite as f a r as 
Pro fes s or Lowe nfe ld -- for his gloss still fails t o explain the 
129. Stein, supra, note 90, 2. 
130. Lowenfeld, supra, no te 65, 83. 
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majority statements that would restrict the Tribunal's ability 
to determine its own jurisdiction, statements which are simply 
not consonant wit.h contemporary law -- it is still true that the 
overall result was right. Even a highly critical American 
observer was forced to admit that, despite the perceived 
inadequacies of the majority's approach, very few Americans 
claimants would be forced to seek a remedy in presumptively 
hostile Iranian courts. 131 At the end of the day , 15 November 
1982, the Iranian arbitrators were still sitting, the Iranian 
government was still participating in proceedings, no nation's 
pride had been offended, and the vast majority of American 
claimants still had a forum in which to pursue their claims (and 
access to a guaranteed enforcement mechanism). Surely this was 
not a bad day's work for a fledgling Tribunal beset by intense 
political acrimony. There was one problem, of course, for in 
order to preserve itself, the Tribunal had been seen to call 
into question a basic premise of international adjudication: the 
right of a tribunal to evaluate its own jurisdiction. Such 
idiosyncracies, prompted by the Tribunal's unique nature and its 
political environment, may be inevitable. 
The second great test of Tribunal jurisdiction arose in 
claims brought by individuals who, under the relevant municipal 
law, possessed both American and Iranian nationality. Under 
Art. II(l) of the Claims Settlement Declaration, the Tribunal 
was granted jurisdiction to adjudicate "claims of nationals o f 
[131. Stein, supra, note 90, 44. 
- 407 -
the United States against Iran and claims of nationals of Iran 
against the United States". The noun "national" was defined in 
Art. VII(l) as "(a) a natural person who is a citizen of Iran or 
the United States; and (b) a corporation or other legal entity 
which is organized under the laws of Iran or the United States 
If 
Regarding corporate nationality, certain other condi-
tions of proof were imposed which have been elaborated in case 
law, 132 but no further guidance was provided concerning the 
nationality of natural persons. It would not appear that the 
negotiators had contemplated the problem of dual nationality; if 
they had, no agreement was manifest. Perhaps the issue was not 
thought to be of great importance. Yet when the claims were 
finally processed, it transpired that approximately 150 involv ed 
dual nationals. 133 
The question whether a dual national was allowed to bri ng 
a claim in the Tribunal against one of his national states arose 
first in Chamber Two. It should be pointed out that in practice 
all such claims are directed against Iran and not the United 
States, and that the claimants were, without exception, 
supporters of the deposed Shah. That fact undoubtedly compli-
cated the decision-making process, for the result would 
certainly be perceived in strongly partisan terms. This was the 
sort of case one state would "win" and the other would "lose". 
132. 
133. 
See the cases cited, supra, note 49. 
Belland, supra, no te 3, 242, fn. 22. 
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Because of the highly charged political atmosphe re, it is 
difficult to see why the Chamber Chairman, Judge Bellet, did not 
seek immediately to turn the case over to the plenary Tribuna l 
for adjudication. l3 4 Instead, the Chamber rendered three 
decisions relating to claims of dual nationals 13 ~ before the 
issue was addressed by the full Tribunal in Case A-18. 1 3 6 
This odd decision to hear the cases in a chamber placed 
the full Tribunal in a very uncomfortable position. It became 
necessary to state expressly in the majority opinion in Case 
A-18 that the previous decisions of Chamber Two would not be 
affected by the full Tribunal holding. 137 In the result, no 
134. In Presidential Order No. 1 of 19 October 1981, Art. 6(a), 
reprinted in (1981) 1 Iran-u.s. C.T.R. 95, President 
Lagergren, who was exercising his power under Art. III o f 
the Claims Settlement Declaration, ordered that "[w)here a 
case pending before a Chamber raises an important issue 
the Chamber may, at any time prior to the final award 
relinquish jurisdiction in favour of the plenary 
Tribunal". 
135. Esphahanian v. Bank Tejarat, supra, note 43, and Golpira 
v. Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, supra, note 
43, were the two controversial cases in which dual 
nationals were authorised to claim against Iran. In 
Haroonian v. The Islamic Republic of Iran (1983) 2 Iran-
u.s. C.T.R. 226, 227, the Chamber decided unanimously 
(though Dr Shafeiei refused to sign the Farsi version of 
the Award, having previously signed the English version ) 
that a person who became a U.S. citizen after the date of 
the Algiers Accords was not entitled to claim against Iran 
because "[d]uring the critical time .•• that is, fr om the 
date the claim arose ••• until the date the Algiers 
Declaration entered into force (19 January 1981), the 
Claimant was an Iranian national and an Iranian national 
only." 
136. Case A-18, supra, note 32. 
137. Ibid., 490. 
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real inconsistency was involved because the full Tribunal in 
large measure adopted the reasoning of the majority opinions in 
Chamber Two. One has cause to ask, however, if the Chamber 
decisions in any way prejudiced the full Tribunal evaluation, 
predisposing it to reject the Iranian position. Alternatively, 
one could speculate that the full Tribunal majority was enabled 
to say that the Chamber Two decisions would stand because it was 
clear that the approaches taken would be, in fact, compatible. 
A believer in rigorously "legal" decision-making might be 
tempted to accept the second alternative except that there does 
not appear to be any authority vested in the Tribunal to 
overturn awards once rendered, 13 ~ so that even if the full 
Tribunal had disagreed with the Chamber Two majority, it would 
not have been possible to reverse the previous Awards. The 
pressure, then, would have operated in the other direction, 
encouraging the plenary Tribunal to reach a decision compatible 
138. There are only two provisions in the Final Tribunal Rules 
of Procedure, supra, note 29, which allow for any re-
examination of Tribunal Awards. Article 35 allows the 
Tribunal to "interpret" an award and Art. 36 provides for 
the correction of "any errors in computation" or for the 
rectification of clerical and typographical errors "or any 
errors of similar nature". Neither of these provisions 
authorises the full scale reversal of an award once 
rendered. In an Order in one of the cases involving the 
Charles T. Main Group , Judge Riphagen noted that "the 
Tribunal Rules, while providing in Articles 35 and 36 a 
thirty day period for the interpretation of awards and the 
correction of errors, do not provide for the substantive 
reconsideration or revision of awards. Chas. T. Main 
International, Inc. v. Khuzestan Water and Power Authority 
et al. (1983) 4 Iran-u.s. C.T.R. 60 (Order) 60. See also 
Dallal v. The Islamic Republic of Iran (1984) 5 Iran-u.s. 
C.T.R. 74. 
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with the Awards in Chamber Two so as to prevent blatantly 
contradictory results. 
These circumstances point once again to the extremely 
complex nature of the Tribunal. Because in many ways it looks 
so much like a court, there is a temptation to assume that the 
Tribunal possesses the same powers as a court. Normally, courts 
of final jurisdiction possess a right to reverse their own prior 
holdings. 139 Yet, despite what appears to be a two-tier system, 
the plenary Iran-u.s. Claims Tribunal has no power to revers e 
the decision of a Chamber. 140 The full Tribunal was completely 
at liberty to render an inconsistent decision but it had no 
procedural mechanism which would enable it to strive for consis-
tency. Any consistency that is achieved must result solely from 
the restraint and politesse of the arbitrators. 
Consistency was achieved in the dual nationality cases , 
but at a cost -- a cost that has yet to be measured. In the 
original Chamber Two decision, the majority (Judge Bellet and 
Mr Aldrich) held that, in determining whether or not a dual 
national could present a claim, the Tribunal should follow t he 
perceived contemporary trend which would allow such claims if 
the individual was relying upon his "dominant and effective 
139. See, ~' the "Practice Statement" of t he United Kingdom 
House of Lords in [1966] 1 W.L.R. 1234. 
140. Under Art. IV(l) of the Claims Settlement Declaration, 
supra, note 2, each decision of the Tribunal is "final and binding." 
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nationality". 141 It should be reiterated that the point of the 
exercise was that, despite the "mixed" public and private 
{international and transnational) nature of t he Tribunal, the 
nationality of claims rules did apply and it was necessary to 
show that individual claimants had a right to the protection o f 
one of the state parties, a protection operating through the 
granting of access to the Tribunal. 
It had been the traditional position of international law, 
a position argued forcefully by the Iranian Government, that 
under the doctrine of "non-responsibility", a dual national 
could not request the state of one of his nationalities t o 
pursue a claim against his other national state. 14 ~ In his 
copious and comprehensive dissenting opinion, which treated bo th 
the Esphahanian and Golpira cases, Dr Shafeiei argued that this 
traditional rule was still binding, 143 but the majority held in 
Esphahanian that "since the beginning of the century, there has 
been a very strong tendency to limit the principle of non-
141. See especially the leading case, Esphahanian, supra, note 
43, 160-1. In so deciding, the Chamber put great 
emphasis, at 163, upon the Judgment of the International 
Court of Justice in the Nottebohm Case {Liechtenstein v. 
Guatemala) [1955] I.C.J, 4, 22 where the Court elaborated 
the "real and effective nationality" doctrine. See also 
the Merge Case {U.S. v. Italy) (1955) 14 R,I.A.A. 236. 
142. See, ~, E. Borcha.rd, The Diplomatic Protection of 
Citizens Abroad or The Law of International Claims (1915 ) 
588. See also the Hague Convention on Certain Questions 
Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws of 12 April 
1930, art. 4. 
143. Dissenting Opinion of Dr. Shafie Shafeiei o n the Issue of 
Dual Nationality, supra, note 3, 225. 
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responsibility •.• by the principle o f effective national-
ity."144 The majority went on to examine the factual links that 
bound Esphahanian to the United States and t o Iran and concluded 
that "Esphahanian's dominant and effective nationality at all 
relevant times has been that of the United States" and t hat 
therefore, the Tribunal "has jurisdiction t o decide his claim 
against Bank Tejarat." 14 ~ The only caveat was that if fraudulent 
exploitation had been proved, the majority might have denied 
Tribunal jurisdiction "on equitable grounds." 146 The 
Esphahanian Award was followed expressly by the majority in 
Golpira. 147 
The dual nationality issue was brough t to the Eull 
Tribunal by Iran as an interpretive dispute between the two 
state parties to the Algiers Accords, an "A" case according t o 
the Registry's number ing system, indicating a d is pu t e referred 
144. Esphahanian v. Bank Tejarat, supra, note 43, 162. 
145. Ibid., 168. In eva luating t he factu a l connections , the 
Tribunal t ook into consideration such factors as 
Esphahanian's l ong residence in the United States (he 
first arrived at the age of seventeen), his service in t he 
American armed forces, his marriage to an American and t he 
fact that there were two U.S.-based children of the 
marriage, and his complete severance of ties with Iran 
after 1978. The major countervailing factor was that 
Esphahanian, from 1970-8, was the Middle Eastern manager 
for a Houston-based corporation and spent nine months oE 
every year stationed in I ran. The factors which linked 
him to America were thought to be more significant. Ibid., 158-9. ~~ 
146. Ibid., 168, 
147. Golpira v. The Government of the Islami c Republic of Iran, 
supra, note 43, 173. 
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to in Art. IV(4) or II(3) of the Claims Settlement Decla r a-
tion. 14 8 The decision of the plenary Tribunal is therefore no t 
an "award" for it does not relate t o any specific claim; i t is 
really a declaratory judgment. As such, it will be relied upon 
as a guide to facilitate decisions in subsequent claims 
involving issues of dual nationality . 
As noted above, the majority of the full Tribunal in 
effect adopted the same position as the Chamber Two majority i n 
Esphahanian. In the words of the plenary Tribunal: 
There is a considerable bod y of law and l e gal 
literature .•• which leads the Tribunal t o t he 
conclusion that the applicable rule of interna -
tional law is that of dominan t and effecti ve 
nationality. 149 
Like Chamber Two, and without pursuing any exte nded anal ysis, 
the Tribunal majority relied primarily upon "the two most i mpo r-
tant decisions o n t he s ubj e ct i n the y ea rs f o llowi ng the Sec ond 
World War [which] have had a decisive effect" l S u -- the 
Nottebohm and Merge 1 ~ 1 cases. In f ac t, the relevance of both 
case s is o pen to some questi o n. 15 2 Neverthe less , t he Tr i bunal 
148. See Annual Report 1, supra, no te 67, 14-5. 
149. Case A-18, supra, note 32, 497. 
150. Ibid., 499. 
151. Supra, note 141. 
152. Points that should perhaps have been treated with 
reference to the Nottebohm Case include: ( a ) the fa c t tha t 
the Nottebohm de c ision did n o t i nvolve a p r o blem of d ual 
nationality; and ( b ) the po ten t ially de cisive eff e c t of 
the Guatemalan argume nts whi ch trea t e d No t tebohm' s 
acquisitio n o f Li ch t e nste in nationa l i t y as fra udul e nt, 
(co nt' d .) 
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majority simply went on to suggest factors tha t would be 
applicable in determining "dominant and effective" nationality. 
Those factors included "habitual residence, center of interests, 
family ties, [and) participation in public life." 1 ~ 3 The list 
was not intended to be exhaustive and the Chambers retain a 
right to consider any additional factors which they deem t o be 
relevant, 
Case A-18 caused the greatest convulsions yet experienced 
by the Tribunal. 154 The mere fact that, apart from the majority 
opinion, there were three separate concurring opinions and one 
dissent (joined by all three Iranian arbitrators ) 1 ~ 5 is 
arguments to which the International Court did not wish to 
lead its imprimatur. Similarly difficult issues arise 
vis-~-vis the Merg§ Case, issues such as: (a) the fa ctual 
importance of Italy's status as a defeated Axis power ; (b) 
the nature of the Tri buna l which may be seen as a mani -
festation of traditional post-war "victor's justice"; and 
(c) the modest reputations of the members of the Tribunal 
in no way mitigated by reasoning that is, to put it 
charitably, wooly (the Tribunal's attempt to suggest that 
it was upholding both the traditional rule of non-
protection and the Nottebohm rule of effective nationality 
remains unconvincing). 
153. Case A-18, supra, note 32, 501. 
154. Accord Belland, supra, note 3, 242, fn. 22. 
155. See the Concurring Opinions of H.M. Holtzmann and George 
Aldrich in Case A-18, supra, note 32, 503, of R.M. Mosk at 
505 and of W. Riphagen at 509. When the majority opi nion 
was released, the Iranian arbitrators attached a "Declara-
tion" expressing their outrage, accusing the Tribunal of 
"bad faith", bias and political motivations. Case A-18, 
supra, note 32, 502. The three Iranians later filed a 
full scale dissent which retains a sense of outrage but 
attempts to ground their anger in a rational l ega l argu-
ment. See Case A-18: Dissenting Opinion of the Ira nian 
Arbitrators, supra, note 35. 
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sufficient evidence of controversy. When one reads the separate 
opinions, the intensity of that controversy is manifest. 
Arbitrators Holtzmann and Aldrich indicate that although they 
concur in the result, they would, in preference, have adopted an 
entirely different course of reasoning, holding that, because 
the Claims Settlement Declaration defines "nationals" as 
"citizens", a term of municipal law, it was "clear that all 
nationals, including dual nationals, are entitled to bring 
claims to this Tribunal." 156 In other words, t he jurisdiction 
of the Tribunal would depend upon the domestic law definitions 
of "citizen" in the United States and Iran. If a person were a 
"citizen", for example, of the United States under U.S. law, he 
w.ould be automatically a "national" for the purposes of the 
Claims Settlement Declaration and would be entitled to claim. 
Any other nationality would be i rre levant. 
Richard Mosk, in his concurring opinion, objected to the 
Tribunal's resort to customary international law and its test of 
dominant and effective nationality, because in his view the 
"plain language" of the Claims Settlement Declaration was clear 
in according to the Tribunal jurisdiction over claims brought by 
dual nationals. He too would rely upon the equation of 
nationality with citizenship in the Declaration def inition to 
hold that all those who could claim U.S. citizenship would have 
standing to be heard before the Tribunal, and the Tribunal would 
156. Concurring Opinions of H.M. Ho ltzmann and George Aldrich, 
ibid., 503. 
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have jurisdiction to hear them. 1 ~ 7 
Judge Riphagen, who had replaced Judge Bellet as Chairman 
of Chamber Two, 158 also concurred in the result but would have 
modified the applicable test of dual nationality, holding that 
the relevant issue was not "the choice of the 'better' ( ie. the 
'dominant' or 'effective') nationality" but rather "the search 
for the most relevant nationality within a specific context". 1 ~ 9 
That search would also explore the 'cause' of dual nationality: 
the Tribunal should look at the "social conduct" of the claimant 
and the "presence or absence of deliberate acts aimed at the 
relinquishment from [sic] the 'other' nationality" . l 6u 
But these divisions of opinion, though important, appear 
mere quibbles in the face of the Dissent signed by all t hree 
Iranian arbitrators. In a lengthy opinion which can only be 
summarized here, they made a solid attempt to marshal all 
possible legal objections to the position adopted by the 
majority. The Iranian arbitrators began by stressing that t he 
totality of the Tribunal's jurisdict ion was derived from the 
Claims Settlement Declaration. For the purposes of interpr eta-
tion, one had to look for the subjective will of both states in 
the Declaration; only results which were "mutually acceptable" 
157. Concurr ing Opinion of R.M. Mask, ibid., 505-9. 
158. Annual Report 1, supra, note 67, 3, fn. 1. 
159. Concurring Opinion of w. Riphagen in Case A-18, supra, 
note 32, 509 [emphasis in original). 
160. Ibid., 510. 
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in the light of those subjective wills could be appropriate 
interpretations. Using this approach, and positing a duty to 
interpret jurisdictional clauses restrictively, it was clear 
that "[n]othing in the context, preamble, or preparatory work 
indicates a converging will of the two governments to extend the 
tribunal's jurisdiction to dual nationals." 1 6 1 
The Iranians rejected the argument that the term 
"national" in the Declaration must automatically include dual 
nationals because in their reading of customary international 
law, a dual national was generally excluded from claiming 
against either of his national governments und er the principle 
of non-responsibility. Following Dr Shafeiei's lead in his 
dissent from the previous Chamber Two decisions in the dual 
nationality cases, the Iranian arbitrators in Case A-18 relied 
primarily upon the Hague Convention of 1930, lb 2 persuasive and 
authoritative doctrine supporting the approach of that Conven-
~ and state practice (largely excluding that of the United 
States) to support their ~osition. But they also included one 
rather neat argument based upon United States practice, drawn, 
one presumes, from the Iranian Government Memorial in the case. 
In 1976, the U.S. Government concluded a Claims Settlement 
Agreement with Egypt in which the parties believed it necessary 
to state expressly that the term "nationals" included dua l 
161. Case A-18: Dissenting Opinion of the Iranian Arbitrators, 
supra, note 35, 11. 
162. Supra, note 142. 
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nationals and that the relevant test to determine standing to 
claim was "dominant and effective" nationality . The Irani ans 
pointed out that if the new customary rule governing the presen -
tation of claims by dual nationals was the principle of dominant 
and effective nationality, as asserted by the United States, 
then the wording of the U.S.-Egyptian agreement was redunda nt . 
It was only because dominant and effective nationality was not 
the customary rule governing the status of claims by dual 
nationals that the United States and Egypt were required 
expressly to include that rule in their agreement. 163 
Whether or not one accepts this argument -- and it is 
clear that it could almost equally run in the other direction, 
the U.S.-Egypt agreement being viewed as furt her evidence of the 
emergence of the "new" dual nationality rule -- it is clear that 
the Iranian arbitrators were concerned to construc t a forceful 
legal argument based upon traditional principles of interna-
tional customary law, buttressed by recent practice invol ving 
claims of dual nationals. It would be incorrect, then, to 
suggest that the Iranian arbitrators are concerned only with 
"politics". Even if their decisions are commonly motivated by 
intensely-felt political beliefs, they often strive to prov ide 
163. Case A-18: Dissenting Opinion of the Iranian Arbitrators, 
supra, note 35, 12-3. 
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formally legal justifications for their holdings. 16 ~ Finally, 
the Iranian arbitrators rejected with scorn the American 
contention, a contention ultimately supported only by the U.S. 
arbitrators, that the municipal law definition of "citizen" was 
the appropriate and exclusive means of defining "national" for 
Tribunal purposes. That argument, the Iranians asserted, would 
deny the international nature of the Tribunal. 16 ~ Ultimately, 
the Iranians found themselves alone in dissent and their 
isolation, mixed perhaps with anger at the failure of their 
attempt at "legal" argument, caused them to adopt a vitriolic 
tone. They asserted: 
In assuming jurisdiction over these claims [of dual 
nationals), the majority has exceeded its power and 
acted in ultra vires. As such, its decision is 
null and void ab initio. 166 
They went on to savage the Tribunal's holding, and the work of 
the Tribunal in its entirety on frankly political grounds, 
noting its "predominantly Western composition" and criticising 
the "exclusive club" of Western arbitrators who "are concer ned 
[only] ... to satisfy their political and materialistic inclina-
164. 
165. 
166. 
See Economt Forms Corp. v. The Government of the Islamic 
Republic o Iran (1983) 5 Iran-u.s. C.T.R. 1 (Dissenting 
Opinion of Mahmoud M. Kashani). See also the comments of 
an American observer who notes that "American officials 
and attorneys freely acknowledge that opinions and 
dissents, even by Iranian judges they happen to revile, 
are copiously documented and closely reasoned". Tonelson, 
supra, note 3, 23. 
Case A-18: Dissenting Opinion of the Iranian Arbitrators, 
supra, note 35, 16-7. 
Ibid., 82. 
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tions". 1 b 7 The entire arbitral process was "designed to safe-
guard the interests of the capitalist world."l 6 b 
The anger displayed by the Iranians in Case A-18 again 
highlights the enormous difficulties facing the Tribunal and it 
justifies a careful approach to evaluations of its own jurisdic-
tion. In the forum-clause cases, the Tribunal majority was 
cautious and avoided wounding national sensibilities. It 
refused to hold that the Iranian legal system was incapable o f 
providing a fair trial for American claimants. Although few 
claimants were actually excluded from the Tribunal under the 
decisions, Iran was not thrust fully into the position of 
"loser" for certain important American arguments were expressly 
rejected. In the dual nationality case, although the majority 
did reject the American equation of nationality and citizenship , 
the result of the case was entirely in accord with American 
wishes. It is probably no coincidence that in the period 
immediately following the release of the decision in Case A-18, 
the Tribunal was confronted with the most serious crisis it has 
yet had to face. 169 The impact of that crisis may be felt in 
subsequent cases, where Tribunal majorities may feel constrained 
to reach decisions which will avoid any repetition of the anger 
167. Ibid., 84-5. 
168. Ibid., 85. 
16~. For a discussion of the crisis, sparked by a physical 
attack upon one of the third-country arbitrators, see 
infra, text accompanying notes 347 to 353. 
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prompted by Case A-18. 
In t h e end, the major Tri buna l decision s i nvolving juri s -
dictional que stions seem to have been condi t i o ned by one o ver-
riding concern: the desire to provide a f o rum. Because t h e 
Tribunal is fully aware that it constitutes t he last, best hope 
for many claimants who have suffered due to t h e collapse of 
U.S.-Iranian economic relations, there is a s trong desire on the 
part of the American and third-country arbitrato rs to ens u re 
that access is granted. Only when it is patently impossi b le to 
fit a claim within the wording of the Claims Settlement Decl a r a-
tion will the majority exclude the claim. 1 7 0 I n the f o rum 
clause cases a few claims were clearly outside the Tribunal's 
jurisdiction and Iran could be partly accommodated. In the dual 
nationality case, the Declaration co uld fairl y be inte rprete d t o 
allow for the inclusion of all t he disputed c l a i ms a nd Iran was 
170. A similar approach can be ide n tified in t he so-called 
"Refusal Cases" where the Registry had r e fu sed t o fil e 
certain claims be cause they had arrived l a te. The Tr i bu-
nal majority he ld that suc h claims we r e properly re fu s ed 
even if they had arrived o nly o ne day l a t e a nd due t o b ad 
weather which had prevented flights into t h e Netherlands. 
When the wording o f the Declaration is clear, the maj o rity 
will exclude a claim, but any ambiguity will be inter-
preted in favour o f a claimant. See,~., In Re Ref usa l 
to Acee t the Claim of Cascade Overview Develo me nt Ente r -
prises, Inc. (1982) 1 Iran-u.s. C.T.R. 127. f o r a harsh 
critique of this position, see Re fus a l Ca s es No s 1, 2 & 3: 
Dissent of H.M. Holtzmann to the Tribunal's Decision --
Refusin to Accept as filed Three Claims Received b t he 
Registrar on January 20, 1982 (1982) Iran-u.s. C.T.R. 
129. See also Lianosoff v. The Government of the Islami c 
Republic of Iran (1984) 5 Iran-u.s. C.T. R. 90 where the 
claim of a state l e ss pe rso n base d upon a 1923 arb itral 
award was held, properly, t o beyond the s cope of t he 
Tribunal's jurisdiction. 
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to be the loser. The Government of Iran may also have made a 
tactical error in arguing the Dual National case. It is 
reported that the United States arbitrators repeatedly asked 
Iranian counsel during oral hearings in Case A-18 if, in Iran's 
view, dual nationals were excluded from the Tribunal, t hey wou ld 
still retain a right t o sue Iran in U.S. courts. In a perhaps 
ill-considered response, Iranian counsel denied that possi-
bility, thereby making it clear that the Tribunal was the only 
likely forum for such claimants. 
Another case in which Iran's position was rejected in its 
entirety by a majority of the plenary Tribunal was Case A-2, 
where the Tribunal held that the Claims Settlement Declaration 
did not grant it jurisdiction to hear direct claims by the 
Government of Iran against United States nationals. 171 The 
Declaration was simply incapable of bearing a n interpretation 
inclusive of any such independent claims. However , as will be 
discussed immediately be low, the rigours of this decision were 
mitigated in practice by the Tribunal's findings concerning its 
jurisdiction over Iranian Government counterclaims, thereby 
underscoring the Tribunal's eagerness to provide a forum 
wherever possible. 
In the series of cases treating the issue of c oun te r -
claims, the tendency to favour the inclus ion of claims has 
171, Case A-2 (1982) l Iran-u.s. C.T.R. 101. See also, Case 
A-16 (1983) 5 Iran-u.s. C.T.R. 57, where a majority of the 
full Tribunal followed Case A-2 and applied it t o claims 
of Iranian banks against U.S. nationals . 
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clearly been, formally at least, to the benefit of Iran. In 
many cases, Iranian defendants have sought t o offset their own 
claims for breach of contract or for the payment o f outstanding 
tax or social security assessments against the claims of 
American corporations and individuals. The American claimants 
asserted that such counterclaims were not within the Tribunal's 
jurisdiction because they were not me ntioned expressly in the 
Claims Settlement Declaration, However, in Case A-1 the 
Tribunal held that although Iran could not bring direct claims 
against U.S. nationals, counterclaims against " nat ionals" were 
admissible as long as they arose "out of the same contract, 
transaction or occurrence that constitutes the subject-matter of 
[the] national's claim." 172 In Gould Marketing, Inc. v. 
Ministry of National Defense of Iran, 173 Chamber Two made it 
clear that such counterclaims were within Tri bunal jurisdiction 
even if the value of the counterclaim exceeded vastly the value 
of the initial claim. 
Having held that Iranian counterclaims were within its 
jurisdiction, the Tribu nal the n faced a thornier issue, for it 
soon became apparent that although Iran sought to offset its 
counterclaims in Tribunal proceedings, it was also pursuing 
separate remedies in Iranian courts. The question then arose 
172. Case A-1, supra, note 16. See also Owens-Corning Fiber-
glass Corp. v. The Government of the Islamic Republic of ~ (1983) 2 Iran-u.s. C.T.R. 322. 
173. (1983) 3 Iran-u.s. C.T.R. 147, 152. 
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whether or not the Tribunal had exclusive jurisdiction over any 
counterclaim arising out of the same contract, transaction or 
occurrence constituting the subject matter of a claim before the 
Tribunal, American claimants sought orders from the Tribunal t o 
compel the dismissal of proceedings instituted in Iranian 
courts. 174 In the leading case, E-Systems, Inc v. The Islamic 
Republic of Iran, the full Tribunal held that "the wording of 
the Algiers Declarations does not support the argument tha t the 
Tribunal's jurisdiction over Iran's counterclaims is exclu-
sive," 175 In the abstract, counterclaims could be presented 
separately to a national court. However, the Tribunal we nt on 
to hold that once a counterclaim had been presented to the 
Tribunal, under Art. VII(2) of the Claims Settlement Declara-
tion, the claim would "be conside red excluded from the jurisdic-
tion of the courts of Iran, or of the United States, or of any 
other court." 17 b It followed that 
[t]his Tribunal has an inherent power to issue such 
orders as may be necessary to conserve the respec-
tive rights of t he Parties and to ensure that this 
Tribunal's jurisdiction and authority are made 
fully effective, No t only should it be said that 
the award to be rendered in this case by the 
Tribunal, which was established by intergovernmen-
tal agreement, will prevail over any decisions 
inconsistent with it rendered by Iranian or United 
174, See,~, E-Systems, Inc v. The Islamic Republic of Iran, 
supra, note 36, 51. 
175, Ibid., 56. See also QuesTech, Inc. v. The Islamic 
Republic of Iran, supra, note 39, 99. And see generally 
Stewart & Sherman, supra, no te 14, 31-3. 
176. Supra, note 2. 
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States courts, but, in order to ensure the full 
effectiveness of the Tribunal's decisions, the 
Government of Iran should request that actions be 
stayed until proceedings in this Tri bunal have been 
completed. 177 
The Tribunal therefore "requested" that Iran stay proceedings in 
the Tehran courts. Such "requests" to stay proceedings have 
been issued in many subsequent cases. 17 b In an o rder in t he 
Behring International case, Judge Manga rd clarified the meaning 
of the word "request" in a somewhat different context, but one 
which is parallel to the situation discussed here . He stated 
that "[tJhe word request .•. is tantamount to and constitutes an 
o rder". 179 In fact, the Iranian court cases have proceeded, 
1 77. 
178. 
179. 
E-Systems, Inc, v. The Islamic Republic o f Iran, supra, 
note 36, 57. 
See,~~., Rockwell International Systems, Inc, v . Govern-
ment ~he Islamic Republic of Iran, supra, note 39; 
Watkins-Johnson Co . v. The Islamic Republic of Iran, 
supra, note 39; Ford Aerospace & Commun icat ions Corp. v. 
The Government of Iran (1983) 2 Iran-u.s. C.T.R. 281 
(Interim Award); Touche Ross & Co. v. The Government of 
the Islamic Republic of Iran (1983) 3 Iran-U.S. C.T.R. 59 
and 200 (Interim Awards); CSA International Development 
Coro. v. The Government of Iran (1983) 4 Iran-u. s . C . T . R. 
53 (Interim Award); and RCA Global Communications Disc, et 
al. v. The Islamic Republic of Iran, et al., supra, note 17 (Interim Award). 
Behring Internatio nal, Inc. v. Islamic Republic Iranian 
Air Force, et al. (1983) 3 Iran-u.s. C.T.R. 173, 175. The 
conclusion that a request was an Order had not been made 
clear in the E-Systems case where a strong division of 
opi nion was evident . Supra, note 36. Such "requests" 
have been issued in diverse contexts. For example, 
Chamber Two has "requested" that the Gover nme nt of the 
United States prevent the sale by public auction of 
certain of Iran's diplomatic and consular properties in 
America "which possess important histor ical, cul tural or 
other unique features" pending the Tribunal 's adjudication 
of the underlying disputes. Cases A-4 and A-15 (Iran v. 
United States) (1984) 5 Iran-u.s. C.T.R. 13 1 , 133. 
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Iran arguing that its municipal rules of civil procedure prevent 
it from complying with the Tribunal's requests. lbu Why such an 
argument should avail before an international or transnational 
tribunal has not been elaborated upon. Internal constitutional 
arrangements may not be invoked to defeat an international o bli-
gation, Still less should the easily-altered positive law of a 
state justify non-compliance with international norms. It would 
appear that Iran simply wants to retain control over the dispo~ 
sition of cases. It should be noted that Iran is not entirely 
alone in seeking external remedies. A losing claimant, Mr 
Dallal, has attempted, unsucce ssfully, to relitigate his case in 
an English court, basing his application solely upon the 
Tribunal's supposed mistake of law. Mr Justice Hobhouse wisely 
struck out Dallal's claim. 181 In 1981, one American claimant 
did succeed, however, in gaining a court attachment o rd e r 
covering property of the National Iranian Oil Company located in 
the Federal Republic of Germany. 182 Iran has petitioned t he 
Tribunal to order U.S. claimants to abandon such attachments. 
In at least one case, an Iranian court rendered judgment on 
180. See,~-, Stewart & Sherman, supra, note 14, 31-2. The 
Iranian arbitrators have adopted that position as well. 
See~-, the concurring opinion of Arbitrators Kashani, 
Shafeiei and Sani in E-Systems, Inc. v. The Islamic 
Republic of Iran, supra, note 36, 65 at 67. 
181. Dallal v. Bank Mellat [1986) l All E.R. 239 (Q.B.D.) ( U. K. ) • 
182. William Brothers Int'l Corp, v. N.I.O.C., Frankfurt-am-
Main District Court no. 3/ 14 0 11/80, 14 Septembe r 1981. 
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matters intimately related to a Tribunal claim and counterclairn, 
and when the American claimant asked the Tribunal to order the 
Iranian Government to take steps to vacate the judgment of the 
Tehran Court, Chamber One refused, suggesting that "the alleged 
interrelationship between the two cases is not quite clear." 183 
One might well ask why the Chamber had ordered a staying of the 
Iranian proceedings in the first p lace. There would appear to 
be some reticence on the part of the Tribunal to confront an 
open attack upon its jurisdiction. 
Again, one can see in the Tribunal's approach to counter-
claims the desire to facilitate access as long as it can be 
justified by a close reading of the Claims Settlement Declara-
tion and as long as harsh controversy can be avoided. Iranian 
counterclaims were allowed because nowhere in the Declaration 
were they expressly excluded. Yet, once the counterclaims were 
allowed, the Tribunal held that its exclusive jurisdiction 
should be made to bear upon the case and, under Art . VII(2) of 
the Declaration, recourse to all other tribunals should be 
suspended, Confronted with an open Iranian challenge to that 
decision, however, the Tribunal has chosen not to push the 
point, hoping, it may be presumed, to avoid any destabilizing 
confrontation. 
183. RCA Global Communications Disc, Inc. et al. v. The Islamic 
Republic of Iran (1983) 4 Iran-u.s. C.T. R . 9 (Interim 
Award-2-) at 12. 
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The same intent to grant access to the Tribunal as long as 
it can be justified safely under the express wording of t he 
Claims Settlement Declaration is evident in the corporate 
nationality cases. The issue in each case concerned problems of 
evidence. How could a corporation prove that it was a 
"national" within Art. VII(l) of the Declaration, which requires 
that "natural persons who are citizens of [Iran or the U.S. as 
the case may be] hold directly or indirectly, an interest in 
such corporation or entity equivalent to fifty percent or more 
of its capital stock." In Flexi-Van Leasing, Inc. v. The 
Islamic Republic of Iran, 184 the majority facilitated corporate 
claims by rejecting Iran ian contentions that the corporation 
should prove conclusively the nationality of each of its share-
holders. Such a holding would effectively have precluded access 
to the Tribunal for any publicly-owned corporation. Having 
established a more lenient system of proof of corporate 
nationality, the Tribunal then applied it rigorously. In Alcan 
Aluminum Ltd. v. Ircable Corp., 185 the management o f a Canadian-
based corporation had sought to bring a claim on behalf of its 
u.s. shareholders on the grounds that U.S. nationals owned more 
than fifty percent of the Corporation. In the end, however, 
after being asked specifically to adduce stronger proof, all 
that the Corporation was able to show was that just over fifty 
184. Supra, note 49, See also VSI Corp. v. The Government of 
the Islamic Republic of Iran, supra, note 49. 
185. Supra, note 49. 
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percent of its shareholders had registered Amer i can add res s es . 
Because many non-Americans live in the United States and b e c a us e 
it was probable that a significant proportion of no n-Americans 
living in the U.S. (~. Canadians) would own shares in a non-
American corporation, Chamber Three held that t he proof of 
nationality was not adequate and that the Alcan claim fell out-
side the Tribunal 1 s jurisdiction. The American arbitrato r 
concurred in this holding and stressed that Alcan had been gi ve n 
every encouragement and opportunity to improve upon its 
proof. l 8 o 
There have been only two ma jor cases in the Trib unal 's 
history, apart from Case A-1 concerning Iranian Government 
claims against U.S. nationals, 187 where the Claims Settlement 
Declaration has been interpreted so as t o exclude entire classes 
of c la ims. In Haji Bagherpour v. The Gove rnme nt of the United 
States of America 188 Chamber Two held that it had no jurisd ic-
tion to adjudicate the claim of an Iranian o il tanker owner who 
suffered the loss of a tanker during the abo rtive rescue at t e mp t 
undertake n by Ame rican military forces to f ree the U.S. 
hostages. Article II(l) of the Claims Settlement Declaratio n 
read with para. 11 of the first Algiers Declaratio n 1 89 precluded 
Tribunal jurisdiction over claims against the United State s 
186. Ibid., Concurring Opinion of R.M. Mask. 
187. See supra, note 16. 
188. Supra, no te 14. 
189. Supra, note 2. 
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based directly upon its response to the seizure of the hostag es. 
The question was how "direct" those connections had to be and 
the Tribunal held that in Haji-Bagherpour, t h e causality was 
direct enough to preclude the claim. There would have been no 
claim unless there had been an American rescue attempt and there 
would have been no rescue attempt unless the hostages had been 
taken in the first place. Any claim arising out of the abortive 
rescue would be inadmissible.l~U 
In Grimm v. The Government of the Islamic Republic of 
Iran, 191 Chamber One read the Claims Settlement Declaration to 
preclude the claim of the widow of an America n oil company 
executive who had been assassinated in Iran in 1978. The widow 
had argued that her husband's death was a "measure affecting 
[her] property rights" and hence could be the subject of a valid 
claim under Art . II(l) of the Claims Settlement Declaratio n. 
She argued further that the assassination had engaged Iran's 
international responsibility and that compensation for breach o f 
that responsibility (the failure to protect her husband) was due 
under international law. The Chamber did no t deal with the 
second contention because it found that in the context of the 
entire Claims Settlement Declaration, the reference to "measures 
affecting property rights" should be interpreted as relating 
solely to the expropriation of property . Assassination did not 
190. Haji-Bagherpour v. The Government of the United States o f 
America, supra, note 14, 38-40. 
191. Supra, note 51. 
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fit within that rubric. The Tribunal justified this holding by 
noting that 
it is generally recognized that a provis ion which 
establishes the scope of jurisd iction of an 
arbitral tribunal should be given a restrictive 
interpretation.1 9 2 
That justification may appear somewhat odd in that, as this 
Chapter has attempted to show, the Tribunal has tended to treat 
questions of jurisdiction expansively so as t o provide a forum 
for as many claimants as could possibly fit within the 
linguistic limits of the Algiers Accords. But if one sets the 
Grimm case in context, the result is hardly surp rising. 
In both Grimm and Haji-Bagherpour , the Tribunal was faced 
with claims involving highly sensitive political questions. If 
it had agreed to adjudge the latter claim, the Tribunal would 
have been called upon t o deal with the leg ali ty o f the American 
hostage - rescue attempt under principles of self-defence and 
self-help in international law. To do so would not only have 
been acrimonious and destabilising, it would have been c ontrary 
to the t eno r of the Claims Se ttlement Declaratio n which clearly 
wa s de signed to prec lude any claims relating to the hostage 
crisis per se (including claims of the hostages themselves). 
The GriJTlffi claim would have forced t he Tribunal to evaluate t he 
internal security arrangements in Iran and the extent to which 
the failure to protect Mr Grimm amounted to a breach of interna-
tional state responsibility. The potential for rancour was 
192. Ibid ., 80. 
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envrmous in both cases and it may be that, given the small 
number of people affected by the Tribunal's refusal to assume 
jurisdiction in the cases, these were issues in wh ich discretion 
really was the better part of valour. Neither of the claims was 
at all representative of the majority of Tribunal cases, yet to 
decide them might have caused irreparable harm to the institu-
tion. Just as the Tribunal refused to comment in the forum 
clause cases upon the fairness of the Iranian legal system, it 
refused in these two cases to delve into issues almost 
calculated to dredge up antipathies and anger. 
C. The Day-to-Day Operations of the Tribunal: A Study in 
Wilful Delay? 
In the Claims Settlement Declaration, 193 Iran and the 
United States agreed that "[m]embers of the Tribunal shall be 
appointed and the Tribunal shall conduct its business in accor-
dance with the arbitration rules of the United Nations 
Com,.~ission on International Trade law (UNICITRAL) except to the 
extent modified by t he parties or by the Tribunal to ensure that 
this agreement can be carried out." Although designed initially 
for ad hoe arbitrations, 1 ~ 4 the UNCITRAL Rules have been adopted 
for the first time to provide a structure for the deliberations 
193. Supra, note 2, Art. III(3). 
194. See,~-, Aksen, supra, note 94; and Branson & Tupman, 
Selecting an Arbitral Forum: A Guide to Cost-Effective 
International Arbitration (1984) 24 Va. J. Int'l L. 917, 920. 
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of a continuing institution. 19 ~ In practice, the "modifica-
tions" allowed for in the Claims Settlement Declaration were 
undertaken by the Tribunal itself and not by the parties. The 
Tribunal issued a set of Provisionally Adopted Tribunal Rules in 
March 1983 196 and the Final Tribunal Rules of Procedures only 
two months later. 197 The Final Rules contained modifications 
some amounting to complete transformations -- involving eighteen 
of the forty-one UNCITRAL Rules. 
The consensus of Tribunal staff and members is that the 
Rules as modified have been entirely adequate. The co-
Registrars of the Tribunal agreed that "from our perspective in 
the Registry, the Rules cover just about every contingency that 
can or has come up." 198 The American and third-country arbitra-
tors are also in broad agreement that the Rules work well for 
them. Mr Brower believes that the UNCITRAL Rules used as a 
basis for the Tribunal Rules "are [as] good as any set of rules 
195. Robinson, supra, note 4, 662. 
196. 9 March 1983, 
234. 
197. Final Tribunal Rules of Procedure, supra, note 29. 
198, D.J. Gulliford, transcript of interview (11 September 
1984). On file with author. The Co-Registrar, A. 
Foroughi, expressly agreed with that assessment, though he 
felt that the "rules about resignation and about the 
substitution or replacement of members" were "not clear". 
A. Foroughi, transcript of interview (11 September 1984) 
On file with author. The issue of resignati o n and 
replacement of arbitrators has been a difficult one for 
the Tribunal and it will be discussed in some detail, 
infra, text accompanying notes 303 to 308. 
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you find." 199 Judge Mangard feels that the Tribunal Rules 
provide the arbitrators, particularly the third-count ry heads of 
Chambers, with all the procedural tools they need to get their 
job done. 200 Mr Aldrich is also satisfied with the Rules, 
suggesting that they work "pretty well". 201 
In regulating the day-to-day operations of the Tribu nal , 
the Rules have to provide for two distinct sets of operations, 
those that go on in the deliberative processes of _ the Tribunal 
and those that are purely administrative. Initially, of course, 
the administrative task was paramount . It was necessary to 
receive, collate and process the 3,836 cases lodged with the 
Tribunal. Under the Claims Settlement Declaration, to fall 
within Tribunal jurisdiction a claim had to be filed no "more 
than one year after the entry into force" o f t he Accords, 202 
that is, one year after 19 Janua ry 1981. The Tribunal Rules 
were somewhat sketchy regarding the process of filing because 
the UNCITRAL Rules were really designed for one-off arbitra-
tions. In any case, the Tribunal Rules were only promulgated 
199. Brower, supra, note 28. 
200. Mangard, supra, note 28. 
201. Aldrich, supra, note 26. 
202. Claims Settlement Declaration, supra, note 2, Art. III(4 ) . 
The Declaration also provided for an alternative termina-
tion date for presenting claims -- six months after the 
date of the President's appointment if that date would 
establ ish a l ater filing deadline -- but that provision 
turned out to be inapplicable as the Presiden t was 
appointed on 9 June 1981 which would have created a filing 
date of 9 December 1981, earl i er than the alternative. 
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after the filing deadline; they do however incorporate many of 
the administrative decisions taken earlier to guide the initial 
filing process. The Rules provided that filing was "deemed to 
have been made when [the relevant document was] physically 
received by the Registrar. 112 u3 The Registrar was authorised to 
refuse to accept "any document which [was] not received within 
the required time period". A party objecting t o such a r efusal 
could, within thirty days, request that the Tri bunal review the 
refusal. 204 In fact, a number of claims were refused because of 
late filing, and upon review, the refusal in t he majority of 
cases was upheld by the Tribuna1 20 ~ o ver the strong protests of 
one of the American arbitrators.2° 6 
203. Final Tribunal Rules of Procedure , supra , note 29 , Art. 
2 ( 1) • 
204. Ibid., Art. 2(5). 
205. In Re Refusal to Accept the Claim of Cascade Overview 
Development Enterp rises, Inc., supra, note 170; In Re 
Refusal to Accept the Claim of Mr. Mohammed Sadegk 
Jahanger (1982) l Iran-u.s. C.T.R, 128; and I n Re Refusal 
to File Claim Conc e rning Sara Helali (1982) I Iran-u.s. 
C.T.R. 134. See also Annual Report 2, supra, note 67, 21. 
206. Refusal Cases Nos 1, 2 and 3: Dissent of H.M. Holtzmann t o 
the Tribunal Decision Refusing to Accept as Filed Three 
Claims Received by the Registrar on January 10, 1982, 
supra, note 170. It should be noted that the two other 
American arbitra t ors concurred with the ma jority in 
upholding the Refusals of the Registry, although Mr Mask 
wrote a Separate Opinion suggesting that "the Tribunal 
should urge the two Governments to agree to allow these 
claims to be filed in order to avoid inequitable 
results. Refusal Cases Nos land 2: Separate Opinion of 
R.M. Mask (1982) 1 Iran-u.s. C .T.R. 132. 
- 436 -
Because the UNCITRAL Rules had little to say about the 
processing of claims, the Tribunal agreed upon certain more 
specific Administrative Directives 2 0 7 to guide the Registry in 
the acceptance of claims, and in all further filings of docu-
ments, These Directives imposed upon Claimants significant 
requirements of form, including the necessity of filing claims 
and most evidence in both official languages of the Tribunal 
(English and Farsi), the presentation of at least twenty copies 
of each claim and of much subsequent written material, 208 very 
precise limitations upon paper size, and provisions requiring 
signatures on a set number of documents. If t he Registry staff 
discovered that any of these formal requirements had not been 
observed, and the deficiency was one that could timeously be 
remedied, the documents were marked as "lodged" until the 
defects were corrected and filing was possible. 209 
207. 
208. 
209. 
Now incorporated as Notes to the Final Tribunal Rules of 
Procedure as reprinted, supra, note 29. See especially 
the Notes to Art, 2, incorporating Administrative Direc-
tive No. 1 of 4 July 1981. The specific functions of 
Registry Staff were furth e r clarified by the "Provisional 
Instructions to Staff Concerning Receipt of Documents" of 
19 October 1981 (Unpublished, but referred to in Annual 
Report 1, supra, note 67, 12). 
In Note 3 to Art. 2 of the Final Tribunal Rules of 
Procedure, ibid., it is provided that in relation to 
subsequent evidence, the Tribunal may determine in each 
case "based o n the nature and volume of the particular 
exhibit or written evidence" the number of copies that is 
required. 
See Annual Re1ort 1, supra, note 67, 14. In all, some forty-eight c aims were "lodged " pending compliance with 
formal requirements. 
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Once a claim had been accepted by the Registry, staff 
prepared documentary receipts for the parties and for the 
relevant state Agent. The claim was then served on the opposing 
Agent after having first been assigned a Claim number, entered 
into the Register, and accorded to a Chamber by lot. 21 u The 
statement of claim was then distributed to the members of the 
Tribunal. The Registry, of course, also has a continuing 
responsibility for the processing and care of all documentary 
evidence filed with the Tribunal. Apart from the Rules and 
existing Guidelines, the Registry receives direction from the 
Tribunal which continues to meet regularly in administrative 
session. By the time of completion of the 1983 Annual Report, 
the Tribunal had held eighty-one administrative meetings. 
210. As required by the Tribunal itself. See ibid., 7. Under 
Presidential Order No. 8, 24 Ma r ch 1982, reprinted in 
(1982) l Iran-u.s. C.T.R. 97, all disputes regarding 
interpretation of the Algiers Accords were required to be 
submitted to the full Tribunal. Despite the fact that 
Claims were assigned to Chambers randomly, it would appear 
that there are informal mechanisms used to prevent incon-
sistent judgments. For example, it has been revealed that 
the Chairmen of the Chambers meet to discuss some proposed 
awards before issuance. Professor Lowenfeld has called 
this informal system a "rough-and-ready substitute for the 
practice of stare decisis." Lowenfeld, suera, note 65, 
78. The practice also highlights the crucial role of the 
Chairmen in a Tribunal which is so polarised. In many 
cases, given the predictable split between the Iranian and 
American arbitrators, it will be the Chamber Chairman who 
shapes the final award. This is particularly true given 
the tendency of the American arbitrators to concur with a 
result simply to allow the issuance of an Award even if 
they disagree with the third-country arbitrator's reason-
ing. For a full discussion of the role of the arbitra-
tors, see infra, text accompanying notes 300 to 358. 
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Although the conclusions reached "are recorded in serially 
numbered minutes," 211 the content, like all written Tribunal 
material apart from Awards 212 and Orders, is not open to the 
public. 
Such secrecy, though typical of international arbitration, 
has been identified as a "major problem" by the one-time United 
States Agent, Arthur Ravine. He has suggested that because the 
Tribunal is a continuing institution, and is not ad hoe, the 
confidentiality rule may not be beneficial. It inhibits t he 
"coordination of claims" because, he asserts, Iran is in 
possession of greater knowledge about the nature of the claims 
and pleadings. The U.S. claimants are prevented from benefiting 
from each other's experience. 213 In practice, this aspect of 
the confidentiality rule may not be a real problem for most 
American c l aimants . First, it is highly unlikely that the 
Iranian Government has been able to co-ordinate its approach to 
claims in the manner implied by Mr Ravine. Unlike most American 
claimants who are dealing with one, or at most a few, claims, 
Iran has been confronted with thousands of cases within a very 
short space of time. Its capacity to organise and analyse the 
211. Annual Report 1, supra, note 67, 6. 
212. The generic term "Awards" is sometimes used to encompass 
not only Final Awards, but also Interim Awards, Awards on 
Agreed Terms, Inte rlocutory Awards, and Refusal Cases. 
The term "Decisions" is sometimes used in the same sense . 
213. Ravine, supra, note 83, 1. See also Clagett, supra, no t e 
29, 131-2. 
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claims in a sophisticated manner has almost certainly been over-
taxed, Knowledge is only power if it can be assimilated. 
Indeed, one American lawyer, who has worked for Iran on 
cases before the Tribunal, has asserted that Iran is at a 
disadvantage precisely because it cannot adequately co-ordi nate 
its claims and defences. Not only is the Iranian Government 
unfamiliar with ttWestern precepts of co-ordinationtt, but there 
is a substantial problem of manpower, with only "16 or 17 
lawyers in all of Iran available at any one time for the kind of 
service required by representation before the Tribunal.tt 2l~ 
Secondly, many American claimants have banded together in a 
spirit of self-help to share information through an umbrella 
group, the United States-Iran Claimants' Committee. Although 
participation is voluntary, most major claimants have been 
willing to participate in the sharing of information and in t he 
staffing of committees set up to explore widely applicable 
issues of substantive law. 215 These two factors -- the 
overwhelming legal burden on Iran and the self-help of American 
claimants probably operate to ensure that the confidentiality 
rule does not benefit Iran as much as Mr Rovine suggests. It 
should also be reiterated that secrecy is a strong tradition in 
arbitration, a tradition based upon wise sensitivity to the 
214. Shack, Remarks, (1983) 77 Proc. Am. Soc. Int'l L. 23, 
24-5. 
215. See,~, the description of the work of USICC in 
Clagett, supra, note 29. 
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concerns of state parties, It may even be a defining feature o f 
the entire process, allowing for behind-the-scenes compromises 
which lead to mutually acceptable results. The confidentiality 
rule should not lightly be discarded,Ll6 
The Registry having processed the Statement of Claim and 
accompanying documentation, the Chamber or plenary Tribunal is 
then in a position to deal with the case. Initially, progress 
was very slow, By the middle to April 1984, the Tribunal had 
resolved approximately 118 of the some 3,700 cases pending. 217 
It should be noted, however, that a very high proportion of 
those 3,700 cases consists of the so-called "small claims" of 
less than $250,000 (U.S.), They account for 2,782 of the claims 
initially filed, 210 Immediately following the conclusion of t h e 
Algiers Accords, there appeared to be agreement in principle 
that the small claims could be settled by a lump-sum payment by 
Iran which would then be apportioned to claimants by the United 
States Foreign Claims Settlement Commission. 219 Despite the 
increasingly important place occupied by the lump-sum settlement 
method in twentieth-century state practice, 220 and despite 
216, See the discussion, supra, note 29, 
217. Belland, supra, note 3, 237. 
218. Annual Report 2, supra, note 67, 17. 
219. See Stewart & Sherman, supra, note 14, 13-4. 
220. In their creative and authoritative monograph, Professors 
Lillich and Weston point out that lump sum settlements 
"often in combination with national claims commission 
adjudicati o n" has accounted for "at least 95 percent of 
(cont'd.) 
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Iran's initially favo u rable re a ctio n t o the i d e a , t here is no 
indicatio n that Iran i s now willing to agree t o t hat method of 
dealing with the small claims. 
The United States Government has suggested subsequentl y 
that the Tribunal employ special procedures a nd a test case 
regime to expedite the claims. 22 1 Although t h e Tribunal Rules 
make no specific prov ision for small claims, 2 22 t he Tribunal has 
agree d to employ special legal advisers to e valuate such 
claims. 223 It would seem, however, that t he Iranian Gover nmen t 
is now disinclined to treat the smal l claims dif f erently f rom 
maj o r claims, a r guing somewhat inge nu ously that e ve ry c l a i ma n t 
deserves a full hearing. 224 The Americans assert that t h e 
Iranians are simply trying to delay settlement. A stalemate has 
2 21. 
internatio nal cla ims p r actice since t he c lose of Wo rld Wa r 
II." R. Lillich & B. We sto n, e ds., Internationa l Claims: 
Their Settlement by Lump Sum Agreements (19 7 5), vol. I, 
11. The study had begun in a more limited form with t he 
publication of R. Lillich, International Claims: Postwar 
British Practice (1967); and B. Westo n , I n ternational 
Claims: Postwar French Practice (1971). See generally 
Borchard, supra, no te 142, 381 et s e q. 
See Stewart & Sherman, supra, note 14, 13; and Annual 
Report 1, supra, note 67, 7. 
222. A fact bemoaned by R.M. Mask in Alcan Aluminum Ltd. v. 
Ircable Corp., supra, note 49, (Concurring Opinion o f R. M. 
Ma sk) 298, 301 where he complained that "(t]he Tribunal 
Rules lack s ome o f the modern o r inno va t ive case-
r e s o lution t e chniques" t h a t wo uld speed t he r e solut ion o f 
small claims. There are, for example, no specific Rules 
governing joinder or consolidation of cases, interven-
tions, or class claims. 
223. See Annual Reoort 2, supra, no te 67, 8. 
224. Ma ng ard, supra, no te 28 , 
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resulted. As of June 1984, the Tribunal had distributed by lot 
some 145 small claims cases to the Chambers and had ordered the 
production of fully particularised Statements of Claim accom-
panied by full documentary evidence "including evidence of 
nationality, written statements of witnesses and [a] legal 
brief." 22 b All of the Awards that had been rendered by t h e 
Tribunal in small claims cases, as of June 1984, had been in the 
fonn of Awards on Agreed Terms, 2 2 6 settlements negotiated by the 
parties and merely approved by the Tribunal, thereby providing 
access to the Security Account for purposes of enforcement. 2 2 7 
225. Annual Report 2, supra, note 67, 8-9. 
226. See a recent example, The Government of the U.S.A. on 
behalf of Shipside Packing Co. v. The Islamic RepubITc of 
Iran (1984) 5 Iran U.S. C.T.R. 80. 
227. Annual Report 2, supra, no te 67, 9. Overall, the rate of 
resolution of all types of cases was not much higher in 
the early days of the Tribunal. By the end of October 
1983, the Tribunal had rendered seventy-five Awards, 
thirty-nine of which were Awards on Agreed Terms. Annual 
Report 1, ~upra, note 67, 17, fn. In 1984, writing after 
two-and-a-half years of Tribunal operation, Selby and 
Stewart noted that some 300 claims had been dealt with but 
that "[o)nly one-fifth of those claims ••• were resolved 
by Tribunal adjud ication, the remainder having been 
settled or voluntarily withdrawn." Selby & Stewart, 
supra, note 45, 215. Surprisingly, commentators have based 
their evaluations of Tribunal efficiency on quite varied 
statistics. For example, Stewart & Sherman, supra, note 
14, 8, suggested that over 5,000 claims had been filed 
with the Tribunal Registry. Belland, supra, note 3, 238, 
quoted a figure of some 3,750 claims, while Lowenfeld, The 
U.S.-Iranian Dispute Settlement Accords: An Arb itrator~-
Looks At the Prospects for Arbitration (1981) 36 Arb. J. 3 
(No. 3) 4, seems to have posited a figure around 1,900 
cases, although he appears to have been referring only t o 
American claims against Iran. Even then, the figure is 
(cont'd.) 
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As of October, 1985, the Tribunal had approved 101 Awards on 
Agreed Terms representing some $235 million (U.S.) for American 
Claimants, but had still issued only forty-six Awards, with a 
much lower total monetary value,228 
The overall position is that after some initial congestion 
in the Registry caused by the unexpected flood of claims, 22 9 
too low. The variety in figures is due largely to the 
fact that some commentators were attempting tentative 
evaluations early in the Tribunal's existence and before 
the Registry had completed its evaluation of the claims. 
There is also sometimes a distinction drawn between 
"claims" and "cases" which may incorporate more than one 
claim. Wherever possible, the present writer has relied 
exclusively upon case statistics compiled by the Tribunal 
Registry, though the words claim and case are used inter-
changeably for in the present context, nothing hangs on 
the distinction. 
228. Tonelson, suora, note 3 (Statistics from the U.S. State 
Department). The figures might today look even more 
skewed for it has recently been reported that the Chevron 
Corporation has concluded a settlement agreement with the 
Iranian Government under which $115 million (U.S.) will be 
paid as compensation to the U.S. corporation for the loss 
of its Iranian assets. The settlement has apparently been 
accepted by the Tribunal. Reported in the New York Times (30 January 1986) D-4, col. 6. 
229. It took almost a year for the filing of all documents 
presented on or before 19 January 1982 to be completed. 
Annual Report 1, supra, note 67, 15. Early in the 
deliberative process, the three American arbitrators 
pointed out that filing delays could have a significant 
effect. In their dissenting opinion in In Re Refusal to 
Accept the Claim of Raymond International (U.K.) Ltd. 
(1982) 1 Iran-u.s. C.T.R. 394, 396, a case involving the 
refusal of a claim filed improperly on behalf of a United 
Kingdom national, the Americans took the position that the 
difficulty was purely formal, that the corporation was 
controlled completely by a U.S. corporation and that the 
Claim need merely be amended: 
(cont'd.) 
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the physical processing of claims has been effi c ient, 
facilitated primarily by the Administrative Gu ide lines set down 
by the Tribunal in the absence of detailed prov isions in t h e 
Tribunal Rules, Having reached the Tribunal and Chambers, how-
ever, the adjudication of claims has been slow, Indeed, 
American claimants, government officials and some of the Un i ted 
States a rbitrators have seized upo n the issue of delay as t he 
basis for some extremely damning evaluations o f t he Tribunal 
[I]n this c a se the claim was r e c e ived in the las t days 
before the deadline . Th e Registry was overwhe l me d 
with a very large number of claims filed at that time 
and could not immed·iately examine each one and con tact 
the Claimant when it found an error. Had the Reg i st ry 
been staffed to do so, this Statement o r Claim c ou l d 
have been corrected with the stroke of a pen before 
the January 19 deadline. Ho wev e r, t he Regi s try was 
unable t o examine the c la im until f i ve months l ater , 
by which time correction within the deadline was, o f 
course, impossible. Thus, in some measure, -the Tr ib u -
nal's own Registry procedures and limited staffing 
contributed to the problem which has ar i sen in t h is 
case. 
The Co-Registrars of the Tribu na l r e fus ed t o c o untenance 
the argument o f the Ameri can arbitrators in the Ra y mo nd 
International (U.K,) case . Mr Fo roughi sta t e d that t he 
notion of dealy 1n the Registry was only "an excuse" used 
to support a dissent really motivated by ot her factors. 
He felt that the five month delay in processing the claim 
"didn't have any effect on the acceptance [o r dismissa l ) 
of that Raymond Claim." Equally , Mr Gullifo rd st a ted 
simply that "other than the fa c t tha t wit h in a ve ry s hort 
time period vast amounts" o f claims appe a r e d, he simply 
di d no t "unde rstand that no tion of d e l ay in proce s si ng t he 
claims." A. Foroughi and D. Gulliford, transcripts of 
interviews, supra, note 198. It was emphasised by both 
Co-Registrars that after the initial rush "there's been no 
trouble at all" in processing doc umentary material. 
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process. 230 Interestingly, none of these critics has attached 
any serious blame to the Tribunal Rules as a cause of delay. 
Criticism has instead revolved around the Tribunal's perceived 
lack of resolution in promoting the goals of speed and 
efficiency. 
The harshest critiques have emanated from the Tribunal 
itself, in the form of dissents to Awards and Orders. The most 
vocal critics of Tribunal delays have been the Arrlerican 
arbitrators Holtzmann and Mosk, though Mr Brower seems to have 
adopted a similar position after his appointment to replace Mr 
Mosk. From the outset of the deliberative process, the American 
arbitrators have made it clear 231 that they believe Iranian 
defendants to be purposely delaying the processing of claims, 
arguing further that the Chambers have been co- opted in a game 
of delay. 
Before that charge can be evaluated, the governing Rules 
must be examined. Under Art. 19(1) of the Final Tribunal Rules 
230. The harshness of these reactions supports the observation 
in a recent editorial by Werner that "the length of 
proceedings is clearly of paramount importance to the 
parties' perception of the arbitral process." Werner, 
Optimizing the length of arbitration proceedings (1985) 2 
J. Int'l Arb. 5. In the Iran-u.s. Claims Tribunal, 
because the American arbitrators identify primarily with 
the interests of the Claimants (see infra, text accompany -
ing notes 322 to 331), the American arbitrators also see 
the length of proceedings as of "paramount importance". 
231. George Aldrich does not entirely fit the mold shaped by 
his American confreres and his attitude to delay will be 
deal t with infra, text accompanying notes 263 to 267. 
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of Procedure, the Tribunal is accorded wide discretion in the 
fixing of delays for the filing of Statements of Defence, the 
first step in pleadings after th e filing of the Claim: 
Within a period of time to be determined by the 
arbitral tribunal with respect to each case, which 
should not exceed 135 days, the respondent s hall 
file its Statement of Defence. However, the 
arbitral tribunal may extend the time-limits if it 
concludes that such an extension is justi fied . 232 
The Tribunal decided in administrative session t hat , in deter-
mining whether or not to grant any extensions to filing dead-
lines, the Chamber or plenary Tribunal should take into consid-
eration such facto rs as (a) the complexity of the case; and (b) 
s~ecial circumstances "including demons trated hardship t o a 
claimant or respondent." Moreover, the Tribunal or Chamber 
could also consider "such other circumstances as it considers 
appropriate." These circumstances could inc lude an "unfair 
burden" imposed on a party by the "large number of Statements of 
De fence" it might be required to file "in any particular 
period." 233 This gloss o n the Rule reflects the overr iding 
principle contained in Art. 15(1), that the Tribunal is required 
to conduct the arbitration in a manner it considers "appro-
priate" but that it must be ever mindful of the need to treat 
the parties "with equality." 
232. 
233. 
su1ra, note 29. In their comparative survey of arbitral 
rues, Branson & Tupman, supra, note 194, 925, suggest 
that the UNCITRAL Rules "impose the most comprehensive 
time limits" of all the Rules studied. It should already 
be apparent, however, that those "limits" are in no way 
immutable. Indeed , if the parties are treated with 
equality (Art. 15(1)), the limits can almost be i gnored . 
Ibid., Notes to Art. 19, l(i)-(iii). 
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The Chamber Chairmen and the Iranian arbitrators have 
interpreted the Rules to allow for very liberal extensions to 
the filing dates that have been set in scheduling orders. In 
Texaco Iran Ltd., et al. v. The Government of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran, 234 Chamber Three issued an order providing for 
a fifth extension of t he date for filing Iran's Statement of 
Defence. American arbitrator R. M. Mos k dissented vigorously: 
In this case the Tribunal has granted extensions to 
the Respondents many times with the statement that 
no further extensions will be granted without a 
showing of compelling reasons, for such an exten-
sion. The Tribunal has then granted extensions 
without any showing. In opposition to this latest 
extension request, the Claimants stated, "A dead-
line so clearly stated - and r esta t ed - must be 
enforced if the Tribunal is to retain the respect 
of those who appear before it." The deadline was not 
enforced. 23 ::i 
A similar c oncern was expressed by Mr Ho ltzmann in his disse nts 
to Chambe r One orders allowing for a fourth extension of the 
filing dates for Iranian Statements of Defence in two cases. 
Mr Holtzmann feared that "these further extensions send a 
message to respondents in these and other cases that this 
Chamber lacks the resolve to enforce its scheduling order~ ." 23 6 
In certain cases, American arbitrators have dissented from 
orders granting extensions when they be lieved that the Iranian 
defendant had not proven, or even suggested, any ground upon 
234. (1983) 3 Iran-u.s. C.T.R. 372 (Order). 
235. Ibid., R.M. Mosk Dissent t o Order, 379. 
236. Cases Nos. 452 and 926: Dissent of H.M. Holtzmann fr om 
Orders (19 83) 3 Iran-u.s. C.T.R. 84, 85 . 
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which an extension could be "justified", a requirement of Art. 
19(1) of the Tribunal Rules. 237 In other cases, o r as alterna-
tive considerations, the American dissents to extensions of 
filing dates have been based on notions of equity -- the poten-
tial for unfair treatment of the claimant -- 2 38 and upon a fear 
that the lack of firm deadlines would ultimately cause adminis-
trative confusion, precluding the development of a rational case 
management system. 239 In still other cases, the American 
arbitrators have engaged in a broad attack, consolidating all of 
their grounds for desiring to refuse extensions. 2~a 
As the adjudicative process has progressed , the frustra-
tion of the American arbitrators has intensified as each new 
stage has presented new possibilities for delay, In this 
connection, Art, 20 of the Final Tribunal Rules of Procedure 24 1 
237, See, e.g., R.J, Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. The Government of 
Iran (1982) 1 Iran-u.s. C.T.R. 119 (Order), (Dissent of 
R.M. Mask) 119; Control Data Corp., et al. v. The Islamic 
Republic of Iran (1983) 1 Iran-u.s. C.T.R. 230 (Order) , 
(Dissent of R.M. Mask) 230-1; and Pepsico, Inc. v. Zamzam 
Bottling Co. Azarbaijan, et al. (19 82 ) 1 Iran-u.s. C. T . R. 
773 (Order), (Dissent of H.M. Holtzmann) 175. 
238, See,~, Cases Nos. 203, 262, 330, 333 etc.: Dissent of 
H.M. Holtzmann (1982) l Iran-u.s. C.T.R, 178, 180; and 
National Airmotive Coro. v. The Islamic Republic of Iran 
( D i s s e n t of R , M , Mos k ) ( l 9 8 2 ) l Iran - U • S , C , T , R , 15 8 , 1 5 8 • 
239. See,~, the Control Data Corp. case, supra, note 237, 
231. 
240. See,~, Cases Nos. 6, 51 etc.: Dissent of H.M. 
Holtzmann, G.H. Aldrich and R.M. Mask re Procedural Deci-
sions (1982) 1 Iran-u.s. C.T.R. 320. 
241. Supra, note 29. 
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is relevant, for it permits the parties at any time to "amend or 
supplement" a claim or defence "unless the tribunal considers it 
inappropriate to allow such amendment having regard to the delay 
in making it or prejudice to the other party or any other 
circumstances." The Tribunal has tended to interpret the basic 
provision allowing amendment liberally and has rarely invoked 
the power to prevent amendment. Mr Holtzmann has been outspoken 
in his criticism of this approach: 
The Tribunal has faced efforts to delay at every 
stage of its proceedings. First, there were delays 
in setting times for submissions of Statemen ts of 
Defence; then delays caused by extensions of those 
deadlines -- as many as four extensions in some 
cases. As cases move to more advanced stages, 
extensions of time for respondent to file replies 
have become routine; often Orders to submit 
evidence are complied with late or not at all. 
Now a new opportunity for delay emerges: there are 
frequent requests by respondents to submit further 
written statements after the Hearing has been 
closed . I write to dissent from Orders of this 
Chamber granting such requests. 242 
Delays in later stages have not resulted solely from actions by 
Iranian defendants. In one case, a Chamber Chairma n took the 
initiative and required further written submissions, allowed 
under Art. 22 of the Tribunal Rules, four months after the oral 
hearing had taken place. 243 Such difficulties prompted the 
242. Cases Nos. 33, 87 and 174: Dissent of H.M . Holtzmann From 
Orders (1983) 3 Iran-u.s. C.T.R. 87, 87 . See also 
Sylvania Technical Systems, Inc. v. Government of the 
Islamic Republic of Iran (1984) 5 Iran-u.s. C.T.R. 141 
(Dissent of Howard M. Boltzmann to Order). 
243. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. The Government of Iran (1983) 
3 Iran-u.s. C.T.R. 39 (Orde r), ( Dissent [No. 2] of R.M. 
Mask) 40. 
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American arbitrator in the same Chamber to complain that "[t ]he 
mechanism of hearing and deciding cases is becoming so l ong 
delayed that the Tribunal adjudicatory process may begin to be 
perceived as nothing more than an illusion".2 44 
More recently, Chamber Three expressed the same concern , 
prompting it to reject "unauthorised" post-heari ng filings made 
by both parties. That rejection was justified by considerations 
of "[f]airness, orderliness and possible prejudice to the other 
party". 24 ~ The latest "delaying tactics" perceived by the 
American arbitrators are the Iranian insistence upon pre-hearing 
conferences, designed initially t o promote sett leme nt and to 
define clearly the areas of disagreement, and disruptions t o 
proceedings caused by the resignation of Iran ian arbitrators. 
The American arbitrators now believe that the value of 
pre-hearing conferences is questionable : 
Some pre~hearing conferences have promoted settle-
ments, some pre-hearing conferences have made it 
easier to organize the procedures, a l ot of them 
have no t been very useful. So increasingly , we 
have tried to limit their use to complex or very 
large cases. The Iranians have learned to like 
them because they delay pr~\tedings, so they ask 
for them all the time ••.• 
American members of the Tribunal have also insisted that the 
Tribunal's proceedings should not be allowed t o grind to a halt 
244. Ibid., Dissent [No. 3] of R.M. Mask, 41. 
245. Dames and Moore v. The Islamic Republic of Iran, et al., 
supra, note 122, 214. 
246. Aldrich, suora, note 26. 
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during the inevitable delay before the replacement of retiring 
Iranian arbitrators. Nor, they argue, should any hearings be 
repeated for the benefit of new members. 24 7 
Most American participants in the Tribunal process, both 
government and private counsel, support the negative evaluations 
offered by certain American arbitrators. The Legal Adviser to 
the U.S. State Department has criticised "Iran's delaying 
tactics" and the Tribunal's "tendency to grant extensions and to 
allow delays at Ir-an's urging." 248 The U.S. Administrator for 
Iranian Claims has characterised the Tr-ibunal's pace of adjudi-
cation as "slow and frustrating." 249 He has also written, 
together with the Deputy United States Agent, that the perceived 
Iranian strategy of delay "may not respect, or even acknowledge, 
the imperatives of fair and consistent legal procedures." 2 ~u A 
lawyer who has represented American claimants has speculated 
that delay "evidently is the very cornerstone of the Iranian 
strategy in defending claims before the Tribunal." 2 ~ 1 
The predominant American appreciation of the situation, 
that delay is almost entirely due to wilful Iranian procrastina-
247. See,~' R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. The Government of 
Iran (1983) 4 Iran-u.s. C.T.R. 2 (Order), (Dissenting 
Opinion of R , M, Mosk) 2-3 . 
248. Robinson, supra, note 4, 665. 
249. Stewart & Sherman, supra, note 14, 8. 
250, Selby & Stewart, supra, note 45, 243. 
251. Belland, supra, note 3 , 244 . 
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tion coupled with Tribunal indulgence, is by no means shared 
universally. Not surprisingly, the Iranian arb itrators view the 
situation in an entirely different light: 
[T]he American arbitrators have been constantly 
striving to give the Tribunal the impression that 
Iran and the Iranian arbitrators are preventing the 
Tribunal from examining cases, thwarting its work, 
and slowing down its operations. It must be 
accepted that the American arbitrators have been 
successful in this attempt. Within a short space 
of time, the Tribunal has sent Iran notice to file 
defences in hundreds of cases, scheduled prelimi-
nary hearing conferences and hea·rings, and inequi-
tably placed a country which is in a state of war, 
revolution, and internal disarray under great 
pressure. 2 :i 2 
It would be unwise to discount the burdens that have been placed 
upon Iran. Effectively, it is the sole defendant in many 
hundreds -- indeed thousands -- of claims; the organisational 
and analytical tasks involved must be enormous. Gi ven the 
paucity of experienced legal talent in post-Revolutionary Iran, 
the problems involved in defending claims are real. 
Iran's difficulties have been noted e ven by some American 
observers, including the Chairman of th e ,Zmierican Bar 
Association Section on International Law, 253 Professor Von 
Mehren, a distinguished American arbitration expert, has been 
252, Cases Nos. 83, 188, 200 and 449: Dr. Shafeiei's Reasons 
for Not signing the Awards (1983) 3 Iran-u.s. C.T.R. 124, 
129-30. See also Phillips Petroleum Co., Iran v. The 
Islamic Republic of Iran and Amoco Iran Oil Co. v. The 
Islamic Republic of Iran (1983) 2 Iran-u .s. C.T.R. LBJ 
(Order), (Dissent of Dr. Shafeiei) 284. 
253. Aksen, supra, note 94, 13. See also Belland, supra, note 
3, 252; and Shack, supra, note 214. 
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blunt, ques tioning whether delay really is a serious problem for 
claimants before the Tribunal: "It is very difficult, it seems 
to me, to demonstrate that proceedings before the Tribunal are 
more costly or less expeditious than proceedings in American 
courts would be." 2 ~ 4 A similar conclusion was drawn by one of 
the Tribunal Co-Registrars, who had previously been employed in 
the Registry of the California State Court of Appea ls: 
When I left~- the situation had been getting 
progressively worse -- but when I left, from the 
beginning of a case in that Court t o final dispo-
sition of the normal civil case of the kind we have 
here, it was six yea t"S and climbing fast. How can 
I say that this (the Tribunal) is moving too slowly? 255 
Yet, as has been demonstrated, Americans who participate 
directly in the proceedings by and large do say that the 
Tribunal is moving too slowly. Their main comp l aint now seems 
to be that the Tribunal is not strict eno ugh in apply i ng its own 
Rules. It must be stressed, however, that the wording of the 
Rules does not necessarily compel quick action. The Rules allow 
for t he enforcemen t of time limits, but t hey also grant t he 
Tribunal and its Chambers wide discretion to permit extensions . 
Without intending to criticise the Rules per se, one Amet"ican 
commentator has suggested that t he Rules "are ge neral procedural 
guidelines at best", their sanctions for delay being "rudimen-
254. Von Mehren, supra, note 1, 730. 
255. Gulliford, supra, note 198. See also the comments of 
Rovine, supra, note 92, 30-1 who underscores that a ma jor 
commercial case may take be tween five a nd six years to 
move its way thro ugh the Federal court sy s tem in t he 
United States. 
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tary" • 2 ~ 6 Precisely because the Rules are so flexible, the role 
of Chamber Chairmen is crucial to the progress of claims: "The 
Chairman's task is understandably difficult, but their ability 
and willingness to apply the Rules in a firm and consistent 
manner is essential if the Tribunal is to maintain procedural as 
well as substantive fairness 11 .257 
It would appear that some of the A~erican arbitrators are 
dissatisfied with the manner in which the Chamber Chairmen have 
conducted themselves. As noted above, there have been a large 
number of dissents penned by American members criticising exten-
sions to time limits for filings. When interviewed privately, 
certain arbitrators were quite willing to express their frustra-
tion, although the language employed was necessarily 
elliptical: 
•.. I think it's a general feeling among the 
American arbitrators, it certainly is my feeling, 
that the Tribunal to this point has not had the 
kind of firm direction and leadership, in an 
organisation and administrative sense, that it 
required ..• 258 
The third-country arbitrators are well aware of the disaffec-
tion. Judge Mangard was perfectly open about the criticism that 
had been directed at him: "I know that some of my American 
colleagues have criticised my Chamber for being too lenient, too 
quick to grant extensions . That's a question of temperament, 
256. Belland, supra , note 3, 238 and 244. 
257. Selby & Stewart, suor~, note 45, 244. 
258. Brower, supra, note 28. 
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and a question of fairness." 2 59 
The Chamber Chairmen have found thems e lves to be trul y 
be tween a r o ck and a hard place when tryi ng t o g auge t he 
appropriateness of extensions to filing time limits. Gene r ally, 
such e x tensions are requested by Iranian defe ndants and a r e 
supported by the Iranian arbitrator. In at least two o f t h e 
three Chambers, the Ame rican arbitrato r will r o utinely oppose 
extensions. The Tribunal Rules provide lit t le guidance. In the 
end, the decision whether or not to grant an e xtension will 
often be bas e d upon the Cha irma n's c o ncep ti o n o f the na t ure o f 
the arbitral process. That is what Judge Mang ard me a ns when he 
speaks of extensions in the context of "fairness". The Ch a mber 
Chairman are well aware of the desire of Ame rican claimants t o 
grasp at the remedies held out t o them; the p r omis e of t he 
Security Account is great. But at the same time, the Chairmen 
are conscious of the problems facing Iran in defending a gainst 
claims: 
We must no t fo rge t tha t wh i le on t he American side 
you ha ve , ma ybe .•. a thousand o r s o ind ividual law 
firms, having only a few cases each, and having 
time to work on them ..• o n the other hand, on the 
other side, you have, in principle, only one 
respondent, and that's the Iranian Governme nt. And 
they have had to build o ut [sic] the ir l e gal 
departme nts , to try to find suitab l e lawye rs, whi c h 
was not e asy. 26 0 
The Chairmen do not accept that the Iranians are always delaying 
for the sake of delay. In the wo r d s of Judg e Ma nga r d: " Maybe 
259. Mangard, supra, no te 28 . 
260. Ibid. 
- 456 -
sometimes, yes, because there are politically sensitive cases 
..• but in the main, and we have seen during the last year, they 
have really tried to keep dates." Extensions must be granted, 
the argument runs, to allow Iran the opportunity fully to defend 
itself, to provide for a fair hearing. In this context, it is 
interesting to note the recent comments of one arbitral expert 
who has suggested that any rigid time limits imposed upon 
arbitral tribunals by their governing rules "usually turn out to 
be incompatible with the due process rights of the parties." 261 
Judge Mangard is clearly concerned about the institutional 
ramifications of valuing efficiency more highly than the 
complete presentation of a case. He refused to see extensions 
merely in terms of "delay", emphasising that "[i)t's nece ssary 
to try to get the cases fully briefed on b o th sides ••. Be c a use 
in arbitration, you don't want really to give an award in 
default." 262 The third-country arbitrators at the TribDnal are 
very conscious of the consensual origins of arbitration and the y 
urge and practi se flexibility in the dispos it ion of c ases s o a s 
not to lose the support of the parties. 
One American arbitrator seems also to s h are a sincere 
appreciation of the predicament of Iran. Despite joining t he 
dissent of his two American colleag ues in the 1982 decisio ns in 
261. Werner, supra, note 230, S. 
262. Mangard; supra, note 28 . 
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Cases Nos 6, 51, etc. 263 wherein there were strong protests 
against delays, Mr Aldrich has take n care not to side fully with 
the position elaborated by the United States Agent and his 
staff. In commenting upon the Final Tribunal Rules of Proce-
dure, 264 Mr Aldrich noted that when the Tribunal met to modify 
the UNCITRAL Rules "[w]e were, of course, preoccupied with 
certain parts of the problem ..• particular ly we were concerned 
about potentials for delay". But he went on to assert that 
"[t]oday, that's a lesser problem, it seems to me, than we saw 
at the beginning." 26 ~ Delay, then, is not for Mr Aldrich as 
great a worry as it is for some of his American confreres. Nor 
do the actions of Iran seem to him always t o be wilfully 
dilatory. Although agreeing that the Iranians do "stall" 
certain cases, Mr Aldrich has noted that there is simply no 
"bottleneck" at the Tribunal. It has "more cases ready for 
hearing than we can hear." 266 Moreover, he recognises "that 
some of the Iranian parties do have an awful lot of cases to 
respond to." 267 
On balance, it would seem that the Tribunal Rules are 
adequate for the purposes of moving cases f o r ward , given the 
263. Supra, no te 240. 
264. Su2ra., note 29. 
265. Aldrich, sur2ra, note 26. 
266. Ibid. 
267. Ibid. 
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will to do so. Because of somewhat different appreciations of 
the role of the Tribunal, the third-country arbitrators and the 
Americans collectively have manifested different le vels of 
determination concerning the goal of efficiency. Mr Mosk and Mr 
Holtzmann (and to some extent Mr Brower) seem to have taken the 
position that once the Tribunal has sei zed jurisdiction it must 
act forcefully to assert its jurisdictional imperatives to 
control the progress of claims. The Chamber Chairmen seem to 
view the Tribunal as a continuing process of consensual 
readjustment. Only if both state parti es t o the Algiers Accords 
believe that they are being given a full opportunity to be heard 
will the Tribunal be able to continue operating and settling any 
claims. In the end, much of the controversy concerning delay 
may result, as Judge Mangard suggests, from a clash of legal 
cultures (or, more fully, a clash of legal, political, reli-
gious, economic, and artistic cultures). The cultures, the 
American and the Iranian, have "q uite different routines, qu ite 
different possibilities".268 
Despite the fact that, superficially, the Tribunal 
operates in a manner fully compatible with American attitudes 
towards third-party adjudication -- one American lawye r has 
written that he feels quite at home there -- 269 it must accommo-
date in some manner the instincts of a radically different 
268. Mangard, supra, note 28. See also Audit, supra , note 89, 795-6. 
269. Belland, supr-a, note 3, 252. 
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culture. For example, another American lawyer, one who has 
worked for Iran, issued the following warning to his American 
colleagues: 
Cultural sensitivity is very important, and whether 
you are litigating with the Iranians, arbitrating 
with them, or negotiat ing with them, the heavy-
handed litigation techniques of the American 
litigator are likely to offend them. 270 
He also noted that although the Iranian participants at the 
Tribunal have been exposed to Western cultural values, and hence 
have some insight into the thought process of their adversaries, 
very few Westerners have been exposed to Iranian, or even 
Middle-eastern, culture: "And thus they have a significant 
advantage over you. That is something very difficult for a 
Westerner to perceive." 271 The Tribunal must accommodate both 
contrary cultural impulses and profound ignorance. Professor 
Lowenfeld points out that in his experience of inter-
national arbitration "it has been necessary to fashion 
particular procedures, tailored partly to the arbitrators and 
counsel, partly t o the elements o f the cont roversy", 2 72 and if 
one might suggest an addition, partly to the needs and 
perceptions of the "clients" of the arbitration, the parties. 
In the Iran-u.s. Claims Tribunal, the procedural rules 
have been fashioned to provide enormous flexibility in the 
process of pleadings. This flexibility has been employed by the 
270. Shack, supra, note 214, 26 . 
271. Ibid., 24. 
272. Lowenfeld, supra, note 227, 6. 
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Chamber Chairmen mainly to allow extra time to Iranian part ies 
at each stage of the adjudicative process. No doubt this 
approach has been frustrating to American claimants, counsel and 
to the American arbitrators. But a strong argument can be made 
that such flexibility is a central component of the arbitral 
process . Moreover, it has probably been crucial in holding the 
Iran-u.s. Claims Tribunal together. At least one American 
arbitrator, Mr Aldrich, recognises the great va lue of the leeway 
provided by the Tribunal Rules, admitting that he "would rather 
have the flexibility they give us than be l o c ked into something 
more precise." 273 
If there is nothing to be gained in tightening up t he 
Tribunal Rules to encourage greater efficiency , the question 
remains whether ther~ are any other techniques that might speed 
up the decision-making process. The most obvious answer, one 
often bruited about by commentators and Tribunal participants, 
is that the size of the Tribunal could be increased. Article 
III of the Claims Settlement Declaration 274 states that " [t]he 
Tribunal shall consist of nine members or such larger multiple 
of three as Iran and the United States may agree are necessary 
to conduct its business expeditiously." Apparently, the state 
parties initially agreed in p rinciple that the Tribunal would be 
much larger than it is at present. The American Government had 
273. Aldrich, supra, no te 26. 
274. Supra , no t e 2. 
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suggested the creation of a thir ty-member Tr ibu nal, with t e n 
chambers. 275 However, it seems that by the time t he Irani an 
Government agreed to that number, the Ame ricans had change d 
their position. According to Judge Mangard: 
I have been told that the Iranians were willing and 
already had nominated ten Iranian arbitrators 
prepared to sit in ten Chambers. At that time , 
the Americans said, "Well, let's go step-by -step . 
Let's start with three chambers and see what wo uld 
happen." Nobody knew at the time -- it was May 
1981 -- how many cases we could get. 2 7 6 
The American Government presumably anticipated that the Tri b unal 
would face a similar case load to that of the American courts 
which had been seized with only a few hundred Iranian claims. 
In fact, over 3,800 cases were presented to t he Tribunal a nd , as 
Judge Mangard noted with some unde rstatement, "the American 
Go vernme nt had found out that it had made a mistake. 11277 Bu t 
when the Americans proposed anew that the Tribu nal be i ncreased 
in size, they encountered stiff Iranian opposi tion. The 
American arbitrator, George Aldrich, sugg e s t ed one r e aso n f o r 
t ha t oppositio n: niran do e sn 't · want t o increas e [the size ] 
because increasing it would speed the resolution of cases, and 
would hasten the day when they may have to replenish the 
Security Account." 278 Judge Mang ard offere d a nothe r e xplana-
275. 
276. 
See Rovine, supra, note 83, 5; and Al d rich , supra, note 
26. 
Mangard, supra, no t e 28. 
277. Ibid. 
278. Aldrich, suora, no te 26. 
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tion, that the Iranians have no desire to spe nd more money on a 
larger Tribunal bureaucracy. 279 To do so, in a time of deep 
war-induced austeri ty, is simply against Iranian interests. 
The Claims Settlement Declaration provides in Art. VI(l) 
that "(t]he expenses of the Tribunal shall be borne equally by 
the two governments." In practice, both governments make 
quarterly payments in advance based upon Tribunal estimates and 
extraordinary payments when requested by the Tribunal to do so. 
In 1982-83, the estimates for the financial yea r amounted to 
$4,165,939 (U.S.). In 1983-84, t he figure rose to $4, 736,873 
(U.S.) • 2 80 The Tribunal has, in fact, managed to operate under 
budget. The actual expenditure for 1983-4 amounted to 
$3,999,426.70 (U.S.), and the reserve was reimbursed in equa l 
portions to the United States and Iranian Governments, 2 3 1 
Nevertheless , the cost of operating a Tribunal of this size is 
great, One can imagi ne that the cost of expanding the Tribunal 
would be significant, especially because the current premises 
would not be large enough to cope with any maj or increase in 
size, The United States Government has tried to recoup some of 
its expenses by charging successful American Cla imants a "user 
fee" amounting to two percent of the monetary value of t he ir 
279. 
280. 
Mangard, supra, note 28. 
Annual Report 1, supra, note 67, 38-9. 
281. Annual Report 2, supra, note 67, 43-4. 
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d 282 d . . h . b 
awar , a ec1s1on tat caused cons1dera le anger amongst U.S. 
claimants and that has led to constitutional challenges not yet 
decided authoritatively by U.S. courts. 
opportunity to recover its expenses. 
Iran has no such 
Some American participants in the Tribunal process have 
sought to place the responsibility for the lack of agreement to 
expand the Tribunal squarely on the shoulders of Iran. The u.s. 
Agent has written that "Iran has resisted expanding the Tribunal 
even by one chamber," implying that an expansion could occur as 
soon as Iran was willing to "change its position". 283 However, 
in a remarkably frank interview, American arbitrator Charles 
Brower, commenting upon the possibility of expansion, suggested 
that "the United States Government, to the best of my knowledge, 
has, for some time, not been willing to agree either." That 
reluctance was "largely motivated", he speculated, "by the 
consideration that if you have, say, ten Chambers instead of 
three Chambers inevitably one or more of those Chambers is 
going to be presided over by someone from the Third World who 
may, or may not, be as appropriate to that position from the 
perspective of American Claimants." 284 In other words, for 
motives of varying degrees of legitimacy, nei ther Iran nor the 
United States is currently willing to enlarge the Tribunal. 
282. See Selby & Stewart, supra, note 45, 232, fn. 51. 
283. Ravine, supra, note 83, 5. 
284. Brower, supra, note 28. 
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In concluding this discussion of delay, it should be noted 
that, even if the Tribunal were to be expanded at some future 
time when a common will to do so might exist, there is no 
guarantee that the resolution of cases would quicken dramatic-
ally. There are many reasons for delay apart from mere size 
limitations. For example, Stewart and Sherman point out that 
"[b]y and large, the arbitrators have held claimants to high 
standards of proof." 28 ~ Although rigorous standards are to be 
applauded, evaluating proof is both difficult and time-
consuming. One American arbitrator has, in fact, expressed 
surprise that he is "not spending most of [his] time on the 
questions of what is the law, but rather on how to sort out the 
facts." He noted that the Tribunal is "a trier of facts as well 
as law, and the facts are very confused in many of these 
cases." 286 In the Ultrasystems case, R. Mosk elaborated upon 
some typical problems of evidence confronting the arbitrators: 
285. 
286. 
287. 
The parties and the Tribunal operated under diffi-
cult circumstances. Of two key witnesses, one is 
deceased and the other is incarcerated in Iran. 
Other witnesses were unavailable. Claimant did not 
have access to certain documents and witnesses. 
There were various discrepancies among those docu-
ments produced. Restrictions on travel between 
Iran and the United States, the lack of re lations 
between the two countries, the age of t he claim and 
language differences exacerbated proof problems. 2 8 7 
Stewart & Sherman, supra, note 14, 44. 
Aldrich, supra, note 26. 
Ultrasystems, Inc. v. The Islamic Republic of Iran , supra, 
note 95, Concurring Opinion of R.M. Mosk, 114, 115. 
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On other occasions, Mr Mosk has suggested that the standard of 
proof required of American Claimants was too high while the 
requirements imposed upon the Iranian parties were too low. 288 
He emphasised again the difficulties of adducing proof which may 
be available only in Iran. 
Although an expansion in the size of the Tribunal would 
give more time to the Chambers to evaluate different claims, the 
time devoted to each case would probably grow. Currently 
restricted stages of the Tribunal process, such as oral hear-
ings, might then run at a more leisurely pace. 2 b 9 Individual 
claimants could not necessarily expect much faster adjudication. 
Moreover, because of the myriad problems of proof, claimants 
themselves often cause delay by their inadequate presentation of 
288. Case B-1 (1983) 4 Iran-u.s. C.T.R. 57 (Order), (Dissenting 
Op1n1on of R.M. Mosk) 58; and Schering Corp. v. The 
Islamic Republic of Iran (1984) 5 Iran- u .s. C.T.R. 361 
(Dissenting Opinion of R.M. Mosk) 374, 375. 
289. It should be pointed out that despite complaints about the 
lassitude of the Tribunal process, oral hearings are one 
element that is circumscribed rigorously. Indeed, the 
oral hearings are, if anything, too brief. One American 
lawyer has written that in the claim he tried, two-and-a-
half days of oral argument were permitted. He estimated 
that in a comparable case in an American Federal Court, 
between three and four weeks of oral pleading would have 
been allowed. Belland, supra, note 3, 250, fn. 38. See 
also Selby & Stewart, supra, note 45, 228-9, who empha-
sise, however, that Tribunal hearings are not designed for 
the presentation of proof but for "explanation". Never-
theless, little time appears to be wasted at the stage of 
hearings; indeed, there must be some cases in whic h more 
time for explanation would be of value. 
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facts, 290 a problem that would not be ameliorated by increas ing 
the size of the Tribunal. The difficulties facing the Tribunal 
in evaluating proof and developing coherent evidentiary stan-
dards are exacerbated by the Tribunal's lack of any computerised 
data retrieval system. Consequently, the research done by 
members and their legal assistants is often duplicated and is 
difficult to transfer from case to case. 2 ~1 
Perhaps the greatest obstacle to increased speed in the 
disposition of cases, which would persist even if the size of 
the Tribunal were to be increased, is the problem of transla-
tion. This problem exists in more than one context. The 
claimants and respondents may have great difficulty in findi ng 
translators to prepare English or Farsi versions of the written 
pleadings. 292 Once the materials have been filed with the 
Tribunal, even greater problems may occur, first when attempting 
to schedule oral hearings: 
290. See, e.g., Woodward-Clyde Consultants v. The Government of 
the Islamic Republic of Iran, supra, . note 50, 251 where 
the Chamber complained "that the Parties submitted volumi-
nous documents without sufficient explanation, thus 
requiring the Tribunal to expend a considerable amount of 
time reconciling figures. This is not a desirable way of 
proceeding from the standpoint of either the Parties or 
the Tribunal." 
291. Frances Meadows, notes of interview, (14 September 1984), 
On file with author. {Ms Meadows was, at the time, a 
legal assistant to President Lagergren). 
292. See Belland, supra, note 3, 243. After the creation of 
th& Tribunal, lawyers in Washington and New York found 
that the market for English-Farsi translators was very 
tight. Translators may command fee s as high as $400. 
(U.S.)~ typed page. See Tonelson, supra, note 3, 23 . 
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As a service vital to the efficiency of the 
Tribunal's work, every effort is made to ensure 
that simultaneous interpretation facilities are 
available whenever required. However, a dearth 
of personnel capable of providing services of an 
acceptable degree of speed and accuracy, has 
imposed limitations. 291 
The Tribunal has found it difficult to find adequate simul-
taneous translation staff. It has been forced to contract out 
work to freelance interpreters, which is both expensive and 
administratively inflexible. 
Freelancers were initially paid on a "take-or-pay" basis, 
so they billed for unrendered services on the cancellation of 
meetings or hearings (an unfortunately common phenomenon in the 
first years of the Tribunal).2 94 In 1984, a new method of 
payment was negotiated whereunder freelance interpreters were 
offered dates "on an 'optional' basis, whereby they need no t be 
compensated for dates cancelled at least 15 days in advance." 29 ~ 
This improved method of payment has increased administrative 
flexibility to a certain extent . Freelance interpreters, though 
generally very skilful, also operate under rigid time con-
straints. When their contract time is finished, they will 
simply leave, whether or not a hearing has been completed. 296 
For these reasons, the Tribunal sought acti vely to expand its 
293. Annual Report 1, supra, note n7, 22. 
294. Ibid., 23. 
295. Annual Re2ort 2, supra, note 67, 27. 
296. Belland, supra, no te 3, 252. 
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full-time simultaneous translation staff, The potential 
applicant pool for such positions is small, but the Tribuna l has 
managed to hire four staff interpreters. 297 
Another bottleneck can occur when the Tribunal or a 
Chamber seeks to have written drafts of orders, awards, minutes, 
etc. translated. In just over one year of Tribunal operations 
for which figures are available, the translation service was 
required to translate some 8,735 pages of documents. When one 
considers that on average only six pages are translated per 
Tribunal translator~ working day, the enormi ty of the task 
becomes apparent. 298 In short, even if the Tribunal could be 
expanded, "the lack of resources or infrastructure" and 
especially the problems presented by English-Farsi, Farsi-
English translation could still "cause tremendous delay, 11 299 
D. The Role of the Arbitrators 
There exists a striking, and potentially destabilising, 
disparity in role perception amongst the Members o f the Iran-
United States Claims Tribunal. This disparity has already been 
297. Annual Report 2, supra, note 67, 27, 
298. Ibid., 28-9. It seems that the "level of performance" of 
translators at the Tribunal "compares very favourabl y with 
that of similar units in other intergovernmental 
organizations." Annual Report 1, supra, note 67, 23-4. 
299. Marks, Remarks, (1982) 76 Proc. Am. Soc. Int'l L. 9 (a 
former Deputy Legal Adviser in the U.S. State Department) 
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adverted to in the preceding section where it was pointed out 
that t here seems to be a disagreement concerning the very nature 
of arbitration, some arbitrators emphas is ing jurisdictional 
autonomy, 3 ou others suggesting that arbitration should be viewed 
to some extent as a continuing process of consensual read just-
ment. Clearly, such a difference in opinion about the process 
will lead inevitably to disagreement concerning the arbitrator's 
role within the institution. 
The central issue concerning the role of Tribunal members 
is their independence. Prima facie, o ne would imagine t ha t the 
issue would arise only in conjunction with the party-appoi nted 
arbitrators. That is probably why the third-country arbitrators 
are often referred to by Tribunal staff as the "neutral" 
members, a practice t o which the American arbitrators take great 
umbrage. 301 In fact, the question of indepe nde nce has arisen 
· rather pointedly even in the context of the third-country 
arbitrators, whom t he Iranian members have taken to calling the 
300. That is, once the parties have formally agreed to create 
an arbitral Tribunal, the Tribunal must assert its juris-
diction rigorously even in the face of party intrans i-
gence. In a sense, the Tri bunal, although given birth by 
the parties, takes on an independe nt life, guided by se lf-
defined imperatives. 
301. See especially the comments of Brower, supra, note 28: 
"[F)irst I'd like to disabuse you of the notion that there 
are members of the Tribunal who are supposed not to be 
neutral in the sense of impartia l and independent. Under 
the Rules all nine arbitrators are to be , and that's a 
particular point with the &~e rican arbitrators because 
they feel that they live by those rul e s." 
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"so-called neutrals". 3 u2 Indeed, it is primarily the I ranian 
arbitrators who have called into question t he impartiality of 
their third-country colleagues. The issue first arose early in 
the Tribunal's history when the Iranian arbitrators sought to 
force Judge Mangard's resignation, asserting that he was biased 
in favour of the United States. 303 Judge Ma ngard refused to 
resign and the case was brought before the plenary Tribunal 
which held, with two of the Iranians dissenting, that "the only 
nethod by which an arbitrator, once appointed, may be removed 
from office is through a challenge by a High Contracting Party 
and decision by the appointing Authority pursuant to Articles 
10-12 of the UNCITRAL Rules". 3 U L; 
In response to this decision, Iran did prosecute an 
o fficial " challenge " to Judge Mangard under Articles 10-12 of 
the Final Tribunal Rules of Procedure. 30 ~ Article 10 prov ides 
that "[a]ny arbitrator may be challenged if circumstances exist 
that give rise to justifiab le doubts as t o the arbitrator's 
302. 
303. 
304. 
See Mangard, supra, note 28, who refers with some amuse-
ment to the Iranian usage. 
Judge Mangard had been overheard making c ertain private 
remarks which were interprete d as being anti-Iranian. 
Re Judge Manaard (1982) 1 Iran-U.S. C . T.R. 111, 115. The 
two Iran1an1ssentients call their judgment a "separate 
opinion" (at 115), but they do not, in fact, concur in the 
result, suggesting instead that President Lagergren should 
use his "good offices" to ask the "two High Contract i ng 
Parties to agree on a substitute for Mr. Mangard" (p. 118). 
305. Supra, no te 29. 
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impartiality or inde pendence." Under Art. 11 , a procedure is 
estab lished for notification of the challenge and for a greement 
between the p a rties. If no agreement can be r eached , and t he r e 
was none in this case, the challenge goes ahead and must be 
evaluated by the independent "appointing authority" as prov ided 
for in Art. 12, read with Art. 6, of the Ru les. The app o in ting 
authority, designated by the Secretary-General of t h e Permanent 
Court of Arbitration at The Hague, 306 was Dr Ch. M.J.A. Moons, 
the President of the Supreme Court of the Netherlands. In his 
decision of 5 March 1982, Dr Mo ons held that "Iran is not 
a dmissible in the objections it has raised regarding Mr 
Mangard", primarily because the documents presented by Iran as 
proof of its charge "contain neith er a sufficiently clear 
de scription of the circumstance s g iving rise t o the accusatio n 
levelled against Mr. Mangard of a 'lack of neutrality', nor any 
indicat ion of the d ates on which the actual eve nt on which the 
disqualification is based took place". 30 7 Because the dec i sion 
wa s ba sed on "forma l" gro unds, no e valua tion o f the a uthenti c ity 
of the Iranian assert ions was undertaken. Judge Mangard 
remained on the Tribunal but, as will be discussed below, he 
306. As required in the absence of party agre ement under Art. 
6(2) of the Final Tribunal Rules, ibid. 
307. Re Judge Mangard, decision o f Dr Ch. M.J. A. Moons, sitting 
a s Appo inting Autho rity Unde r the Iran-Un ited Sta t es 
Claims Se ttl e ment Dec l a r a tion, 5 Marc h 1982, r epr i n ted as 
Appe nd ix I , (19 8 2) 1 Ira n-u .s. C.T.R. 509. 
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was later made to suffer for his presence. 3 u& 
The second major assertion by Iranian arbitrators of bias 
on the part of the third-country arbitrato rs a r ose in the 
highly-charged dual nationality case, A-18. 309 In their 
dissenting opinion, the Iranian arbitrators castigated their 
colleagues : 
Regrettably, the [decisional] task has now fallen 
into the hands of a group of 'professional' 
arbitrators who, forming an exclusive club in the 
international arena, are automatically b rought into 
almost any major dispute by the operation of pre-
determined methods. These 'professional' arbitra-
tors are concerned, not with the quality of their 
decisions, or with the rights and wrongs of the 
parties, but with the quantity of their decisions, 
made to satisfy their political and materialistic 
inclinations. The present award is only a mani-
festation of the work of a degenerated system. 31 0 
The "political inclinations" referred to were identified as 
solidly pro-Western, and pro-capitalist. 
Although the position adopted by the Iranian arbitrators 
on this score is undoubtedly overstated, to the point of 
o ffensiveness, it c o ntains a kernal o f truth, as uncomfo rtab le 
as that may seem to Western observers. It is unquestionably 
true that over the last twenty years or so, there has emerged a 
highly talented corps of international arbitrato rs, mostly 
European, whose expertise makes them valuable members of any 
Tribunal. The first and second Presidents of t h e Iran-u.s. 
308. 
309. 
310. 
See infra, text accompanying notes 347 to 351. 
Supra, note 32. 
Supra, note 35, 84. 
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Claims Tribunal are good examples. Without casting any 
aspersions on the professionalism or integrity of such persons, 
it is fair to comment that, because a ce ntral feature of most 
arbitrations is the appointment of arbitrators by the parties, 
any arbitrator who hopes to continue working in that high l y 
specialised field must hope to be acceptable to at l east one of 
the two potential arbitrating parties. Cand idate arbitrators 
who are from Western states are more likely to be chosen as 
party-appointed arbitrators by such states or by Western corpo-
rations. If they then adopt positions radically opposed to the 
arguments put forward by Western parties, the chances are that 
they would not be chosen by another Western party in any subse-
quent arbitration. Although t h is pressure may not prompt ac tual 
"bias", for there are sub tle moderating factors linked to an 
arbitrator's role appreciation and even to a Western party's 
desire that justice be seen to be done (part of the Rule of Law 
mystique), it is still likely t ha t a Western arbitrator will not 
wish to go on r ecord as being strongly opposed to Western 
economic interests. 311 It should be said that an arbitrator 
from a developing state is likely to find himself or herself in 
exactly the same position vis-a-vis his or her potential 
311. Although in a different context, the point is supported by 
the vitriolic reaction of some British commentators to Sir 
Humphrey Waldock's vote against certain Un ited Kingdom 
arguments in the Arbitration Between the United Kingdom of 
Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the French Republic 
on the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf (30 J une 1977 
and 14 March 1978), reprinted in (1979) 18 I.L.M. 397. 
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appointers. As one observer has pointed out, in arbitration, 
unlike in judicial settlement, "[t)he issue is essentially one 
of striking a balance between the requirement that the tribunal 
be impartial and recognition of the right of the parties to 
select persons in whom they have confidence." 312 
On the whole, the third-country arbitrators at the Iran-
U.S. Claims Tribunal seem to have found an acceptable balance. 
They are conscious of the need at times to placate both state 
parties and always to maintain the essential "equality" of 
treatment commanded by Art . 15(1) of the Tribunal Rules. But 
one can understand that, from the Iranian point of view, the 
third-country (European) arbitrators may not be seen as fully 
"neutral". Before examini ng in greater detail the substantive 
aspect of the role played by the third-co untry members as 
Chamber Chairmen, it is best to review briefly the job of the 
party-appointed arbitrators, for the Chairmen often seem to 
define their functio n s in opposition t o the approaches t aken by 
their party-appointed colleagu es . 
There can be no doubt that the independence of party-
appointed arbitrators on the Tribu nal is more suspect than that 
of the third-country arbitrators. One disting uished Amer ican 
lawyer has pointed out that: 
[t)here are certainly some skeptical American 
attorneys who have expressed concern as to the 
independence of the Iranian members of t he 
312. de Vries, Practical Aspects of Inte rnational Litigation 
and Arbitration (1970) 64 Proc. Am. Soc. Int'l L. 251. 
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Tribunal. They point to the recent reported purge 
of the judiciary in Iran as casting doubt on 
whether any Iranians are free to decide impartially 
and in accordance with generally understood princi -
ples of international law, Similarly, Iranian 
skeptics may question the role of any American 
arbitrator who was emoloyed by the U.S. govern-
ment. 313 " 
Another American counsel who has appeared before the Tribunal 
reports that "[t)he records of Tribunal decisions make it quite 
apparent that the Iranian arbitrator is not likely to support 
[an American Claimant's] claim or be won over by anything you 
say no matter how compelling", 314 The U.S. Agent was even more 
blunt, perhaps unintentionally, in discounting the possibil ity 
of impartiality on the part of the Iranian arbitrators. In 
discussing a major plenary Tribunal decision, the Agent no ted 
that "[t)he final vote of the Tribunal on the issue was 6 to 3 
against Iran, which in a sense makes the vote unanimous, 11 315 
Implicit in that statement is the assumption that the votes of 
the Iranian members are predetermined and the only votes that 
real l y "count" are those of the Amer-ican and third-country 
arbitrators, Despite the rather unattractive smugness displayed 
-- the assumption is that the American arbitrators are patently 
impartial for otherwise why should their votes count any mo re 
313. Aksen, supra, note 94, 4. 
314. Belland, supra, note 3, 241. 
315. Rovine, supra, note 83, 3. See also Rovine, supra, note 
92, 26: "From the Iranian point of view, the Iranian 
arbitrators, the Iranian parties, and the Iranian Agent 
are all one large family ." 
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than those of the Ira nians? -- t he U.S. Ag e nt was no t being 
entirely unfair. The Iranian arb itrato rs ha ve s t ate d ope nly 
t ha t they do no t believe the ms e lve s to be sub jec t t o any 
obligation of impartiality. Because they view Iran as t h e 
weaker party, they believe that t heir duty is to protect 
Iran. 316 Indeed, on no major decision have any of t he Iranian 
arbitrators voted against the Iranian Government position . 3 17 
On the other hand, one observer has cautioned against v iewi ng 
the Iranian arbitrators as "rob e d Islamic ze a lots." He no t e d 
that they are typically quite s o phi s ti cated lawye rs t rai ned in 
the European civil law tradition. 318 
The strong connection between the Iranian members a nd 
their government was made plain, however, in t h e circumstances 
surrounding the r e signation o f Dr Sani, t he second I rani a n 
arbitrator assigned to Chamber Th ree. 319 When Dr Sani firs t 
contemplated resigning (in the end, a rather p r o tracted 
process), he contacted the Head of t h e Inte rna tional Legal 
316. See,~, the comments of Judge Mangard, supra, note 28: 
"[T]he Iranians in Chamber Three openly admit it [a pro -
Iranian bias], saying that 'that is our role, we wou l d a c t 
otherwise if we were sitting in an Ira n ia n court as 
judges, but here we are de f ending the underdog . The 
Iranians are always weaker ; we ha ve t o defend them .'" See 
also the impre ssio ns of Mr Brower, supra, no t e 28 , who 
notes that "(m]y Iranian colleague has announced t hat he 
does not live by " any rules of neutrality. 
317. See Ravine, supra, note 92, 27. 
3 18. Tonelson, supra, no te 3, 23. 
319. The original membe r was Mr Enayat who also r e signed . Se e 
Annual Report 1, supra, note 67, 7. 
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Services Bureau of of the Islamic Republic of Iran who replied 
by telex as follows: tt(P]lease advise Dr. Mostafa Jahanguir-Sani 
that his resignation will be raised at the next meeting of the 
High Council of Supervision, whose decision will be duly 
conveyed to him.tt 320 Agreement was finally forthcoming and Dr 
Sani submitted his resignation to the Government of Iran, and 
not to the Tribunal. Mr Mosk, the American member of Chamber 
Three, characterised this course of action as "inconsisten t with 
the principle that the members of the Tribunal are independe nt 
and not employed by their governments." 32 1 The Tribunal as a 
whole decided that resignations should be submitted to the 
Tribunal itself and not to the appointing government. 
The position of the American arbitrators is more compli-
cated, reflecting a remarkable disparity between their se lf-
perception and the impressions they convey to their third -
country colleagues. The American arbitrators have made it a 
point of pride that they are perceived to be i mpa rtial and 
motivated only by a desire to discover the truth. Mr Brower has 
stated that "[u) nder the Rules all nine arbitrators are to be 
[impartial and independent), and that's a particular point with 
the American arbitrators because they feel that they li ve by 
320. Reported in RayGo Wagner Equipment Co. v Star Line Iran 
Co. (1982) 1 Iran-u.s. C.T.R. 411, (Reply of Dr. Sani to 
Mr. Mask's Comments of 3 March 1983 Concerning Case No . 
17) 428 at 440. 
321. Cases Nos. 42, 48, 60, 167 and 439: Dissent of R.M. Mosk 
to Orders (1983) 3 Iran-u.s. C.T.R. 209 . 
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those rules". 322 For Mr Aldrich, "[t]he j ob is to dec ide o n t he 
basis of the law appointed by Article V what is the l e g al 
r esult, and, on the whole, I would say that certainly is what I 
have tried to do. I have not hesitated to come down agai nst 
American parties when it seemed to me that it was the righ t 
thing to do . " 323 On one important occasi o n, Mr Aldrich d i d 
indeed part company with his American colleagues in deciding not 
to join their dissent in the forum clause cases. 3 21.t Th is 
development was seize d upon by Professor Lo we nfeld as e v idence 
of the essential impartiality o f the Ame r ica n arbit ra t o rs: 
I think .•• that it was important for t he cause of 
international arbitration that one of the American 
arbitrators, George Aldrich, shared t he v iew of t h e 
majority. In c o ntrast to the Iranian a r b itrators, 
who have vot8d as a bloc on every significant 
issue, the Ame r ican arb itrators appe ar t o be call-
ing the c a ses as the y s ee t h em, s ome time s for and 
sometime s aaainst t he contentions o f the Ameri can 
claimants. 32 ~ 
One might be forgiven for suggesting that Pro f e ssor Lowenfeld 
has extracted rather too much from a very smal l data sampl e . 
Eva luations of t h i s kind a re admittedly impre s sionistic at best, 
but if one reads through the rep orted decisions of the Tri bunal, 
it is difficult to point to many instances in which an Ame rican 
arbitrator has rejec ted outright the claim o f a n ~~e ri can corpo -
322. Brower, supra, note 28. 
323. Aldrich, supra, note 26. 
3 24. See the discus sion supra , text acc o mpa ny ing no t e s 115 t o 
131. 
325, Lowenfeld, supra, note 65, 84-5. 
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ration or the contentions of the U.S. Government. The American 
members may be "calling the cases as they see them" but they see 
them in very large measure in a manner most compatible with the 
perceptions of American parties. It may be, of course, that the 
claimants do have very strong legal arguments, but it does seem 
significant that unanimous decisions are extremely rare at the 
Tribunal and that on the few occasions when American claimants 
do lose, the American arbitrator is typically to be found 
dissenting . 3 2 b 
326. See,~, In Re Refusal to Accept the Claim of Raymond International (U.K.) Ltd., supra, note 229, (Dissent of H.M. Holtzmann in which G.H. Aldrich and R.M. Mosk Join) 396; Grimm v. The Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, supra, note 51, (Dissenting Opinion of H.M. Holtzmann) 81; RayGo Wagner v. Iran Express Terminal Corp., supra, note 50, (Concurring and Dissenting Opinion of R.M. Mosk) 146 (concurring in holding that the Tribunal had jurisdiction to hear the claim and dissenting from the Award on the Merits which rejected the American Company's Claim); Queens Office Tower Associates v. Iran National Airlines Corp., supra, note 50, (Dissenting Opinion of H.M. Holtzmann) 254; Dallal v. The Islamic Republic of Iran, et al. (1983) 3 Iran-u.s. C.T.R. 10, (Dissent of H.M. Holtzrnann) 17; J,I, Case Co. v . The Islamic Republic of Iran, et al. (1983) 3 Iran-u.s. C.T.R. 62, (Dissent of H.M. Holtzrnann) 66; RCA Global Communications Disc, Inc. et al. v. The Islamic Republic of Iran (1983) 4 Iran-u.s. C.T.R, 9 (Interim Award), (Dissent of H.M. Holtzmann) 12; Ultrasystems Inc. v. The Islamic Republic of Iran, supra, note 96, (Dissenting Opinion of R.M. Mosk) 80; Behring International Inc. v. The Islamic Republic of Ira n (1983) 4 Iran-u.s. C.T.R. 89 (Decision), (Dissent of R.M. Mosk) 93; Dames and Moore v. The Islamic Republic of Iran, supra, note 122, (Dissenting Opinion of R.M. Mosk) 229; CBA International Development Corp. v. The Government of Iran (1984) 5 Iran-u.s. C.T.R. 177, (Dissent of R.M. Mosk) 181; and {\merican Housing International, Inc. v . Housing Cooperative Society of Officers of State General Gendarmer ie (1984) 5 Iran-u.s. C.T.R. 235 (Disse n ting Opinion of R.M. Mosk) 242. 
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The third-country arbitrators certainly believe that both 
their Iranian and American colleagues tend to favour their own 
side. Judge Mangcrd was most frank in discussing this aspect of 
Tribunal deliberations. He believed that t he Iranian and U.S. 
arbitrators "have worked very much alone", that the third-
country arbitrators have been caught in a no-man 's land between 
essentially intractable positions: 
So, the three neutral arbitrators, I believe, 
always in my Chamber and also in the others, have 
acted between two persons, two eolleagues who, even 
if they don't admit it, really act as the leading 
counsel for the party in question, for t he private 
party, or the Government party to the particular 
case. They both do that, no doubt about it, and 
the Iranians in Chamber Three openly admit it, 
saying "that is our role" The Americans could 
not, would not admit it, but they act in the same 
way ... 3 2 7 
Clearly, Judge Mangard's impressions mesh with the self-
perceptions of the Iranian arbitrators, but are completely at 
variance with the publicly-expressed perceptions of the 
Americans. Privately, however, at least one American arbitrator 
was willing to admit that because, in his view, the Irani ans 
327. Mangard, supra, note 28. It is interesting to note that 
under the Arbitral Rules of the American Arbitration 
Association, a party-appointed arbitrator may, if the 
parties agree , actually operate as an advocate for his 
appointing party (Rule 12). Such a rule emphasises the 
important theoretical dissimilarities between arbitration 
and the judicial settlement of disputes. The moral 
objections to bias are clearly not as strong in arbitral 
tribunals as in courts, at least when considering the role 
of party-appointed arbitrators. See Stein & Wotman , 
International Commercial Arbitration in the 1980s: A 
Comparison of the Major Arbitral Systems and Rules (19 83) 
38 Bus. Law. 1685, 1701. 
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were so partisan, he sometimes felt it necessary to support 
actively the position of American claimants. 
There can be no doubt that there are valid distinctions to 
be drawn between the role of a party-appointed and a third-
country arbitrator. Although he argues that a party-appointed 
arbitrator should be tttruly impartialtt, de Vries suggests that 
such an arbitrator has a duty to ensure that ttfull understanding 
is attained by the entire tribunal of the presentation of facts 
and law advanced by his nominator,tt 328 The Iranian arbitrators 
carry this argument very far and seek actively to represent the 
interests of the ttunderdog'', Iran. They also perceive a special 
duty to ferret out inconsistencies in the English and Farsi 
versions of proof. 32 Y Needless to say, none of the other 
arbitrators is likely to be capable of such a task. 
The American arbitrators seem to share de Vries's 
perception of their role. Mr Aldrich acknowledged in discussion 
that, despite his emphasis upon complete impartiality, ttthe 
party-appointed arbitrator has a special responsibility to bring 
to light matters peculiar to his own legal system and to explain 
things that may not otherwise be explicable in terms of the 
facts of the casett, 330 Mr Brower also sees a ttspecial responsi-
bilitytt to ttensure that the Tribunal or the Chamber, in most 
328. De Vries, supra, note 312, 253. 
329. Reported by Judge Mangard, supra, note 28. 
330. Aldrich, supra, note 26. 
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cases, has understood, has appreciated in a cognitive sense, the 
arguments presented by the claimants, and that those arguments 
have been considered so that a full exposition of the issues has 
taken place." 331 Clearly, there is a very fine line between 
ensuring that the Tribunal has "understood" the Claimant's case 
and acting as "leading counsel" for the party, to adopt Judge 
Mangard's words. The perception of the third-country arbitra-
tors is that the line is regularly transgressed by both the 
American and Iranian arbitrators. 
Indeed, it may be fair to say that the Chamber Chai r me n 
have come to expect that the party-appointed arbitrators will 
show a "special interest" 332 in the arguments presented on 
behalf of the party which shares their nationality. The Chair-
men have consequently developed a distinctive conception of 
their own role. They are painfully conscious of the fact that, 
as is commonly the case with tripartite arbitral tribunals, it 
is their vote that will in e ffe c t decide most cases. 3 3 3 The 
Chairmen have gone to some remarkable lengths to ensure that 
they can pull together a majority, including such expedients as 
dividing cases into sections according to subject matter and 
rendering "Interim Awards" which will attract the support of one 
or the other party-appointed arbitrator, even though neither 
331. Brower, supra, note 28. 
332. de Vries, supra, note 312, 253. 
333. Ibid. 
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could go along with the result if conceived as a whole. 334 
There is at least one significant institutional pressure that 
prompts the Chamber Chairman to adopt this singular approach: 
the ability of the party-appointed arbitrators to write separate 
and dissenting opinions. That ability tends to make compromise 
more difficult, forcing the Chamber Chairman to adopt expedient 
solutions to create some common ground for an award. There is 
also a strong desire on the part of Chamber Chairmen to be seen 
to have provided a full hearing to both parties. It is this 
fact that has led to the routine granting of extensions to 
filing deadlines. It may also be relevant in this context that 
all three of the third-country arbitrators originally appointed 
to the Tribunal had significant judicial experience whereas the 
party-appointed members were drawn from the ranks of leading 
advocates, government officials or professors. The third-
country arbitrators may initially have possessed a more hi g hly-
developed perception of impartiality. Recently, the re has been 
a change of emphasis in the appointment o f third-country 
arbitrators (in the absence of agreement, by the appointing 
authority). Messrs Bocksteigel, Virally and Riphagen were all 
334. See,~, Ultrasystems Inc. v. The Islamic Republic of 
Iran, supra, note 96, (Dissenting Opinion of R.M. Mask) 
go;-82: "I am ••• disturbed by the potential consequences 
of unnecessarily separating a case into segments and then 
deciding it piecemeal at different times and with differ-
ent majorities. The procedu r e gives the Chairman t he 
ability to divide a case into a number of issues and 
thereby to dictate the final result witho ut their being 
any majority for the award." 
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professors. 
Owing partly to the perceived imbalance in the quality of 
advocacy before the Tribunal,3 35 the Chamber Chairmen seem also 
to emphasise an independent "truth-seeking" approach, particu-
larly in hearings. That is, the Chairmen will involve them-
selves actively in the presentation of cases, adopting an 
inquisitorial tone and requesting the presentation of additional 
written proof. 330 There is also a common feeling amongst t h e 
third-country arbitrators that they must act as buffers between 
the two party-appo inted arbitrators in each Chamber, and betwee n 
the parties in any given case. Although recognising that they 
335. Mr Aldrich was quite frank in pointing out that "[t] h e 
Iranians often come with totally inarticulate counse l of 
very modest abilities. They have, I think, the Iranians 
have mad e a great mistake in this regard." Aldrich, 
supra, note 26. He did note, however, that the National 
Iranian Oil Company had engaged independent and eminent 
counsel such as the Whewell Professor of International Law 
at the University of Cambridge. 
336. Judge Mangard emphasises the impo rtance of his Swedish 
background to his role perception: "I would say, a s I am 
used to Swedish arbitration and Swedish litigation, the 
presiding judge really has the functional roles of trying 
to find the truth and not being just passively listening 
to the attorneys of the parties but also by putting 
questions and asking maybe for possible documentary 
evidence, and so on." Mangard, supra, note 28. I t may be 
relevant in this regard that so far all of the third-
country arbitrators have bee n Europeans familiar with 
civilian systems of law where an inquisitorial judiciary 
is the norm. On the advantages of this system, see 
Langbein, The German Advantage in Civil Procedure ( 1985) 
52 u. Chi. L. Rev. 823. In their article advising co unsel 
for American claimants, Selby and Stewart note that "[t]he 
arbitrators are prone to ask difficult questi o ns r egarding 
legal theories and f a ctual details." Selby & Ste wart, 
supra, note 45, 230. 
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are bound to decide cases "on the basis of respect for law", 3 31 
they emphasise the need at times to foster an informal, 
"conciliatory" atmosphere. In the words of J udg e Mangard: 
[WJ e know that according to the UNCITRAL Rules, we 
are not allowed to act as an amiable compositeur 
unless we are expressly asked to do so, but I would 
say that there is maybe a greater amount of 
maybe not calling [sic] conciliation, but equity 
coming into our minas-than maybe would be other-
wise. And in a way, we conciliate too, because to 
try [sic] to avoid this very harsh conflict within 
the Chambers ••. in the full Tribunal, it has been 
impossible, 338 
It would not be accurate to say that the third country arbitra-
tors see themse lves as being conciliators a bove all. The 
Tribunal's second President, Professor Bockstiegel, stressed 
that he is in a formal sense, a judge, 33 ~ but o ther third 
country members have demonstrated that being a "judge " does not 
require rigid observance of rule-bo und legality. They may be 
required to mediate between intractable posi tions. The party-
appointed arbitrators acknowledge this "conciliatory" aspect in 
the work of the Chamber Chairmen, although it is not necessarily 
337. Article V of the Claims Settlement Declaration , supra, 
note 2. 
338. Mangard, supra, note 28. 
339. Bockstiegel, supra, note 27. 
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applauded. 340 
Given the obvious conflicts in role perception amongst the 
arbitrators, and in light of the enor~ous political strains to 
which the Tribunal is subjected, it comes as no surprise t ha t 
the atmosphere at the Tribunal has been tense. Professo r 
Lowenfeld has written that "the key to tripartite arbitration 
with party-appointed arbitrators is that all members of the 
Tribunal approach the task as professionals. They must want to 
earn each other's respect, and to be prepared to give it." 341 
It must be accepted that such mutual respect simply does not 
exist at the Iran-u.s. Claims Tribunal, particularly between the 
Iranian and American members. From the very beginning of the 
deliberative process the arbitrators have failed to develop a 
sense of collegiality. 342 There has been constant and violent 
disagreement, some of which has erupted publicly and is revealed 
on the pages of Tribunal Reports. In a remarkable series of 
"Statements" and "Repl ies" in one o f the RayGo Wagner Equipment 
Co. cases, Arbitrators Sani a nd Mask traded angry accusations. 
340, See,~, Brower, supra, note 28: 
I can tell you as a practical matter, the Third 
Country judges, the Chairmen, apparently all feel that 
they have some additional role t o play •.. and f eel 
that they should be taking some steps to encourage the 
two sides to come together in the case." 
Mr Brower believes that they should instead behave fully 
as judges and simply apply t he law. See also Selby & 
Stewart, supra, note 45, 229. 
341. Lowenfeld, supra, note 227, 7. 
342. See Lowenfeld , supra, note 65, 90 . 
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In the concluding volley, Mr Mask suggested that Dr Sani's 
previous statement had been "inaccurate and misleading" and 
reflected "bickering among members of the Tribunal which does 
little more than detract from the decorum of the Tribunal." 343 
Similar problems are revealed in cases such as Granite State 
Machine Co. v. The Islamic Republic of Iran, et al. 344 and Gruen 
Associates, Inc. v. Iran Housing Co., 345 and in the published 
"Reasons of Dr. Shafeiei for not signing the Awards in Cases 83, 
188, 220 and 449." 346 
The most serious public display of anger and frustrati o n 
to date is to be found in the reports of Case A-18, the dual 
nationality decision of the plenary Tribunal. In their separate 
"Declaration", the Iranian arbitrators called the decision a 
"clear manifestation of a bad faith interpretation, 11347 Two of 
the American arbitrators complained bitterly about this 
343. RayGo Wagner Equipment Co.v, Star Line Iran Co., supra, 
note 320, (Further Comments of R.M . Mask) 441. The 
exchange of views had by then reached almost comic propor-
tions, having already encompased the following missives: 
a) "Mr Jahangir Sani's Reasons for Not Signing the 
Decision Made by Mr Mangard and Mr Mask in Case No. 17", 
at 415; b) "Comments of R.M. Mask With Respect to Mr 
Jahangir Sani's Reasons for No t Signing t h e Decision Made 
by Mr Mangard and Mr Mosk in Case No. 17", at 424; c) "Mr 
Jahangir Sani's Reply to Mr Mask's 'Comments' of 3 March 
1983 Concerning Case No. 17", at 428. Mr Mask's "Further 
Comments" were the final volley. 
344. (1982) 1 Iran-U.S. C.T.R. 442, (Concurring Opinion of R.M. Mask) 449. 
345 . Supra, note 50. 
346. suera, note 252. 
347. Case A-18, supra, note 32, 502. 
- 488 -
"Declaration": "We deeply regret the tone and content o f t he 
'Declaration' which the three Iran ian Arbitrators have i nserted 
above their signatures on the Decision. Such libelous and base-
less invective has no place in an international arbitral tribu-
nal and merits no reply." 348 In their Dissent, publish ed subse-
quently, the members from Iran went further , as was no t ed above, 
to assert that the Tribunal, and all international arbitration, 
was designed solely "to safeguard the interests of the 
capitalist wo~ld." 349 The Prime Minister of Iran declared t hat 
the decision in Case A-18 was "unlawful and wrong " and that Iran 
would boycott proceedings in claims presented by dual 
nationals. 35 U As the decision and dissent were released, 
reports suggest that tension at the Tribunal rose to new 
heights . Indeed, in Septembe r 1984, shortly before the filing 
of the Iranian members' dissent in Case A-18, two of the Iranian 
arbitrators physidally assaulted Judge Mangard and attempted to 
eject him from the Tribunal premises on the g r ou nd that he was 
pro-American . 351 That action prec ipi t ated a major cri s is at the 
348. Ibid., (Concu r ring Opinion of H.M. Holtzmann and George 
Aldrich) 50 3 at 504. 
349. Case A-18: Dissenting Opinion of the Iranian Arbitrators, 
supra , note 35, 85. 
350. "Statement of the Prime Minister of Iran", supra, no te 39, 430. 
351. Reported in The Times [of London] (5 September 1984) 6, 
col. 8, Judge Mangard , in his sixties and an ex-Member of 
the Swedish Court of Appeals, was no t seriously in jur ed . 
See also Aldrich , supra, note 26. 
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Tribunal which prompted intense negotiations leading to t he 
resignation and replacement of t he Iranians involved. Tribunal 
business ground to a halt for some months. 
Interviewed shortly after the attack, Judge Mangard was 
remarkably sanguine and would say only that there was no strong 
rapport amongst members of the Tribunal. Ironically, he felt 
that overall he had "rather better relations to [sic] my Iranian 
colleague [in Chamber Three) than maybe to my American 
colleagues who have written rather aggressive dissents. 11352 In 
his earlier letter of Resignation from the Tribunal, Judge 
Bellet had been far less circumspect: 
My efforts are becoming pointless, and, at the end 
of my moral and physical tether, I consider that I 
cannot continue, at the risk of endangering my 
health and my family life. 353 
Judge Bellet 's letter highlights the intense pressure imposed 
upon the third-country members. Perhaps that pressure goes some 
way towards explaining the high turnover in third-country 
membership on the Tribunal. 
Mr Aldrich has also been quite open about his frustra-
tions, admitting that the Tribunal had been "often an unpleasant 
place to work" largely because "the Iranians are under terrible 
pressure and sometimes they behave terribly." He believed that 
it would be difficult to attract competent replacement arbitra-
352. Mangard, supra, note 28. 
353. Quoted in Cases Nos. 83, 188, 220 and 449: Dr. Shafeiei's 
Reasons for Not Signing the Awards , supra, note 252, 144. 
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tars to fill openings caused by resignations. 3~4 Mr Brower felt 
saddened by the lack of "collegiality", and he suggested that 
the difficulty was basic and perhaps, therefore, insol uble: 
Arbitration ordinarily presumes [sic] two parties 
that are present in the arbitrati~wi thi n the 
institution, not simply technically by agreement, 
but because of being motivated by unde rlyi ng will 
to really use that means for resolving certain out-
standing problems, and I think many people have 
concluded that that type or deqree of will is not 
present on the Iranian side. 3 ~~ 
Keeping in mind Judge Mangard's point that there exists in the 
Tribunal a fundamental clash of cultures, Mr Brower's evaluation 
may be somewhat too simple. The tensions and frustrat ions 
probably are not caused solely by a lack of commitment by Iran 
to the Tribunal process, but also by deep differences in percep-
tion involving the very nature of the process and the role o f 
the arbitrator within the institution. 3 ~ 6 Although it is true 
that the Tribunal is buffeted by external political constraints 
354. Aldrich, supra, note 26. 
355. Brower, supra, note 28. 
356. In the words of a former American Agent: 
The process is fragile. It is no t solidly based. The 
cultural differences are enormous. The two sides' 
perceptions of what an i nterna tional arbitration is 
are very different. The roles of their key p l ayers , 
the arbitrators, the agents, and the parties are very 
different. 
Ravine, supra, note 92, 30-1. 
The antipathy created by the decision in Case A-18, 
supra, note 32, was exacerbated by the fact that all of 
the dual nationals who were seeking to assert c laims were 
supporters of the former Shah, who was viewed by t he new 
Iranian regime as an arch-villain and a Wes t erniser . The 
dual nationals represented an ousted regime that was 
thought to have posed a deep threat to Islamic culture. 
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and continuing ideological antipathies, 357 it must also respond 
to sincerely-held, but contradictory, cultural impu lses amongst 
its membership. One may question whether or not the institution 
is strong enough to withstand such pressures, bu t the more 
far-reaching issues are whether the compromises necessary to 
hold it together will render its process and decisions entirely 
idiosyncratic and whether the enormous tensions will threaten to 
undermine the entire institution of international arbitration by 
calling into question the possibilities for trust and consensus 
upon which it is based. 358 These issues will be explored in the 
concluding section. 
E. Contributions of the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal to the Theory 
and Practice of International Arbitration 
Oddly enough, the greatest contribution yet made by t he 
Tribunal to international arbitral practice was actually imposed 
upon it by the parties. That was the creation of an independent 
enforcement mechanism -- the Security Account 
under the 
Algiers Accords. 359 The Account was designed to ensure Iranian 
performance of monetary awards issued by the Tribunal; it will 
357. See,~, Selby & Stewart, supra, note 45 , 216. 
358. On the second issue , see Lowenfeld, supra, note 65, 91. 
Mr Rovine, the former U.S. Agent, doubts the integrity of 
the process: "[W)e have a process here whe r e the cultural 
differences run so deep as, in many cases, to betray t h e 
essential purpose of international arbitration." Rovine, 
supra, not~ 92, 27. 
359. See the discussion, supra, note 2. 
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have no bearing upon non-monetary Orders nor upon Awards 
rendered against the United States or American parties. The 
creation of the Account is analogous to a lump sum settlement 
agreement, for the money to settle claims against Iran has been 
paid in advance and the adjudication of specific claims takes 
place subsequently. Of course, the analogy cannot be drawn too 
far because the distribution of lump sum settlements is commonly 
managed by a national Claims Commission 360 ~nd here the adjudi-
cation is undertaken by an international or transnational 
tribunal. Moreover, the money in the Security Accounts vests in 
Iran until the Tribunal orders a transfer to satisfy a specific 
award. Nevertheless, the basic structure of the two systems is 
comparable. 
None of the previously existing sets of institutional 
arbitral rules elaborate any specific enforcement mechanism. 
Although arbitral awards rendered under the auspices of ICSID 
may benefit from the state parties' commitment to recognise and 
enforce awards, no independent enforcement procedure was estab-
lished by the World Bank Convention. 361 Local rules governing 
360. See,~, Lillich & Weston, supra, note 220. 
361. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes 
between States and Nationals of Other States (done 18 
March 1965; entered into force 14 October 1966) 575 
UNTS 160. Under Art. 54(1), "[e)ach Contracting State 
shall recognize an award rendered pursuant to this Conven-
tion as binding and enforce the pecuniary obligation 
imposed by that award within its territories as if it were 
a final judgment of a court in that State." However, sub-
section (3) emphasises that the "[e)xecution of the award 
(cont'd.) 
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specific aspects of enforcement -- most notably claims of 
sovereign immunity -- are still allowed to operate. The 
situation with awards of the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal is ~xact-
ly the reverse. One may start with the presumption that, as 
long as funds remain in the Security Account, enforcement of 
awards against Iran (the vast majority of all Tribunal awards) 
will take place without any involvement of municipal law, and it 
is only in strictly limited situations that local rules may have 
application. 
One of the central provisions of the Algiers Accords was 
the termination of all existing or future legal proceedings in 
United States courts involving claims arising out of the Iranian 
Revolution and subsequent events and the lifting of related 
attachments. 362 An essential element of the quid pro quo of the 
Accords was that, in response to the lifting of United St ates 
attachments, Iran agreed to the creation of the Security Account 
out of which Tribunal monetary awards against Iran would be 
shall be governed by the laws concerning the execution of 
judgments in force in the State in whose territories such 
execution is sought." Moreover, any local interpretations 
of the rules of state immunity from execution are still 
permitted to apply (Art. 55). 
362. See Adler, The U.S.-Iran Accords and the Taking Clause of 
the Fifth Amendment (1982) 68 Va. L. Rev. 1537, 1539. See 
also Executive Orders 12277-12281 (19 January 1981) 46 
Fed. Reg. No. 15 (1981), reprinted in (1981) 20 I.L.M. 
287-91. For full discussions of the legal status and 
effects of the Algiers Accords and the Executive Orde rs in 
United States Law, see Cohen, Krueger, et al., supra, note 
55~ and Eskridge, The Iran Nationalization Cases: Toward a 
General Theory of Jurisdiction Over Foreign States (1981) 
22 Harv. Int'l L.J. 525. 
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paid. The Tribunal has itself recognised this quid pro quo: 
A critical aspect of this substitution of fora [ the 
Tribunal for domestic courts] was the parallel 
replacement of the various United States attach-
ments with the Security Account in the N.V. Settle-
ment Bank. Although funded initially with U.S. $1 
billion, the Account's continued replenishment at 
the U.S. $500 million level has been guaranteed 
both by the Government of Iran and Bank Markazi 
Iran. In order to assure further the effectiveness 
of this unique claims settlement mechanism, the 
United States in essence forced its nationals to 
file their claims here by dissolving their attach-
ments and suspending litigation in the United 
States. 363 
The Security Account was established under the first 
Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular 
Republic of Algeria. 364 As Iranian funds were released from the 
American freeze orders and attachments, one-half of each instal-
ment paid to Iran was placed "in a special interest-bearing 
security account in the [Algerian] Central Bank, until the 
balance in the security account [had] reached the level of $1 
billion." All funds in the Security Account were "to be used 
for the sole purpose of securing the payment of, and paying, 
claims against Iran in accordance with the claims settlement 
agreement." Iran also accepted a continuing obligation that 
whenever it was notified by the Central Bank that the "balance 
in the security account has fallen below $500 million, Iran 
shall promptly make new deposits sufficient to maintain a 
minimum balance of $500 million in the account." 
363. Esphahanian v. Bank Tejarat, supra, note 43, 165. 
364. Supra, note 2, para. 7. 
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Under a subsequent "Technical Agreement" 36 ~ involving 
various banking institutions charged with the transfer and 
deposit of Iranian Government assets, the N.V. Settlement Bank 
of the Netherlands, a public corporation with registered office 
in The Hague (a subsidiary of the Dutch Central Bank), a g reed to 
act as "Depositary for the Iran i an funds i n the Unite d States 
within the meaning of the Algiers Agreements". 366 The Security 
Account was thereby established in that Bank . Under the Agree-
ment, Bank Markazi Iran undertook an independent and binding 
obligation to replenish the Security Account once it had fallen 
below U.S. $500 million. Two of the parties to the Technical 
Agreement, the Bank Markazi Iran and the New York Federal 
Reserve Bank as Agent for the United States, were unable to 
agree upon the treatment of interest from the Security Account. 
The Iranian bank argued that such interest s hould accrue to it 
directly, while the U.S. bank asserted that t he interest s hould 
remain in the Security Account, in partial fulfilmen t of t h e 
oblig ation to replenish. 36 7 Be cause the Alg iers Accords g ave no 
adequate guidance on the questfon, it was almost inevitable that 
the Tribunal would reach a compromise result. The debate was 
resolved by the plenary Tribunal in the second phase o f Ca se 
365. Technical Agreement with the N.V. Settlement Bank of the 
Netherlands (17 August 1981), reprinted in (1981) l Iran-
U.S. C.T.R, 38 [hereinafter Technical Agreement] 
366. Ibid., para. l(d)(ii). 
367. Ibid., Appendix I, para. 1. 
- 496 -
A-1, the majority deciding "that t he interest must ••• be 
credited as it accrues to a separate interest-bearing a c count in 
the N.V. Settlement Bank". The funds in the separate account 
"would be finally remitted to Iran at the same time as any 
balance in the Security Account". Iran would retain access to 
the separate account "in order to help satisfy its rep l enishment 
obligation, if the need arises." The Tribunal majority believed 
that this solution maintained the existing "equilibrium" between 
the parties by "freezing the situation". 368 
When a monetary award in favour of a U.S. claimant has 
been rendered by the Tribunal, payment is made in the following 
manner. The President of the Tribunal must notify the Escrow 
Agent (the Central Bank of Algeria) 369 that the Tribunal has 
rendered an award, identifying the number o f the claim, the name 
and address of the claimant, the amount awarded including 
interest, and the number of the award. The Escrow Agent will 
then issue payment instructions t o the Depositary Bank (N. V. 
Se ttlement Bank ), including a l l the info rmation provided by the 
President of the Tribunal, and the Depositary Bank will "prompt-
ly comply" with those instructions. 370 Each Award must be dealt 
with individually. The Depositary Bank is e xpre ssly exonerated 
368. Case A-1 (1982) 1 Iran-u.s. C.T.R. 189 (Second Phase) 
191-2. 
369. Escrow Agreement (20 January 1981), reprinted in (1981) 1 
Iran-u.s. C.T.R. 16. 
370. Technical Agreement, supra, note 365, paras l(e) (i) and ( ii ) . 
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from any liability regarding funds transferred "in satisfaction 
of ••• an award" even if the award is subsequently challenged, 
revoked, set aside or modified. 371 For its services, which also 
include the co-ordination of investments from the Security 
Account, 372 the Depositary Bank receives a monthly fee of 
$150,000 (U.S.). 373 
A problem has arisen in connection with the payment from 
the Security Account of Awards rendered to confirm party-
negotiated settlements, the so-called Awards on Agreed Terms. 
In Case A-1 (First Phase), the Tribunal established a set of 
standards "to be applied in recording a settlement as an award 
on agreed terms." 374 It decided, unanimously, that because the 
Tribunal derived its jurisdiction solely from the Claims Settle-
ment Declaration, when it was required to make an Award on 
Agreed Terms, the Tribunal would have to undertake "such 
examination concerning its jurisdiction (over the settled claim] 
as it deems necessary". But it refused to set down "in 
abstracto" any general rule "concerning the extent of the 
examination as to jurisdiction that may be needed." 37 ~ In fact, 
the Tribunal has adopted a flexible approach and usually records 
371. Ibid., para. l(e)(iii). 
372. Ibid., para. 2(a)(iii). 
373. Ibid., para. 3(d)(i). 
374. Case A-1 (First Phase), supra, note 16. 
375. Ibid., 152. 
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simply chat it is satisfi d h. 
approves a. A~a~· on~ red T r m 
i h s jurisdiction when it 
In some cases , the issue is 
One A.":'.eri an arbitrator, H.M. Holtzmann, has complained 
abo ut the ease wi '.: .. w:-i ich .:\wards on Agreed Terms have been 
approved. ~e be _i2 ves that the Security Account may in some 
circumstances have been abused. Two difficulties have arisen. 
First, Holtzmann .as suggested that certain parties have reached 
agreement on a settlenent in order to extract funds from the 
Security Account ~h ich will be used to finance transactions 
involving goo's ordered after 19 January 1981, the date of the 
Accords. In other words, t he money from the Security Account 
Nill be available to complete a transac tion over which the 
r ri bunal would not have jurisdiction . 377 Mr Boltzmann would not 
376. See, ~' ABS Wo rldwide Technical Services, Inc. v. The 
Islamic Republic of Iran (1983) 3 Iran-u.s. C.T.R. 17~ 
Advanced Compu ter Techniques Corp. v. The Islamic Republic 
of Iran (1 983 ) 3 Iran - u .s, C . T.R . 326; Combustion 
Engineering, Inc., et al. v. The Islamic Republic of Iran 
(1983) 3 Iran-u .s. C.T.R. 366; William B. Rorer, Inc. v. 
Toobi Co. (1983) 3 Iran-u.s. C.T.R. 390; American Motors 
Corp., et al. v. The Islamic Republic of Iran (1983 ) 4 
Iran-u.s. C.T.R. 29; and Smith International, Inc. v. The 
Islamic Republic of Iran (1983) 4 Iran-u.s. C.T.R. 33.~-
The American arbitrator, Mr Mask , has criticised the 
Tribunal for its tendency in all types of cases to decide 
substantive issues "without deciding jurisdictional 
issues". Schering Corp. v. The Islamic Rep ublic of Iran, 
supra, note 288, 377. 
77. The General Tire and Rubber Co . v. Iran Tire Manufacturing 
Co, (1983) 3 Iran- u .s. C.T.R. 351, {Dissent of H.M. 
Boltzmann) 358. See also Pan American World Airways, 
Inc., et al. v. The Government of the Islamic Republic of 
Iran (1983) 4 Iran-U.S. C . T .R. 205 {Dissenting Opinion of 
B ,M. Boltzmann) 206 at 207. 
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give Tribunal blessing to such Agreements. 
It should be pointed out that, if the Tribunal refused 
jurisdiction and the Settlement Agreement collapsed, the 
Claimant would not formally be left without a remedy, for under 
President Reagan's Executive Order Suspending Iranian Litiga-
tion, a claimant may re-institute an action in United States 
courts if the Tribunal has dismissed the claim for lack of 
jurisdiction. 378 Execution could, of course, prove very diffi-
cult for idiosyncratic municipal law interpretations of the 
doctrines of sovereign immunity and Act of State might preclude 
enforcement of any court judgment. 
The second problem with the Awards on Agreed Terms in Mr 
Holtzmann's view is that the Tribunal has abused its limited 
discretion to order that the exact terms of an Award be kept 
secret. According to the Tribunal Rules: 
(U]pon the request of one or more arbitrating 
parties, the arbitral tribunal may determine that 
it will not make the entire award or other decision 
public, but will make public only portions thereof 
from which the identity of the parties, other 
identifying facts and trade and military secrets 
have been deleted. 379 
Mr Holtzmann has argued that this discretion is being exercised 
much too broadly, to excise entire Awards from the public 
record. He has asserted that the Tribunal should restrict itself 
378. See Lowenfeld, supra, note 65, 80-1, commenting upon 
Executive Order 12,294 of 24 February 1981, 46 Fed. Reg ., 
No. 3. 
379. Article 32(5) of the Final Tribunal Rules of Procedure, 
supra, note 29. 
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to the deletion of only the identity of the parties and other 
"identifying facts and trade and military secrets". Even then, 
the Tribunal should act only when it is satisfied that such 
action is necessary. 3au Instead, the Tribunal has tended to bow 
to the will of the parties in specific cases and to suppress 
entirely the substantive content of certain Awards on Agreed 
Terms. 381 
Mr Holtzmann's overriding concern is that fairness be seen 
to be done to all parties before the Tribunal. Because all 
awards are paid out of the Security Account, parties in all 
cases have an interest in seeing that only those awards based 
upon claims where the Tribunal would have jurisdiction are 
extracted from the Account. Secrecy prevents open examinat ion: 
A primary purpose of the Settlement Agreements is 
to provide for payment of Settlements from the 
Security Account established by the Algiers 
Declarations. Any withdrawals from the Security 
Account affect the interest of parties in all 
cases. It is therefore highly inappropriate that a 
Settlement Agreement annexed to an Award which 
triggers such a withdrawal of funds should be 
cloaked in secrecy.3 82 
380. Cases 15, 19 and 387: Separate Opinions of H.M. Holtzmann, 
supra, note 29, 79-80; and The Government of the U.S.A. on 
behalf of Shipside Packing Co. v. The Islamic Republic of 
Iran, supra, note 226, (Opinion of H.M. Holtzmann, 
Concurring in Part and Dissenting in Part from Award on 
Agreed Terms) 82. 
381. See, ~' Chevron Research Co. v. National Iranian Oil 
Co. (1983) 2 Iran-u.s. C.T.R. 364 (Award on Agreed Terms). 
382. Cases 15, 19 and 387: Separate Opinions of H.M. Holtzmann, 
supra, note 29, 80. 
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Of course, Mr Holtzmann's position is predicated upon a 
particular view of the Tribunal process. The proper scope of 
secrecy will depend in part upon whether or not the Tribuna l 's 
Awards are believed to have any precedential value. Formally, 
of course, no decisions of international tribunals have binding 
precedential value. However, even a cursory examination of 
contemporary textbooks in public and private international law 
will reveal the extent to which case law is now relied upon as a 
source of legal justification. It is still best to refer rather 
to the persuasive value of tribunal awards. It will be 
suggested below that in the case of the Iran-u.s. Claims Tribu-
nal such value is, in fact, very low except in relation to 
future adjudication in the same Tribunal. Mr Holtzmann would 
probably disagree. 
Parties no doubt have a right to expect that the Security 
Account will not be drained by the payment of improper awards, 
but it remains for the Tribunal to evaluate its own jurisdic-
tion. If it is s atisfied that it does have jurisdiction, it is 
entirely proper to satisfy the parties' request for secrecy. In 
practical terms, the limited persuasive value of Tribunal 
Awards, elaborated upon below, means that secrecy will have no 
damaging consequences. Mr Holtzmann's first concern is valid 
and important: the Tribunal must be careful in evaluating its 
jurisdiction when approving Awards on Agreed Terms, for it will 
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not commonly be subject to review, 383 and enforcement will occur 
almost immediately through the Security Account. The second 
concern, which leads to the conclusion that there is almost a 
duty to publish details of awards, even when the parties are 
opposed, is probably misdirected. 
The existence of the Security Account must be viewed as 
almost the defining feature of the Iran-u.s. Claims Tribunal. 
Its creation was a singular achievement and its operation is of 
enormous benefit to Claimants. One American lawyer has pointed 
out that if the American Claimants had been forced to litigate 
in United States courts, even if their cases were held to quali-
fy for judicial consideration under the doctrine of restrictive 
sovereign immunity, execution and even prejudgment attachments 
could very well have been held to be contrary to the relevant 
American legislation. 384 The importance of an independent 
enforcement mechanism, agreed upon in advance by the parties and 
383. The Dutch Parliament has considered a bill which would 
effectively preclude judicial review in the Netherlands of 
any Tribunal Award on substantive grounds or even for lack 
of jurisdiction. See the Law concerning the "Applicabi-
l(ty of Dutch Law to the Awards of the Tribunal Sitting in 
The Hague to Hear Claims Between Iran and the United 
States", reprinted in Iranian Assets Litigation R~. 6, 
899 (15 July 1983). The bill appears to have died on the 
order paper. See also The Netherlands. Ministers of 
Justice and Foreign Affairs, Applicability of Dutch Law to 
the Awards of the Tribunal Sitting at The Hague to Hear 
Claims Between Iran and the United States: Explanatory 
Notes, reprinted in (1983) 4 Iran-u.s. C.T.R. 308. 
384. Clagett, supra, note 29. On problems of enforcement and 
issues of sovereign immunity, see supra, Chapter III. 
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free of idiosyncratic municipal law constraints, cannot be over-
stressed. Indeed, if there is any outstanding lesson to be 
gleaned from the experience of the Iran-u.s. Claims Tribunal, it 
is that private parties wishing to negotiate an arbitration 
clause in a contract with a state, or an ex post facto dispute 
resolution agreement, would be well advised to attend to the 
possibility of creating some type of institutional enforcement 
mechanism. 
The design of any such security mechanism would, of 
course, depend upon the amount claimed, the number of cases to 
be dealt with, the nature of the parties, and the level of trust 
that exists between them. Possibilities include the deposit of 
performance bonds, the negotiation of separate suretyship 
contracts with third-party guarantors, the simple deposit of 
funds with the Tribunal, or the creation of a formal Security 
Account with pre-established rules of access and disbursement. 
If either of the last two mechanisms is chosen, experience at 
the Iran-u.s. Claims Tribunal suggests that the negotiating 
parties should make every attempt to reach agreement on the 
treatment of interest, thereby avoiding later legal disputes 
which would have to be settled by the arbitral tribunal, causing 
delay and increasing costs. 
Ironically, although the Security Account is one of the 
great innovations of the Tribunal structure, its existence may 
be viewed as a major inhibiting factor in the general applica-
tion of Tribunal practice and case law in other contexts. This 
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difficulty has been alluded to throughout this Chapter but must 
now be dealt with more fully. It bears reiteration that the 
Tribunal is operating in a highly charged, deeply politicised 
atmosphere. Typically, the American and Iranian arbitrator will 
not agree on the legal reasoning applicable in any given case. 
The burden then falls upon the Chairman to conduct Chamber 
business and to author awards, orders, etc. in such a manner 
that some equilibrium and some rational corununication can be 
maintained. To do so, it will often be necessary to compromise, 
to play down differences of opinion and to render decisions that 
are intentionally vague and obfuscatory. The Security Account 
makes such an approach more attractive because its existence 
precludes the need for separate enforcement proceedings. In 
other words, given the lack of any review procedure or challenge 
mechanism, the Iran-u.s. Claims Tribunal can afford to be 
imprecise, and in order to ensure its own survival it is almost 
bound to be imprecise. Justice will still to a great extent be 
done because Claima nts will benefit from almost immediate, 
essentially guaranteed enforcement of their awards, a benefit 
they could hardly have anticipated in the dark days when their 
contracts were being repudiated and their assets seized. For 
the parties, the precision of the Tribunal's reasoning, or lack 
thereof, is largely irrelevant. Consistency is a valid 
objective of all parties, for they have a legitimate expectation 
of being treated with equality, but precision is largely irre -
levant. It is for the wider legal community, seeking guidance 
and precedent, that precision is an issue. 
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Professor Sohn has been quite supportive of the Tribunal's 
elaborations of substantive law, arguing that the Tribunal has 
not been "timid and conservative", that it has been willing to 
apply "novel" rules. 385 In support of this view, he cited the 
decision establishing the de facto successorship of liabilities 
whereunder a government-controlled entity which effectively took 
over a private company was held liable for its debts even t hough 
no legal succession had taken place. 386 He also pointed to the 
decisions in the dual nationality cases 387 and to one case in 
which the Tribunal asserted jurisdiction over a claim grounded 
in unjust enrichment. 388 It is interesting to note, however, 
that the Tribunal's lack of timidity has been apparent almost 
entirely in cases involving the interpretation of its own 
jurisdiction under the Claims Settlement Declaration. As was 
discussed above, 389 the Tribunal is lath to deprive Claimants of 
access. But jurisdiction is ·essentially an internal question, 
and when other substantive questions have been addressed, t h e 
385. Sohn, supra, note 52, 100-2. 
386. Oil Fields of Texas, Inc. v. The Government of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran (1982) l Iran-u.s. C.T.R. 347, 356-62. 
387. Professor Sohn was relying upon the decisions of Chamber 
Two in Esphahanian v. Bank Tejarat, supra, note 43 and 
Golpira v. The Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 
supra, note 43, but a similar approach was adopted by the 
full Tribunal in Case A-18, supra, note 32. 
388. Isaiah v. Bank Mellat, supra, note 123. 
389. Supra, text accompanying notes 105 to 192. 
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Tribunal's approach has been far less bold and far less predict-
able. On some issues the Tribunal has even manifested patent 
inconsistency. In any case, one may question whether "timidity" 
or "boldness" are very useful measures of a legal process. A 
tribunal may be quite bold and fail to ground its decisions in 
any rigorous analysis. On the other hand, timidity may promote 
vagueness of thinking or it may prompt intense legalism in an 
attempt at self-justification. The central question raised by 
the experience of the Iran-u.s. Claims Tribunal is not so much 
whether it is "bold" but whether or not its practice has 
persuasive value for the larger legal community. 
In most cases, the Tribunal has focussed very heavily upon 
the facts in rendering Awards. 390 It is quite common for the 
major part of an Award to be devoted to a recitation of the 
facts and contentions of the parties, probably drafted by a 
legal assistant to the Chamber Chairman, only then followed by a 
short and typically vague set of reasons for the Award. 391 Even 
Professor Sohn notes that opinions are generally succinct and 
that the majority "does not find it necessary to rely expressly 
390, See Carbonneau, "The Elaboration of Substantive Legal 
Norms and Arbitral Adjudication: The Case of the Iran-
United States Claims Tribunal" in R. Lillich, ed., The 
Iran-United States Claims Tribunal 1981-1983 (1984)-ro-4, 
126. 
391. See,~, J.I. Case Co. v. The Islamic Republic of Iran, 
supra, note 326; and Ran International Industries, Inc., 
et al. v. The Air Force of the Islamic Republic of Iran 
(1983) 3 Iran-u.s. C.T.R. 203. 
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on precedents." 392 The concurring and dissenting opinions are 
generally much more elaborate in their citation of sources, but 
their utility remains entirely dependent upon the power of the 
argument advanced. No doubt, the style of majority opinions is 
influenced heavily by the factual complexity of the cases 
brought before the Tribunal and by difficulties in proof. 393 
But there are also institutional imperatives promoting such a 
technique. 
One American academic observer, Professor Carbonneau, has 
been particularly harsh in his evaluation of Tribunal decisions, 
asserting that "the awards rendered by the Tribunal have been 
essentially devoid of substantive legal content and, as a 
result, [are] incapable of having much precedential value. 113 ~ 4 
A similar argument has been advanced by one of the Iranian 
arbitrators who has written that if "legal principles are sacri-
ficed, the resulting decisions 
will necessarily be so flawed 
and insupportable as to damage the reputation and standing of a 
tribunal enjoying a certain international status." 395 So far, 
most of the Tribunal's major decisions have been jurisdictional 
-- the forum-selection clause cases, the dual nationality cases, 
392. See Sohn, supra, note 52, 96. 
393. See supra, text accompanying notes 285 to 288. 
394. Carbonneau, supra, note 390, 128. 
395. R.N. Pomeroy, et al. v. The Government of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran: Dissentin Opinion o M.J. Sani (1983) 4 
Iran-u.s. C.T .R. 237. 
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the corporate nationality cases, all of whic h have been 
discussed above. Jurisdictional questions d o not lend them-
selves to the elaboration of broad norms, especially in arbitra-
tion where particularities of the governing instrument will 
condition the Tribunal's evaluation of its jurisdiction. To 
evaluate Professor Carbonneau's criticism, then, it is best to 
examine other types of Tribunal decisions. One area in which 
there has been, necessarily, a great deal of discussion is the 
issue of applicable law. That issue will now be investigated as 
an example of the Tribunal's typical app roach to dispute resolu-
tion. 
First, one potential objection must be met. It could be 
suggested that, in arbitration, the evaluation of applicable law 
is similar · to the evaluation of jurisdiction in that d e cisions 
in both cases are strongly guided, if not controlled, by 
specific clauses in the agreement to arbitrate (whether a 
separate document or part of an underlying contract). As such , 
the issue of choice of law may be just as particular t o a 
specific tribunal as are questions of jurisdiction. However, in 
the case of the Iran-u.s. Claims Tribunal, that potential objec-
tion loses much force because of the nature of the choice o f law 
provision in question. The relevant provision is Art. V of the 
Claims Settlement Declaration which states: 
The Tribunal shall decide all cases on the basis of 
respect for law, applying such choice of law rul e s 
and principles of commercial and internat i onal law 
as the Tribunal determines to be applicable, taking 
into account relevant usages of the trade, contract 
provisions and changed circumstances. 3 96 
396. Supra, note 2. 
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Clearly, the choice of law is phrased in such a broad ma nne r 
that conclusions reached by the Tribunal mig h t be thoug ht po ten-
tially to have relevance in other contexts. A fortiori is that 
the case at a time of great indecision amongst the propone nts of 
international arbitration concerning the law applicable t o 
contracts between states and foreign private parties. 397 Any 
decisions involving that issue could be of widespread interest 
due to the absence of clear international authority. 
The central element of Art, Vis the req uirement that 
Tribunal decisions be rendered on "the basis of respec t for 
law". Although some American participants have tried to argue 
that this choice-of-law provision is "sharply and narrowly 
drawn", 3 ~ ti one must conclude that such an assertion has more to 
do with bargaining positions and desired outcomes than wi th 
independent analysis. There are many ways in which a decision 
may be based upon "respect for law". Moreover, the crucial 
point is that "law" is a very wide term, with many sub-
categor ies and related concepts. Article V s e ems to c o ntemp l ate 
the application of many different legal sources, mentioning as 
it does "commercial" law, "international" law, "contract" prov i-
s ions, "changed circumstances", and "relevant usages of the 
trade". Guiding the application of these sources is the over-
riding principle that the Tribunal may apply "such choice of law 
397. See the discussion, supra, Chapter II. 
398. Stewart & Sherman, supra, note 14, 7. 
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rules ••• as [it] determines to be applicable." 
Even in its early days, as it wrestled with the modifica-
tion of the UNCITRAL Rules, the Tribunal signalled that it would 
take a flexible approach regarding choice of law, for it chose 
not to alter Art. 33(2), which enabled the Tribunal to decide 
cases ex aeguo et bona if so authorised in writing by the 
parties to a specific case. The United States Government had 
argued that any such decision would not be "on the basis of 
respect for law", 39 ~ but the Tribunal demonstrated that 
"respect" is a nebulous concept which may extend "law" into an 
independent form of "equity". It would seem, however, that 
unless there is specific authorisation to decide ex aequo et 
bona, the Tribunal does feel bound to apply some form of law. 
The sources of that law remain in doubt. One might have 
expected at least one clear rule to emerge, that the various 
alternative sources of law mentioned in Art. V would not over-
ride a clear contractual choice of law, but as will be discussed 
below, even this seemingly obvious interpretive point has been 
obfuscated. 
The choice-of-law provision of the Claims Settlement 
Declaration underscores the "mixed" nature of the Tribunal. In 
the case of international claims commissions adjudicating under 
principles of state responsibility in international law, the 
399. Ibid., 15-6. The Tribunal has yet to publish a case in 
which the parties had authorised it t o act ex aequo et 
bono. See also Jones, supra, note 31, 52. 
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characteristic agreement provides for the application of "in ter-
national law, justice and equity." 4 uu Professor Stuyt's survey 
of international arbitral tribunals also revealed that when 
choice-of-law clauses are drafted to govern such proceedings, 
they tend to require the application of amorphous principles of 
"justice and equity" and "impartiality", or they refer t he 
Tribunal to rules of international law. 4 0 1 David Lloyd Jones 
notes that the Iran-u.s. Tribunal is called upon to apply a more 
complex amalgam of legal rules. Like a tribunal resolving 
state-state controversies, it is authorised to apply interna-
tional law, but the Tribunal is also directed to apply princi-
ples . of commercial law, contract law and trade usages, signal-
ling that it is also a "transnational" commercial arbitral 
tribunal. 4 u2 The application of any particular category of 
sources would depend upon the nature of the underlying 
dispute. 4 0 3 It would seem unlikely that all sources should 
apply in any given case. 
400. Jones, ibid., 51-2. 
401. Out of 441 arbitrations catalogued by Pro fessor Stuyt, 281 
were not governed by any exp ress c h o ice -of-law cla use (or, 
if they were, the clause is not known), 101 were governed 
by principles of "justice and equity", etc., and forty-
seven were to apply international law. See A. Stuyt, 
Survey of International Arbitrations 1794-1970 (1972), 
passim. 
402. Jones, supra, note 31, 51-2. 
403. Audit, supra, note 89, 844. 
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In Case A-18, 4 0 4 the dual nationality decision of the 
plenary Tribunal, the debate in part revolved around the nature 
of the Tribunal, as was discussed above. 40 ~ In attempting to 
decide upon that nature, inevitably the issue of choice of law 
arose. In the case, Iran argued forcefully that the Tribunal 
was fully "international". One would have expected, then, that 
its primary source of law would be international law. Initial-
ly, that seemed to be the position adopted by the three Iranian 
arbitrators in their dissenting opinion: "[T]he Tribunal shall 
base its decisions on law, not equity, and that law can be no 
other than international law. 11406 But a mere glance at Art. V 
of the Claims Settlement Declaration belies the validity of that 
approach and the Iranian arbitrators recognised that fact, for 
they went on to say: 
Equal reference in Article V to choice of law rules 
and commercial law, as well as other provisions and 
elements, appears fully justifiable due to the 
nature and diversity of the claims before the 
Tribunal. 407 
In the end, the Iranians were forced to accept the inevitable, 
even though their broader argument was much weakened by the 
admission. The Tribunal does retain enormous flexibility to 
pick and choose amongst various sources of law. Some commen-
404. Supra, note 32. 
405. Supra, text accompanying notes 32 to 52. 
406. Case A-18: Dissenting Opinion of the Iranian Arbitrators, 
supra, note 35, 25. 
407. Ibid., 25-6. 
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tators have speculated that the flexibility allowed the Tribunal 
under Art. V of the Declaration would encourage it to adopt 
~omparative law techniques and to find guidance in the princi-
ples of private international law. 4 U 8 It was thought that the 
Tribunal might engage in creative methodological explorations. 
In fact, "the awards generally are devoid of any comparative law 
methodology or transnational substantive dimension. 114 0 9 
The striking fea~ure of many awards is that they nowhere 
state expressly what sources of law are being applied. In Craig 
v. Ministry of Energy of Iran, et al., 410 an American engineer 
claimed unpaid fees and expenses, and damages for breach of 
cont ract, from three separate Iranian defendants and their 
supervising Ministry . In evaluating the status of the relevant 
contract, Chamber Three rejected a defence argument that non-
compliance with internal company procedures invalidated the 
contract. The Chamber stated that "even if internal MAHAB 
provisions required the signatures of more than one MAHAB rep re-
sentative, such a provision, even under Iranian law, wo uld not 
affect the validity of the contract". 411 The statement seems 
consciously ambiguous, leaving entirely unclear if Iranian law 
in fact governed the formation of the contract and the result in 
408. See,~' Lillich, supra, note 5, 6-7; and Carbonneau, 
supra, note 390, 105. 
409. Carbonneau, ibid., 126. 
410. (1983) 3 Iran-o.s. C.T.R. 280. 
411. Ibid., 287. 
oassa:1:: . 
clear:y . 
cla ·_ -..,,as 
limitat: 0:1 . a ve 
_a: .. s e: re 
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and t e co:1tract is interpreted in t ~e linhc : t::e fcc:.s 
witho t express reference t a ny governi:.g _ega ~ princi_les or 
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rather be taKe:1 as an election on ~rai~'s part t 
:::-egard t he co:1t ract as havinq been te::'.":7li nate by 
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- , . l , ~ 1 3 r y1:1g an e_ect1on. · 
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words f t he contract itself, perhaps supported by general 
principles o f contract law (wi t h a hea vy emp hasis pon common 
law con tract doct rine ) but those princi ples re_ ain veiled and 
unela bo rated . 
412 . 
413 . 
Ibid , 289 . 
Ibid. 
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In cases where the arbitrators have been more specifi c 
about the applicable law, they have sometimes revealed s t ark ly 
contradictory approaches, especially when one compares results 
in different Chambers. The clearest example to date concerns 
the law governing the awarding of interest by the Tribunal. In 
White Westinghouse International Co. v. Bank Sepah-Iran, 4 1 4 
Chamber Three held that the amount of interest due on the prin-
cipal sum of a dishonoured cheque was governed by the law of New 
York, where a "consent judgment" had been rendered: "Because the 
debt was payable in New York and the consent judgment was 
entered in New York, the law of that State is applicable in this 
case." More recently, Chamber Two adopted a c ompletely anti-
thetical position regarding the source of law governing damage 
awards, including interest. In CMI International, Inc . v. 
Iranian Ministry of Roads and Transportation, et al., 41 ~ the 
Chamber confronted a situation in which the application of the 
governing law of the contract (that of the U.S. Sta te of I d aho) 
would have led, i t believed, to an inequitable r esult. Conse-
quently, the Chamber held that it was not "rigidly tied to the 
law of the contract" and that it should analyse all issues of 
damages "in accordance with gene r al principles of law", rather 
than by reference to the U.S. Uniform Comme rcial Code as 
incorporated in the statutes of Idaho. The Chamber went so fa r 
414. 
415. 
(1982) 1 Iran-u.s. C.T.R. 169, 170-1. 
(1983) 4 Iran-u.s. C.T.R. 263 (Award). 
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as to suggest that its task was to search for "justice and 
equity, even in cases where arguably releva nt national laws 
might be designed to further other and doubtless quite legiti-
mate goals." 416 In conversation, the arbitrator George Aldrich, 
expressed great pride in the CMI decision: 
[I)t was a very interesting case in which we 
rejected the damages as applied by the law of Idaho 
· because we thought it led to an unfair result. It 
led to a result that made sense in a United States 
legislative context of trying to promote the sale 
of goods, the Uniform Commercial Code, but didn't 
necessarily do justice, in our view, here •.• even 
though the Contract said the law of Idaho applies, 
we were free to resort to general principles in 
respect of damages. 417 
He acknowledged, however, that "there is probably not uniformity 
about this among the Chambers" and it was his impression that 
Chamber One in particular was "much more interested in adhering 
to the stated law of the contract." 41 ~ 
Resort to international law on questions of damages and 
interest has also received some indirect support in Chamber 
Three, despite the holding in White Westinghouse International 
Co. 419 Mr Mosk, the American arbitrator, implicitly sanctioned 
the alternative -- international law-based -- approach in his 
416. Ibid., 268. 
417. Aldrich, supra, note 26. 
418. Ibid. 
419. Supra, note 414. 
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concurring opinion in the Granite State Machine Co. case. 420 
There he employed international law sources to determine a 
"reasonable" rate of interest on a damage award, relying 
especially upon O'Connell who suggested that interest under 
international law in cases of expropriation or seizure of funds 
could reasonably be determined by answering the question "what 
could the claimant reasonably have expected had he had use of 
the property?" 421 
Perhaps in an effort to avoid the obvious incompatibility 
of these approaches, in many recent decisions of the Tribunal, 
interest has been awarded without any citation of legal 
sources. 422 The most common approach now seems simply to award 
interest at a "fair" or a "reasonable" rate, usually set at ten 
percent. 423 Lump sum interest damages have also been awarded in 
420. Granite State Machine Co. v. The Islamic Republic of Iran et al. (1982) 1 Iran-u.s. C.T.R. 442 (Concurring Opinion of R.M. Mosk) 449 at 450. 
421. D. O'Connell, International Law, 2d ed., (1970) 1123. 
422. 
423. 
See, e.g., Economy Forms Corp. v. The Government of the Islam~epublic of Iran (1983) 3 Iran-0.S. c.T.R. 42, 53; Ultrasystems, Inc. v. The Islamic Republic of Iran, supra, note 95, 111; and the cases cited, infra, note 423. 
See,~, Intrend International, Inc. v. The Imperial Iranian Air Force, et al. (1983) 3 Iran-u.s. C.T.R. 110, 116; Blount Brothers Corp. v Ministry of Housing and Urban Development, et al. (1983) 3 Iran-u.s. C.T.R. 225, 235; John Carl Warnecke and Associates v. Bank Mellat (1983) 3 Iran-u.s. C.T.R. 256, 267; Chas. T. Main International, Inc. v. MAHAB Consulting Engineers, Inc., et al., supra, note 29, 275; General Dynamics Corp. v. The Islamic Republic of Iran (1984) 5 Iran-u.s. C.T.R. 386; and Craig v. Ministry of Energy of Iran, supra, note 29, 290 (all 
(cont'd,) 
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a few cases. 424 On the whole, the Tribunal has failed to 
provide any consistent legal justifications for the awarding of 
interest in particular types or categories of cases. 4 2 ~ An 
attempt by President Bockstiegel to elaborate a consistent set 
of principles in the awarding of interest has not been followed. 
He had suggested in the Sylvania Technical Services case that an 
appropriate rate of interest could be established by looking to 
six month certificates of deposit for which the rate of interest 
could be gleaned authoritatively from government sources. Such 
certificates are available to all types of investors. Recently 
the interest on six month deposit certificates has hovered 
around twelve per cent. Subsequent awards have reverted, 
establishing a "fair" rate of interest). And see 
Woodward-Clyde Consultants v. Iran, supra, note 50, 251 
(setting a "reasonable rate" of ten percent per annum). 
American Arbitrator, Howard Holtzmann, has criticised this 
"arbitrary" approa~h to the awarding of interest. See 
Case B-53 (Iran v. United States) (1984) 5 Iran-u.s. 
C.T.R. 105 (Concurring Opinion of Howard M. Holtzmann) 
111. 
424. See,~' Gruen Associates, Inc. v. Iran Housing Co., 
supra, note 50; Pomeroy et al. v. The Government of the 
Islamic Republic of Iran (1983) 2 Iran-0.s, C.T.R. 372; 
and Pomeroy Corp. v. The Government of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran, supra, note 50. 
425. Given the intentionally vague approach concerning the law 
governing damage awards (including interest), one aspect 
of Chamber Three's Award in Woodward-Clyde Consultants v. 
Iran, supra, note 50, is surprising. The Chamber held, at 
251, that although the damages suffered by the Claimant 
were higher than those actually requested, "[t)he Tribunal 
is, however, constrained by the relief requested by 
Claimant." No indication is given of the source of that 
"constraint", and one might well ask why such a rig id 
approach was adopted. 
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however, to the "fair" rate of ten per cent. 4 26 
The Administrator for Iranian claims in the U.S. State 
Department has warned that the decisions of the Iran-United 
States Claims Tribunal "will not be accorded their proper 
precedential weight if they are not well reasoned and firmly 
grounded in law". Moreover, he has emphasised the difficulty of 
establishing the Tribunal's "place in the international arbitra-
tion process generally" 427 if its decisions are not consistent 
and justified in law. Given the nature of the Tribunal, such 
cricitisms, although probably accurate, are simply misdirected. 
The various parties appearing before the Tribunal have a right 
to expect logical consistency in decisions, consistency 
transcending Chambers and, of course, cases. Without such 
consistency, and it has not always been apparent, the Tribunal 
becomes little more than a lottery which can hardly be viewed as 
a legal process. However, the world beyond the Tribunal can and 
should expect to gain little from its deliberations, either in 
the elaboration of substantive law or in the development of a 
model structure for international arbitration. The Tribunal is 
a very complex creature: part public and part private; part 
international and part transnational; part legal and part 
political. This complexity alone should cause one t o be wary in 
426. Sylvania Technical Systems, Inc. v. Islamic Republic o f 
Iran, Award of 27 June 1985, reported in (1986) 80 Am. J. 
Int'l L. 365, 366. 
427. Stewart & Sherman, supra, note 14, 17. 
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searching for general principles. Its very size and formal 
structure have caused some arbitrators and observers to doubt 
whether it should be categorised as arbitration at all. 
Certainly it is a form of arbitration which bears little rela-
tion to the typical ad hoe and relatively informal method of 
dispute resolution commonly called by that name. 
The presence of the Security Account has affected the 
persuasive value of Tribunal awards, insulating the decisional 
process and allowing the arbitrators enormous licence to render 
awards in the full knowledge that they will be enforced without 
comment or subsequent evaluation. That factor, when linked to 
the harsh political realities c9nfronting the Tribunal, has 
tended to promote the drafting of vague, almost unreasoned, 
awards. There is a strong institutional resistance to tight 
drafting or to the elaboration of general rules. 42 ~ When that 
tendency is linked to the fact that the majority of awards are 
actually authored by only one person, the third-country arbitra-
tor, the persuasive force of Tribunal awards must be doubted. 
Moreover, even when the Tribunal is more precise in its hold-
ings, most commonly in jurisdictional cases, its decisions must 
be treated warily for they are likely to be heavily contingent 
upon the arbitrators' reactions to the political difficulties 
428. Professor Reisman remarks that most international 
adjudication is based upon some form of compromise whi ch 
encourages the drafting of judgments with a "weak legal 
formulation". See supra, note 89, 111. 
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they face, Compromise solutions are advanced wh ich may be 
valuable and entirely proper within the Tribunal context but 
which may have limited applicability outside that institution. 
In certain cases, the Tribunal has felt the political pressu re 
so keenly that it has even forgone its characteristically 
expansive interpretation of jurisdiction and has refused to 
adjudicate on the merits of a claim. 4 ~~ 
Throughout its short history, the Tribunal -- and here one 
must emphasise the major role of t h e third-country arbitrato rs 
-- has manifested a remarkable instinct for self-preserv ation. 
There have been many occasions upon which observ ers might h ave 
predicted collapse, In the end, the Tribunal's continued e x is-
tence must be viewed as its greatest achieveme nt. It is a 
symbol of the importance of pro cess-values in legal systems, It 
is the process itself that enhances the Rule of Law rather than 
the substantive content of the Tribunal's Awa r ds. Claimants 
still have an opportunity to gain c ompensation and, o n a h igher 
plane, Iran and the United States, desp i te intense ideological 
and cultural dissimilarities, are still engaged in a common 
pursuit. That is probably all that one could fairly be entitled 
to expect given the circumstances of the Tri bunal's cre ati o n and 
the fine balancing required every day o f its operation. In 
resolving disputes on the basis of "respect for law", the 
Tribunal is forced to display enormous flexibility; it must be 
429. See,~, Grimm v. The Government of the Islamic Republic 
of Iran, supra, note 51. 
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willing to compromise. This has led to an esse ntially idi o -
syncratic approach to choice of law and even to the app lication 
of substantive legal principles. In addition, the heavy case 
load and the Qeed for some degree of efficiency has required the 
establishment of highly formal and elaborate institutional 
structures which are peculiar to this Tribunal. Fo r all these 
reasons, it would be unwise and misleading to treat t h e 
substantive output of the Iran- U.S. Claims Tribunal as highly 
persuasive authority in other third-party adjudications of 
conflicts involving states and foreign private parti e s. The 
independent enforcement mechanism is worthy of emulation but on 
the whole, the Tribunal's idiosyncracy makes it a flawed 
paradigm. 
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CONCLUSION 
The eminent American legal theorist, Lon L. Fuller, 
believed that all "adjudication should be viewed as a form of 
social ordering", as a means -- but not the only or necessarily 
the dominant means -- by which "the relations of men to one 
another are governed and regulated." 1 Given his understanding 
of the nature of law, that it is a purposive and constantly 
developing enterprise, 2 Fuller's description of adjudication as 
a form of social ordering implies that serious attention must be 
paid to the design of an adjudicatory mechanism and that, to do 
so adequately, one must articulate the purposes it is to serve. 
To identify the purposes of arbitration between a state 
and a foreign private party -- "mixed arbitration" -- is no t an 
easy task because the "purposes" will surely differ depending 
upon the perspective from which the mechanism i s viewed. The 
foreign private party may desire arbitratio n p rimarily beca use 
of its potential for "delocalising" the decisi o nal process, 
1. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication (1978) 92 Harv. 
L • Re V • 3 5 3 , 3 5 7 • 
2. L. Fuller, The Morality of Law, rev. ed. (1969) 145: 
I have insisted that law be viewed as a purposeful enter-
prise, dependent for its success on the energy, insight, 
intelligence, and conscientiousness of those who co nduct 
it, and fated, because of this dependence, to fall always 
somewhat short of a full attainment of its goals. 
The same theory underlies the fascinating work o f the 
Harvard anthropologist, Sally Falk Moo re, who descri be s t he 
creation of legal systems and rules as a "human ind ustry " 
notable for its dynamism. See S.F. Moore, Law as Process: 
An Anthropological Approach (1983) 1 et seq. 
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providing neutrality by removing the dispute from the juris-
diction of the courts of the state party. An additional 
interest of the private party may be in the potential applica-
tion of "international" (or transnational) legal standards that 
are perceived to provide stability and protection for investors. 
The state party to an arbitration may be seeking a means to 
settle a dispute quietly and confidentially so that a decision 
that runs contrary to the state's interests will not involve any 
loss of prestige or cause domestic political controversy. 
But from the perspective of the academic observer, 
particularly if he is an international lawyer, the purpose of an 
adjudicatory institution cannot be defined solely by mediating 
the expectations of the clients, although those expectations 
should be accommodated as far as possible. A further considera-
tion must be factored into the equation. The international 
lawyer must evaluate arbitration with reference to its systemic 
purposes by asking how arbitration contributes to the infra-
structure of the international legal system. It is this aspect 
of institutional or "process" purposes that most interested 
Fuller. 
This study has revealed a complex and, at times, uneasy 
relationship between mixed arbitration and the broad structure 
of international law. Arbitrations involving states and foreign 
private parties pose a number of difficult problems for inter-
national legal theorists and for practitioners. The central 
problem is how to cope with the unequal status of the parties. 
The approach suggested here has been that the inequality of the 
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parties must be preserved, or rather, that our recognition of 
that inequality should not be obfuscated. 
There is no doubt that a state and a foreign private party 
do not possess the same international status. This fact is 
demonstrated anply by the examination of arbitral enforcement 
rules contained in this study. Even in the case of institutions 
such as ICSID and the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, which 
were designed specifically for the purpose of adjudicating 
disputes between states and foreign private parties, it has 
proven impossible to eliminate completely the traditional rules 
concerning diplomatic protection. If the institutional enforce-
ment mechanisms fail, as they can in the case of either insti-
tution, the private party seeking to enforce a valid award may 
be required ultimately to ask for the diplomatic intervention of 
its national state, for the private party will have no standing 
to pursue international law remedies. This possibility is even 
greater in the case of awards resulting from ad hoe arbitration. 
Despite the patently unequal status of the parties, 
lawyers for private interests and some Western commentators have 
argued that arbitrations involving states and foreign private 
parties fall within the purview of international law. According 
to some proponents of this view, the state bequeaths a limited 
international status upon a private party simply by consenting 
to resolve a conflict through arbitration. Because this reason-
ing leads to the dangerous conclusion that standing in the 
international community can be granted (and, by implication, 
withdrawn) through the unilateral act of a single state, it must 
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be rejected. Such a conclusion would undermine the rules of 
recognition of states and would challenge the fundamental theory 
of customary law formation. 
Most participants and commentators who accord inter-
national status to arbitrations between states and foreign 
private interests do not even attempt a theoretical justifica-
tion. Some suggest simply that when a state and a foreign 
private party to a dispute instruct arbitrators to apply inter-
national law, alone or in conjunction with another system of 
substantive rules, their choice automatically gives the arbitra-
tion an international status. Others opine that it is the 
nature of the underlying contract that may grant status under 
international law; if a contract is an "international develop-
ment agreement", it must be governed by international law and a 
consequent arbitration must be international. In yet another 
setting, it is asserted that when an arbitral institution has 
been created by treaty, ICSID for example, the international 
status of resulting arbitrations must be presumed. 
It has been demonstrated that there are serious problems 
with all of these arguments. Creating a tribunal by treaty does 
not necessarily imply that the tribunal is itself international 
nor that the parties granted access to the tribunal are trans-
muted into international persons. The choice of international 
law simply reveals the principle of party autonomy that under-
lies all arbitration; the parties can typically choose to apply 
any system of law, but the choice indicates nothing about t h e 
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status under international law of the parties or the arbitra-
tion. The same is true with regard to assertions of "inter-
nationalisation" based upon the existence of an "international 
development agreement". Furthermore, under the theory that 
"internationalisation" results from the mere existence of inter-
national development agreements, investments in develop ing 
states are said to be governed by international law and foreign 
corporations are presumed to be entitled to invoke that law 
directly for their own benefit. The international responsi-
bility of the state is said to be engaged directly vis a vis the 
private investor. Interestingly, foreign investments in 
developed states are never said to be subject to the same 
process of "internationalisation". But there exists no legally 
relevant distinction between investments in developed and 
developing states and it must be assumed that the reason for the 
difference in treatment is based upon political and economic 
considerations, specifically the desire to protect Western 
commercial intere sts. To reject the argument that all arbitra-
tions growing out of international development agreements are 
"internationalised" should not be viewed, therefore, as a 
conservative position butt r essing the power of the sta te in the 
face o f challenge s from other participants in the international 
community. It is the rejection of an inequality of treatment as 
between developed and developing states. 
There is an even stronger challenge t o arg uments c laiming 
full status under international law for arbitrat i ons invo lving 
states and foreign private parties, a challenge based upon t h e 
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fundamental incoherence of such assertions. If an arbitrat ion 
between a state and a foreign private party were truly "inter-
national", the obligations imposed upon the parties by the 
decision of the tribunal would have to be international legal 
obligations. Yet, if one examines the facts, a very differen t 
pattern of obligation emerges. When an award is rendered 
against a private party, that party is contractually bound, by 
virtue of the agreement to arbitrate, to perform the terms of 
the award. But in no sense is it bound by international law to 
abide by the award. The foreign private party will not be 
subject to doctrines of state responsibility, and the oppo sing 
state will have no international recourse directly against the 
private party. Any enforcement proceedings under the New York 
Convention would depend solely upon the fulfilment of the 
obligations of other states party to the Convention. If 
enforcement was not possible, for whatever reason, the state 
would not even be able to press a claim against the natio nal 
state of the priva te party because the latte r state would bear 
no responsibility for the private acts or omissions of the 
corporation. 
To say, therefore, that the obligations arising out o f a n 
arbitration between a state and a f o reign private party a r e 
international could at best be only a half truth. The state 
party could potentially be bound under international law , but 
the private party could never be so bound. This fundamental 
inequality of o bligation is the stronge st indication that these 
arbitrations are not creatures of international law. 
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The persistence of arguments favouring "internationalisa-
tion" is due to three factors. The first is the tendency to 
view arbitrations between states and foreign private parties 
purely as a sub-category of international commercial arbitration 
and partaking of the values of that process. The second is the 
undue emphasis placed upon the objectives of the foreign party 
by many of the commentators in the field. The third factor may 
be deemed "psychological": the desire for systematisation that 
leads some observers to seek to fit all phenomenon within 
existing structures, in this case, within the international 
legal system. 
It has been reiterated throughout thi~ study that arbitra-
tions between states and foreign private parties, even those 
conducted under the auspices of an institution created by an 
international convention, are of a "mixed" nature. Although 
substantive principles of international law will apply in some 
cases, and although the procedure of the arbitral tribunal can 
be completely delocalised, the process of mixed arbitration 
itself is not a manifestation of international law. The issues 
that must be addressed concern both private law rights and 
public law actions. It is crucial that in such arbitrations 
attention be paid to the legitimate goals and expectations of 
both parties and to broader institutional imperatives and 
values. The special "mixed" nature also underscores the need to 
conceive of the institutional characteristics in an inclusive 
manner. These characteristics are not limited to the elements 
that animate and affect systems of commercial arbitration that 
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involve only private parties. 
From the institutional characteristics outlined in this 
study, it is possible to identify five values that animate the 
process of mixed arbitration. These values must be acknowledged 
and strengthened if arbitration between states and foreign 
private parties is to function efficiently and to play a bene-
ficial role in the international community. 
The overriding value is party consent to jurisdiction, 
which must be recognised as the foundation of the mixed arbitral 
process. In practice, this recognition will require arbitral 
tribunals to take special care not to offend the sensibilities 
of state parties unless absolutely necessary to reach a princi-
pled result. That approach, manifested most clearly in the case 
law of the Iran-u.s. Claims Tribunal, is justifiable both 
practically and theoretically. 
The practical justification for a solicitous attitude 
towards state participants in the arbitral process is the 
evident fact that despite the limitations placed by interna-
tional law upon the sovereignty of states, particularly in the 
field of human rights, 3 the state remains the principal actor in 
3. See,~-, C. Jenks, The Prospects of International 
Adjudication (1964) 497; H. Lauterpacht, Private Law Sources 
and Analogies of International Law (1927) 73, fn. 1 and 306; 
H. Lauterpacht, The Function of Law in the International 
Community (1933) 431 (hereinafter The Function of Law]; W. 
Friedmann, The Changing Structure of International Law 
(1964), passim but especially 35 et seg.; Fuller, ibid., 
110; and J. Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (1980) 
149-50. 
- 531 -
the international arena and the principal repository of power. 4 
Arbitration is a means of dispute resolution rooted in party 
autonomy and it is therefore dependent for its smooth operation 
upon the continuing consent of the parties.~ Because of its 
dominant position in the international milieu, the state is in a 
stronger position to withhold or to withdraw consent. This 
should not, however, lead to a cynical conclusion that states 
always get what they want. Examples of awards can be drawn from 
4. See,~-, McDougal & Reisman, "International Law in Policy-
Oriented Perspective" in R. Macdonald & D. Johnston, eds, 
The Structure and Process of International Law: Essays in 
Legal Philosophy Doctrine and Theory (1983) 108; Friedmann, 
A Theory of Justice: A Lawyer's Critique (1972) 11 Col. J. 
Trans. L. 369, 378; and Friedmann, The Reality of Interna-
tional Law -- A Reappraisal (1971) 10 Col. J. Trans. L. 46, 
56. Professor Friedmann also made the acute observation 
that even the most forceful and authoritative advocates of 
an expanded role for individuals in the international legal 
system, people such as Lauterpacht and Jessup, were careful 
to limit the claim: "They have •.. drawn a distinction 
between the individual as the subject of enforceable claims 
on an international level and the individual as the bene-
ficiary of a system of international law, in which the 
states are subjects and actors, but in which they are 
directed to take action and assert claims on behalf of 
individuals." Friedmann, ibid., 234. 
5. Shapiro has argued that all third party dispute settlement 
is dependent upon consent because the "logic of the triad" 
is that both parties agree to abide by the result of the 
adjudication. The adjudicator, in turn, must attempt to 
fashion a result that does not alienate one party complete-
ly. In discussing full-scale court adjudication, Shapiro 
noted that "[a] substantial portion of the total behavior of 
courts in all societies can be analyzed in terms of attempts 
to prevent the triad from breaking down into two against 
one." M. Shapiro, Courts: A Comparative and Political 
Analysis (1981) 2. Because arbitration is rooted solely in 
the consent of the parties and does not typically include 
independent enforcement mechanisms, the need to foster 
continuing consent is obvious. 
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the practice of both institutional and ad hoe tribunals where a 
state has been an unqualified loser. 6 The point is rather that 
a tribunal which is sensitive to the realities of the interna-
tional community will strive not to exacerbate potential sources 
of tension on the part of state participants. 
Such solicitude also has a sound theoretical justifica-
tion. It has already been stressed that the parties to the type 
of arbi~ration discussed here do not have equal standing in the 
international legal process. Although that unequal status is 
often analysed in terms that emphasise the greater rig hts of 
states, it can equally be viewed as a recognition of their more 
onerous duties. Sir Hersch Lauterpacht framed the point neatly: 
No doubt it is true to say that international law 
is made for States, and not States for interna-
tional law, but it is true only in the sense tha t 
the State is made for human beings, and not human 
beings for the State. 7 
States exist to serve their citizens, and in their capacity as 
guardians of the public interest, states are deemed to pos s e ss 
6. See,~-, Libyan American Oil Co. v. The Government of the 
Libyan Arab Republic (Merits), decision of 12 April 19 77, 
reprinted in (1981) 20 I.L.M. 1 (ad hoe); Texaco Overseas 
Petroleum Co. and California As i atic()il Co. v. The Govern-
ment of the Libyan Arab Republi c (Merits), decision o f 19 
January 1977, reprinted in (1979) 53 I.L.R. 389, 42 2 (ad 
hoe); Amco Asia Corp. v. Republic of Indonesia (MeritsT; 
ICSID award of 21 November 1984, reprinted in (1985) 24 
I.L.M. 1022; Case A-18, Iran-u.s. Claims Tribunal award o f 6 
April 1984, reprinted in (1984) 23 I.L.M. 489 and (1984) 5 
Iran-u.s. C.T.R. 251; and SPP (Middle East) Ltd v. Egypt, 
r.c.c. award of 11 March 1983, reprinted in (1983) 22 I. L . M. 
752. 
7. Lauterpacht, The Function of Law, supra, note 3, 430-1. 
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special prerogatives within the international legal system. 
It is this "public" aspect of the role of the state that 
demands a sensitive application of commercial norms. Although a 
lex mercatoria which exalts the principles of stability and 
certainty may apply most appropriately to a contractual dispute 
between two Western corporations, it is less appropriate when 
seeking principles to regulate a dispute involving, for example, 
the expropriation of a foreign-owned mineral extraction opera-
tion that happens to account for a significant percentage of a 
state's gross national product. Arbitral tribunals that are set 
up under the auspices of an institution that is concerned almost 
exclusively with private law rights are not likely to be suffi-
ciently sensitive to the public interest obligations of states, 
and states will be loth to submit any but the most purely 
commercial disputes to such tribunals. 
Flowing directly from the principle of consent is a second 
value that must be emphasised in arbitral proceedings invol v ing 
states and foreign private parties, the value of compromise. In 
arbitral systems designed specifically to deal with mixed public 
and private law disputes, the process can be viewed as a conti-
nuing essay in consensual readjustment. One commentator empha-
sises that in arbitration, 
[m]ediate solutions acceptable to both parties are 
the goal, and, as a practical matter, few arbitra-
tors would find much employment if they did not 
develop a record of providing such solutions. 8 
8. Shapiro, supra, note 5, 4. 
- 534 -
The notion of a "mediate solution" in arbitration should not be 
confused with mediation per se. In arbitration, the mediate 
solution will typically be based upon legal norms and the result 
will be binding. Nevertheless, throughout the process, arbitra-
tors will attempt to employ the rules so as to encourage the 
continuing participation of the parties and voluntary compliance 
with the resulting award. Such an approach has particular value 
when the parties wish to continue commercial relations. 
The important role of compromise highlights a third value 
crucial to mixed arbitrations, that is, the independence of the 
arbitrator. Here a distinction must be drawn between two types 
of arbitration. The issue is quite clear when only one arbitra-
tor is sitting. He must display impartiality throughout the 
process for it has already been stressed that access to a 
neutral forum is one of the primary goals of many parties, 
particularly of private parties, in choosing arbitration. 
The case of three-member tribunals, the more common 
modality when dealing with disputes involving a state, is more 
problematic. The experience of the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal 
suggests that to expect impartiality from the party-appointed 
arbitrators is unrealistic. Indeed, full impartiality may not 
even be desirable. As Lon Fuller noted: 
[T)he device as I have stated it [with three 
arbitrators) amounts to a mixture of adjudication 
and negotiation. All mixed forms have their 
dangers, and tripartite arbitration is no excep-
tion. The danger lies in the difficult role to be 
played by the flanking arbitrators. They can be 
neither wholly advocates nor wholly judges. They 
cannot perform their role adequately if they are 
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completely impartial; it is their task during the 
deliberations to represent an interest, a point of 
view . •.. If, on the other hand, each of the 
flanking arbitrators must represent the party who 
appointed hire, he must at the same time observe 
some of the restraints that go with a judicial 
position.:! 
A delicate balancing is required, for although a party-appointed 
arbitrator may represent a special interest, he must always 
remain conscious of the "role morality"lu that attaches to the 
arbitral function. 
Increasingly, the concern of legal theorists from diverse 
traditions is to underscore the personal responsibility of 
adjudicators, and to recognise the policy implications of all 
legal decisions. 11 The idea of role morality is linked to this 
emphasis upon personal responsibility because the role of an 
adjudicator always requires a willingness to distance oneself 
from one's personal interests and from the pressures exerted by 
one's sponsors. The party-appointed arbitrator must ensure that 
his appointer's case is understood by the tribunal, but at the 
9. Fuller, supra, note 1. 
10. Fuller, supra, note 2, 193. 
11. See, !::..!.9.•, the "policy-oriented" perspective of W. Michael 
Reisman, Nullity and Revision: The Review and Enforcement 
of International Judgments and Awards (1971) 261; the 
classic liberal position of Fiss, The Bureaucratization of 
the Judiciary (1983) 92 Yale L.J. 1442, 1452-3; and the 
secular natural law approach of Fuller, supra, note 2, 
165-7. The most radical formulation of the concern is to 
be found in the writings of the Critical Legal Studies 
Movement. See,~-, R.M. Unger, Law in Modern Society: 
Toward a Criticism of Social Theory (1976); and Hutchinson, 
From Cultural Construction to Historical Deconstruction ( 1984) 94 Yale L.J. 209. 
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time of decision he must assume a personal responsibility to 
render a fair judgment. 
The fourth value central to the process of arbitration 
between a state and a foreign private party is flexibility in 
the application of rules. This value may be distinguished from 
"compromise" in that flexibility may be required even when the 
parties' positions are so far apart or are based upon such 
incompatible premises that no real "compromise" is possible. 
Flexibility in the application of rules has a potentially wider 
ambit than does the value of compromise. To lay emphasis upon 
the goal of flexibility is necessarily to devalue to some extent 
the goals of certainty and predictability. In private commer-
cial arbitration, the parties typically share common cultural 
assumptions and a common goal, to foster increased commercial 
activity. It is widely assumed that stability is the key to 
that enhanced activity, and that stability is promoted by rules 
that are certain and adjudicatory processes that are, to the 
greatest extent possible, - predictable. 12 Therefore, proponents 
of commercial arbitration have created institutions and systems 
of rules that foster certainty and predictability. At least in 
part, this development is due to a heavy reliance upon unsophis-
12. See,~-, Cohn, The Rules of Arbitration of the 
International Chamber of Commerce (1965) 14 Int'l & Comp. 
L.Q. 132, 158: "Only the application of rules of law can 
give that amount of predictability and certainty which 
commercial relations require." 
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ticated and idealised notions of municipal cour t adjudica tio n, 1 3 
but the Scottish legal philosopher Neil MacCormick has suggested 
that there may be a general 
tendency of legal order to define itself in terms 
of more or less precise rules (the move, as Max 
Weber put it, towards "logically formal rational-
ity" in law) [which] tends to reduce judicial and 
official discretions. 14 
The tendency towards a rigid procedural or substantive 
rule-orientation is dangerous in the context of mixed arb itra-
tions primarily because of the lack of consensus between t he 
parties as to the goals to be pursued. Due to its publi c 
interest orientation, a state party may not accord as high a 
value to commercial security as will the private party. More-
over, the parties' cultural context may be so different as to 
preclude any agreement upon a specific body of immutable rules 
of substance or procedure. For example, the expectations and 
attitudes of an Islamic Revolutionary state or an African 
Socialist state simply do not mesh with the perceive d need s of a 
United Kingdom c o rporation. An arbitra l tribuna l crea ted by 
such parties must retain a certain flexibility in its proce ss 
and in its application of substantive rules i f t he arbitration 
i s to succeed in settling the underlying dispute. In such an 
arbitration, "the problem of adjusting the functioning o f t he 
13. See Brownlie, "The United Nations as a Form of Governme nt" 
in R. Higgins & J. Fawcett, eds, International Organiza-
tion: Law in Movement (1974) 26; and Bilder, Some Limita-
tions of AdJud1cat1on as an International Dispute Settle-
ment Technique (1982) 23 Va J. Int'l L. 1, 1. 
14. N. MacCormick, H.L.A. Hart (1981) 132. 
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law to the perpetual antinomy of change and stability" 1 j is 
acute, but ultimately it is flexibility and an openness to 
change that is essential. Applying "the rules" without sensi-
tivity could lead to intense antipathy and ultimately to the 
disintegration of the arbitral tribunal. In the international 
context, there may be no alternative forum to pursue a legiti-
mate claim. 
The fifth underlying value identified in this study of 
mixed arbitration is the depoliticisation of disputes. In a 
sense, this value is fostered by the previous four. It is 
enhanced especially by the impartiality of arbitrators, by 
flexibility in the arbitral process, and by proper attention to 
consensual readjustment. But depoliticisation as a value must 
still be underscored separately because of its important 
implications for the issue of "internationalisation". 
One of the great advantages of arbitration as a means of 
settling disputes between states and foreign private parties is 
that disputes which are at core commercial or economic can be 
adjudicated without setting at issue the entire political 
relationship between the state party and the national state of 
the foreign private party. Arguments promoting the full inter-
national status of such arbitrations encourage, perhaps uninten-
tionally, the intrusion of extraneous political issues into the 
arbitral process. The debate may cease to focus upon the 
commercial relationship of the parties and may instead turn 
15. Lauterpacht, The Function of Law, supra, note 3, 248. 
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towards the exposition of a whole range of irritants in the 
relationship of the states implicated in the arbitration. A 
good example of the consequences that may flow from such an 
approach is to be found in the heated controversies that have 
arisen in the Iran-u.s. Claims Tribunal because of the 
insistence of certain private parties that they may invoke for 
their own benefit the 1955 Treaty of Amity between the U.S.A. 
and Iran. The difficult and often bitter relationship between 
the governments of those two states has had to be debated in 
order to resolve disputes rooted in private contractual rela-
tions. Although disputes between states and private entities 
will always be subject to special, often political, considera-
tions (justifying the view of mixed arbitration as a unique 
process of consensual readjustment), the full internationalisa-
tion of mixed arbitration would actually encourage politicisa-
tion, making the resolution of commercial disputes more diffi-
cult. The value of depoliticisation is enhanced by a rejection 
of the notion of full internationalisation. 
The preceding identification of the values that are 
fundamental to the process of arbitration between states and 
foreign private parties would no doubt cause concern in some 
students of the process, particularly those of a positivist 
bent. There is a danger that arbitration as here described may 
seem to be too much the creature of the parties' will. The 
adjudication may appear unprincipled, the results entirely 
contingent upon the respective power of the parties, In short, 
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it would be argued by some that this type of arbitration, if it 
is truly based upon the values that have been articulated in 
this study, is simply not a legal process at all. It would 
follow that the worth of such arbitrations should be discounted, 
for they would have nothing to contribute to t he development of 
the international rule of law. 
To the extent that such an argument addresses the question 
whether or not awards rendered by tribunals adjudicating 
disputes between states and foreign private parties should be 
accorded significant precedential value, it has some me rit. 
Because of the need for flexibility in the application o f 
substantive rules, because of the need to ensure continuing 
consent and to encourage compromise, any award rendered by a 
tribunal in a mixed arbitration is likely to manifest certa i n 
idiosyncracies in the application of procedural and substantive 
law. The clearest examples are found in the case law of the 
Iran-u.s. Claims Tribunal, but idiosyncratic awards c a n e qually 
be e xpected from ICSID or ad hoe arbitrations. Such awards are 
not necessarily valueless as precedent, but they should be 
analysed carefully, with their context always in mind. 
The possible lack of persuas i ve value of arbitral award s 
should not be particularly troubling, h owever. At a purely 
formal level, it is important to remember that no doctrine of 
stare decisis exists in the international legal system, not e ven 
for the case law of the Inte rnational Court of Justice. Mo r e 
substantive reassura nce can also be offered by contrasting t h e 
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role of arbitration with that of courts. Whereas courts are 
designed not only to settle individual disputes but also t o 
provide guidance for the larger society that created them, 
arbitration has always been conceived primarily as a means to 
resolve specific disputes. The process of arbitration is, as 
Fuller reminds us, a means of social ordering, but the impact of 
particular awards has typically been case specific. That 
distinction is the reason why court judgments are almost always 
public documents and arbitral awards are very often conf i den-
tial. Of course, the content of a confident i al award i s 
immaterial at a systemic level, for it can have little e x ternal 
impact. But even if an arbitral award from a mixed tribunal is 
made public, it should not be seen to play the same role as a 
court judgment. Whether or not the substantive c o ntent is 
contingent or idiosyncratic, therefore, should not be of great 
concern to those outside the scope of the parti c ular arbitra-
tion. 
A yet more fundamental arg ument can be adduced t o c ombat 
the suspicion that mixed arbitration is incapable of f u rtheri ng 
the international rule of law. All that is required is an 
understanding of the rule of law that is suf f ic i ently sensit ive 
to proce ss values. The pedig r ee of the arg ument can be traced 
to the seminal work of Lon Fuller who, in the words of Ro be r t 
Summers, "rejected a narrowly instrumentalist view that legal 
p r ocesses are to be judged by the quality of their o utcomes; the 
workings of the processes themselve s involve important 
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values." 16 
One of Fuller's greatest contributions to contemporary 
legal theory was his focussing of attention upon the values 
inherent in legal processes, what he called the "internal 
morality of the law". 17 His concern with legal process may be 
seen as one aspect of a broader attempt to challenge the radical 
dissociation of ends and means, fostered, Fuller believed, by 
utilitarian and positivist philosophy. Fuller rejected the idea 
that means "are a mere matter of expediency", emphasising 
instead "that means and ends stand in a relation of pervasive 
interaction." 18 
Fuller's recognition of the central importance of legal 
process caused him to reinterpret the ideal of the rule of law. 
He suggested that the rule of law could be defined as "the 
process by which the party affected by a decision is granted a 
formally defined participation in that decision. 1119 The 
particular vocation of adjudication, Fuller believed, was that 
16. R.S. Summers, Lon L. Fuller (1984) 76. Professor Falk of 
Princeton adopted an analogous position when he warned that 
"[t]he extension of law in international relations should 
not be identified ••• with the maximum application of 
universal substantive standards." R. Falk, The Role of 
Domestic Courts in the International Legal Order (1964) 5. 
17. See Fuller, supra, note 2, 39 where he sets out the eight 
elements of the inner or internal morality of the law. See 
also Summers, ibid., 28 and 37. 
18. Fuller, ibid., 197. 
19. Fuller, Adjudication and the Rule of Law (1960) 54 Proc. 
Am. Soc. Int'l L. 1, 2. 
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it could provide the "affected party [with] a peculiar form of 
participation in the decision, that of presenting proofs and 
reasoned arguments for a decision in his favor. 1120 
Armed with this process-centred understanding of the rule 
of law, it is easier to recognise the significant legal contri-
bution that can be made by mixed arbitration. The simple fact 
that a state and a foreign private party are willing to struc-
ture their disputes in a reasoned manner and to settle them 
through an appeal to the rational decision of a third party, 
rather than resorting to mere fiat, enhances the rule of law. 
The symbolic value of third party adjudication in the interna-
tional community is significant, 21 Moreover, there is a prac-
tical reason to encourage third party adjudication. Much inter-
national commerce could be discouraged if the private party 
believed itself to be subject to the whim of state fiat. Of 
course, the rule of law will not be created simply through 
participation in legal processes. Fuller stressed that an 
evolving "community of purpose" is also essential. 22 But 
participation in the process may actually encourage the develop-
ment of stronger bonds of communication and shared experience. 
20. Fuller, supra, note 1, 364. 
21. See Bilder, supra, note 13, 9. 
22. Fuller, supra, note l, 378. One of the most extensive 
discussions of the role of community is found in the wor k 
of Finnis who described community as "a sharing of life or 
of action or of interests, an associating or coming-
together. Finnis, supra, note 3, 135. 
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Fuller believed that the development of all types of relation-
ships across borders would contribute to the growth of the 
international rule of law 23 but he also thought that participa-
tion in rational legal procedures was a particularly helpful 
means to build what he called "moral insight", fostering 
community identifications and, hence, the rule of law. 2 4 
As described in this study, the process of arbitration 
between states and foreign private parties does not mesh 
comfortably with municipal law conceptions of adjudication nor 
with the system of international commercial arbitration as a 
whole. Largely because of the unequal status of the parties and 
the consensual source of jurisdiction, the values that animate 
and sustain the process are and must be singular. Because of 
this singularity, one should not expect the process simply t o 
mirror court structures or other forms of arbitration. Although 
the broad outlines of an arbitration between a state and a 
foreign private party will resemble those of private interna-
tional commercial arbitration, there are c e rtain possibilitie s 
of institutional design that can increase the efficacy of the 
process by reflecting in practice its special animating values. 
A preliminary point is that states and foreign private 
parties would be well advised to submit disputes to private 
arbitral institutions only in the very rare cases when the 
23. Fuller, supra, note 19, 8. 
24. Fuller, Irrigation and Tyranny (1965) 17 Stanford L. Rev. 
1021, 1033-4. 
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disputes concern straightforward and completely non-political 
commercial dealings. Private arbitral institutions are designed 
to exalt the value of commercial stability above all else, and 
tribunals set up under their auspices cannot be expected to 
display the requisite degree of sensitivity to the special 
public interest considerations that affect the commercial deal-
ings of states. Whenever questions of sovereign rights or 
public policy are likely to arise, resort to specialised insti-
tutions such as ICSID or to ad hoe tribunals is preferable. 
The parties should make every effort to choose or design a 
set of arbitral rules to guide the arbitrators in their tasks. 
Whether chosen from among the institutional systems or specially 
designed, the arbitral rules should allow great flexibility in 
the submission of evidence and in the structure of hearings. 
Although clear time limits should be established, they should 
not be particularly rigorous. The arbitrators should be 
instructed that the full articulation of the issues is to take 
precedence over pure time considerations. Of course, rigorous 
time limits are needed when dealing with the appointment or 
replacement of arbitrators or the process can grind to a halt. 
Within the arbitral rules, some provision should be made for 
pre-hearing conferences. Such conferences are often intended 
primarily to identify the issues at stake and to develop a 
procedure to deal with them, but pre-hearing meetings may also 
serve to encourage compromise on as many issues as possible. 
The parties should also try to agree in advance upon the 
possible sources of substantive rules of law to be applied by 
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the tribunal. They should avoid vague invocations of "general 
principles" and be explicit if they wish to incorporate inter-
national law. It is in the interest of the state to make it 
clear that resort to international law does not imply any direct 
application of the principles of state responsibility. 
If a three-member tribunal is established, the arbitrators 
should be instructed expressly about the nature of their job, 
which would require that the parties openly state their expecta-
tions concerning the role of the party-appointed arbitrators. 
Ideally~ their independence should be stressed. The procedural 
rules of the arbitration should establish clearly that any 
protective measures involving the seizure of property should be 
referred to municipal courts with powers of enforcement, o r the 
parties should agree in advance upon the deposit of performance 
bonds or the creation of a security account to guarantee perfor-
mance. The final award may be published or kept confidential as 
the parties see fit, but advance agreement on the question is 
needed. A number of recent awards have been made public by one 
party alone for motives that probably have little to do with a 
desire to aid legal scholarship or to promote the rule o f law. 
Apart from the incorporation of these elements of institu-
tional design, the values underlying the process are served best 
by arbitrators who are sensitive to the special and highly 
complicated nature of arbitrations involving states and foreign 
private parties. It is widely acknowledged that an arbitration 
is only as good as the arbitrators. Perhaps, therefore, the 
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most important component of good institutional design is a 
reliable system for choosing and replacing arbitrators. 
The arbitral system as it applies to states and foreign 
private parties does not fit very neatly within existing inter-
national legal structures. There remains considerable room for 
debate concerning its role and its status. Indeed, the 
concluding prescription must be for the debate to continue and 
to expand. Mixed arbitration, like all legal institutions, is a 
dynamic phenomenon; it changes and is refined in response to the 
needs of the constituency it serves. If international law is, 
as Fuller put it, a highly imperfect system, still "in the 
process of being born", 2 ~ the system of law that clings to the 
fringes of international law and structures the relationships 
between states and foreign private groups and persons must still 
be in utero. For that reason, being full of possibilities for 
growth and change, mixed aibitration should continue to prove a 
fascinating and challenging subject for the student of legal 
process. 
25. Fuller, supra, note 19, 1. See also Allott, Language, 
Method and the Nature of International Law (1971) 45 Brit. 
Y.B. Int'l L. 79, 130-1; and Friedmann, supra, note 3, 
118. 
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